Home Affairs Minister Clare O’Neil has set out the Albanese government’s goal to redefine the tenor of Australia’s national security conversation, and to reshape her portfolio.

In a speech to the National Press Club, O’Neil avoided the emotive language we have become accustomed to in this space over the past nine years. Instead, she stated that ‘we face a time of great global challenge’. From there she outlined where the Department of Home Affairs needs to evolve its work—in cybersecurity, immigration and countering foreign interference. The minister identified national resilience and maintaining the strength of our democracy as priorities.

Since the department’s establishment in 2017, Home Affairs and its portfolio agencies have achieved much. They’ve faced down and responded to all manner of crises. Their performance measures show notable achievements in disrupting terrorism and transnational organised crime. Home Affairs has been there, ready on many occasions to take on new roles when needed. Even with the return of law enforcement responsibilities to the Attorney General’s Department, this muscular portfolio is focused on responding.

O’Neil acknowledges the department’s achievements and the importance of continuing to do many of these tasks. She also posits that the department must adapt as the threat environment has drastically changed over the last five years.

It seems that the Albanese government wants Home Affairs to adapt from reactive responses to become more proactive. From cybersecurity to foreign interference, the focus is on evidenced-based policy. There’s also a more explicit desire to shape, prevent and prepare for future domestic security challenges.

The government’s focus on national and democratic resilience illustrates this new thinking.

The National Resilience Taskforce will consider how Australians can prepare for and return from crises. The taskforce will have its work cut out, especially given the continual and concurrent crises we’re experiencing. This is no small task—it will require big thinking and a willingness to make significant financial investments.

In his speech launching the Labor Party’s 1972 election campaign, Gough Whitlam pushed the term ‘social cohesion’ into the mainstream when he argued: ‘We can double and treble social benefits, but we can never make up through cash payments for what we take away in mental and physical wellbeing and social cohesion through the breakdown of community life and identity.’

This statement, among others at the time, set the foundations for an almost five-decade-long policy fixation on creating a homogeneous Australia with diverse characteristics. Initially, the government of the day developed policies focused on recognising differences (eventually termed ‘multiculturalism’) and tying society together.

The policy focused on identifying those differences and promoting the right of individual Australians to express their cultural identities. It also recognised Australia’s economic reliance on migration and the contribution that social justice makes to communities cooperating to survive and thrive. Arguably, multiculturalism also had a not-so-subtle message that being different is okay as long as you become part of Australia’s broader community.

Social cohesion has consistently been a key driver of long-term national prosperity and competitiveness. Cohesive societies are politically stable and their members can focus on economic growth and business development. Social cohesion makes competitiveness sustainable. It results from policies that reduce inequality and division by promoting the sharing of prosperity.

Social cohesion can’t be imposed overnight. It takes years to build, but is nevertheless brittle. Australian policy has in the past treated social cohesion as an end state rather than an aspirational goal. Often as a nation we fail to acknowledge that it requires constant nurturing and adaptation in response to changes in the social and economic environment, technology, and national and international political systems.

O’Neil’s focus on democratic resilience seeks to change the aperture of Australia’s social cohesion policies and strategies to focus on democratic resilience. It will undoubtedly have to have many of the same flavours as previous social cohesion policy. However, strengthening our democracy and Australians’ faith in these arrangements is critical to our domestic and national security.

Done well, it will generate new opportunities to accelerate economic growth and reduce the conditions for social division. It will enhance public trust in the government and its institutions. It will also reduce our vulnerability to several domestic and foreign threats during a period of unprecedented strategic uncertainty.

The Albanese government should develop and deploy a national strategy for social cohesion and government trust. The central aim of the strategy should be to draw together the various existing cohesion programs and policies. In doing so, the government should prioritise avoiding measures viewed as tokenistic engagement with cultural difference. Policy measures that fail to contribute to fighting exclusion and marginalisation, that don’t create a sense of belonging, promote trust, and offer people the opportunity for upward mobility should be terminated.

Further attention should be given to repositioning the government’s social cohesion policies to identify and mitigate the conditions that contribute to exclusion and marginalisation. One key element of that process is to move on from ‘forcing’ social cohesion onto Australians and excluding those who don’t accept it. Instead, efforts need to seek out differences and give voice to their proponents, and that needs to include initiatives that promote the democratic process.

United Nations peacekeeping operations are an extremely important part of the UN’s contribution to international peace and security. Peacekeeping expert Charlie Hunt from RMIT University joins ASPI’s Lisa Sharland to discuss some of the challenges facing the UN in delivering these important operations and the future of peacekeeping, and how Australia can increase its presence in peacekeeping operations.

In June, the US government released its first National strategy for countering domestic terrorism. Arie Perliger, director of security studies at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, joins ASPI’s Teagan Westendorf to examine the strategy. They consider the document’s four strategic pillars, policy gaps and the strategy’s potential to address the threat of domestic terrorism in the US.

In an excerpt from an ASPI webinar, Will Cathcart, head of WhatsApp, talks with ASPI’s Fergus Hanson about some of the challenges facing the world’s largest messaging service. They discuss end-to-end encryption, working in countries with different government requirements, and the importance of security to WhatsApp. You can watch the full discussion on ASPI’s YouTube channel.

ASPI’s Counterterrorism yearbook 2021 provides a comprehensive picture of the global terrorism landscape, emerging themes and recommended policy responses for governments and communities. Covid-19 has had an impact on global terrorism, but pervasive online social media platforms have played a more significant role, increasing terrorists’ ability to radicalise and incite individuals to commit terrorist acts and encouraging financial support to terrorist groups.

An overview of current trends and the terrorism landscape identified in the 8th Global Terrorism Index (GTI), produced by Australia’s Institute for Economics and Peace, notes a 50% decrease in terrorism-related deaths in the past five years, from more than 33,000 in 2014 to fewer than 14,000 in 2019. While the impact of radical jihadist terrorism has subsided in the West (though there’s now a regional concentration of Islamic State–supported activities in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa), there’s been a rise in politically motivated terrorism, from 13 deaths in 2014 to 90 deaths in 2019 including 51 people slain in Christchurch in March 2019. The sharp increase in far-right terrorism in the West is concurrent with the rise of strong nationalism, civil unrest and political violence more generally. Between 2002 and 2014, far-right violence accounted for 14% of attacks in the West. That grew to 40% in 2015 and to 46% in 2019 (49 far-right incidents out of 108 attacks).

In the yearbook, Ramón Spaaij and Christopher Winter provide an overview of lone-actor attacks and dispel the notion that ‘lone actors are truly alone and operate in a social vacuum’. They find that lone actors are usually active in online communities and signal their intent before carrying out their attacks.

Terrorist ideology now attracts larger, more diverse sections of societies because propaganda and online rhetoric are increasingly sophisticated, making the rapid spread of misinformation and disinformation harder to contain. Anne Aly outlines the intersection of cybercrime with online radicalisation and calls for a comprehensive approach incorporating online prevention and early intervention strategies.

Conspiracy theorists abound on the internet, and many have used the pandemic, the installation of 5G mobile towers and the Black Lives Matter protests, or the US election process, as a catalyst for violent protest or terrorist actions in 2020 and into 2021. Elise Thomas examines this in greater detail, assessing the rapid transition of the ‘Boogaloo Bois’ from online memes into extremist violence.

Online extremist and fringe groups are gaining more prominence and credence in the real world and are difficult to counter. While several global social media companies have attempted to reduce the exposure and reach of extremist narratives on their platforms, there are limitations. As the live-streaming of the Christchurch attacks in 2019 demonstrates, a recording can be disseminated so widely and rapidly that it’s impossible to eradicate. The online spread of propaganda continues to encourage lone actors to commit terrorist acts.

Terrorists’ tactics and the impact of emerging technologies are explored, with a clear acknowledgement that terrorist groups have always embraced new technologies. Levi West delves into the history of terrorists’ exploitation of technologies, from powerful weapons and extreme tactics to ‘low-capability tactics such as stabbings and vehicle ramming’.

New technologies, such as unmanned aerial platforms, 3D printing, artificial intelligence or deep fakes and—of extreme concern—biological agents, can all be exploited by terrorists. The regulation and potential negative impact of new technologies must be constantly and quickly analysed by governments to remain ahead of developments. That hasn’t traditionally been the case; legislation and capability investment to counter emerging threats has often lagged, causing gaps in efforts to prevent or counter terrorist actions.

Joshua Sinai provides a chronology of the use of hoax devices by terrorists from the turn of the century to 2020, noting that their impact was as significant as the use of real weapons.

Levi West notes that the ‘exploitation of communications technology has been, and will continue to be, an essential requirement for terrorism to achieve effect’. While online environments have allowed for the acceleration and growth of extremist rhetoric and incitement to violence, Covid-19 has had a compounding effect. Peta Lowe finds this particularly concerning for young people, who are digital natives and have spent a lot of time online during lockdowns.

Several authors highlight terrorist groups’ attempts to use the pandemic to legitimise their activities, spread propaganda and gain community support by providing charity to vulnerable groups. Jeremy Douglas and Niki Esse de Lang show that Jemaah Islamiyah provided family support, healthcare and welfare to Indonesians following the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami and the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake. Recently, the group installed 13,000 charity boxes at marketplaces across Indonesia and has used the pandemic to raise funds for its terrorist activities. Alexandra Phelan shows that terrorist groups in Brazil and Colombia have used the Covid-19 crisis to enhance their own power and legitimacy and provide local support where states have failed to respond effectively.

Lydia Khalil examines the impact of natural disasters on violent extremism, describing how a study of 167 countries over 30 years from 1970 found that an increase in deaths from natural disasters resulted in an increase in terrorism-related deaths and attacks in the following two years. The researchers suggested that the turmoil exacerbated vulnerabilities that terrorists then exploited. Khalil also points to research showing that the portrayal of government responses to natural disasters affects subsequent terrorism activities because poor emergency management, or the perception of it, can exacerbate existing grievances and manifest as terrorism or violent extremism.

The yearbook contains a new theme focused on the global challenges of countering terrorism financing and the nexus between terrorism and organised crime. The GTI estimated that the economic impact of terrorism was as high as US$104 billion in 2014, declining to US$26.4 billion in 2019. This is the fifth consecutive year that it has declined, and the authors assert that the improvement has been driven largely by the declining terrorism in Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria.

Gordon Hook explores global efforts to reduce terrorist financing through the Financial Action Task Force. Fundraising by terrorist groups has grown to range from small remittances by supporters to large-scale sales of oil and gas, investment in real estate and offshore tax havens, and sales of counterfeit medical drugs during the pandemic. While a reduction in the estimated economic impact of terrorism financing is encouraging, the task force reports that there are fundamental gaps in legal frameworks and compliance endeavours globally, leading to very few convictions for terror financing offences.

Sylvia Laksmi assesses the opportunities for greater global collaboration to diminish terrorist money flows in her review of the counter-terrorism-financing partnership between Indonesia and Australia. She highlights the abuse of funds donated to charities, the risks associated with new digital currency platforms and the requirement for appropriate mechanisms to be implemented to verify the digital identities of customers.

John Coyne, Daria Impiombato and Alexandra Phelan analyse the role of organised crime activities, including drug distribution, in funding terrorism. The 2018 edition of the GTI found in a study of 13 countries that more than 45% of terrorist recruits had criminal backgrounds. The largest sample was of 778 IS fighters from Germany of whom 66% had prior criminal convictions, while 64% of 319 foreign fighters and ‘would be’ foreign fighters from the Netherlands had criminal backgrounds. Analysis of their motivation allows policymakers and investigators to consider methods to target their activities.

In Australia, the facilitation of terrorism and organised-crime funding, through real estate, offshore tax havens and other money-laundering activities, should be addressed through long-proposed anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing legislation focused on estate agents, lawyers and accountants. Recent legislative amendments in Australia didn’t address this significant gap. Phelan says governments are responsible for economic regulation and protection, and should limit the ability of individuals and terrorist groups to launder money, legitimise their criminal financing activities or move funds to tax havens.

On strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism, community resilience is key and Australia’s devastating bushfires and the global pandemic provided strong examples of community resilience with lessons for counterterrorism practitioners.

Michele Grossman finds that resilience to terrorism evolves as communities experience and recover from crises and disasters. She stresses that resilience is a social process involving health, education, cultural, legal, economic and environmental strategies, complemented by interventions focused on an individual or group. Likewise, counterterrorism practitioners in New South Wales, Victoria and the Australian Federal Police highlight the importance of well-coordinated strategies as well as alliances between social science researchers, non-government organisations, governments and law enforcement and intelligence agencies to inform evidence-based decision-making on the intent, motivation and ideological drivers to violent extremism. The yearbook includes contributions on this from Pia van de Zandt, Aftab Malik and Madeleine Coorey; Ross Guenther and Debra Smith; Peta Lowe; and Sandra Booth and Natalie Davis.

Boaz Ganor examines lessons from Israel’s focus on counterterrorism over many decades and the key role of the counterterrorism coordinator, who reports directly to the prime minister and provides an effective mechanism for constant enhancement of strategies.

Maintaining and regularly reviewing Australia’s counterterrorism strategy and coordination framework, led by an independent and properly supported national security adviser, is crucial to ensuring that coordination and capability development are continuously assessed and enhanced across state and territory boundaries.

This coordination is increasingly important as terror risks in Australia expand. Multiple terrorism offenders are scheduled for release from prison over the next five years, and right-wing extremists are becoming increasingly organised and sophisticated. Our authors agree that the key to effective strategy implementation is to build trust and transparency in processes and decision-making, and to engage individuals and communities in design and delivery.

The yearbook provides governments and counterterrorism practitioners with analysis of current and emerging challenges and offers key policy recommendations. Emerging technologies need to be monitored for their potential use by terrorists. Technologies and methods for the funding of terrorist groups also need constant monitoring and agile regulatory responses.

The findings of New Zealand’s royal commission into the Christchurch attack also provide a strong framework for governments throughout the world to consider when developing counterterrorism strategies. While the commission recommended some tactical legislative changes, for example in firearms and hate crimes regulation, it emphasised a strong focus on leadership and building community cohesion, as well as embracing diversity.

Covid-19 has resulted in significant funding for important health and economic responses. While that funding may concurrently support strategies for preventing and countering violent extremism, addressing broader radicalisation factors such as socioeconomic inequality must remain a focus. Work to prevent and counter violent extremism must be further supported to develop it into a whole-of-system approach encompassing all actors involved in the prevention of terrorism, including governments, communities and businesses. Effective governance, credible institutions, the rule of law and trust in government and its systems are crucial for combating the activities of terrorists and delegitimising their actions in the eyes of the community.

An international terrorism specialist has found an ‘eerie similarity’ between the manifesto released by right-wing terrorist Brenton Tarrant, who murdered 50 people and injured dozens more in New Zealand last year, and jihadist propaganda issued before and after Islamist terror attacks.

Professor Boaz Ganor is the author of a new ASPI special report, ‘Terrorism is terrorism’: The Christchurch terror attack from an Israeli CT perspective, released today. He examines the events leading up to the 40 minutes of terror on 15 March 2019 when Tarrant, 28, attacked two mosques in Christchurch. Most of the victims were Muslim immigrants and refugees who came to New Zealand from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kuwait, Indonesia, Turkey, Somalia or India.

Ganor notes that, ‘Unlike many of the terror attacks perpetrated globally in the past few decades, the attacker was not an Islamist jihadist terrorist but rather a Christian Australian who was motivated by an extreme right-wing racist ideology.’

Reviewing the manifesto in which Tarrant attempted to justify his actions, Ganor outlines eight major points of similarity which highlight common justifications for violence and comparable mindsets of right-wing and Islamist extremists:

• Altruism: Like many other lone wolves, Tarrant sees himself as an altruist acting to secure the future of his people by protecting them from ‘invading immigrants’. He sets out to create an image similar to that built by Islamic terrorists, including many suicide bombers, who see themselves as protecting the Islamic ‘nation’ or the Islamic faith.
• Defensive action: Despite the cruel and brutal nature of Tarrant’s attack, he describes it as a defensive action meant to convey a clear message to the ‘invaders’ that the lands and countries of white people will never be theirs and that they will never replace the white race. A similar message is conveyed by Islamist terrorists who present their actions as defensive and as a response to colonialism and the conquest of the lands, resources and holy sites of Islam by ‘crusaders’ and Jews.
• The target: Tarrant positions himself and his Anglo-American reference group in contrast to the immigrant ‘invaders’. He declares war on the invaders much as Islamic jihadist terrorists declare war on ‘infidels’, which include any Muslim who doesn’t subscribe to their fundamentalist views on Islam as well as members of other faiths.
• Modus operandi: Tarrant’s attack was intended to scare his perceived enemies and deter them from continuing with their course of action. Similar motives are held by Islamic terrorists, who strive to create a rift between the citizens of Arab Muslim countries and their ‘corrupt’ governments.
• Revenge: Tarrant stresses that his attack is meant to avenge the killing of Western citizens, including children, who perished at the hands of Islamic terrorists. Jihadi terrorists often present their attacks as revenge for attacks on Muslims or for counterterrorism activity. This rationale carries a special danger, because an attack carried out as revenge by a right-wing extremist against Muslim targets may trigger a counterattack by Islamist jihadists, and vice versa.
• Restoring old glory: Tarrant claims that he acts to correct a historic injustice. He wants to restore the status quo ante, under which immigrants live in their countries of origin and Anglo-Americans live in the West. He stresses that he doesn’t have anything against Muslims or Jews living in their own countries. Similarly, Islamist jihadists excuse their actions by relying on an obscure ‘historic justice’, saying they’re acting to restore Islam’s golden age, when vast areas in Europe and other parts of the world were controlled by Muslim empires.
• Call for action: Tarrant stresses that one of his goals is to call the ‘dormant, individualist, nihilist’ Anglo-American masses to action against the ‘invaders’. Islamist terrorists entreat their target Muslim audience to shake off complacency and join them, either as foreign fighters in jihadi theatres of action or as home-grown lone-wolf terrorists in their countries of residence.
• Sense of urgency: Tarrant anxiously observes the wave of Muslim immigration into Europe and concludes that European culture is nearing an imminent demise or, as he calls it, ‘white genocide’, because of the differences in birth rates between Europeans and immigrants. This process and its severity in his eyes create a sense of urgency to act. This sense of urgency is also typical of the incitement messages promoted by Islamist terror organisations that rely on a ‘godly’ religious directive which they say compels them to take action.

Ganor analyses the different phases of Tarrant’s attack and looks for the lessons to be learned for preventing, thwarting and managing such atrocities, based on Israeli counterterrorism experience.

The report steps the timeline of Tarrant’s actions from his preparations to his arrest, and explores his right-wing indoctrination and radicalisation, mostly online, in the two years leading up to the attack.

Ganor discusses Tarrant’s livestreaming of the event, which caused outrage across the world. While governments and social media companies swiftly intervened to have the footage removed, the somewhat lawless nature of the internet meant those efforts weren’t fully successful and Tarrant’s manifesto and video remain accessible to those who want to find them. This has helped spread Tarrant’s message and has been the catalyst for terrorist acts in the United States and Norway.

Ganor emphasises the important role intelligence and law enforcement agencies play in gathering public information and using data analytics to identify people who may be undergoing radicalisation or who are intent on committing an act of terror.

The report is a compelling piece of analysis that provides insights into the mindsets of terrorists and outlines opportunities for preventing and disrupting terrorist actions at key points in the planning phase.

The cancellation of the memorial service marking the first anniversary of the Christchurch terrorist attacks because of the risk posed by the novel coronavirus, Covid-19, demonstrates how immediate threats can overtake the most painful events.

Activities across New Zealand and Australia—where the service in Canberra’s Nara Peace Park was limited to officials only—were expected to attract large crowds.

The tragedy is stark. Fifty-one people were killed and 49 injured when an Australian right-wing extremist attacked the Al Noor Mosque and Linwood Islamic Centre with firearms that included semi-automatic weapons.

The memories remain intense in New Zealand, but questions are being asked about what’s been done prevent such a terrible event from occurring again.

Justice is proceeding, but the legal process has been delayed by the challenges of gathering evidence of the attacker’s actions before the killings, including tracking his online life. He is due to face court in June.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the actions required were clear. Removing easy access to assault rifles was quickly legislated, with support across parliament, and a gun buy-back scheme was introduced.

But more complex reforms of New Zealand’s regime for firearms ownership and use remain a work in progress. While this is frustrating to some, the lesson from Australia’s experience with the Port Arthur massacre is that working through the issues in a measured way—including how to accommodate legitimate sporting, rural and hunting needs—takes time.

Authorities also sought to limit the propaganda value of the attack, which was live-streamed around the world. The public and media were asked not to view or share the horrific footage—and they largely complied. New Zealand worked with other countries and technology companies to take the issue of terrorists’ use of the internet to another level.

In Paris in May 2019, New Zealand and France, both affected by terrorism, led the Christchurch Call to tackle this issue that crosses borders and corporations. The initiative is now backed by 31 countries along with eight of the largest technology corporations. Mainly Western countries and US and French companies have heeded the call to action, which means that extremists will likely continue to use other means in countries less concerned about human rights.

The longer term focus in New Zealand is the royal commission of inquiry into the Christchurch attack, led by supreme court judge William Young and iwi (Maori tribal) leader and former diplomat Jacqui Caine. The commissioners are examining the actions of New Zealand agencies in the lead-up to the attacks and considering whether anything could have been done to prevent them.

The inquiry’s original eight-month timeframe was extended to 12 months after more than 1,000 submissions were received by the September 2019 deadline. It’s now due to report on 30 April 2020. While the commission works in private, it regularly updates a Muslim community reference group, ensuring the primary victims remain at the forefront and are told as much as possible.

The inquiry may not provide all of the hoped-for answers. So far, we know the attacker showed few clear indications that he intended to act on his extremist views. While talk of violence is common on online extremist sites, there’s little to differentiate the Christchurch attacker’s views from those of others who have not gone on to commit murder. Lone terrorist actors are successful because they give limited outward signs of what they’re planning to do.

The commission’s examination of state agencies will, however, give New Zealand a comprehensive understanding of how those charged with countering terrorism operate and where the gaps are. New Zealand and Australia need to draw on this thorough and considered investigation to plot the long-term direction of their counterterrorism capabilities.

The good news is that, when it comes to dealing with terrorism, our two countries have long worked together as a team. The peak body for both countries is the Australia–New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee, which brings the two jurisdictions together to examine the threat, develop policies and plans, determine appropriate capabilities and exercise together in response.

The Christchurch attack was perpetrated by one man whose path to violence may never be fully understood, and there’s no guarantee a plan will emerge to prevent a repeat. But the lessons we learn will help us deal with future threats—and they are real.

On 24 February, in Australia’s first public annual threat assessment, ASIO’s Director-General Mike Burgess put right-wing extremism at the top of his concerns. The numbers are small but growing, he said, and, as Christchurch showed, have the potential to be lethal.

This year alone, Australian authorities have prevented two far-right extremists from engaging in terrorism. They stopped one who was seeking to travel overseas to be a foreign fighter, using a mechanism better known for preventing Islamic State supporters from going overseas. Then a man was arrested on the south coast of New South Wales for attempting to procure firearms and develop improvised explosive devices to carry out an attack. In December, a man was found guilty of similar activities in an attempt to attack left-wing targets in Melbourne. He will be sentenced later this month.

While such investigations that foil terrorist acts tend to attract less attention than a successful atrocity, the resources and effort that go into them provide the best chance of preventing another massacre.

A year on, New Zealand is progressing well with immediate and short-term measures and demonstrating calm consideration in planning to take the community forward.

One thing is certain. Instead of inflicting permanent damage on New Zealand’s Muslim community or the community at large, this terrible event demonstrated the extraordinary resilience and cohesion of New Zealand’s people. The power of this cannot be overstated. Terrorists of all types use propaganda as their main weapon, but their words and actions can only take root in fertile soil.

What Christchurch showed the world is that New Zealanders refused to fall for the attacker’s simplistic narrative—and they are the stronger for it.