Tag Archive for: counterinsurgency

Military manpower has become a critical factor for Myanmar’s junta

Victories by Myanmar’s ethnic insurgents over the past three months have resulted in a strategic shift in the civil war, and in the balance of power in Myanmar. Manpower is a key factor in an existential conflict.

 Myanmar’s generals have always known that the armed forces, or Tatmadaw, could never maintain a physical presence throughout the entire country. To exercise control, they counted on a divided opposition, superior intelligence and mobile strike forces. They also relied on a large element of bluff. Operation 1027, launched in northern Myanmar in October by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA), and later joined by several other ethnic armed organisations (EAO) and militias, has effectively called that bluff.

Myanmar is the largest state in mainland Southeast Asia, covering 676,578 square kilometres. Much of it consists of rugged mountains, dense forests and major waterways. Vast tracts of land, mainly around the country’s borders, are thinly inhabited, or visited only by small bands of hunters, smugglers and refugees. Even now, after a major road building program begun in 2004, there are barely 150,000 kilometres of roads, of which only 40% are paved.

These harsh geographical realities have posed major challenges to central governments in Myanmar throughout history. Such difficulties have been compounded even further for the Tatmadaw which, ever since the 1962 military coup, has acted as an army of occupation, particularly in those peripheral areas dominated by the country’s many ethnic minorities.

No-one has ever determined the precise number of men and women in the Tatmadaw, but until the late 1980s it was less than 200,000 strong. This meant that large parts of the country had no permanent military presence and many others saw only an occasional patrol to show the flag. Even after a massive expansion of the Tatmadaw in the 1990s, perhaps to 400,000, there were still not enough troops to dominate the entire country.

Under the quasi-civilian government of Aung San Suu Kyi, personnel numbers were reduced, ostensibly to create a more professional ‘standard’ army. Since the February 2021 coup manpower levels have fallen even further, due to a rash of desertions, ‘defections’ to the opposition, battlefield casualties, recruitment shortfalls and other problems. It was estimated in May 2023 that the Tatmadaw was about 150,000 strong, of which only 70,000 were front line troops.

Most standard combat units have been undermanned, with some battalions reportedly down from the gazetted 750 men to less than 150. One so-called ‘battalion’ that surrendered to the TBA after the launch of Operation 1027 consisted of 127 soldiers. On another occasion, a Tatmadaw battalion that surrendered to the insurgents reportedly had only 41 men (although this apparently did not include the garrison’s casualties).

Even before the coup, one result of these manpower shortages was the difficulty of exerting coercive power throughout the country. Mobile units such as the 10 ‘elite’ light infantry divisions were kept up to strength and viewed as rapid reaction forces deployed to trouble spots as required. They were used to quell civil unrest beyond the capabilities of the police force and, as in the case of the Rohingyas in 2016-17, to conduct ‘clearance operations’.

Also, during the 1990s and early 2000s, many military bases, airfields and other facilities were built or expanded to manage the larger numbers of troops, and the influx of arms and equipment from abroad. They were located strategically around the country, but most were in, or close to, the ethnic Bamar-dominated heartland, where they could be more easily maintained and defended against hostile EAOs based in the country’s periphery.

Smaller outposts and strongholds were established closer to the combat zones. They were thus more vulnerable to attack. Like the police stations that existed in all major towns and villages in Myanmar, many were built as much to establish a token Tatmadaw presence as to support operations. Even the more heavily fortified camps did not have the manpower or heavy weapons to hold off a concerted attack by superior numbers of well-armed insurgents.

In this regard, it is misleading for opposition spokesmen to claim that 200 Tatmadaw ‘bases’ have been overrun since last October. This is not to take anything away from the TBA and its allies since the launch of Operation 1027. At least four major bases and several large towns have fallen to the insurgents. Critical land communications between Myanmar and China have been cut. Large quantities of small arms and ammunition have been captured.

At the same time, other EAOs, notably the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), but also the Chin National Army (CNA) and Karenni Army (KA), have seized the opportunity to launch operations in other parts of the country against a distracted and over-stretched Tatmadaw. There have also been opportunistic attacks against the junta by militia groups, including the shadow National Unity Government’s (NUG) People’s Defence Forces (PDF), often in conjunction with the EAOs.

This campaign is one of the Tatmadaw’s recurring nightmares come true. The generals know how thinly spread their troops are, and how difficult it is to fight more than one major battle at the same time. The EAOs opposing them are still divided at the political level, but they have managed to establish an unprecedented level of military cooperation. This has permitted them to coordinate attacks in force against multiple Tatmadaw positions, with dramatic results.

The EAO victories over the past three months have resulted in a strategic shift in the civil war, and in the balance of power in Myanmar. In responding, the junta faces many complex challenges, and difficult decisions. A key factor remains the question of available manpower.

It has long been the mantra of military experts around the world that to defeat an insurgency the defending forces require a ratio of ten to one, or even 15 to one, over the insurgents. No fixed ratio can guarantee success, but numbers do matter. In this regard, the junta clearly has nothing like the forces needed to wage an effective war on all fronts against the many disparate groups now arrayed against it.

Let’s assume, that there are about 45-50,000 combat soldiers in the TBA. The KIA and KNLA together number another 20,000 seasoned combatants. Add the reported 1,000 in the KA and another 1,500 in the CNA, and the total matches the likely number of the Tatmadaw’s front line troops. There are also believed to be some 65,000 in the PDF and 30,000 in local defence forces.

These numbers are estimates only. In some cases, they are informed guesses. A few respected Myanmar-watchers have put the total number of armed soldiers in all the EAOs at around 80,000. Whatever figures are accepted, however, it is clear that the Tatmadaw is in no position to mount the kind of concerted nation-wide campaign of which it so often speaks, let alone dominate the national battle space.

Even if army veterans, ad hoc militias, service family members and sundry other supporters were included, the junta could not marshal anything like the number of people—trained or untrained—required for a major counter-offensive. If it deploys its mobile troops to meet specific threats, then other areas are left badly exposed. The use of air power, armour and artillery gives the junta certain advantages, but ultimately only troops on the ground can win back territory and exert its will over the population.

One option canvassed by some respected Myanmar-watchers is for the junta to pull its forces back to the heavily populated and economically important heartland, where it can more easily regroup. That would be a hard decision for it to take, given the generals’ worldview and commitment to Myanmar’s unity, but it may be necessary for them to get through the latest crisis. It would not be the first time a Myanmar government has faced such a decision.

Critical to the resolution of all these problems will be the continuing cohesion and loyalty of the armed forces, for they are essential for the junta’s survival. There are internal tensions, and the Tatmadaw’s morale is currently low, for obvious reasons. To date, however, there have been no signs of a serious breakdown in discipline, a mutiny by a major combat unit, or irreconcilable differences between elements of the state’s coercive apparatus, of a kind that might spell the junta’s downfall.

The latest multi-faceted campaign constitutes the most significant challenge to the junta since it seized power three years ago. Indeed, it may be the most dangerous situation faced by any central government in Myanmar since the country regained its independence in 1948. In activist social media posts, there is a sense of optimism, if not an element of triumphalism. Some pundits confidently predict the disintegration of the country. Others  talk about the need to prepare for a post-junta government, possibly even UN intervention.

However, it is too early to write off the generals. As the US intelligence community has observed, for them this is an existential struggle. They have nowhere else to go. The junta has ruled out any negotiated settlement and can be expected to fight to the bitter end. The EAOs and NUG, too, have stated that total military victory is the only acceptable outcome. There is likely to be a lot more fighting and a lot more suffering before this civil war is concluded.

 

Some thoughts on strategy

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‘Strategy’ is one of those words that’s used so widely and in so many different contexts that it often seems to generate confusion. That doesn’t need to be the case, as the nature of Australia’s long-running involvement in the wars in the Middle East can be used to illustrate.

Writing in the Fairfax media several months ago about the West’s 15-years-and-counting war in Afghanistan, former chief of Army, now University of Canberra professor, Peter Leahy stated that, ‘Over time, our politicians did not tell us much of our strategy. There is a good excuse—we didn’t have one’.

Professor Leahy’s assertion warrants examination at several levels.

First, at the national (grand) strategic level, Australia unquestionably had a strategy, which was to serve our perceived interests by supporting our major ally, the United States. Indeed, that approach has been a constant in our defence policy for more than one hundred years, since federation.

In the case of Afghanistan, it could also reasonably be argued that it was in our interest to oppose the danger represented by the Taliban and, more generally, by Islamic extremism, as far away from home as possible.

Second, at the military (operational) level, we also had a strategy, namely, the theory of counter-insurgency warfare. Promoted zealously by Western generals since World War II, Coin operations were supposed to secure victory by ‘isolating’ the enemy, ‘pacifying’ hostile populations, ‘winning hearts and minds’, and so on.

But in wars in Algeria, Somalia, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, Coin has been exposed as an intellectually unsustainable theory: as nothing more than a series of hollow slogans.

In every case, the end result was a gradual slide into military failure, which in turn caused the gradual loss of public and, therefore, political support at home.

The reason for that failure is not difficult to identify.

Again in every case, Western strategists were extraordinarily dismissive of the values of the countries their forces invaded. What was their history? What did their dominant religious beliefs imply? What did their thousands of years of distinctive social morés indicate? How had previous invasions fared? How did they regard the West? And so on. The fact is that it is very hard to ‘fight amongst the people’ when most of those people don’t want you there.

In short, the West, including Australia, did have a strategy in Afghanistan—it’s just that it wasn’t a very good one.

Professor Leahy also criticised the Australian government for not identifying an ‘end-state’ for the war in Afghanistan. But the dogma that strategy must have a clearly-defined end-state is another questionable proposition.

In an ideal world, establishing an optimal end-state is a good thing. But ‘ideal’ scarcely describes the situation in Afghanistan, or Iraq-Syria, which by any measure is complex in the extreme. And in the real world, it is infinitely better to be flexible than to cling to a thoroughly bad plan.

Thus, the end-state defined by the second Bush Administration prior to the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 of to ‘win’ (whatever that might mean) and to ‘establish democracy’ were unrealistic. Ideology had usurped rational analysis.

It shouldn’t have been a surprise that West’s strategy failed in both instances, as it had 30 years before in Vietnam.

Under the Obama Administration, since about 2010, the West’s military strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq-Syria implicitly has changed to one of containment; that is, of containing the damage at an acceptable cost to the US and its allies while the core issues that are now driving those conflicts—civil war, religious war, and regional power struggles—play themselves out.

In the circumstances, that’s a reasonable objective. Indeed, such is the extent of the mess on the ground that restraining what’s happening is not merely the West’s best option, it’s pretty well the only one. It’s consistent with the objective circumstances in the Middle East; and it’s realistic in terms of what the West can do, as opposed to what it might like to do.

There’s a clear message here for the people who determine Australian defence strategy.

Paths to victory in the Australian defence and security context

Corporal Aspen Williams gives local children presents for Christmas in a small village on the out skirts of Honiara in the Solomon Islands.

RAND has just released Paths to Victory: lessons from modern insurgencies, a report that uses case studies of the 71 insurgencies completed since World War II to (among other things) identify the approaches that give a government the best prospects for defeating an insurgency. I’m the principal investigator and lead author, and I’ll speak on the study’s results at ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre on Friday 4 October at noon. I look forward to my visit to Canberra, not only for the chance to share findings but also for the opportunity to consider those findings in the context of Australian defence and security. Details on the study’s methodology can be found in the report. Here, I review the study’s primary findings, and I encourage readers of The Strategist to share their thoughts.

The first major finding is that good counterinsurgent practices ‘run in packs.’ That is, governments that defeat insurgencies don’t just do one or two things right, they do many things right, and they do many more things right than they do wrong. Read more

ASPI suggests

As usual, we’ve compiled a mix of new reports and articles for your weekend reading pleasure as well as events for the coming week.

First up is some defence industry news. The consolidation of global defence industry continues unabated with the announcement that the largest British company BAE and EADS (the parent company of Airbus) might merge. The trend of more business being in the hands of fewer companies has seen the emergence of a more globalised approach to buying and maintaining military equipment, something that continues to change the landscape here in Australia as well.

The Pentagon might be facing a 10% cut over the coming years, but Todd Harrison over at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis has a new backgrounder that suggests it might be manageable without cutting any major programs.

Moving onto regional issues, the Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre at the University of Adelaide has a new policy brief which examines different constructions of the Indo-Pacific region and the implications for regional security (PDF). The authors, Dennis Rumley, Timothy Doyle and Sanjay Chaturvedi, argue for an Indo-Pacific regional security construction that includes both China and the United States.

Turning to military operations, RAND has just released a rather timely monograph prepared for the Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan that examines eight cases of local security forces in counterinsurgency operations. Ranging from 1945 to the present day, the study investigates efforts to raise local defence units in Indochina, Algeria, South Vietnam, Oman, El Salvador, Southern Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Interestingly but not surprisingly, the findings are a mix of prescriptions for managing the local forces but also stress the importance of relations with the host government and the role of aid agencies in building local defence units.

If you’re in Canberra next week, there’s a presentation at the ANU by Dr Zifirdaus Adnan, Indonesian Language and Studies Discipline, University of New England on how Indonesian terrorists ‘left’ terrorism. Dr Adnan will present findings from an international project on the life stories of Indonesian jihadis which traced how they became initially engaged in terrorism, how some have deradicalised and ‘left’, and what this means for the future. The seminar is at the HC Coombs building, ANU, Tuesday 25 September at 12pm.

Lastly, ASPI’s Andrew Davies will join a list of other speakers headed by the Hon. Jason Clare MP, Minister for Defence Materiel, at the ADM Defence Workforce Participation Summit 2012 at the Hyatt in Canberra next Thursday and Friday, 27 and 28 September.

And, if you’ve got any suggestions for reports or events, we’d like to hear from you. You can reach us by email here.