Tag Archive for: Cook Islands

If New Zealand wants to restate terms with Cook Islands, it should step up support

New Zealand wants to renegotiate its free association agreements with Cook Islands to secure increased transparency in its foreign partnerships. To do so, New Zealand will need to step up its own support and can learn a thing or two from Australia.

Following the announcement of an agreement between the island nation and China this week, New Zealand’s foreign affairs minister, Winston Peters, on Wednesday said his country and Cook Islands needed to ‘reset’ the relationship and ‘re-state the mutual responsibilities and obligations’. He stressed that consultation and transparency was most important.

His stance seems to raise the possibility that New Zealand will seek a power of veto over Cook Islands’ agreements with other countries.

But New Zealand must be careful not to overstep when Pacific sovereignty is at stake: every Pacific island nation is entitled to engage with foreign partners, including China. But Wellington also has a right to ensure that its support to Cook Islands is not jeopardised by engagement with other foreign partners.

This week the Cook Islands government released an action plan for its comprehensive strategic partnership with China. New Zealand is uncomfortable with the Cook Islands government’s lack of consultation with Wellington before the agreement. The deal’s inclusion of cooperation around sea-bed mining, diplomatic missions, maritime cooperation and humanitarian aid must be putting New Zealand even more on edge.

The plan identifies priority areas including economic resilience, environment, cultural exchange, social well-being and regional and multilateral cooperation. It reiterates Cook Island’s commitment to its One-China policy.

Seabed mining, noted as a ‘national priority for the Cook Islands’, remains a key motivator for Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown. The section on maritime cooperation also contains opportunities for cooperation on hydrography, geospatial and foreshore protection, maritime support and attendant infrastructure. This support could provide excuses for increased visits and engagement by Chinese security forces. Disaster management cooperation also strays into New Zealand’s defined role but will likely be limited by distance and emergency response times.

China already engages with Cook Islands at several regional-level forums on fisheries and foreign affairs. But the two countries now commit to bilateral ‘discussions’ before any regional meetings hosted by Cook Islands that China is to attend. China has also been supporting Cook Islands infrastructure development for years, building a court house, police headquarters, sports stadium, school and water supply network. However, not all support has earned favour, with some projects requiring substantial repairs after China’s substandard work.

The action plan notably lacks the security strings that much of the world was worried about. Although Brown promised no security deals, Wellington may still fear the slow-growing Chinese presence and influence that may accompany activities in the plan.

Brown now faces domestic upset. There was a popular protest of over 400 people in the capital (more than one in 40 people in the nation). Opposition party members have filed a motion of no confidence. They are frustrated that the deal is jeopardising the partnership with New Zealand.

In free association with New Zealand, Cook Islands is self-governing, but New Zealand assists in defence, disaster relief and foreign affairs. The 2001 Joint Centenary Declaration is a non-binding agreement to consult with New Zealand on national security issues, but Pacific security has changed dramatically in the past 20 years.

This is where New Zealand can learn from Australia’s new approach.

Over the past two years Australia has redefined competition in the region. Agreements with Nauru, Tuvalu and Papua New Guinea have given Canberra some degree of power to prevent other foreign countries from entering the same security or infrastructure space.

But it hasn’t come cheap.

In Nauru, Australia will provide $100 million in budget support over five years and ensure physical banking services in the country. Under the Nauru-Australia treaty, both countries must agree to any foreign engagement in Nauru’s security, banking and telecommunications sectors and consult on any engagement in critical infrastructure.

Similarly, in Tuvalu, the Falepili Union treaty states, ‘Tuvalu will mutually agree with Australia any partnership, arrangement or engagement with any other State or entity on security and defence-related matters’. In exchange, Australia is helping address Tuvalu’s climate threats and offering a special visa pathway.

Australia and PNG have just announced plans to restart negotiations on a treaty-level agreement. This follows Australia’s investment in a future PNG National Rugby League team.

In these agreements, Australia has highlighted the lasting value it will provide and has made it clear that foreign competition in the same space will prevent Australian support from reaching its potential.

If New Zealand doesn’t want Cook Islands engaging with China in certain sectors, including those outside traditional security, it will need to show commitment to developing those areas and delivering what Cook Islands needs. It can start by investing more in maritime security and infrastructure and addressing climate threats.

Stepping up in Cook Islands won’t solve all of New Zealand’s issues in the Pacific, with tensions still high in Kiribati and other leaders looking on cautiously. But they can at least start with taking care of their realm.

New Zealand’s trouble in paradise

New Zealand is taking too hasty and too abrasive an approach to Pacific islands, putting leadership in the region on edge. We see this in a bungled attempt to visit Kiribati that led to a threat to withdraw aid and in a tense public stand-off with Cook Islands over a looming agreement with China.

In January, Kiribati President Taneti Maamau told New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister Winston Peters he would be unavailable to meet during a trip by Peters to Kiribati. On receiving the news, which came only a week before the scheduled visit, Peters and the New Zealand delegation chose not to meet with another Kiribati representative and instead cancelled the trip.

Shortly after, Peters said New Zealand would review its aid to Kiribati.

While Peters regrets the publicity that the issue has generated, he has continued to stress that accountability works both ways in the Pacific. New Zealand had a responsibility to its taxpayers to ensure international aid is meeting its objectives, he said, adding that ‘the lack of political-level contact makes it very difficult for us to agree on joint priorities’ and ‘deliver good value for money.’

Peters isn’t necessarily wrong. It is hard to deliver support without talking things over at the right levels. But the sudden change in approach was abrasive and has only worsened relations. Other statements from Peters, such as labelling the Pacific ‘our backyard’, come with paternalism.

New Zealand is not alone in its frustration with Kiribati. Australian diplomats have struggled to engage optimally there for quite some time, and Maamau, to focus on domestic issues, suspended international diplomatic visits to the country in the lead up to its elections last year. Since his re-election, Maamau appears to have doubled down, delegating bilateral engagements to other ministers.

Australia recently faced a choice similar to New Zealand’s. However, Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles stuck with a plan to travel to Kiribati to deliver a patrol boat, even without an opportunity to meet Maamau. Australia ‘remains committed to its longstanding partnership,’ he said. Commitment through frustration is a healthy way to mend partnerships.

Australia also faces the challenge of justifying spending in the region to its taxpayers, particularly after the announcement of a $600 million deal to set up a Papua New Guinea team in the National Rugby League deal. But in that case, it is justifying additional support, whereas Peters has raised the possibility of taking away existing support that is highly valuable for the 120,000 people of Kiribati.

There is some concern that if the relationship continues to sour, New Zealand will be pushing Kiribati towards China. Beijing has an embassy in the country and police on the ground providing training and other assistance. While New Zealand has provided more than $90 million in aid since 2021, its support remains appreciated but not irreplaceable. Following through on threats to step away will only take New Zealand out of the contest, placing more pressure on Australia and the US to pick up the slack before China does. New Zealand should show patience and commitment to its partnership with Kiribati.

Now, New Zealand’s attention has shifted to a closer member of their Pacific family: the self-governing country of Cook Islands, which is in free association with New Zealand.

Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown says he will visit Beijing this week to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with China and will not need New Zealand ‘sitting in the room’. Brown said he had assured New Zealand ‘over and over’ that there would be no surprises in relation to security and that Cook Islands would announce the details of the agreement publicly once it was signed.

The country’s free association with New Zealand means that the nation conducts its own affairs, but New Zealand assists in defence, disaster relief and foreign affairs. We don’t yet know whether the strategic partnership agreement with China will relate to these subjects. Brown has reiterated that New Zealand has its own comprehensive partnership with China and didn’t consult the Cook Islands when agreeing to it, nor did he expect it to.

Again, in engaging with Cook Islands, New Zealand’s abrasive public response has caused friction. Last week, a Cook Islands proposal to create its own passports was abandoned after New Zealand, in Brown’s words, ‘bared its teeth in response’.

New Zealand needs to be cautious in its responses to Pacific island actions.

Even if the deal between the Cook Islands and China is revealed as disagreeable, its intentions might not ultimately be achieved. When details are available, New Zealand should encourage community consultation. It can still express concerns fairly and detail why certain objectives might affect its relationship with Cook Islands.

Stubbornness will not aid engagement with the Pacific family. Increasing support, not withdrawing it, will demonstrate what can be gained from greater partnership and trust.