Tag Archive for: Critical & Emerging Technology

South Korea and Australia in space: Towards a strategic partnership

Space cooperation between Australian and South Korea remains stuck in its infancy and, to some extent, is treated as an end in itself. This report argues that the time is ripe for both Australia and South Korea to embark on joint projects and initiatives that would deliver tangible and practical outcomes for both countries.

For South Korea and Australia, space cooperation and space development serve as key pillars of the bilateral relationship. The two nations elevated their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in December 2021, incorporating space development into core areas of cooperation in the fields of economics, innovation and technology. As a part of that elevation, the leaders of both countries agreed to strengthen joint research and cooperation between space research institutes and industries. Following that, in 2022, South Korea and Australia established a Space Policy Dialogue.

A greater bilateral focus on expanding the scope and opportunities for space cooperation could deliver foreign-policy, national-security, defence and economic outcomes for South Korea and Australia. This report argues that there are opportunities in the bilateral relationship to boost both space cooperation (the collaborative efforts between nations to leverage space advancements for mutual benefit and to foster diplomatic ties and intergovernmental collaboration) and space development (the advancement of space-related technologies, infrastructure and industries) and is pivotal in areas such as national security, economic growth and resource management.

This report first analyses the space development strategies of South Korea and Australia and examines the environmental factors that can increase the potential for cooperation. It then proposes areas where the two countries can combine their technologies and resources to maximise mutual benefits and offers eight policy recommendations to the governments of both countries.

Scott Pace, former Executive Secretary of the US National Space Council, has emphasised that ‘International space cooperation is not an end in itself, but a means of advancing national interests.’ The South Korea – Australia partnership aligns with that principle, and it’s time to realise the opportunity.

Australia and South Korea: Leveraging the strategic potential of cooperation in critical technologies

Executive summary

Cooperation between Australia and the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea or the ROK) in a range of critical technology areas has grown rapidly in recent years. Underpinned by the Australia – South Korea Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cyber and Critical Technology Cooperation signed in 2021, collaboration is currently centred around emerging technologies, including next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing. Such technologies are deemed to be critical due to their potential to enhance or threaten societies, economies and national security. Most are dual- or multi-use and have applications in a wide range of sectors.1

Intensifying geostrategic competition is threatening stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Particularly alarming is competition in the technological domain. ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker, a large data-driven project that now covers 64 critical technologies and focuses on high-impact research, reveals a stunning shift in research ‘technology leadership’ over the past two decades. Where the United States (US) led in 60 of the 64 technologies in the five years between 2003 and 2007, the US’s lead has decreased to seven technologies in the most recent five years (2019–2023). Instead, China now leads in 57 of those technologies.

Within the Indo-Pacific region, some countries have responded to those shifts in technology leadership through the introduction of policies aimed at building ‘technological sovereignty’. The restriction of high-risk vendors from critical infrastructure, the creation of sovereign industrial bases and supply-chain diversification are examples of this approach. But a sovereign approach doesn’t mean protectionism. Rather, many countries, including Australia and South Korea, are collaborating with like-minded regional partners to further their respective national interests and support regional resilience through a series of minilateral frameworks.

The Australia – South Korea technological relationship already benefits from strong foundations, but it’s increasingly important that both partners turn promise into reality. It would be beneficial for Australia and South Korea to leverage their respective strengths and ensure that collaboration evolves in a strategic manner. Both countries are leaders in research and development (R&D) related to science and technology (S&T) and are actively involved in international partnerships for standards-setting relating to AI and other technologies. Furthermore, both countries possess complementary industry sectors, as demonstrated through Australia’s critical-minerals development and existing space-launch capabilities on one hand, and South Korea’s domestic capacity for advanced manufacturing on the other.

This report examines four stages common to technological life cycles — (1) R&D and innovation; (2) building blocks for manufacturing; (3) testing and application; and (4) standards and norms. For each, we examine a specific critical technology of interest. Those four life-cycle areas and respective technologies—spanning biotechnologies-related R&D, manufacturing electric-battery materials, satellite launches and AI standards-setting—were chosen as each is a technology of focus for both countries. Furthermore, collaboration through these specific technological stages enables Australia and South Korea to leverage their existing strengths in a complementary manner (see Figure 1). Supporting the analysis of these four stages of the technological life cycle and selected critical technologies is data from ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker and the Composite Science and Technology Innovation Index (COSTII) jointly released by South Korea’s Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) and the Korea Institute of Science & Technology Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP).

Informed by that examination, this report identifies a set of recommendations for strengthening cooperation that is relevant for different stakeholders, including government and industry.

Policy recommendations

Biotechnologies

Australia and South Korea can enhance knowledge-sharing in biotechnologies-related R&D through people-to-people exchanges. Links should be formalised through an MoU between relevant institutions—such as Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and Biotechnology. An MoU could be used to implement initiatives such as a virtual mentoring program and long-term in-person exchanges (preferably at least 12 months in duration). Such exchanges would support immersive in-country interaction, enabling the transfer of specialised R&D expertise. Australian researchers could share knowledge about advances in early-stage clinical trials processes, while South Korean researchers could contribute insights into synthetic biology and AI tools in drug-discovery clinical-trial methodologies. Financial support from Australia’s National Health and Medical Research Council could facilitate the exchanges.2 There remains a need to address visa constraints impeding the free flow of researchers between both countries. While this report focuses on R&D, we suggest that there’s equal value in considering cooperation in the manufacturing stages of the biotechnologies value chain.

Recommendation 1: Formalise links between Australia’s and South Korea’s key biotechnologies R&D institutions by facilitating long-term people-to-people exchanges aimed at transferring specialised expertise. This includes in areas such as clinical trials, synthetic biology and AI integration in biotechnologies.

Electric batteries

Australian companies should consider the production of battery materials, including lithium hydroxide and precursor cathode active materials (pCAM), through joint ventures with South Korean battery manufacturers. Such ventures would benefit from jointly funded and owned facilities geographically close to requisite critical minerals. Since spodumene is needed for lithium hydroxide and nickel, cobalt and manganese are required for pCAM, Western Australia provides the ideal location for those facilities. Furthermore, BHP’s recent suspension of its Western Australian nickel operations provides an ideal opportunity for a South Korean battery company to purchase those operations— securing nickel sulphate supplies necessary for pCAM manufacturing.3 There’s also the potential for South Korea to invest in cathode active manufacturing (CAM) manufacturing in Australia by taking advantage of the co-location of mining and pCAM operations.

The provision of loans with relatively low interest rates from South Korean Government–owned banks,4 as well as tax credits and energy incentives provided by the Australian Government, would assist in offsetting the relatively high operational costs (including for labour and materials) associated with establishing joint battery-material plants in Australia instead of South Korea.5 Environmental regulations will need careful consideration in assessing such proposals, such as those covering the disposal of by-products. In the case of sodium sulphate, that by-product can be used in fertilisers and even recycled for future use in battery-material manufacturing.6

Recommendation 2: Consider the establishment of facilities in Australia under joint venture arrangements between Australian and South Korean companies to enable expanded production of battery materials (including lithium hydroxide and pCAM).

Space and satellite technologies

Australia and South Korea should establish a government-to-government agreement that would facilitate the launch of South Korean satellites from northern and southern locations in Australia. This would be similar to the Australia–US Technologies Safeguard Agreement. The agreement would increase the ease with which companies from both countries can pursue joint launches by streamlining launch permit application processes, export controls, taxation requirements and environmental regulations. The agreement can establish a robust framework for joint operations and continued R&D in space and satellite technologies while ensuring that both countries protect associated sensitive technologies. Any such agreement should prioritise consultations with community stakeholders to further inclusive decision-making focused on addressing the social and environmental impacts of space launches.7 Engaging with Indigenous landowners to ensure the protection of cultural heritage, sacred sites and traditional land stewardship is particularly key.8

Recommendation 3: Establish a government-to-government agreement similar to the Australia–US Technologies Safeguard Agreement to bolster the ease with which Australian and South Korean companies can conduct joint satellite launches on Australian soil.

Artificial intelligence technologies

Closer collaboration between Standards Australia and the Korea Standards Association in establishing international AI standards will be beneficial. The established positive record of Australian and South Korean stakeholders in relation to international norms and standards relating to critical technologies, and comparative regional strengths, provide a means to ensure that international AI standards continue to evolve in a way that fosters interoperability, innovation, transparency, diversity and security-by-design. One recommended body through which Australian and South Korean stakeholders could coordinate their respective approaches is the international, industry-led multistakeholder joint subcommittee (SC) created by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) known as the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 Subcommittee 42 on AI (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42).

Recommendation 4: Coordinate the approach of Standards Australia and the Korea Standards Association in establishing international AI standards in international technology standards bodies, for example, through ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42.

Full Report

For the full report, please download here.

  1. J Wong Leung, S Robin, D Cave, ASPI’s two-decade Critical Technology Tracker, ASPI, Canberra, 28 August 2024, online. ↩︎
  2. Austrade, ‘Australia: A go-to destination for clinical trials’. ↩︎
  3. ‘Western Australian Nickel to temporarily suspend operations’, BHP, 11 July 2024, online. ↩︎
  4. Government-owned banks in South Korea are currently funding a similar joint venture in the form of the POSCO – Pilbara Minerals lithium hydroxide facility in South Korea. For more information, see A Orlando, ‘POSCO Pilbara Lithium Solution executes US$460 million loan agreement to help fund chemical facility in South Korea’, Mining.com.au, 27 February 2023, online. ↩︎
  5. In particular, the high cost of a joint lithium hydroxide plant in Australia rather than South Korea was the primary reason for the joint POSCO – Pilbara Minerals plant to be built in Gwangyang, South Korea. For more information, see P Kerr, ‘Lithium processing is 40pc cheaper in South Korea, says POSCO’, Australian Financial Review, 22 May 2023, online. ↩︎
  6. M Stevens, ‘Cathode manufacturing: solutions for sodium sulphate’, Worley, 29 May 2024, online. ↩︎
  7. ‘Koonibba Test Range launches large commercial rocket’, Asia–Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR), 6 May 2024, online; J Hamilton, A Costigan, ‘Koonibba looks to the future as a rocket launch site, but one elder is concerned about the impact on sacred sites’, ABC News, 11 May 2024, online. ↩︎
  8. M Garrick, ‘Equatorial Launch Australia lodges plans for expansion to 300 hectares for Arnhem Space Centre’, ABC News, 8 November 2023, online. ↩︎

Persuasive technologies in China: Implications for the future of national security

Key Findings

The rapid adoption of persuasive technologies—any digital system that shapes users’ attitudes and behaviours by exploiting physiological and cognitive reactions or vulnerabilities—will challenge national security in ways that are difficult to predict. Emerging persuasive technologies such as generative artificial intelligence (AI), ambient technologies and neurotechnology interact with the human mind and body in far more intimate and subconscious ways, and at far greater speed and efficiency, than previous technologies. This presents malign actors with the ability to sway opinions and actions without the conscious autonomy of users.

Regulation is struggling to keep pace. Over the past decade, the swift development and adoption of these technologies have outpaced responses by liberal democracies, highlighting the urgent need for more proactive approaches that prioritise privacy and user autonomy. That means protecting and enhancing the ability of users to make conscious and informed decisions about how they’re interacting with technology and for what purpose.

China’s commercial sector is already a global leader in developing and using persuasive technologies. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tightly controls China’s private sector and mandates that Chinese companies—especially technology companies—work towards China’s national-security interests. This presents a risk that the CCP could use persuasive technologies commercially developed in China to pursue illiberal and authoritarian ends, both domestically and abroad, through such means as online influence campaigns, targeted psychological operations, transnational repression, cyber operations and enhanced military capabilities.

ASPI has identified several prominent Chinese companies that already have their persuasive technologies at work for China’s propaganda, military and public-security agencies. They include:

  • Midu—a language intelligence technology company that provides generative AI tools used by Chinese Government and CCP bureaus to enhance the party-state’s control of public opinion. Those capabilities could also be used for foreign interference (see page 4).
  • Suishi—a pioneer in neurotechnology that’s developing an online emotion detection and evaluation system to interpret and respond to human emotions in real time. The company is an important partner of Tianjin University’s Haihe Lab (see page 16), which has been highly acclaimed for its research with national-security applications (see page 17).
  • Goertek—an electronics manufacturer that has achieved global prominence for smart wearables and virtual-reality (VR) devices. This company collaborates on military–civil integration projects with the CCP’s military and security organs and has developed a range of products with dual-use applications, such as drone-piloting training devices (see page 20).

ASPI has further identified case studies of Chinese technology companies, including Silicon Intelligence, OneSight and Mobvoi, that are leading in the development of persuasive technologies spanning generative AI, neurotechnologies and emerging ambient systems. We find that those companies have used such solutions in support of the CCP in diverse ways—including overt and attributable propaganda campaigns, disinformation campaigns targeting foreign audiences, and military–civil fusion projects.

Introduction

Persuasive technologies—or technologies with persuasive characteristics—are tools and systems designed to shape users’ decision-making, attitudes or behaviours by exploiting people’s physiological and cognitive reactions or vulnerabilities.1 Compared to technologies we presently use, persuasive technologies collect more data, analyse more deeply and generate more insights that are more intimately tailored to us as individuals.

With current consumer technologies, influence is achieved through content recommendations that reflect algorithms learning from the choices we consciously make (at least initially). At a certain point, a person’s capacity to choose then becomes constrained because of a restricted information environment that reflects and reinforces their opinions—the so-called echo-chamber effect. With persuasive technologies, influence is achieved through a more direct connection with intimate physiological and emotional reactions. That risks removing human choice from the process entirely and steering choices without an individual’s full awareness. Such technologies won’t just shape what we do: they have the potential to influence who we are.

Many countries and companies are working to harness the power of emerging technologies with persuasive characteristics, such as generative artificial intelligence (AI), wearable devices and brain–computer interfaces, but the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its technology companies pose a unique challenge. The Chinese party-state combines a rapidly advancing tech industry with a political system and ideology that mandate companies to align with CCP objectives, driving the creation and use of persuasive technologies for political purposes (see ‘How the CCP is using persuasive technologies’, page 21). That synergy enables China to develop cutting-edge innovations while directing their application towards maintaining regime stability domestically, reshaping the international order, challenging democratic values and undermining global human-rights norms.

There’s already extensive research on how the CCP and its military are adopting technology in cognitive warfare to ‘win without fighting’—a strategy to acquire the means to shape adversaries’ psychological states and behaviours (see Appendix 2: Persuasive technologies in China’s ‘cognitive warfare’, page 29).2 Separately, academics have considered the manipulative methods of surveillance capitalism, especially on issues of addiction, child safety and privacy .3 However, there’s limited research on the intersection of those two topics; that is, attempts by the Chinese party-state to exploit commercially available emerging technologies to advance its political objectives. This report is one of the first to explore that intersection.

Chinese technology, advertising and public-relations companies have made substantial advances in harnessing such tools, from mobile push notifications and social-media algorithms to AI-generated content. Many of those companies have achieved global success. Access to the personal data of foreign users is at an all-time high, and Chinese companies are now a fixed staple on the world’s most downloaded mobile apps lists, unlike just five years ago.44 While many persuasive technologies have clear commercial purposes, their potential for political and national-security exploitation—both inside and outside China—is also profound.

This report seeks to break through the ‘Collingridge dilemma’, in which control and understanding of emerging technologies come too late to mitigate the consequences of those technologies.55 The report analyses generative AI, neurotechnologies and immersive technologies and focuses on key advances being made by PRC companies in particular. It examines the national-security implications of persuasive technologies designed and developed in China, and what that means for policymakers and regulators outside China as those technologies continue to roll out globally.

Persuasive-technology capabilities are evolving rapidly, and concepts of and approaches to regulation are struggling to keep pace. The national-security implications of technologies that are designed to drive users towards certain behaviours are becoming apparent. Democratic governments have acted slowly and reactively to those challenges over the past decade. There’s an urgent need for more fit-for-purpose, proactive and adaptive approaches to regulating persuasive technologies. Protecting user autonomy and privacy must sit at the core of those efforts. Looking forward, persuasive technologies are set to become even more sophisticated and pervasive, and the consequences of their use are increasingly difficult to detect. Accordingly, the policy recommendations set out here focus on preparing for and countering the potential malicious use of the next generation of those technologies.

Full Report

For the full report, please download here.

References

  1. First defined by Brian J Fogg in Persuasive technology: using computers to change what we think and do, Morgan Kaufmann, 2003. ↩︎
  2. See, for example, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Chinese next-generation psychological warfare, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 1 June 2023, online; Elsa B Kania, ‘Minds at war: China’s pursuit of military advantage through cognitive science and biotechnology’, PRISM, 2019, 8(3):82–101, online; Department of Defense, Annual report to Congress; Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, US Government, 19 October 2023, online. ↩︎
  3. Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: the fight for a human future at the new frontier of power, Ingram Publisher Services, 2017. ↩︎
  4. Examples of Chinese-owned apps that are among the most downloaded globally include Tiktok, CapCut (a ByteDance-owned video editor) and the e-commerce platforms Temu and Shein. See David Curry, ‘Most popular apps (2024)’, Business of Apps, 30 January 2024, online. ↩︎
  5. Richard Worthington, ‘The social control of technology by David Collingridge’, American Political Science Review, 1982, 76(1):134–135; David Collingridge,
    The social control of technology, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1980. ↩︎

Darwin Dialogue 2024: Triumph from teamwork

In an increasingly fracturing international system, set to undergo only further strain in the near future, critical minerals are a point of significant international contention. Critical minerals underlie competition across critical civil and defence sectors and promise economic opportunity throughout their supply chain. They are vital to the clean-energy transition with minerals needed for electric vehicle batteries, solar panels, and even wind turbines. Resolving the significant vulnerabilities across critical mineral supply chains is a significant economic and national security challenge.

This report—based on an exclusive, invitation-only discussion at the Darwin Dialogue 2024, a 1.5 Track discussion between the Australian, United States, Japanese and Republic of Korean Governments-makes 11 recommendations for government and industry to develop both the domestic and international critical minerals sector.

This report also assesses the developments in Australia’s critical mineral policy since the inaugural Darwin Dialogue in April 2023, including the flagship Future Made in Australia policy; policy options to unlock new sources of domestic and international capital for the Australian critical minerals sector, and, how to better promote high ESG compliance in the international critical minerals market.

Australia’s natural endowments of critical minerals promise significant economic opportunity. But seizing this opportunity is dependent on teamwork. The Australian Government must work effectively with domestic state and territory governments, as well as close minilateral partners, to resolve the threats facing the critical minerals sector and develop secure and resilient supply chains for ourselves and the international community.

Connecting the Indo-Pacific: The future of subsea cables and opportunities for Australia

This report examines the role of hyperscalers as drivers of the subcable market and the geostrategic context of subcable systems; it highlights the significance of these developments for Australia, exploring both the potential benefits and challenges.

Submarine cable networks are critical infrastructure; they carry nearly all public internet and private network data traffic, facilitating global economic and financial activity as well as government and military communications and operations.

The submarine cable landscape has entered a new era and is now shaped by the rising participation of hyperscalers—hyperscale cloud and content providers— as well as the strategic actions of major powers and minilateral groups. The report examines the significance of this for Australia and explores how Australia can capitalise on these evolving dynamics to solidify its position as a regional digital hub in the Indo-Pacific by improving regional subcable resilience and digital connectivity, including its own.

This report makes five key recommendations, including that the Australian Government supports and strengthens regional repair and maintenance capabilities, ensuring that the management and protection of cables remains best practice, while continuing to work with regional partners to shape the regulatory norms and standards of the region. Additionally, to manage risks to Australia’s data security and digital economy ambitions, this report recommends that the Australian Government engages more closely with industry, makes potential regulatory adjustments, and maintains strategic oversight and vigilance to digital supply-chain dependency risks and anticompetitive behaviour.

Not only will those measures build connectivity and resilience domestically and regionally, but they align with Australia’s foreign-policy, development, security and cyber objectives, and will also support Australia’s growth and attractiveness as a subcables hub.

The future of intelligence analysis: US-Australia project on AI and human machine teaming


Dr Alex Caples is Director of The Sydney Dialogue, ASPI’s annual summit for critical, emerging and cyber technologies.

Previously, she was Director of Cyber, Technology and Security at ASPI.

Alex is a former diplomat and national security official whose career spans over 20 years’ in Defence, the Office of National Intelligence, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Department of Foreign Affairs, including postings to Canada and Afghanistan.

Between 2019-2023, Alex was an Associate Director, Operations Advisory and Director, Policy Evaluation and Public Impact at professional services firm KPMG, supporting Commonwealth and State Governments on policy and program design and implementation.

Prior to this, Alex held various senior policy advisor roles in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s National Security Division, including Director of Law Enforcement and Border Security, Director Cyber Security Policy and Director Crisis Management. In this capacity Alex provided advice to Government on a wide range of security legislation, policy and operations, including critical infrastructure security, foreign interference, cyberspace, telecommunications security, digital identity management, intelligence and border security.

During 2011-2012, Alex was a Senior Analyst for Transnational Issues at the Office of National Intelligence, where she provided senior executives and Ministers with all-source analysis on people smuggling, regional law enforcement and transnational crime.

Alex is an Australian Defence Force Academy Graduate. She holds a PhD in International Relations from Monash University (2007).

ASPI’s two-decade Critical Technology Tracker: The rewards of long-term research investment

The Critical Technology Tracker is a large data-driven project that now covers 64 critical technologies spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas. It provides a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology capability.

It first launched 1 March 2023 and underwent a major expansion on 28 August 2024 which took the dataset from five years (previously, 2018–2022) to 21 years (2003–2023). Explore the website and the broader project here.

Governments and organisations interested in supporting this ongoing program of work, including further expansions and the addition of new technologies, can contact: criticaltech@aspi.org.au.

Executive Summary

This report accompanies a major update of ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker website,1 which reveals the countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—leading scientific and research innovation in critical technologies. It does that by focusing on high-impact research—the top 10% of the most highly cited papers—as a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology (S&T) capability.

Now covering 64 critical technologies and crucial fields spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas, the Tech Tracker’s dataset has been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022)2 to 21 years of data (2003–2023).3

These new results reveal the stunning shift in research leadership over the past two decades towards large economies in the Indo-Pacific, led by China’s exceptional gains. The US led in 60 of 64 technologies in the five years from 2003 to 2007, but in the most recent five years (2019–2023) is leading in seven. China led in just three of 64 technologies in 2003–20074 but is now the lead country in 57 of 64 technologies in 2019–2023, increasing its lead from our rankings last year (2018–2022), where it was leading in 52 technologies.

India is also emerging as a key centre of global research innovation and excellence, establishing its position as an S&T power. That said, the US, the UK and a range of countries from Europe, Northeast Asia and the Middle East have maintained hard-won strengths in high-impact research in some key technology areas, despite the accelerated efforts of emerging S&T powers.

This report examines short- and long-term trends, to generate unique insights. We have updated the recent five-year results (2019–2023) to show current research performance rankings (top 5 country results are in Appendix 1). We have also analysed our new historical dataset to understand the country and institutional trends in research performance over the full 21-year period. In select technologies we have also made projections, based on current trends, for China and the US to 2030.

The results show the points in time at which countries have gained, lost or are at risk of losing their global edge in scientific research and innovation. The historical data provides a new layer of depth and context, revealing the performance trajectory different countries have taken, where the momentum lies and also where longer term dominance over the full two decades might reflect foundational expertise and capabilities that carry forward even when that leader has been edged out more recently by other countries. The results also help to shed light on the countries, and many of the institutions, from which we’re likely to see future innovations and breakthroughs emerge.

China’s new gains have occurred in quantum sensors, high-performance computing, gravitational sensors, space launch and advanced integrated circuit design and fabrication (semiconductor chip making). The US leads in quantum computing, vaccines and medical countermeasures, nuclear medicine and radiotherapy, small satellites, atomic clocks, genetic engineering and natural language processing.

India now ranks in the top 5 countries for 45 of 64 technologies (an increase from 37 last year) and has displaced the US as the second-ranked country in two new technologies (biological manufacturing and distributed ledgers) to rank second in seven of 64 technologies. Another notable change involves the UK, which has dropped out of the top 5 country rankings in eight technologies, declining from 44 last year to 36 now.

Besides India and the UK, the performance of most secondary S&T research powers (those countries ranked behind China and the US) in the top 5 rankings is largely unchanged: Germany (27), South Korea (24), Italy (15), Iran (8), Japan (8) and Australia (7).

We have continued to measure the risk of countries holding a monopoly in research for some critical technologies, based on the share of high-impact research output and the number of leading institutions the dominant country has. The number of technologies classified as ‘high risk’ has jumped from 14 technologies last year to 24 now. China is the lead country in every one of the technologies newly classified as high risk—putting a total of 24 of 64 technologies at high risk of a Chinese monopoly. Worryingly, the technologies newly classified as high risk includes many with defence applications, such as radar, advanced aircraft engines, drones, swarming and collaborative robots and satellite positioning and navigation.

In terms of institutions, US technology companies, including Google, IBM, Microsoft and Meta, have leading or strong positions in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum and computing technologies. Key government agencies and national labs also perform well, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which excels in space and satellite technologies. The results also show that the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)—thought to be the world’s largest S&T institution5—is by far the world’s highest performing institution in the Critical Tech Tracker, with a global lead in 31 of 64 technologies (an increase from 29 last year, see more on CAS in the breakout box on page 19).

The results in this report should serve as a reminder to governments around the world that gaining and maintaining scientific and research excellence isn’t a tap that can be turned on and off. Too often, countries have slowed or stopped investing in, for example, research and development (R&D) and manufacturing capability, in areas in which they had a long-term competitive advantage (5G technologies are an example6). In a range of essential sectors, democratic nations risk losing hard-won, long-term advantages in cutting-edge science and research—the crucial ingredient that underpins much of the development and advancement of the world’s most important technologies. There’s also a risk that retreats in some areas could mean that democratic nations aren’t well positioned to take advantage of new and emerging technologies, including those that don’t exist yet.

Meanwhile, the longitudinal results in the Critical Tech Tracker enable us to see how China’s enormous investments and decades of strategic planning are now paying off.7

Building technological capability requires a sustained investment in, and an accumulation of, scientific knowledge, talent and high-performing institutions that can’t be acquired through only short-term or ad hoc investments.8 Reactive policies by new governments and the sugar hit of immediate budget savings must be balanced against the cost of losing the advantage gained from decades of investment and strategic planning. While China continues to extend its lead, it’s important for other states to take stock of their historical, combined and complementary strengths in all key critical technology areas.

This report is made up of several sections. Below you’ll find a summary of the key country and institutional findings followed by an explanation of why tracking historical research performance matters. We then further analyse the nuances of China’s lead and briefly explain our methodology (see Appendix 2 for a detailed methodology). We also look more closely at 10 critical technology areas, including those relevant to AI, semiconductors, defence, energy, biotechnology and communications. Appendix 1 contains visual snapshots of top 5 country rankings in the 64 critical technologies.

We encourage you to visit ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker website (https://techtracker.aspi.org.au) and explore the new data.

What is ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker?

ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker is a unique dataset that allows users to track 64 technologies that are foundational for our economies, societies, national security, defence, energy production, health and climate security. It focuses on the top 10% of the most highly cited research publications from the past 21 years (2003–2023).9 The new dataset is analysed to generate insights into which countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—are publishing the greatest share of innovative and high-impact research. We use the top 10% because those publications have a higher impact on the full technology life cycle and are more likely to lead to patents, drive future research innovation and underpin technological breakthroughs.10

Critical technologies are current or emerging technologies that have the potential to enhance or threaten our societies, economies and national security. Most are dual- or multi-use and have applications in a wide range of sectors. By focusing early in the science and technology (S&T) life cycle, rather than examining technologies already in existence and fielded, the Critical Technology Tracker doesn’t just provide insights into a country’s research performance, but also its strategic intent and potential future S&T capability. It’s only one piece of the puzzle, of course: it must be acknowledged that actualising and commercialising research performance into major technological gains, no matter how impressive a breakthrough is, can be a difficult, expensive and complicated process. A range of other inputs are needed, such as an efficient manufacturing base and ambitious policy implementation.

The Tech Tracker’s dataset has now been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022)11 to 21 years of data (2003–2023). This follows previous attempts to benchmark research output across nations by focusing on quality over quantity, key technology areas and individual institutions, as well as short-term, long-term and potential future trends. This update continues ASPI’s investment in creating the highest quality dataset of its kind.12

Both the website and two associated reports (this one included) provide decision-makers with an empirical methodology to inform policy and investment decisions, including decisions on which countries and institutions they partner with and in what technology areas. A list of the 64 technologies, including definitions, is on our website.13 Other parts of this project include:

  • the Tech Tracker website: ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker14 contains an enormous amount of original data analysis. We encourage you to explore these datasets online as you engage with this report. Users can compare countries, regions or groupings (the EU, the Quad, China–Russia etc.) and explore the global flow of research talent for each technology.
  • the 2023 report: We encourage readers to explore the original report, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power.15 In addition to analysing last year’s key findings, it outlined why research is vital for S&T advances and it examined China’s S&T vision. The report also made 23 policy recommendations, which remain relevant today.16
  • visual snapshots: Readers looking for a summary of the top 5 countries ranked by their past five years of performance in all 64 technologies (see example below) can jump to Appendix 1.
Example of the visual snapshots depicted further in the report.

Data source: ASPI Critical Technology Tracker.

Full Report

For the full report, please download here.

  1. Critical Technology Tracker, ASPI, Canberra. ↩︎
  2. Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power, ASPI, Canberra, 1 March 2023. ↩︎
  3. 21-year dataset with improved search terms and institution cleaning, see Methodology for more details. ↩︎
  4. In the early years, such as 2003–2007, some of the 64 technologies have not yet emerged and the credits assigned to top countries or institutions are too low to be statistically significant. Where this is the case we have avoided pulling key insights from the rankings of countries and institutions in these technologies. ↩︎
  5. Bec Crew, ‘Nature Index 2024 Research Leaders: Chinese institutions dominate the top spots’, Nature, 18 June 2024. ↩︎
  6. Elsa B Kania, ‘Opinion: Why doesn’t the US have its own Huawei?’, Politico, 25 February 2020. ↩︎
  7. See, for example, Zachary Arnold, ‘China has become a scientific superpower’, The Economist, 12 June 2024.
    ‘China’, Nature, 9 August 2023, https://www.nature.com/collections/efchdhgeci ;
    ‘China’s science and technology vision’ and ‘China’s breakout research capabilities in defence, security and intelligence technologies’ in Gaida et al.
    ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, 14–20; Tarun Chhabra et al., ‘Global China: Technology’, Brookings Institution, April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/global-china-technology/ ;
    Jason Douglas and Clarence Leong. “The U.S. Has Been Spending Billions to Revive Manufacturing. But China Is in Another League”, The Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/the-u-s-has-been-spending-billions-to-revive-manufacturing-but-china-is-in-another-league-75ed6309 . ↩︎
  8. Eva Harris, ‘Building scientific capacity in developing countries’, EMBO Reports, 1 January 2004, 5, 7–11. ↩︎
  9. These technologies were selected through a review process in 2022–23 that combined our own research with elements from the Australian Government’s 2022 list of critical technologies, and lists compiled by other governments. An archived version of the Australian Government’s list is available: Department of Industry, Science and Resources, ‘List of critical technologies in the national interest’, Australian Government, 28 November 2022.
    In May 2023, the Australian Government revised their list: Department of Industry, Science and Resources, ‘List of critical technologies in the national interest’, Australian Government, 19 May 2023, https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/list-critical-technologies-national-interest .
    A US list is available from National Science and Technology Council, ‘Critical and emerging technologies list update’, US Government, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf .
    On our selection of AUKUS Pillar 2 technologies, see Alexandra Caples et al., ‘AUKUS: three partners, two pillars, one problem’, TheStrategist, 6 June 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukus-three-partners-two-pillars-one-problem/ . ↩︎
  10. Felix Poege et al., ‘Science quality and the value of inventions’, Science Advances, 11 December 2019, 5(12):eaay7323;
    Cherng Ding, et al., ‘Exploring paper characteristics that facilitate the knowledge flow from science to technology’, Journal of Informetrics, February 2017, 11(1):244–256, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joi.2016.12.004 ;
    Gaida et al., ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, 9. ↩︎
  11. Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power. ↩︎
  12. See more details in the full methodology in Appendix 2. ↩︎
  13. ‘List of technologies’, Critical Technology Tracker. ↩︎
  14. Critical Technology Tracker ↩︎
  15. See Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power. ↩︎
  16. Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power, 44. ↩︎

Australia’s new digital ID system: finding the right way to implement it

This report reviews the Australian Government’s proposed plans for establishing a digital ID, and the ways the new system is expected to work. It explores the planned digital ID system, the key features of the approach, and the privacy and security protections that have been built into the proposals.

Australia has had a long and troubled history with national ID systems, dating back to the mid-1980 when the government failed to introduce the Australia Card. Since then, Australia has ended up with a clunky and inefficient process to identify peoples’ identities online. It has led to an oversharing and storage of sensitive personal data. As the Medibank and Optus data breaches has shown, this creates serious cybersecurity risks.

Now that Parliament has passed the Digital ID legislation, it’s critical that government gets the implementation right.

The report outlines that, although the proposed federated model for a digital ID system is commendable and a needed step-forward, there is a need to still address a range of policy issues that – if left unresolved – would jeopardise trust in the system.

Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is delighted to share its latest report – the result of a multi-year project on Artificial Intelligence (AI), technical standards and diplomacy – that conducts a deep-dive into the important, yet often opaque and complicated world of technical standards.

At the heart of how AI technologies are developed, deployed and used in a responsible manner sit a suite of technical standards: rules, guidelines and characteristics that ensure the safety, security and interoperability of a product.

The report authors highlight that the Indo-Pacific, including Australia and India, are largely playing catch-up in AI standards initiatives. The United States and China are leading the pack, followed by European nations thanks to their size, scope and resources of their national standardisation communities as well as their domestic AI sectors.

Not being strongly represented in the world of AI governance and technical standards is a strategic risk for Indo-Pacific nations. For a region that’s banking on the opportunities of a digital and technology-enabled economy and has large swathes of its population in at-risk jobs, it’s a matter of national and economic security that Indo-Pacific stakeholders are active and have a big say in how AI technologies will operate and be used.

Being part of the conversations and negotiations is everything, and as such, governments in the Indo-Pacific – including Australia and India – should invest more in whole-of-nation techdiplomacy capabilities.

Authored by analysts at ASPI and India’s Centre for Internet and Society, this new report ‘Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence: A techdiplomacy playbook for policymakers and technologists in the Indo-Pacific’ – and accompanying website (https://www.techdiplomacy.aspi.org.au/) – explains the current state of play in global AI governance, looks at the role of technical standards, outlines how agreements on technical standards are negotiated and created, and describes who are the biggest ‘movers and shakers’.

The authors note that there are currently no representatives from Southeast Asia (except Singapore), Australia, NZ or the Pacific Islands on the UN Secretary-General Advisory Body on AI – a body that’s tasked to come up with suggestions on how to govern AI in a representative and inclusive manner with an eye to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

The capacity of the Indo-Pacific to engage in critical technology standards has historically been lower in comparison to other regions. However, given the rapid and global impact of AI and the crucial role of technical standards, the report authors argue that dialogue and greater collaboration between policymakers, technologists and civil society has never been more important.

It is hoped this playbook will help key stakeholders – governments, industry, civil society and academia – step through the different aspects of negotiating technical standards for AI, while also encouraging the Indo-Pacific region to step up and get more involved.

AUKUS Pillar 2 critical pathways: A road map to enabling international collaboration

The AUKUS trilateral partnership presents Australia with an unprecedented opportunity to achieve national-security goals that have eluded it for decades. It could offer access to cutting-edge technologies. It can further integrate Australian, US and UK military forces, allowing more unified action to maintain deterrence against national and transnational actors who threaten the global rules-based order. Perhaps most importantly, AUKUS—in particular its Pillar.2 objectives—is an opportunity for Australia to pursue the long-sought industrial capacity necessary to defend its borders and its interests across a range of probable conflict scenarios.

A vision for Pillar 2 success

AUKUS partner nations implement operational and regulatory frameworks to co-produce, co-field and continuously enhance world-leading national defence capabilities in critical technology areas. Governments will provide leadership and resources to drive effective multinational collaboration among government, industry and academic contributors, leveraging competitive advantages from across the alliance to deliver collective capability.

Whatever the rhetoric, however, the benefits are far from assured. While the effort has had successes, including cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) / autonomy trials and landmark legislation, most of the hard work remains. Strategies and principles are only the beginning. Success or failure will hinge on the translation of those strategies and principles into the regulations, standards and organisational realignments necessary to operationalise the vision. The challenges are significant—from skills and supply to budgets, leadership and bipartisanship. But the benefits from this three-nation enterprise are worth the hard work to sustain political will and financial investment and to combine aspirational ambition with suitable risk tolerance to overcome obstacles.

Past debate has contributed valuable insight into problems that can threaten the full realisation of the AUKUS arrangement including for example, problems like outdated and dysfunctional export-control regulations, struggles with integrating complicated classified information systems and differing regulations and frameworks among the AUKUS partners. Yet, when it comes to fixing those problems, regulators and industry participants often talk past one another. Governments claim that mechanisms are in place to facilitate cooperation. Businesses counter that waiting six months or more for necessary approvals is an unreasonable impediment to innovation. Both sides have a point. So far, reform efforts have been unable to break the logjam.

In this study, ASPI takes a different approach. Rather than wade once more into the morass of trade regulations to identify obstacles and recommend fixes, we interviewed the regulators and businesses that implement and operate under those regulations. Our data collection involved engaging more than 170 organisations as well as key individuals. Our intent here is to provide an operational perspective on practical barriers to cooperation as envisaged under AUKUS—particularly under Pillar 2—and offer the Australian Government detailed and actionable recommendations that we believe would help AUKUS Pillar 2 succeed.

A constant challenge has been policymakers’ lack of understanding of the daily challenges faced by businesses striving to keep Australia, the US and the UK at the forefront of defence innovation. Similarly, myths abound among industry participants about the degree of restrictions imposed by regulations such as the US’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Officials make the claim that all necessary exemptions exist for AUKUS partners to cooperate, and that only minor adjustments are required to turbocharge transnational innovation. Businesses reply that narrowly tailored exemptions buried in mountains of rules are useful only for the lawyers required to make sense of them. This report aims to bridge that gap.

AUKUS is a generational opportunity for Australia. Its focus on critical Pillar 2 technologies has the potential to bring Australian champions to the world stage and lift the nation’s defence industry up to the state of the art in a range of modern capabilities. Done right, that can help to realise the robust industrial capacity that Australia needs.

Tag Archive for: Critical & Emerging Technology

Stop the World: The road to artificial general intelligence, with Helen Toner

Australian AI expert Helen Toner is the Director of Strategy and Foundational Research Grants at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET). She also spent two years on the board of OpenAI, which put her at the centre of the dramatic events in late 2023 when OpenAI CEO Sam Altman was briefly sacked before being reinstated.

David Wroe speaks with Helen about the curve humanity is on towards artificial general intelligence—which will be equal to or better than humans at everything—progress with the new “reasoning” models; the arrival of China’s DeepSeek; the need for regulation; democracy and AI; and the risks of AI.

They finish by discussing what will life be like if we get AI right and it solves all our problems for us? Will it be great, or boring?

Stop the World: The Sydney Dialogue Summit Sessions: Australia’s Cyber and Critical Technologies Ambassador Brendan Dowling

The Sydney Dialogue Summit Sessions are back!  

Today on Stop the World, we are relaunching our special series – The Sydney Dialogue Summit Sessions. To kick off the series, Alex Caples, Director of ASPI’s Sydney Dialogue, speaks to Brendan Dowling, Australia’s Cyber Affairs and Critical Technologies Ambassador.

This conversation covers all things cyber and offers a preview of some of the topics to be explored in Sydney in September. Alex and Brendan discuss the importance of security by design, regional security and the cybersecurity threats our region is facing, and the opportunities the digital transition provides the clean energy transition.

The Sydney Dialogue (TSD) is ASPI’s flagship initiative on cyber and critical technologies. The summit brings together world leaders, global technology industry innovators and leading thinkers on cyber and critical technology for frank and productive discussions. TSD 2024 will address the advances made across these technologies and their impact on our societies, economies and national security.

Find out more about TSD 2024 here: ⁠https://tsd.aspi.org.au/⁠ 

Guests:  

⁠Dr Alexandra Caples⁠
⁠Brendan Dowling

Tag Archive for: Critical & Emerging Technology

Tech and Trust: Safeguarding AI for Economic and Security Progress

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