Tag Archive for: Critical & Emerging Technology

Countering the Hydra: A proposal for an Indo-Pacific hybrid threat centre

What’s the problem?

Enabled by digital technologies and fuelled by geopolitical competition, hybrid threats in the Indo-Pacific are increasing in breadth, application and intensity. Hybrid threats are a mix of military, non-military, covert and overt activities by state and non-state actors that occur below the line of conventional warfare. The consequences for individual nations include weakened institutions, disrupted social systems and economies, and greater vulnerability to coercion—especially from revisionist powers such as China.

But the consequences of increased hybrid activity in the Indo-Pacific reach well beyond individual nations. The Indo-Pacific hosts a wide variety of political systems and interests, with multiple centres of influence, multiple points of tension and an increasingly belligerent authoritarian power. It lacks the regional institutions and practised behaviours to help ensure ongoing security and stability. And, because of its position as a critical centre of global economic and social dynamism, instability in the Indo-Pacific, whether through or triggered by hybrid threats, has global ramifications.

Because hybrid threats fall outside the conventional frameworks of the application of state power and use non-traditional tools to achieve their effects, governments have often struggled to identify the activity, articulate the threat and formulate responses. Timeliness and specificity are problematic: hybrid threats evolve, are often embedded or hidden within normal business and operations, and may leverage or amplify other, more traditional forms of coercion.

More often than not, hybrid threat activity is targeted towards the erosion of national capability and trust and the disruption of decision-making by governments—all of which reduce national and regional resilience that would improve security and stability in the region.

What’s the solution?

There’s no silver-bullet solution to hybrid threats; nor are governments readily able to draw on traditional means of managing national defence or regional security against such threats in the Indo-Pacific.

Because of the ubiquity of digital technologies, the ever-broadening application of tools and practices in an increasing number of domains, it’s evident that policymakers need better and more timely information, the opportunity to share information and insights in a trusted forum and models of how hybrid threats work (we provide one here). Exchange of information and good practice is also needed to help counter the amorphous, evolving and adaptive nature of hybrid threats.

We propose the establishment of an Indo-Pacific Hybrid Threat Centre (HTC, or the centre) as a means of building broader situational awareness on hybrid threats across the region.1 Through research and analysis, engagement, information sharing and capacity building, such a centre would function as a confidence-building measure and contribute to regional stability and the security of individual nations.

While modelled on the existing NATO–EU Hybrid Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Finland, the centre would need to reflect the differences between the European and Indo-Pacific security environments. Most notably, that includes the lack of pan-regional Indo-Pacific security institutions and practice that the centre could use. There are also differences in the nature and priorities assigned to threats by different countries: the maritime domain has more influence in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe, many countries in the region face ongoing insurgencies, and there’s much less adherence to, or even interest in, democratic norms and values.

That will inevitably shape the placement, funding, and operations of an Indo-Pacific HTC. A decentralised model facilitating outreach across the region would assist regional buy-in. Partnership arrangements with technology companies would provide technical insight and support. Long-term commitments will be needed to realise the benefits of the centre as a confidence-building measure. The Quad countries are well positioned to provide such long-term commitments, while additional support could come from countries with experience and expertise in hybrid threats, particularly EU countries and the UK.

As with the NATO–EU Hybrid CoE, independence and integrity are paramount. That implies the positioning of the Indo-Pacific HTC core in a strong democracy; better still would be the legislative protection of its operations and data. Accordingly, we propose scoping work to establish policy approval, legislative protection and funding arrangements and to seed initial research capability and networks.

Introduction

Hybrid threats are a mix of military and non-military, covert and overt activities by state and non-state actors that occur below the line of conventional warfare. Their purpose is to blur the lines between war and peace, destabilise societies and governments and sow doubt and confusion among populations and decision-makers. They deliberately target democratic systems and state vulnerabilities, often leveraging legitimate processes for inimical ends, and typically aim to stay below the threshold of detection, attribution and retaliation.2 They’re the same activities that the Australian Government attributes to the ‘grey zone’, involving ‘military and non-military forms of assertiveness and coercion aimed at achieving strategic goals without provoking conflict.’3

Hybrid threats are increasingly of concern to governments as they grapple with the effects of digital technologies, Covid-19 and an increasingly tense geopolitical environment. Ambiguous, evolving, at the intersection of society, commerce and security, and transnational in character, hybrid threats challenge and undercut ‘normal’ conceptions of security. Unmet, they stoke division and anxiety in societies and states. They threaten to erode national security, sovereignty and societal resilience, leaving nations and their people vulnerable to coercion, particularly by authoritarian states and criminal elements.

The immediate targets of motivated hybrid activity are typically non-traditional, in the sense that government security apparatuses aren’t expected to manage and repulse them. Hybrid activity takes advantage of other, easier targets and means of generating confusion and disruption at the nation-state level: individuals may be targeted for repression or assassination; fishing vessels harassed; intellectual property stolen; commercial advantage pillaged; researchers and journalists intimidated; ethnic communities hijacked; and elites co-opted for corrupt ends.

The Indo-Pacific region is particularly vulnerable. For example, it lacks the more practised security frameworks, cooperative mechanisms and understandings present in Europe. There’s little shared awareness and understanding of the nature and consequences of hybrid threats. The region is also especially economically and demographically dynamic and socially diverse, featuring a number of competing political systems and institutions.

That offers both challenge and opportunity. In this paper, we consider the nature of hybrid threats, explore the threat landscape in the Indo-Pacific, turn our attention to the potential ‘fit’ of an Indo-Pacific HTC and make recommendations for the way forward.

A number of the thoughts and insights incorporated in this paper emerged during ASPI’s consultations with governments, businesses and civil society groups in the Indo-Pacific, as well as in Europe and the UK. We thank those respondents for their time and insights.

  1. Danielle Cave, Jacob Wallis, ‘Why the Indo-Pacific needs its own hybrid threats centre’, The Strategist, 15 December 2021. ↩︎
  2. See NATO’s definition, online, and the Hybrid Centre of Excellence’s definition. ↩︎
  3. Defence Department, Defence Strategic Update, Australian Government, 2020, 5. ↩︎

Artificial intelligence: Your questions answered

This collection of short papers developed by the Australian Institute for Machine Learning (AIML) at the University of Adelaide and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) offers a refreshing primer into the world of artificial intelligence and the opportunities and risks this technology presents to Australia.

AI’s potential role in enhancing Australia’s defence capabilities, strengthening alliances and deterring those who would seek to harm our interests was significantly enhanced as a result of the September 2021 announcement of the AUKUS partnership between the US, the UK and Australia. Perhaps not surprisingly, much public attention on AUKUS has focused on developing a plan ‘identifying the optimal pathway to deliver at least eight nuclear-powered submarines for Australia’.

This AIML/ASPI report is a great starting point for individuals looking to better understand the growing role of AI in our lives. I commend the authors and look forward to the amazing AI developments to come that will, we must all hope, reshape the world for a more peaceful, stable and prosperous future.

University of Adelaide, Australian Institute for Machine Learning - logo

Artificial intelligence and policing in Australia

ASPI’s Strategic Policing and Law Enforcement Program is delighted to share its new Strategic Insights report, Artificial intelligence and policing in Australia by Dr Teagan Westendorf.

Digital technologies, devices and the internet are producing huge amounts of data and greater capacity to store it, and those developments are likely to accelerate. For law enforcement, a critical capability lagging behind the pace of tech innovation is the ability and capacity to screen, analyse and render insights from the ever-increasing volume of data—and to do so in accordance with the constraints on access to and use of personal information within our democratic system.

Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning are presenting valuable solutions to the public and private sectors for screening big and live data. AI is also commonly considered and marketed as a solution that removes human bias, although AI algorithms and dataset creation can also perpetuate human bias and so aren’t value or error free.

This report analyses limitations, both technical and implementation, of AI algorithms, and the implications of those limitations on the safe, reliable and ethical use of AI in policing and law enforcement scenarios. This publication closely examines usage of AI by domestic policing agencies to model what success looks like for safe, reliable and ethical use of AI in policing and law enforcement spaces. It also explores possible strategies to mitigate the potential negative effects of AI data insights and decision-making in the justice system; and implications for regulation of AI use by police and law enforcement in Australia.

AI ‘algorithms’ or ‘models’ promise to: enable high volumes of data processing at speed, while identifying patterns human judgement is not capable of; supercharge knowledge management while (supposedly) removing human bias from that process; and operate with ethical principles coded into their decision-making.

This ‘promise’, however, is not a guarantee.

The future of assistance to law enforcement in an end-to-end encrypted world

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Domestic telecommunications companies assist law enforcement by the lawful interception of otherwise private communications when presented with a valid warrant.

This has been a powerful tool to combat crime. In the 2019–20 financial year, for example, 3,677 new warrants for telecommunications interception were issued, and information gained through interception warrants was used in 2,685 arrests, 5,219 prosecutions and 2,652 convictions. That was in the context of 43,189 custodial sentences in the same year.

But law enforcement and security officials assert that the usefulness of ‘exceptional access’, as it’s called in this paper, has declined over time as strong encryption has become increasingly common.

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Director-General Michael Burgess has stated that encryption ‘damages intelligence coverage’ in 97% of ASIO’s priority counter-intelligence cases.

The problem of increasingly powerful encryption degrading the usefulness of exceptional access is often referred to as ‘going dark’.

The Australian Government has committed to the reform of Australia’s electronic surveillance legislative framework.5 Although its discussion paper mentions encryption only in passing,6 we can expect that encryption and going dark will be a topic of debate as reform is considered. This paper contributes to that debate by examining how firms that provide digital communications services can provide assistance to law enforcement even as strong encryption is increasingly common.

Although exceptional access is primarily concerned with evidence collection, it may be better in some cases to focus on crime prevention, when it comes to achieving society’s broader aim of safety and security. This may be especially true for serious offences that cause significant harms to individuals, such as child exploitation and terrorism.

Accordingly, in this paper I divide assistance to law enforcement into two broad types: 

  1. Building communications services so that criminal harm and abuse that occur on the service can be detected and addressed, or doesn’t even occur in the first place. Examples of harms that might be avoided include cyberbullying or child exploitation that occur online.
  2. Assisting law enforcement with exceptional access for crimes that are unrelated to the communications service. Examples of such crimes might include an encrypted messaging service being used to organise drug smuggling or corruption.

I start by exploring the justification for exceptional access and then examine how encryption has affected assistance to law enforcement, as well as the differences between transport encryption and end-to-end (E2E) encryption and the implications those differences have for law enforcement.

I examine encryption trends and discuss the costs and benefits of exceptional access schemes.

I then examine some of the approaches that can be used by service providers to provide these two different forms of assistance as E2E encryption becomes increasingly common. I also summarise some of the advantages and disadvantages of those different approaches.

A number of initiatives seek to embed safety and security into the design, development and deployment of services. They encourage industry to take a proactive and preventive approach to user safety and seek to balance and effectively manage privacy, safety and security requirements. Those initiatives have relatively few big-picture privacy or security drawbacks, but there are many issues on which there isn’t yet consensus on how to design platforms safely. Such initiatives may also need extensive resources for employee trust and safety teams.

Providing law enforcement access to E2E encrypted systems is very challenging. Proposals that allow access bring with them some potentially significant risks that exceptional access mechanisms will be abused by malicious actors.

Watch the launch webinar here.

Digital Southeast Asia

Opportunities for Australia–India cooperation to support the region in the post-Covid-19 context

What’s the problem?

Covid-19 and the subsequent public-health responses have disrupted social and economic lives across the globe. Fiscal support measures may have alleviated the initial fallout in some places, but one of the bigger shocks has been the accelerated adoption and integration of and reliance on digital technologies. While this is a positive contribution towards digital development, it has also accentuated the already large gap between those able to adopt digital technologies and those without sufficient means to do so.

For the many fragile democracies in the Indo-Pacific, this is creating conditions that could undermine democratic resilience. A central question for these democratic governments is how to drive accelerating digital transformation and ICT-enabled growth towards poverty reduction, sustainable economic growth and building social cohesion while maintaining resilience to cybersecurity threats.

Southeast Asians are exceptional consumers of online goods and services. The region is also home to a growing number of technology start-ups, and governments are pushing this ‘drive for digital’ through ambitious national strategies. Despite those positives, digital growth within the region and within individual economies is uneven.

Human capital is a central driver of poverty reduction, sustainable growth and social cohesion,1 but, in Southeast Asia, digital literacy and skills are lagging behind usage and infrastructure. The adoption of technology is progressing, but problems of affordability, connectivity and coverage remain. There’s a limit to the growth trajectory due to weak demand from micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) that don’t have the means, skills or opportunities to adopt or integrate digital technologies.

This is particularly affecting the livelihoods of non-metropolitan communities, women, MSMEs and those whose jobs may be affected by the introduction of technology and automation.

The digital divide and rising inequality are now the everyday bromides of earnest policymakers. But the phrases have become policy cliches, stripped of meaning, with no sense of the underlying dynamics at play, making the prospects for any viable solutions slim. The Covid-19 pandemic has offered a harsh look at the role of the digital divide in driving inequality and the unedifying future that lies ahead as major technological advances compound and permanently entrench inequality.
— Huong Le Thu, ‘Investing in Southeast Asia’s tech future’, in The Sydney Dialogue: playbook, 20212

Since the outbreak of Covid-19 in early 2020, digital adoption has further accelerated and driven greater demand for online services in retail, education and health. However, the pandemic has also contributed to the further widening of pre-existing digital divides. Women have been disproportionately affected, as many are employed in the informal and ‘gig economy’ sectors, which were hit hard by lockdowns. The pandemic has also further exposed more users to cybersecurity and online safety risks in an environment in which practices of cyber hygiene are generally poor.

As a result, the region is now faced with a dual transformation challenge: how can we stimulate further digital development while ensuring that future growth is inclusive?

What’s the solution?

This report recommends Australia and India leverage their bilateral partnership in cyber and critical technologies to support inclusive digital development in Southeast Asia, and strengthen the foundations of Southeast Asia’s digital economy.

The governments of Australia and India should take a more coordinated approach to their digital engagements with Southeast Asian countries, and further consider establishing a Joint Working Group on Digital Engagement to bring together like-minded partners.

Given that India and Australia face digital development challenges that are similar to Southeast Asia, an Australia-India spearheaded cooperation should be approached through a troika-type collaboration with Southeast Asian partners. This collaboration should look to address the region’s digital skills shortage, improve cyber resilience and contribute to digital public infrastructure. This requires a multi-stakeholder effort involving governments, the private sector, civil society and the technical community.

A priority area for additional support are efforts that enhance the digital knowledge and digital business skills of the Southeast Asian workforce. International initiatives should seek to augment or connect with existing local digital skilling programs. Specific areas of focus for Australia and India could include support to female digital entrepreneurship, and improvement of access to online courses and training to upskill MSMEs.

To improve cyber resilience operationally, Australia and India could strengthen and deepen relationships with Southeast Asia’s national cybersecurity agencies and national Computer Emergency Response Teams by exploring ways to share collective resources, expertise and experiences more effectively and more widely across each country’s economic sectors and non-metro areas.

At a strategic level, through the Australia-India Joint Working Group on Cyber Security Cooperation, the two countries could consider the possibility of sharing strategic assessments of the regional cyber threat landscape with Southeast Asian partners.

Finally, India and Australia should explore regional marketplaces for digital public goods and infrastructure which could offer further business incentives to digital, technology and cybersecurity communities in Australia, India and Southeast Asia.

Introduction

Southeast Asia is home to one of the world’s fastest growing markets of internet users. Pre-pandemic, there was enormous optimism about the growth of Southeast Asia’s digital economy. Estimates from 2019 showed a trajectory that would triple its US$100 billion internet economy by 2025.3 During the first year of the Covid-19 pandemic, the region’s internet economy gained more traction, and even achieved double-figure growth in Vietnam and Indonesia.4

Today, the region continues to struggle with new and more contagious variants of the virus, as the majority of the region’s population remains unvaccinated.5 Economic hardship, overburdened health systems and, in some cases, repressive public-order responses are posing challenges to political stability and societal resilience. As a consequence, when combined with the effects of climate change, there’s uncertainty about the long-term economic and social effects and the shape and speed of economic recovery.

Digital technologies6 are playing an integral part not just for contact tracing or getting public-health messages out into the community but also as a driving force for post-pandemic economic recovery. For years, governments in Southeast Asia have been pursuing ambitious digital transformation agendas that have laid a foundation for their emerging digital economies. In a post-Covid world, international partnerships of governments, industry and civil society organisations, such as between India, Australia and Southeast Asia, could form a key element in the region’s digital economic recovery and help set digital standards and norms.

Focusing on Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, which are some of the region’s largest and emerging technology-enabled economies, this report explores what efforts can be made by an Australia–India collaboration to support Southeast Asia’s digital capacity and resilience in the aftermath of the Covid-19 crisis. Collaboration between Australia and India in the area of cyber and critical technology is an emerging partnership that brings opportunities for strengthening both countries’ digital cooperation with Southeast Asian partners.

What are the digital economy, digital transformation and Industry 4.0?

There’s no agreed definition or framework that defines the digital economy. Different frameworks highlight, to varying degrees, macro policy foundations (such as competition, trade, governance), digital enablers (infrastructure, platform policies, skills, finance) and sectoral transformation (such as ICT applications in key economic sectors such as public services).7

Digital economy frameworks rarely consider the whole digital ecosystem and its interaction with the rest of the economy. The Asian Development Bank, for instance, has introduced the term ‘core digital economy’,8 which it defines as the contribution to GDP of any economic transaction involving both digital products and digital industries. In this report, we also consider wider aspects within the digital economy, including gender and inclusion.

Digital transformation refers to the process of moving from analogue to digital processes, integrating technology into working processes and, in its most advanced stages, doing so under the guidance of a strategy.

Industry 4.0 or the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ (4IR) refers to the application in industry of the convergence of physical and digital technologies. This can include artificial intelligence, machine learning, ‘internet of things’ (IoT) devices, advanced robotics, augmented reality, cloud computing, big data and analytics, and 3D printing.

The first section of the report reviews the enablers and attendant challenges of Southeast Asia’s digital economy, such as the supply of infrastructure, demand for digital services and general uptake of technology by individuals and businesses. In addition, it looks at intersecting policy issues that enable, support and sustain digital transformation, such as inclusivity; skills and talent; online security and safety; and regulations and governance. It then touches upon the region’s adoption of advanced technologies such as 5G and artificial intelligence (AI) that could equally be enablers of the region’s next leap in digital transformation.

The second section offers an overview of the pandemic’s effects on Southeast Asia’s digital landscape. Although there’s been continued investment into digital infrastructure, it shows there are fundamental weaknesses in the rate of digital growth within MSMEs.

The third section looks at a troika type of collaboration between India, Southeast Asia and Australia. As the digital development challenges faced by Southeast Asia are equally relevant to Australia and India, we provide a selection of relevant skills, expertise and flagship programs that India and Australia could contribute to the region in a common effort to adapt to a digital future that’s free, open and secure.

Finally, this report concludes with a set of policy recommendations for Australia and India on areas in which they could extend meaningful and targeted support to Southeast Asia’s digital economic recovery.

Download Report

This report continues with chapters on;

  • The state of digital Southeast Asia in 2021
  • The impact of Covid-19 on Southeast Asia’s digital landscape
  • India-Australia and cyber and technology cooperation in Southeast Asia
  • Conclusion
  • Recommendations

Readers are warmly encouraged to download the full report.

Acknowledgements

ASPI and ORF would thank all of those who peer reviewed drafts of this report, including Arindrajit Basu and Akshay Mathur, for their valuable feedback. We would also like to acknowledge the contributions of Baani Grewal, Samyak Leekha, Antara Vats, Ariel Bogle, Karly Winkler and Albert Zhang to this report. We are also grateful to the individuals consulted across government, industry and academia, including participants at the Southeast Asia Internet Governance Forum and the ASPI-ORF-hosted Track 1.5 Dialogue on Digital Southeast Asia that helped to shape and focus this report.

This report was commissioned by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The work of ASPI ICPC wouldn’t be possible without the support of our partners and sponsors across governments, industry and civil society.

A draft of this report was shared with DFAT and valuable comments were incorporated, but, as with all our research, ASPI remains fully independent in the editorial judgements and policy recommendations made by our authors.

About the Observer Research Foundation

ORF seeks to lead and aid policy thinking towards building a strong and prosperous India in a fair and equitable world. It sees India as a country poised to play a leading role in the knowledge age—a role in which it shall be increasingly called upon to proactively ideate in order to shape global conversations, even as India sets course along its own trajectory of long-term sustainable growth. ORF helps discover and inform India’s choices. It carries Indian voices and ideas to forums shaping global debates. It provides non-partisan, independent, well-researched analyses and inputs to diverse decision-makers in governments, business communities and academia and to civil society around the world. Our mandate is to conduct in-depth research, provide inclusive platforms and invest in tomorrow’s thought leaders today. ORF’s website is at https://www.orfonline.org/.

What is ASPI?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our annual report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements.

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber, emerging and critical technologies, issues related to information and foreign interference and focuses on the impact these issues have on broader strategic policy. The centre has a growing mixture of expertise and skills with teams of researchers who concentrate on policy, technical analysis, information operations and disinformation, critical and emerging technologies, cyber capacity building, satellite analysis, surveillance and China-related issues.

The ICPC informs public debate in the Indo-Pacific region and supports public policy development by producing original, empirical, data-driven research. The ICPC enriches regional debates by collaborating with research institutes from around the world and by bringing leading global experts to Australia, including through fellowships. To develop capability in Australia and across the Indo-Pacific region, the ICPC has a capacity building team that conducts workshops, training programs and large-scale exercises for the public and private sectors.

We would like to thank all of those who support and contribute to the ICPC with their time, intellect and passion for the topics we work on. If you would like to support the work of the centre please contact: icpc@aspi.org.au

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2022

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.

First published February 2022. ISSN 2209-9689 (online). ISSN 2209-9670 (print). Cover image: Wes Mountain.

Funding Statement: Funding support for this publication was provided by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

  1. World Bank, The Human Capital Index 2020 update: human capital in the time of COVID-19, World Bank, Washington DC, 2020, online. ↩︎
  2. Huong Le Thu, ‘Investing in Southeast Asia’s tech future’, in: Fergus Hanson, Danielle Cave, Madeleine Nyst (eds), The Sydney Dialogue: playbook, ASPI, Canberra, 19 November 2021, online. ↩︎
  3. Google, Temasek, Bain & Company, e-Conomy SEA 2019, 2019, online; Cybersecurity in ASEAN: an urgent call to action, AT Kearney, 2018, online. ↩︎
  4. Google, Temasek, Bain & Company, e-Conomy SEA 2020, 2020, online. ↩︎
  5. ‘Share of people vaccinated against COVID-19, Jan 18, 2022’, Our World in Data, 2022, online. ↩︎
  6. ‘Digital technologies’ refers to the electronic tools, systems, devices and resources that generate, store or process data. Their use requires a level of understanding of how information and communication technologies work and a degree of skill to engage with and create technology applications. ↩︎
  7. Nagy K Hanna, ‘Assessing the digital economy: aims, frameworks, pilots, results, and lessons’, Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, 2020, 9(16), online. ↩︎
  8. Asian Development Bank (ADB), Capturing the digital economy: a proposed measurement framework and its applications—a special supplement to Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2021, ADB, Manila, August 2021, online. ↩︎

Benchmarking critical technologies

Building an evidence base for an informed critical technologies strategy

Kitsch Liao, Dr Samantha Hoffman and Karly Winkler, with Baani Grewal, Cheryl Yu, Saki Kikuchi, Tilla Hoja, Matthew Page and Jackson Schultz.

What’s the problem?

Technology policy formulation has recently gained a renewed importance for governments in the era of strategic competition, but contextual understanding and expertise in deciding where to focus efforts are lacking. As a result, decision-makers might not understand their own national strengths and weaknesses. It’s difficult to judge whether a country’s R&D outputs, no matter how advanced, and its development of production capacity, no matter how significant, align with the country’s intended strategic objectives or can be used effectively to achieve them.

The ability to measure the relative strengths and weaknesses of a country by weighing specific strategic objectives against technical achievements is of paramount importance for countries.

This is especially true as nations seek to resolve supply-chain resilience problems underscored by the Covid-19 pandemic. China’s rejection of the Quad’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, willingness to use economic coercion and the resulting strategic competition, call further attention to multiple technology sectors’ heavy reliance on a single source. A solution must be found that can exploit synergy across multiple technology sectors among collaborating countries while ensuring supply-chain resilience.

What’s the solution?

Governments’ ability to ensure that strategic objectives pertaining to critical technologies are both well articulated and achievable, and researchers’ and industry’s ability to collaborate in meeting those objectives, would be greatly enabled by the development of an objective and repeatable methodology for measuring technical achievements against clearly defined strategic goals for the critical technology sector. The most pressing challenge should be a relatively straightforward one to resolve: standardise metadata about national objectives and R&D efforts to enable business analysis.

The Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group is an important step towards building collaboration in the research, development and production of critical technologies among like-minded governments. While in nascent stages, the group is gathering momentum and working towards addressing the September 2021 objective to monitor trends in critical and emerging technologies for cooperation, with an initial focus on biotechnology. We recommend as follows:

  • Conduct detailed analysis to understand current and emerging gaps in critical and emerging technologies, starting with biotechnology, among like-minded countries.
  • Develop a partnership between like-minded countries with advanced technological capabilities to deliver a secure technology supply chain for critical tech. This should include a commitment to a set of core principles for technology development and delivery, including ‘baking in’ democratic principles to the technology and agreeing to share any civilian advances on market terms and refrain from coercion.
  • Establish a Quad or Quad Plus critical technologies fund to which participating states pledge investment funds that are then disbursed to address current and emerging critical technologies gaps.

Introduction to the Benchmarking Critical Technologies Project

Benchmarking Critical Technologies is a pilot project at ASPI ICPC that examines the development of a handful of critical technologies in the context of strategic partnership and strategic competition.

‘Critical technologies’ broadly refers to strategically important technology areas.1 Australia, for example, defines ‘critical technology’ as ‘technology that can significantly enhance or pose risks to Australia’s national interests, including our prosperity, social cohesion and national security’.2 For this pilot study, we focus on the biotechnology and energy technology sectors in China and in the Quad— the quadrilateral Indo-Pacific diplomatic network consisting of Australia, India, Japan and the US.

This project will be expanded over the course of 2022 to include more technology areas and countries.

During the Quad Leaders’ Summit in March 2021, the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group was announced. The communiqué from the summit said that the working group was intended to ‘ensure the way in which technology is designed, developed, governed and used is shaped by the Quad countries’ shared values and respect for universal human rights’.3 The communiqué didn’t directly name China, but China was clearly implied in its pledge to recommit to ‘promoting the free, open, rules-based order, rooted in international law and undaunted by coercion, to bolster security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond’.4

It’s clear that China is the key strategic competitor that the Quad countries are hedging against. They’re technology and manufacturing powerhouses with strong geopolitical influence in the region, which makes the competition both more important and more difficult. As the Quad works to develop capabilities in a range of critical sectors, the Quad members will need to also understand how to leverage each other’s strengths and overcome collective weaknesses to guarantee supply-chain resilience, among other strategic objectives.5 They will also need to triangulate the effects of each nation’s digital enmeshment in Chinese supply chains and the net effects of that in particular sectors.

There’s a lack of empirical data to ground decision-makers’ advice on everything from capability gaps to priority investment areas. This project is an attempt to begin to bring additional empirical data to the decision-making process. Our intent is to offer improved clarity on each country’s strengths and weaknesses in each critical technology. After consultation with the Australian Government, we decided to focus on hydrogen energy and solar photovoltaic (solar PV) technologies from the energy sector, and genetic engineering and vaccines and medical countermeasures in the biotechnology sector.

The broader technology areas that these specific technologies sit within are of clear strategic importance. The Quad Leaders’ Summit communiqué established that biotechnology would be the starting point for the Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group’s collaboration. It also highlighted, in the context of the recent COP26 conference, that the Quad would coordinate to ‘establish responsible and resilient clean-energy supply chains’.6

To assess national capabilities, we measured each country’s R&D and infrastructure development efforts using patent and patent impact data and academic impact data, and compared those results against the country’s technology-specific policy goals. For patents, we collected two measures for each critical technology: the quantity and quality of the patents. IP Australia provided ASPI ICPC with patent data to analyse the quantity of patents for each critical technology. Additionally, using the commercial product PatentSight developed by LexisNexis, we assessed patent quality with the Patent Asset Index (PAI).7 The tool assesses patent quality across various measures in the overall ecosystem of a technology field. Those measures are technology relevance (TR), indicating how much future patents in the field depended upon the patent; market coverage (MC), indicating how much of the global market the patent offers protection of; and competitive impact (CI), the aggregate of TR and MC indicating the economic value of the patent. The aggregate economic value of all patents in the field then constitutes the field’s PAI. For academic impact factors, we used the CiteScore (CS) methodology for measuring impact factors embedded within Elsevier’s Scopus commercial database product.

We also drew on background interviews with industry specialists and senior officials in relevant government departments. Budget data was more challenging to collect, normalise and assess.

Consequently, it isn’t treated as a separate metric, but included with general policy analysis. (For more on our methodology, see the Appendix.)

We recognise that both the policies and technologies on which we base our assessments are evolving. Technology development doesn’t always move in a linear trajectory, and current capabilities aren’t the only indicator of future outcomes. Moreover, the strategic interests and desired policy outcomes one country seeks might not align simply or easily with those of another. Therefore, it isn’t possible to directly compare countries against each other. Rather than arbitrarily rating each country’s progress against the others, we’ve rated each country’s progress in achieving the strategic objectives that it has outlined for each technology area (Figure 1). The progress indicator’s location should be interpreted as being dynamic, given that both policies and technologies will evolve.

Figure 1: Rating scale—country progress in meeting national policy objectives

Rating scale legend

  1. Some high-level policy objectives specific to the technology area have been set, but there’s little evidence of efforts making progress towards meeting those objectives.
  2. Despite the articulation of some policy objectives pertaining to the technology area, those are still relatively unclear. The country’s R&D and production capabilities don’t appear to be sufficient to contribute to realising the country’s stated policy objectives.
  3. There’s some evidence that the country is developing actionable policy in the technology area. There’s clear progress in the country’s ability to contribute to the R&D of the technology, or production capacity. It isn’t clear, however, whether this progress aligns with the country’s stated policy objectives.
  4. There’s evidence that stated policy objectives, research and investment are beginning to translate into aligning capabilities.
  5. There’s strong evidence that stated policy objectives, research and investment have already translated into aligning capabilities.

Source: Image produced by ASPI.

Overall assessment

  • Quantity doesn’t mean quality, at least in terms of the way patents and research shift global knowledge and capabilities in the overall ecosystem of a technology field. Our findings on patent impact—measured by how often a patent is cited or purchased—highlighted that China, with the highest number of patent applications filed, didn’t have a correspondingly high impact factor.
    Australia and India, and to a lesser extent Japan, filed far fewer patents, but those few patents had impact more on par with US patents, which were high in both number and impact. One patent can significantly influence the evolution of a technology; others might incrementally advance knowledge or create offshoot fields. Impact factors in these types of analysis can be an objective measure for determining scientific advances or commercial success but aren’t necessarily useful in indicating whether national capabilities support policy objectives. If the point of benchmarking critical technologies capabilities at a national level is to understand what makes a country capable of meeting national policy objectives, competitive in a strategic competition and well placed to work with like-minded partners, then the ability of individual researchers or organisations to advance a technology field doesn’t tell us how competitive a country is in translating concepts to capabilities that align with its strategic objectives. For example, ASPI ICPC believes that in China, the disproportionately large number of patents filed internally is most likely attributable to companies patenting specific applications of technology. In the Quad, countries such as Australia and India have been more impactful for a fewer number of patent applications filed and research papers significantly advance the field.
  • Success in connecting policy objectives to outcomes isn’t yet entirely measurable. Our comparison of national policies pertaining to each critical technology we research shows that China, followed by the US, tends to have more clarity about what it seeks to achieve by investing in R&D and production capabilities, and following that up with actions that will achieve those objectives. India, Japan and Australia don’t lack policy development or innovative capacity, but we believe they have been less effective at connecting concepts to capability. This assessment is no doubt at least partially because the development of policy objectives postdates most of our data.
  • Metrics don’t explain the context in which innovation is taking place, including incentive structures, and how that affects a country’s ability to meet specific objectives. In China, the incentive structure is designed so that researchers are working to meet specific policy objectives. In fact, companies closely collaborate with the state in technical standards development. According to the revised 2017 Standardisation Law,8 the Standardisation Administration of China (an agency under the State Administration for Market Regulation) is required to oversee standards initiation and implementation, and in practice technical committees for standards setting under the Standardisation Administration tend to consist of both companies and research institutes.
    We believe the knock-on effect of the incentive structure in China is that the R&D base is disadvantaged, while companies and researchers focus on implementing specific applications of technology that meet policy needs. China’s National Patent Development Strategy (2011–2020) was designed as a ‘long-term and comprehensive plan to use the patent system and patent resources to enhance the country’s core competitiveness’.9 The strategy document prioritises ‘encourag[ing] and supporting[ing] enterprises to upgrade the core technologies and key technologies with patent rights in China’s advantageous fields to national and international standards’.10 We believe companies are seeking to achieve those objectives by owning the market first, and patents support that approach. They’re adding economic value by increasing the quantity of applications, and owning the market comes before efforts to refine the product. Many PRC-originated technologies are being exported globally (see ASPI ICPC’s Mapping China’s Tech Giants project), no matter what the overall quality of the product in comparison to competitors, and that proliferation is probably achieving some market power and incumbency. It’s a cumulative and individual challenge for the Quad nations to move more rapidly from concept to capability in order to avoid the PRC leading in meeting strategic objectives with that technology

Download

Readers are warmly encouraged to download the full report to access the detailed sector by sector analysis.

The Patent Search Strategy used in the formulation of the report is available for review here.

Acknowledgements

We acknowledge the assistance we have received from IP Australia, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources, and numerous interviewees and peer reviewers in policy and industry roles across the Quad.

Thank you to ASPI ICPC researcher Albert Zhang for assistance. We are grateful for the valuable comments and assistance provided by Fergus Hanson, Michael Shoebridge and Jocelinn Kang.

This project was supported through a $150,000 grant from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

What is ASPI?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally.

ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our annual report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements.

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber, emerging and critical technologies, issues related to information and foreign interference and focuses on the impact these issues have on broader strategic policy. The centre has a growing mixture of expertise and skills with teams of researchers who concentrate on policy, technical analysis, information operations and disinformation, critical and emerging technologies, cyber capacity building, satellite analysis, surveillance and China-related issues.

The ICPC informs public debate in the Indo-Pacific region and supports public policy development by producing original, empirical, data-driven research. The ICPC enriches regional debates by collaborating with research institutes from around the world and by bringing leading global experts to Australia, including through fellowships. To develop capability in Australia and across the Indo-Pacific region, the ICPC has a capacity building team that conducts workshops, training programs and large-scale exercises for the public and private sectors.

We would like to thank all of those who support and contribute to the ICPC with their time, intellect and passion for the topics we work on. If you would like to support the work of the centre please contact: icpc@aspi.org.au

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional. 

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2021

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.

First published November 2021. ISSN 2209-9689 (online). ISSN 2209-9670 (print).
Cover image: Leslie Sharpe.

Funding Statement: Funding support for this publication was provided by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

  1. ‘What is a “critical technology”?’, in ‘Appendix A: National Critical Technologies List’, Clinton White House archives, online. ↩︎
  2. Marise Payne, ‘Launch of the International Cyber and Critical Technology Engagement Strategy’, speech, 21 April 2021, online. ↩︎
  3. Scott Morrison, ‘Quad Leaders’ Summit communique’, 24 September 2021, online. ↩︎
  4. Morrison, ‘Quad Leaders’ Summit communique’. ↩︎
  5. See, for instance, the Biden administration’s memorandum, ‘Multi-agency research and development priorities for the FY 2023 Budget’, August 2021, online; and the former Trump administration’s October 2020 list of critical and emerging technologies, online. ↩︎
  6. Morrison, ‘Quad Leaders’ Summit communique’. ↩︎
  7. For a more comprehensive definition and explanation of the methodology behind the Patent Asset Index, consult the product website, online. ↩︎
  8. Standardisation Law of the People’s Republic of China, Standardisation Administration of China, 23 March 2018, online. The Standardisation Law was revised and adopted at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in November 2017 and came into force on 1 January 2018. ↩︎
  9. ‘National Patent Development Strategy (2011–2020)’ [‘全国专利事业发展战略(2011—2020年)’], China National Intellectual Property Administration, 18 November 2010, online. ↩︎
  10. ‘National Patent Development Strategy (2011–2020)’. ↩︎

The Sydney Dialogue: Playbook

Major advances in technology have always been disruptive. But when they occur against a backdrop of great power competition, the stable development and deployment of these technologies becomes fraught.

Few have grasped the enormity of the disruption coming our way as more and more new technologies – from increasingly sophisticated surveillance to quantum and biotechnologies – are deployed across the world. While governments grapple with foreseeing the full impacts and setting policy direction, there’s a growing realisation that emerging and critical technologies will be extraordinarily important for societies, economies and national security.

We launched The Sydney Dialogue to support a more stable roll-out of the next wave of transformational technologies. It is a forum allowing for frank debate about the rapidly changing strategic landscape, and a space for governments, business and civil society to come together to focus on solutions, cooperation and policy options.

The Sydney Dialogue came about because we saw big gaps in forums on technology, especially in the Indo-Pacific. There were industry events that showcased the latest technical advances and products, but they tended to eschew policy debates, and did not encompass government and civil society. There were important government multilateral discussion and policymaking forums, but these usually lagged well behind technological advances, and because they were primarily for governments, key global players – including those making the technology – weren’t part of the discussion. And there were excellent civil society initiatives, but these often focused on individual topics that were only one piece of a larger puzzle. Few of these initiatives focused on or resonated in the Indo-Pacific – the region that incubates much of the world’s technological innovation and has become a hotbed of strategic technological competition.

These gaps drove us towards a dynamic where all the key actors were speaking past one another, while rarely all being in the same room. Tech companies are developing and deploying products that are revolutionary and hugely disruptive. A decade later, governments are scrambling to retrospectively legislate to address issues they did not foresee, and civil society is critiquing from the sidelines.

Right now, three major problems must be addressed to ensure the stable development of advanced technologies.

First, there’s the large lag between the deployment of new technologies and regulation governing them. With social media, this lag was about a decade. As we’ve seen, this doesn’t lead to good outcomes for individuals, or for societies.

Second, there’s a delay between states’ use of new technologies and their consideration of the ethical questions raised by its use. Examples of this can be seen in the global surveillance industry, which has allowed its products to support some of the most egregious human rights abuses of our times.

Third, a tense relationship between governments and technology companies is playing out around the world. The negative dynamic that has taken hold is hindering progress and genuine cooperation, leaving democracies at risk of being left behind.

The Sydney Dialogue seeks to fill a gap and contribute towards these big challenges. By bringing world leaders, tech company CEOs and the world’s top civil society voices together for an annual dialogue, we hope the roll-out of the next wave of revolutionary technologies over the coming decade can be better managed.

This collection of striking essays from some of the world’s top strategic thinkers from across business, government and civil society is a fitting way to start this dialogue. It explores timely debates at the forefront of technology and examines points of crisis and tension in the nexus of society, government and technology. Crucially, it offers innovative ideas to solve these challenges and bring about a brighter, fairer Indo-Pacific.

The following pieces bring us all a much-needed dose of optimism and show that in many cases, the solutions already exist – we just need to work together to bring them to life.

Read the Playbook: Online. 

Digital government services. Building for peak demand.

Early in the Covid-19 pandemic, the myGov website was overwhelmed by a demand surge from citizens seeking to rapidly access digital services. In 2016, the online Census (eCensus) suffered a series of relatively small distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. While they didn’t overwhelm the platform, the attacks ultimately resulted in the eCensus being taken offline.

What do these two examples have in common, and what lessons should we learn to ensure more robust digital government services?

To answer those questions, this paper will examine five points:

  • The nature of the DDoS attacks
  • The CIA (confidentiality, integrity and availability) triad model for digital security
  • How to predict demand
  • How to respond to unpredictable demand
  • The structure of reliable data systems

Deterrence through denial: A strategy for an era of reduced warning time

Australia now needs to implement serious changes to how warning time is considered in defence planning. The need to plan for reduced warning time has implications for the Australian intelligence community, defence strategic policy, force structure priorities, readiness and sustainability. Important changes will also be needed with respect to personnel, stockpiles of missiles and munitions, and fuel supplies. We can no longer assume that Australia will have time gradually to adjust military capability and preparedness in response
to emerging threats. In other words, there must be a new approach in Defence to managing warning, capability and preparedness, and detailed planning for rapid expansion and sustainment.

This paper addresses those issues, recognising that they’re a revolutionary break with the past era of what were much more comfortable assumptions about threats to Australia. Considering the complexity of the issues involved, we have identified further areas for research, including at the classified level.

ASPI – Embassy of Japan 1.5 Track Dialogue on Responsible Behaviour in Space

Earlier this year, ASPI and the Embassy of Japan in Australia convened a hybrid workshop on responsible behaviours in space; a concept which has emerged as a key focus of the international space policy community. At the workshop, participants discussed the stable and sustainable use of space and management of security challenges in space, and ways to define responsible behaviour in space, including through UN General Assembly Resolution 75/36. Participants at this workshop included academics, practitioners, government representatives, military personnel and legal experts from Australia, Japan, Britain and Southeast Asia.

This workshop and report were sponsored by the Embassy of Japan in Australia.

Tag Archive for: Critical & Emerging Technology

The Truth about 5g – ABC Four Corners

“If you are not currently working to stop 5G this means you don’t understand it. Nothing else matters anymore.”  Leading activist

Around Australia a vocal band of activists have joined a worldwide protest movement against the arrival of the next generation in wireless technology known as 5G. 

“I don’t want to be a human lab rat. Because that’s what’s happening. They’re just using us to see if it’s going to be okay. And if we die, well, we’ve got so many of us, what does it matter?”  Protestor

Activists claim 5G is an invisible and potentially deadly health hazard, blaming the radiation emitted by the technology for a range of long-term health problems.

ASPI’s Dr Huong Le Thu is interviewed on ABC’s Four Corners special: The truth about 5G

You can watch the program here: https://www.abc.net.au/4corners/the-truth-about-5g/12519392.

Dr Malcolm Davis on The Space Show

ASPI’s Dr Malcolm Davis was guest on this episode of The Space Show podcast.

In this podcast, Dr Davis discusses Australian commercial space development, national policy and space security, space defense issues.

You can hear the episode here.

5G matters: (Geo)politics and critical national infrastructure

In January 2020 Danielle Cave contributed an essay for the Raisina Dialogue hosted by India’s largest think-tank The Observer Research Foundation (ORF) as part of ORF’s Raisina Edit series:

“Few people would have guessed that the ‘topic du jour’ for 2019 would be 5G. While telecommunications companies have long had their eye on the prize as the chief deployers of fifth-generation telecommunications, few world leaders, politicians, and key policy departments have had to pay much attention as we have slowly ticked over from 2G to 3G, and from 3G to 4G. But 5G, which is still very much on the horizon for most countries, is different. And it is different for a range of reasons.

First, 5G is a departure from its predecessors, because we are no longer dealing with just telecommunications. 5G will not just give us extra connectivity and faster smartphones; it will connect billions of smart devices, increasingly sophisticated smart cities, and will enable developments like autonomous vehicles. It will provide a platform for advances in robotics and artificial intelligence. While its predecessors brought us text messaging, wireless internet connections, mobile broadband, and cloud technologies, the power of 5G lies in the fact that it will underpin and enable other technological advancements (including those still in the pipeline).

So instead of seeing it as just another step forward for telecommunications, states must also view 5G’s strategic technology as critical national infrastructure….

…Because 5G is critical national infrastructure, decisions made about which companies to partner with really come down to a state’s risk appetite. And states across the world will assess the risks that matter to them and make different decisions. For many, decisions will not focus on the companies themselves. Rather, key consideration will be given to the rules, laws and norms that govern a company’s home environment and guide that state’s international behaviour.

Given the evidence available, Australia’s place in the world and our strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific, Australia’s risk appetite had its limits. And that hard limit was working with high-risk vendors in a technological advancement critical to enabling the world’s next industrial revolution.”

Read Danielle’s full essay here.

Asia’s Great Huawei Debate – A special on The Diplomat

Experts on Singapore, South Korea, India, Japan, and Australia weigh in on the Chinese telecom firm’s reception. Experts Pauline Reich, June Park, Aman Thakker, Motohiro Tsuchiya, and Danielle Cave explain how the Huawei debate has unfolded domestically in each of those countries, and what conclusions (if any) were reached.

Read a version of this article ‘Australia and the great Huawei debate: risks, transparency and trust on The Strategist here.

Access the Diplomat special Asia’s Great Huawei Debate here;

On China Podcast. Dr Malcolm Davis

For China’s military, space is a critical domain that enables complex operations, and the denial of it to adversaries during conflict is a high priority. Join Malcolm Davis and me in looking at China’s military space strategy.

Admiral Michael S. Rogers to Join ASPI’s Cyber Centre as Distinguished Visiting Fellow

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s International Cyber Policy Centre is pleased to announce that Admiral Michael S. Rogers (retired) will join us as the Centre’s next Distinguished Visiting Fellow.

Admiral Rogers retired from the U.S. Navy in 2018 after nearly 37 years of naval service rising to the rank of four-star admiral. He culminated his career with a four-year tour as Commander, U.S. Cyber Command and Director, National Security Agency. In those roles he worked with the leadership of the U.S. government, the DoD and the U.S. Intelligence community as well as their international counterparts in the conduct of cyber and intelligence activity across the globe. He also assisted in the development of national and international policy with respect to cyber, intelligence and technology – including extensive work with corporate leadership in the Finance, IT, Telecommunications and Technology sectors.

ASPI’s Executive Director Peter Jennings said “I am delighted to welcome Admiral Rogers to Australia. As the international system enters a turbulent period, it is a great opportunity to hear from one of the world’s foremost intelligence officials”.

During his broader service in uniform, Admiral Rogers held positions afloat and ashore around the globe focusing on cyber, intelligence, maritime operations and national security. His joint service was extensive including duty with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Indo Pacific Command and U.S. Atlantic Command. In addition, Admiral Rogers commanded at the unit, Numbered Fleet and service component levels in the Navy.

Admiral Rogers is currently supporting companies in the private sector, serving as a member of various Boards or acting as a Senior Advisor. He also speaks globally to various business and academic groups and is working internationally in the cyber and national security arenas. He is a Senior Fellow and Adjunct Professor with Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Managements’ Public Private Initiative and a member of the advisory board of Auburn University’s McCrary Institute for Cyber and Critical Infrastructure. Admiral Rogers is a member of the AALD US advisory board. 

Admiral Rogers will be sharing his experience and insight as keynote speaker at ASPI’s National Security Dinner on 7 May. He will be resident at the Cyber Centre from 29 April to 15 May 2019.

Microsoft partners with the ASPI-ICPC

The International Cyber Policy Centre is proud to announce a partnership with Microsoft.

“There’s a worrying tendency to talk about Cyberspace in the abstract. But it is not a nebulous space. Cyberspace consists of concrete elements in the real world, such as datacentres, undersea cables, laptops and mobile devices. These are designed and manufactured by private companies and that is why the private sector needs to be at the table in any debate on cyber policy.

If anyone had any doubts that Australia and its institutions were a target – the Prime Minister rising to inform the House of Representatives that a cyber attack targeting Parliament House was carried out by a sophisticated state actor and that same actor had targeted major political parties – should have put those doubts to rest.

We live in an interconnected world. Digital technologies have brought incredible benefits and opportunities. Australia’s great tyranny of distance is no longer an excuse nor an insurmountable challenge to economic and social integration with the rest of the world.

The February attack demonstrated graphically how this global interconnectedness has brought new challenges. The technologies that enable economic and social connections are the same platforms that malicious actors use to target Australian organisations and citizens.

To be effective, cyber policy engagement must be multilateral and multi-stakeholder. This is the reason Microsoft was such a strong supporter of last years’ Paris Call – the first of a new type of international cyber agreement involving governments, companies, researchers, think tanks and not-for-profits. Bodies who facilitate and create trusted environments for these often-difficult and nuanced, but critical conversations, are so important. Since its inception in 2011, ASPI’s ICPC has played a critical role in advancing debate and multilateral engagement on cyber issues not just in Australia, but across the Asia Pacific region and ultimately into international fora.

And that is why Microsoft has become a sponsor of the ICPC and why we look forward to working with the ICPC and its partners to further the debate on trust, ethics, privacy and security in our use of technology”.

– Tom Daemen, General Counsel, Head of Corporate External Legal Affairs, Microsoft Australia-New Zealand

The challenges and opportunities facing the Australian defence sector

Dr Malcolm Davis recently spoke with on the Defence Connect Podcast at the Avalon International Airshow on the topic of the challenges facing the Australian defence landscape. 

Listen to the audio here.

ASPI Cyber Masterclass ‘In Conversation: The future of cyber and emerging technologies’

Media are invited to attend a special event featuring former US top cyber adviser Chris Painter hosted by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) on the future of cyberspace and emerging technologies. Question our panel on some of the world’s pressing global issues including the impact of emerging tech on national security, cyber threats to our election process, the changing nature of cyber-conflict and the rise of censorship and strict information control in the Asia-Pacific.

Panel:

• Chris Painter, former US State Department Coordinator for Cyber Issues and White House Senior Director for Cybersecurity Policy;
• Dr Tobias Feakin, Australian Ambassador for Cyber Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
• Professor Elanor Huntington, Dean, College of Engineering and Computer Science, Australian National University
• Fergus Hanson, Head of the International Cyber Policy Centre (chair)

Date: 28 February 2018
Time: 1630 – 1730
Venue: ASPI, Level 2, 40 Macquarie St Barton Canberra 

A canapes and drinks reception will conclude the event. Chris Painter is in Australia as the inaugural distinguished fellow at ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC). His visit is made possible thanks to the generous support of DFAT’s Cyber Affairs Special Visits Program, Macquarie Telecom Group and ICPC core sponsors

To register your attendance please contact:

Renee Jones, Events and Communications Manager, ASPI

E: reneejones@aspi.org.au

M: 0400 424 323

What He Did on His Summer Break: Exposed a Global Security Flaw – The New York Times

Danielle Cave, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said that Twitter is playing an increasingly important role in open-source intelligence, the collection of sensitive information from publicly available sources. Researchers from think tanks, nongovernmental organizations and the corporate sector who are at the cutting edge of cybersecurity work gravitate to the platform to exchange information, she said.

Read the full story here.

Tag Archive for: Critical & Emerging Technology

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