Tag Archive for: Counter-terrorism

The post-caliphate Salafi-jihadi environment

In 2019, the global Salafi-jihadi architecture is very different from the one that emerged in September 2001, when transnational terrorism burst on to the international scene, or July 2014, when ISIL controlled more than 34,000 square miles in Syria and Iraq and thousands of young men and women were flocking to be part of its ‘caliphate’.

Many of the leaders of the Salafi-jihadi movement are gone. Some, like Osama bin Laden and Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, have been killed, and many others have been captured or are in hiding. And yet, despite having no territory and having lost many of their leaders, both al-Qaeda and ISIL continue to pose a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. In fact, one could argue that they pose more of a threat today, as the structure of the groups has moved from integrated to fragmented, making command and control more tenuous.

In 2018, there were at least 66 Salafi-Jihadi groups around the world, the same number as in 2016 and three times as many as there were in 2001. The Center for Strategic and International Studies has pointed out that in 2018 there were at least 218,000 Salafi-jihadis and allied fighters around the world—a 270% increase.1 These figures indicate that, despite 18 years of combat and the spending of trillions of dollars, we’re nowhere near ending the jihadist threat, as the ideology continues to resonate with people.

This Strategic Insight reviews the post-caliphate Salafi-jihadi environment, focusing on two issues: the franchising strategy of al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the evolving threat of online messaging. I highlight a change in the threat posed by Salafi-jihadis to Australia; it’s now less a ‘top-down’ threat than a ‘bottom-up’ one and emanates from homegrown individuals whose links with and understanding of Salafist-jihadism are minimal. Consequently, I offer three sets of recommendations for how Australia’s official counterterrorism community should change its strategies.

18 years and counting

This report provides a general overview of what successive Australian governments have done since 9/11 to counter the threat posed by Salafi-jihadi to the maintenance of international peace and security, to regional security and to domestic security.

Since 2014, the threat level in Australia has been assessed as ‘Probable’, which means that credible intelligence exists to indicate that individuals or groups continue to possess the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia. Both Melbourne and Sydney have featured in jihadist videos and publications.

Safety in numbers

The private security guarding sector is a vital piece of the national security puzzle that has not been drawn into Australia’s counterterrorism planning.

There are more than 120,000 licenced security guards in Australia.  The security industry has more than double the personnel of Australia’s combined police agencies and permanent Australian Defence Force. Private security staff provide the ‘eyes, ears and hands’ before any terrorist attack and an ability to be first responders after any security-related incident.

This report outlines the problems that are holding the guarding sector back from being an active participant in national counterterrorist plans and presents recommendations to enable the private security industry to become an effective part of our counterterrorist capability. 

Weapons of mass economic disruption

While Australia no longer rides upon the sheep’s back, strong economic and cultural links with agriculture remain and our economy is still intrinsically linked to agricultural production.

As the so-called ‘strawberry sabotage’ clearly demonstrates, accidental or deliberate biosecurity breaches present very real existential and economic threats to Australia that can harm agricultural exports as well as impact food security and trigger concerns about its safety.

ASPI’s latest research report ‘Weapons of Mass (economic) Disruption: Rethinking Biosecurity in Australia’ highlights the importance Australia’s effective and successful plant and animal biosecurity systems and border protection services to our wellbeing and economy and adds a further perspective on new and emerging threats that need to be addressed.

A primer on the ideological and theological drivers of AQ and Daesh: al-Qaedaism

In 2018, it’s more appropriate to see al-Qaeda as not only a terrorist group, albeit one that’s less engaged in mass-casualty attacks but as the progenitor and promoter of a distinct theological–historical–political ideology.

This special report aims to explain the persistent and enduring allure of al-Qaedaism as an ideology that is apocalyptic and conspiratorial.

By understanding al-Qaedaism, we could better counter the violence that it perpetrates, inspires and advocates and recognize that we’re engaging in a cosmic, generational conflict, led by individuals who corrupt the key tenets of Islam.

Counterterrorism Yearbook 2018

The Counter Terrorism Yearbook is ASPI’s annual flagship publication curated by the Counter Terrorism Policy Centre, now in its second year of publication.

It is a comprehensive resource for academics and policymakers to build on their knowledge of counterterrorism developments in countries and regions around world.

Each chapter in the Yearbook is written by internationally renowned subject matter and regional experts, who provide their insight and commentary on counterterrorism policy, legislation, operations and strategy for a specific country/region, concerning the year in review, and looking at challenges for the year ahead.

3rd Australia-Europe Counter-Terrorism Dialogue: ‘Transforming the New Threat Landscape’

Europe and Australia are connected in many ways. As liberal democratic societies, they share a common normative foundation of values that set the parameters for what the state may or may not do.

Based on that background, in September 2017 a delegation from Australia composed of practitioners, policymakers and academics travelled to Germany and Belgium to participate in the 3rd Australian Strategic Policy Institute – Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Australia–Europe Counterterrorism Dialogue, entitled Transforming the New Threat Landscape.

Understanding the BRI in Africa and the Middle East

This Strategic Insight aims to expand on Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith’s powerful, provocative paper, Australia’s management of strategic risk in the new era. Dibb and Brabin-Smith, two of Australia’s leading strategic thinkers, examined China’s growing assertiveness in our region. Here, I look beyond our region and beyond China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative (BRI) to highlight how China is expanding its influence in Africa and the Middle East. I examine some selected cases, such as Zimbabwe, Israel, Turkey and Iran. I also try to situate the BRI in President Xi Jinping’s grand strategy.

Preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa: mining and Australia’s interests

Australia has commercial and strategic interests in helping to prevent and counter violent extremism in Africa. Australian mining companies are engaged across the continent in Mali, Burkina Faso, Kenya and many other countries where there have been high-profile terrorist attacks and kidnappings of foreign nationals, including Australians. Those threats already affect the way Australian mining companies approach their operations on the continent. With rising risks to Australian nationals, businesses and foreign investment through the mining industry, violent extremism in Africa is a direct threat to Australian national interests.

Drawing on the findings of a newly published in-depth report, Preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa: The role of the mining sector, this paper examines how the Australian mining sector should step up efforts aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) in Africa. While the report notes that mining projects present risks that can exacerbate some of the drivers of violent extremism, it also highlights the potential to leverage the work of mining projects as a bulwark against violent extremism.

This paper shows that there’s scope for further cooperation and engagement with the Australian Government in the mining sector. The potential of the private sector in P/CVE remains underexplored. Consequently, the mining sector has an opportunity to lead by example in this field.

COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2017

This yearbook looks at those areas around the world where terrorism and counterterrorism (CT) are in greatest focus. Each chapter examines CT developments in 2016, including the terrorist threat being faced and how governments and others have approached CT through both policy and operations. Countries and regions covered include Australia, Indonesia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Turkey, UK, USA, Canada, Africa, Russia and China.

Through this first Counterterrorism Yearbook, in what will be an annual publication, we aim to promote understanding and contribute to shared knowledge of CT.

The authors of individual pieces are Anthony Bergin, Jacinta Carroll, Colin Clarke, Michael Clarke, Virginia Comolli, Greg Fealy, Fadi Hakura, Peter Jennings, Shashank Joshi, Lydia Khalil, Joseph Chinyong Liow, Olga Oliker, Raffaello Pantucci, Thomas Renard, Vern White, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Tag Archive for: Counter-terrorism

Indonesia has cut funding for counterterrorism programs. Australia should step in

Indonesia’s government has slashed its counterterrorism (CT) budgets, despite the persistent and evolving threat of violent extremism. Australia can support regional CT efforts by filling this funding void.

Reducing funding to the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNTP) and associated initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism (CVE) risks undoing years of progress, creating security vulnerabilities that extremist groups and foreign actors could exploit. To support regional stability, Australia should strengthen CT cooperation with Indonesia, ensuring funding for important programs and enhancing adaptability of CT efforts.

On 22 January, President Prabowo Subianto introduced a sweeping budget efficiency policy for 2025. This directive aims to reallocate 306.6 trillion Indonesian rupiah (Rp), equivalent to AU$30 billion, from the national state budget to support a priority state welfare program focused on food security. About a third of the reallocation will fund the administration’s program for free nutritious meals for school children.

Indonesia’s CT programs are facing some of the most significant budget cuts. The BNPT has been hit particularly hard, with its 2025 budget slashed by 433 billion rupiah. This cut amounts to 69.1 percent of its original allocation of 626 billion rupiah.

Although Indonesia has remained relatively free from major terrorist attacks in recent years, the significant cut to the BNPT’s funding has sparked debate over whether terrorism continues to be a pressing concern for the nation.

The agency was established in 2010 following the suicide bombings targeting the Ritz-Carlton and JW Marriott Hotels in Jakarta in July 2009. It has an expansive scope of responsibilities and significant access to resources and authority. It is mandated to oversee all aspects of Indonesia’s CT strategies. Additionally, the BNPT is led by a ministerial-level official who reports directly to the president, facilitating smoother inter-agency coordination.

While the BNPT has made progress since its inception, the recent budget cuts could undermine Indonesian CT efforts.

In addition, the broader implications of the push in the United States to defund USAID could affect Indonesia, particularly its already underfunded CT and CVE programs. Many such projects run by local NGOs in Indonesia face financial uncertainty. Defunding USAID will only make this worse.

Through its various programs in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia—including Indonesia—USAID has supported programs aimed at countering the root causes of extremism.

For example, the USAID-funded Harmoni program was designed to support initiatives promoting tolerance and resilience against violent extremism in Indonesia. The project worked with various Indonesian government bodies, local civil society organisations and community groups.

Such programs have complemented BNPT activities, particularly in areas where government efforts have fallen short. Civil society organisations play a vital role in CVE, as they maintain close relationships with practitioners in the field, have strong local networks and offer specialised expertise in the Indonesian context. Collaboration between the BNPT and these organisations is essential for the success of CVE initiatives.

The programs should not be abandoned, even amid major funding reductions. Failure to invest in counter-extremism efforts now could lead to greater security threats in the future, which requires an urgent need for alternative sources of support.

Moreover, analysts warn that a loss of USAID support could provide Beijing with an opportunity to expand its regional soft power. The China International Development Cooperation Agency does seek to expand its government’s influence in the region. While it’s uncertain whether China would fund CT and CVE initiatives, the void could heighten their interest.

The decline in terrorist attacks by groups such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State should not be viewed as mission accomplished. Experts warn that terror threats are constantly evolving, and that complacency creates vulnerability. Sustained funding for CT and CVE is important for maintaining and strengthening national security.

Australia may be Indonesia’s best option for cooperation on CT and CVE. The two countries already have a history of collaboration in this area.

The Australian government has recognised the importance of international engagement strategies on CVE, and of reassessing such strategies. A 2022 report titled ‘Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism 2022-26’ acknowledged the need to ‘re-examine’ its CVE objectives through to 2026.

Similarly, in Australia’s 2025 CT and CVE strategy, titled ‘A Safer Australia‘, the government outlined its commitment to strengthening international and regional partnerships and continuing cooperation to build capability in Southeast Asia.

Australia can step in to provide support and funding to Indonesia’s CT and CVE programs. Continued investment in counterterrorism is essential—waiting until threats materialise will only lead to greater challenges and higher costs in the future.

A political fix in hate-crime and terror legislation shows the government isn’t leading

After bowing to the opposition on mandatory minimum sentences, the Australian government needs to reestablish its leadership in national security.

Australia’s new anti hate crime amendment includes mandatory minimum sentencing for terrorism and certain hate crimes. The Labor government had resisted implementing mandatory minimums, but the Liberal-National opposition called for it.

Parliament passed the bill for the law, the Criminal Code Amendment (Hate Crimes) Bill 2024, on 6 February.

Introduced to the House in September, the law commendably extends protection against hate crimes to characteristics including gender, sexual orientation, sexual identity and disability. It also creates a new hate crime offence for damaging (or threatening to damage) property and motor vehicles.

As recently as 20 January, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, opposing mandatory minimum sentencing in the bill, told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation that such a measure would lead to ‘counterproductive issues’.

The bill as passed, however, includes mandatory minimum sentences for:

—Committing a terrorist act or being a member of a terrorist organisation (six years);

—Financing terrorism (three years);

—Publicly displaying Nazi or terrorist organisation symbols or performing a Nazi salute (one year); and

—Advocating force or violence through damage to property (one year).

The effectiveness of mandatory minimum sentences is debated. Particularly within the legal community, there are concerns that they pose risks to the independence of the judicial system. Their inclusion in the bill is best explained as a government attempt to avoid amplifying the public national security discussion.

The opposition called for the measures six weeks before the bill was passed. It criticised the government’s handling of a range of national security issues, including the response to an arson attack on Melbourne’s Adass Israel Synagogue in December 2024 and, more recently, the prime minister not being briefed on an explosive-laden caravan in Dural, Sydney.

Mounting political pressure appears to be forcing the government’s hand. Albanese reportedly overruled Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus to support mandatory minimum sentencing. This isn’t the first time Albanese has changed his mind on criminal and security policy. He has done so on terrorism and sex crimes against children, so this latest decision doesn’t set a new precedent.

After the addition of mandatory minimum sentencing, Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke quickly shepherded the bill through Parliament, and there was reportedly little need for negotiation with the crossbench in the Senate.

Albanese’s apparent change of heart is a defensive move, protecting the government from further criticism. But the government’s role is to lead on national security issues—something it has struggled to do since the High Court’s 2023 decision in the case NZYQ v Minister for Immigration to release non-citizen criminal offenders held in indefinite detention.

National security demands greater attention. It is rarely the most important issue to the electorate, but poor national security records have bedevilled past governments.

The attorney-general and home affairs minister each have overlapping national security responsibilities, reflecting the unresolved departmental divide of policy and operational responsibilities. The government needs stronger and clearer messaging and policy, driven by a dedicated spokesperson.

ASPI’s Justin Bassi and John Coyne have argued that the muddled national security framework is diminishing departmental capacities to respond to counterterrorism and related issues. Similarly, the unclear division of responsibility appears to limit ministerial responsiveness, opening space for the parliamentary opposition to cut through.

Another issue is the overburdening of ministers. For example, Burke is also minister for immigration and multicultural affairs, cyber security and the arts. Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong is also leader in the Senate. Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles is also minister for defence. All three are highly capable, but they have been forced to juggle competing priorities. At this moment national security needs unwavering focus.

To reclaim leadership on national security, the government should develop effective policies that can be announced and implemented in the short term. A national hate crime register, for example, would provide a central data source for law enforcement, policymakers and researchers. Better understanding of the problem will allow us to better combat it.

The government should also provide more resources for law enforcement and intelligence to establish a national unit dedicated to combating hate crimes. This could fall within the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission or a joint taskforce. Special operations currently address hate crimes, but a dedicated unit would provide permanent attention to this challenge.

Incumbent governments must assert themselves as national security leaders. Instead of conceding to implementing doubtful measures, the government should refocus its national security posture to develop effective policy.

Some offenders are too dangerous to be freed

Countering terrorism while preserving essential freedoms and holding together a stable and harmonious community isn’t an easy task, but it has been managed effectively by successive Australian governments and their agencies.

The Albanese government’s focus on national resilience to provide greater assurance to Australians in the face of rising global uncertainty is vital, and combines aims such as security, diversity and prosperity to increase our overall preparedness to withstand crises or incidents without turning on each other.

The repatriation of women and children from Syria earlier this year was a prime example, relying on the expertise of security agencies, police and community leaders to manage risks and assuage understandable community concerns.

However, the case of convicted al-Qaeda terrorist Abdul Nacer Benbrika is testing the way we prioritise public security and safety in a much more fraught way, with a key national security legislation watchdog recommending the abolition of the legal measure that has kept Benbrika behind bars beyond his original sentence.

The federal government should not accept this recommendation. The risk presented by some offenders is simply too great.

Benbrika will soon return for his final day in the Victorian Supreme Court to challenge his detention. Foremost among the questions facing the national security community is what to do with the practice of continuing detention orders or CDOs, which enable a court to order that a prisoner be detained beyond their sentence if they are deemed to pose an unacceptable continuing risk.

In 2008, Benbrika was found guilty of leading an Australian terror cell that plotted to blow up Australian landmarks and sentenced to 15 years in jail. He completed that sentence on 5 November 2020 but, based on assessments that he remained an ‘unacceptable risk … if released into the community’, the federal government sought and obtained from the Victorian Supreme Court a three-year CDO.

The court agreed to the CDO after considering an expert’s report and taking into account factors such as the safety and protection of the community and Benbrika’s participation or lack thereof in treatment and rehabilitation.

In March, however, the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Grant Donaldson, released a scathing report that questioned whether the assessment tools used by the courts in deciding CDOs predicted risk accurately.

Donaldson argued that CDOs should be abolished and non-custodial measures such as extended supervision and preventive orders used instead.

‘Detention in a prison is too profound a thing to be determined by prediction about the future based on this risk assessment process,’ he wrote.

The monitor’s role is part of the comprehensive system of checks and balances that is integral to Australia’s security. Our laws do need regular review. But our security requires the government and parliament to reject this recommendation.

We have to learn from history and our misjudgements. It might seem tempting to wind back laws when global terrorist groups are seemingly in retreat. But in January 2013, the government declared the era of terrorism over—only to see Islamic State rise within the year.

Offenders who are radicalised into terrorist ideology can be rehabilitated, but recidivism does occur.

Monitoring by security agencies is not a replacement for imprisonment, as the case of Ahamed Samsudeen in New Zealand showed. Regarded as a terrorism risk, Samsudeen was under surveillance by New Zealand Police. That didn’t stop him from entering an Auckland supermarket on 3 September 2021 and grabbing a knife. It only took the police surveillance team one minute to realise he was launching an attack and a further 30 seconds to shoot him dead. But in that time, he injured eight people.

We need surveillance and supervision, as well as rehabilitation. But these measures must be part of a comprehensive framework.

The monitor’s report fails to recognise that Australian communities are made safer, including from terrorism, through the combined effect of a systematic approach to managing threats.

The High Court has previously upheld the legality of CDOs. Rather than throwing out the practice altogether, a better approach would be to improve and reform it. Some adjustments could address the challenges that have been raised as in a critical academic report that questioned the effectiveness of the expert tool that assesses risk.

There’s an additional option to keep Benbrika off our streets. In 2020, the government cancelled his Australian citizenship on the basis that he was born in Algeria and hence a national of that country. This month, the government revoked his non-citizen visa. This likely means that if Benbrika is released later this year, he would be taken immediately to immigration detention to await deportation to Algeria.

But that might not keep him from posing a risk to Australians. Benbrika is appealing his citizenship and visa cancellation in the High Court. Even if he’s deported, Algeria might be unable to prevent his becoming a threat there or to Australians elsewhere. We would effectively be asking Algeria to do what we are unwilling to do. Deportation should be our last resort, not our first and only option, to keep Australians safe.

Australia has 20 other convicted terrorists due for release between now and 2027. Not all will be dual nationals who can have their Australian citizenship revoked.

Our resilience depends on a carefully balanced national security strategy that takes account of individual rights as well as community protection. A community is stronger if it feels the government is making difficult but necessary decisions to keep people safe.

That means maintaining a comprehensive framework that includes enforcement to punish wrongdoers, rehabilitation to reintegrate offenders, and prevention and deterrence to stop crimes. All are necessary for community trust, resilience and safety.