The 2017 foreign policy white paper reiterated the need for Australia to ‘advance our values and our national interests’ and to deepen ties with the US. The revived Friends of Australia Congressional Caucus in Washington is a useful vehicle for pursuing both of those aims.

The caucus’s recent launch demonstrates the deep goodwill towards Australia on Capitol Hill. And it is already proving useful in the Trump era—last week, the caucus hosted a briefing on the white paper with the Australian embassy in Washington. But Australian leadership will be required for it to maintain relevance and contribute meaningfully to a closer bilateral relationship.

The caucus sprang directly from the infamous telephone call between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull last January in which Trump ‘badgered, bragged and abruptly ended’ the call. In response, more than 50 members of Congress called Australian ambassador Joe Hockey to express their solidarity with Australia. But now, as the phone call drifts into history, members of Congress start to focus on the 2018 midterm elections, and the Australian embassy’s ‘100 years of mateship’ campaign approaches its end, the caucus risks becoming a non-entity.

Consider the life cycle of the previous Australian caucus. It was established in 2003 to capitalise on the goodwill generated in Washington by Australia’s involvement in the Iraq War. The caucus was crucial in securing the passage of the Australia–US free trade agreement with overwhelming majorities in both houses, and in gaining the E3 visa, which makes it easier for Australian professionals to work in the US. These were impressive achievements in the caucus’s first two years, but it then lost its raison d’être and soon ceased to exist. Both of its original co-chairs left the House of Representatives in 2005 and one has since passed away.

Many congressional caucuses quickly lose meaning. There are so many caucuses on Capitol Hill that members of Congress simply don’t have the time to actively contribute to them all. Since 2000, the number of caucuses has quadrupled: there is now more than one for each member of Congress. Members of Congress are sometimes deeply committed to the cause of a caucus or two, but often are nominal members of many more. On average, senators belong to about 18 caucuses and representatives belong to 34. Caucuses seemingly exist for everything: there’s a bourbon caucus, a bike caucus and a shellfish caucus.

Caucus membership varies greatly. While many are bipartisan, some such as the House Tea Party Caucus operate more like party factions. Similarly, the Congressional Black Caucus—overwhelmingly made up of Democrats—has exercised significant influence for decades. In the 1980s, it helped spearhead legislation that imposed sanctions on apartheid South Africa, and helped override President Ronald Reagan’s ensuing veto. This year, it has been vocal in its criticism of Trump, especially over his comments after racially fuelled events in Charlottesville, Virginia.

The Australia caucus will never have that level of influence. But with effective leadership from Canberra and the Australian embassy in Washington, it can be a helpful vehicle for Australian interests. Both Republicans and Democrats agree on the importance of the relationship with Australia. The caucus has bipartisan co-chairs in both houses: Roy Blunt (vice chairman of the Senate Republican conference) and Dick Durbin (the second-highest ranking Democrat) in the Senate; and Republican Mike Gallagher and Democrat Joe Courtney in the House of Representatives, both of whom sit on the Armed Services Committee. Steny Hoyer, the second-highest ranking Democrat in the House of Representatives, attended the launch. More than 70 members of Congress have joined the caucus.

Regardless of these members’ affinity for Australia, they know that time spent with the Australia caucus will have a negligible impact on their domestic political goals, much less their prospects of re-election. There’s a clear and present risk that the caucus will drift into obscurity over the next 11 months leading up to the 2018 mid-term elections.

To avoid that, Australian leadership will be needed. The caucus has the drawing power to attract key members of Congress. Any Australian minister visiting the US should make time to address the group. Another idea is to create a mutual exchange system between members of Congress and Australian parliamentarians. Reciprocal visits would promote engagement between the legislatures. Finally, the Australian embassy could involve the caucus in next year’s busy program of World War I commemorations.

If the caucus can eventually outlive its previous iteration or outdo its level of influence, Australia will benefit from the group’s existence. But an influential Australia caucus in Congress will require sustained Australian effort and creative thinking.

Last Friday, the US House of Representatives passed an amendment to the National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2015 that included a reference to a recent issue: China’s potential participation in 2016 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, a biannual multilateral exercise that mostly involves the US and its key allies.  Other nations are invited but do not partake in major parts of the program. China was such a guest last year.

The amendment stipulates that if US Department of Defense invites Beijing to participate in RIMPAC, a similar invitation must be extended to Taiwan.  Not surprisingly, the news was received well in Taiwan. David Lo, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry spokesperson, welcomed the amendment, and Taiwan-based Want China Times ran the headline ‘House passes clause to invite Taiwan to RIMPAC’.

However, before jumping to conclusions, let’s have a look at the exact wording of amendment proposed by Rep. Mark Walker (R-NC):

‘The Secretary of Defense shall invite the military forces of Taiwan to participate in any maritime exercise known as the Rim of the Pacific Exercise if the Secretary has invited the military forces of the People’s Republic of China to participate in such maritime exercise.’

First of all, the wording of the amendment is quite telling. If China gets invited, the Pentagon must invite Taiwan as well. Let’s put the amendment to a simple test: which scenario appears less complicated? To invite both China and Taiwan-which would no doubt elicit a very loud and unhappy reaction from Beijing? Or to not invite China in the first place and be done with it? It’s rather obvious that despite the excitement on Taiwan’s side, the amendment is more about the absence of China at RIMPAC 2016 than about a potential Taiwanese presence.

It’s likely that Walker’s amendment will make it to the final version of NDAA that will eventually land on President Obama’s desk. Such a provision would be hardly controversial for Republicans who are in the majority, and even if the Senate version didn’t include a similar amendment in its version of the NDAA, it is unlikely to be removed during the reconciliation process of both versions of NDAA. President Obama may veto the bill but the reason won’t be one, uncontroversial amendment, but rather disputes over the Overseas Contingency Operations budget that became a back door for the Congress to bypass restrictions imposed by sequestration.

There is certainly pro-Taiwan element in the amendment. Support for Taiwan has always been a bipartisan issue, a rare quality in the Congress engaged in political bickering between the GOP-controlled legislature and Obama administration. For congressional friends of Taiwan, this amendment is a win-win proposition. It demonstrates Congress’ resolve vis-à-vis China and, at the same time, inclusion of Taiwan in amendments to NDAA is certain to generate positive news in Taipei.

However, amendment or not, China is unlikely to receive an invitation to join RIMPAC 2016 anyway. China’s debut participation in RIMPAC last year was controversial from the onset. Moreover, to dispel any positive impressions, Beijing put on a comical twist on its participation by sending a spy ship that was monitoring the exercises from a distance. By doing so, Beijing gave Washington a golden opportunity to emphasise that just as China did not break any rule by sending such a vessel, nor does the US violate standing international law when it conducts patrols and surveillance outside China’s territorial waters and within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). That’s worth noting because it’s Beijing who insists that it has the right to regulate third party military activity within the 200 nautical miles zone delimitating its EEZ. If the Pentagon wanted to make Chinese participation in the exercise look awkward, it would have hardly do better than the Chinese themselves. Beijing has now upped the ante in its neighbourhood once again by embarking on large-scale island reclamation in the South China Sea, prompting the US to strengthen their patrols in the area. In the light of this development, the chances that Washington would invite China back next year are not exactly high. Thus, the amendment and the publicity it received is—in practical terms—much ado about nothing.

The eagerness on Taiwan’s side is easy to understand. Lacking broad international recognition, multilateral exercises like RIMPAC are typically a no-go for Taiwan. This is not to say that its military does not have opportunities to train with foreign counterparts. There are regular exercises with the Singaporean army in Taiwan while Taiwanese F-16s instructors train at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona. However, the wide array of regular activities simply slips under the radar because both sides need to keep it low-profile. Therefore, if there is a chance to acknowledge the US–Taiwan partnership publicly, it is typically in a manner similar to the reporting on this NDAA amendment.

But if Taiwan were to attend RIMPAC 2016, what would its participation look like? This is of course pure speculation, but it’s plausible that Taiwan’s navy would send the newly commissioned fast replenishment ship AOE-532 Panshih rather than a surface combatant. A lightly-armed support ship would certainly be less controversial than, for example, a Kidd-class destroyer or Lafayette-class frigate. When contemplating Taiwan’s participation, one needs to understand that for Taiwan it is about symbolism first and practical experiences second. A one-off invitation would not mean much in terms of experience but it would carry great symbolic significance—well served by sending the biggest ship in Taiwan’s navy inventory. But for now, Taiwan’s participation in RIMPAC remains a dream.