Tag Archive for: community engagement

How to fill gaps in AUKUS communication efforts

Gaps in AUKUS communication strategies limit public understanding of its benefits and allow malign actors, such as China and Russia, to sway public opinion.

A roundtable held by ASPI’s Washington office on 3 December served as a forum to address these gaps. It involved experts from academia, government and think tanks, and was the first in a series of roundtables aiming to improve AUKUS messaging strategies and public understanding through open and inclusive dialogue.

The question at the heart of this discussion was: ‘What are the most significant obstacles each AUKUS partner nation faces in effectively communicating the program’s public benefits, and how can these be addressed to build stronger public support?’

Early on, the participants identified the need to align the narratives surrounding AUKUS into a story.

A challenge in writing this story is to define what importance AUKUS has for the public in the future. AUKUS is fundamentally a security partnership, but it presents an opportunity for partner nations to reshape their economies by revitalising their defence industries and integrating them with each others’.

This promise of economic stimulation needs to be at the centre of the story that is communicated to the public. Citizens must be shown how investment into the defence priorities of AUKUS will improve their lives. Beyond economic growth, AUKUS’s technological advancements could revolutionise defence technologies. This could deliver broader societal benefits similar to the internet and GPS, which were both military inventions.

There should be an understanding from AUKUS governments that multiple levels of messaging will be needed to help AUKUS maintain its political resilience. These include the international, national and local levels.

Subnational messaging through local politicians and community leaders will be essential to building support for AUKUS in their relevant constituencies. These local voices can fight perceptions that defence is a dirty industry. They can also better define the immediate benefit to their constituents, framing the growth of defence industries as a net positive for their regions as it facilitates economic development and positions them as centres of innovation.

These communication channels can counter misinformation and politicisation surrounding AUKUS by increasing the transparency of the initiative’s objectives. Public engagement will dispel false narratives before they arise and ensure that AUKUS objectives cannot be co-opted for political advantage. It is also important that each nation has its own approach to messaging around AUKUS that reflects the concerns of its population.

Canberra currently faces a greater scrutiny for its AUKUS spending because Australians are more knowledgeable on the program than those of other partner nations. The government must acknowledge the tradeoff between massive spending on AUKUS and spending on issues facing young Australians, such as a cost-of-living crisis.  To justify this spending, the Australian government must communicate beyond the security benefits of the program and highlight the economic benefit AUKUS will bring to Australia, particularly in the form of high-paying science and technology jobs.

Britain must highlight the technological benefits of AUKUS, particularly for rejuvenating and sustaining the nation’s submarine industry for decades to come. Brexit significantly hampered London’s approach to economic engagement and technological cooperation with the EU, and AUKUS can provide some economic reprieve. Subnational messaging will be important to celebrate economic and technological wins in the post-Brexit context.

In the United States, foreign policy is rarely a voting issue, but the economy almost always is. Subnational messaging can be used to present economic benefits of AUKUS with a focus on domestic issues, rather than those on the other side of the planet. In Washington, it will be important to drive home the point that AUKUS is a counter to China’s growing influence to justify congressional spending and maintain its status as a bipartisan issue.

AUKUS will bring about change and technological advancement, but we may have to wait for it. It is difficult to sell benefits that are not immediate, but a constant focus on the future is necessary to maintain support for AUKUS in all three nations.

We must include local communities in the response to coronavirus

Communities play an essential role in reducing the impact of disasters. In Australia, we saw this in the recent unprecedented bushfires, when neighbours helped each other to battle flames, evacuate the vulnerable, and feed and shelter the displaced. Over 90% of firefighters were community-based volunteers.

But is there a role for local community action in responding to the coronavirus pandemic? Statements of government officials and discussions in the media would suggest not. The messaging has focused mainly on describing national-level efforts to scale up the capacity of hospitals and healthcare systems to meet the anticipated huge spike in demand, and on encouraging individuals to thoroughly wash their hands and not engage in panic-buying of face masks and other supplies. Any mention of local community action is conspicuously absent.

Actually, it’s more than absent: it’s implicitly being discouraged. Government planning for important ‘social distancing’ measures to slow the spread of the pandemic, such as prohibiting community gatherings, closing schools and quarantining suspected cases, is inadvertently disempowering local communities. It sends the subliminal message that ‘community’ itself is a threat. And that idea is being reinforced by the growing public awareness that people infected with coronavirus can be contagious before they exhibit symptoms. In these circumstances, how can we trust even our closest neighbours?

It might be bearable to sacrifice community action for a short period in order to slow infection rates if the government were able to provide additional health support. However, this seems unlikely. Most analysis suggests that even in a moderately severe pandemic, our healthcare system will be overwhelmed. Hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of Australians will need to self-isolate in their homes while they recover from the illness or help loved ones recover.

This is a recipe for despair on an unprecedented scale, but the impact will be reduced in local communities that have taken the initiative to prepare for the pandemic.

Some weeks ago, our neighbourhood in Canberra got together to discuss the emerging pandemic and how we could support each other through the challenges ahead. Many of our neighbours are over 55 and therefore at higher risk of complications and death from the virus. Some live alone. Others look after children or grandchildren. All came to the meeting because they were deeply concerned and wanted to share their concerns with their neighbours. We were also searching for ways to interrupt the growing sense of isolation that seems intrinsic to this crisis.

We reviewed the official advice about how to prevent contagion and explored ways we could prepare for being confined to our homes and for treating the illness. We agreed that we would circulate mobile phone numbers and use a community mailing list to keep each other informed if any of us contracted or suspected we had contracted the virus.

We would also use the mailing list to request help if any of us who were isolated at home ran out of food or other essentials, so that neighbours could assist by dropping off what was required. We agreed we would regularly communicate with each other about developments during the pandemic and use our community network to share questions we were having trouble answering.

Psychologists point out that people in threatening situations feel less stress and fear when they affiliate with others experiencing similar emotions. That was certainly our experience at the end of our two-hour discussion. Simply sharing our thoughts and concerns was hugely therapeutic. That, combined with the measures we had agreed to take, meant that we left the meeting feeling that some of the load had been lifted and more confident in our ability to meet the serious challenges that lie ahead.

Unfortunately, given how rapidly the virus is spreading in Australia, other local communities may now need to meet virtually, rather than face to face, to prepare their plans. But most are unlikely to do so without strong encouragement, support and guidance from governments at all levels. As a starting point, it would be useful for governments to begin emphasising that in a pandemic social distancing doesn’t have to mean social isolation.

Community engagement to counter radicalisation is a team effort

Image courtesy of Flickr user JamesDPhotography

While community engagement is a commonly recognised by Australian law enforcement, security agencies and community groups as a mechanism for social cohesion and countering radicalisation, successfully engaging with target audiences is challenging. Given the downward trend of the ages of Australians engaging in violent extremism, it’s vital that community engagement programs appeal to young people’s interests. Community elders or religious leaders who are often involved in such programs may not always fit that category.

The Australian Intervention & Support Hub (AISH), a joint initiative between the Australian National University and Deakin University, recently launched its archive of studies on radicalisation and terrorism. At the launch, Hub co-director Greg Barton identified ‘secondary intervention’—the practice of identifying potential extremists and providing them with mechanisms for community engagement and family support—as an area Australian law enforcement and security agencies need to improve on.

The underlying theory informing the Hub’s ongoing research on understanding why people join Islamic State is Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. Maslow’s Hierarchy includes belonging, self-actualisation and esteem as drivers influencing people’s behaviour. The importance of those factors in the context of Islamic State recruitment has been highlighted by Barton, who referred to ‘the need for friendship, belonging, for being esteemed, for being part of a larger team and having purpose’ as potential characteristics of young people vulnerable to radicalisation.

One Victorian government reference describes ‘public participation’ as one avenue of community engagement, with an emphasis on  the importance of affiliation or identity, such as with sport clubs. Given Australia’s rich sporting culture which provides avenues for achievement and has been greatly strengthened by diversity, it’s worth exploring how it can be leveraged to increase social cohesion among young people, some of whom might be considerably vulnerable to extremism.

Earlier this year, the Australian Rugby League Commission was one organisation which received some of the Multicultural NSW’s Community in Partnership (COMPACT) program funding ($8 million) to counter violent extremism across the state. The focus of the COMPACT grant is to facilitate early intervention by finding alternative pathways for young people who could be attracted to violent extremism and develop community resilience to reduce the impact of radicalisation. In making the announcement, Minister for Multicultural Affairs John Ajaka stressed the need to use sporting venues rather than places of worship to reach relevant individuals. While it’s difficult to measure results at this point, similar programs indicate potential for success.

One such program is the Australian Football League’s Bachar Houli Cup and Leadership Program, which has been granted $625,000 in federal government funding to facilitate a youth mentoring program, traineeships and transitional pathways to employment, as well as Iftar and Eid events to engage with communities and foster cultural awareness. Given the AFL has been tarnished with recent instances of intolerance, this is one way for sporting bodies to celebrate diversity and acknowledge its key role in Australian society.

The program appears to build on the ‘More Than a Game’ program, developed by the AFL in association with the Australian Federal Police, Western Bulldogs Football Club and the Hobson’s Bay Council. That program uses to sport to engage with young men whose experiences may make then vulnerable to radicalisation, to address issues of social cohesion, encourage community participation and provide skills to address intolerant messages. The partnership with law enforcement is significant given the AFP’s recognition of the need to engage third parties in the community to counter violent extremism.

A Victoria University evaluation found that such programs succeeded in developing resilience and cross-cultural awareness in the community, with particular success in engaging at-risk youth in civic engagement and responsibility. It also highlighted the capacity to develop pro-social behaviours, trust and a greater sense of social inclusion. However, it gave consideration to the difficulties in measuring the impact of sports participation on crime and violence prevention. So instead of supporting such programs specifically to counter violent extremism, perhaps it’s more sensible to measure their success when we use them to enhance community engagement, with CVE a by-product of this. That’s significant as it’s important those programs aren’t used to generalise particular groups as vulnerable to radicalisation.

In order for such sporting programs to succeed, they need to address factors which might obstruct individuals from engaging with the broader community. Western Sydney women’s AFL pioneer Amna Karra-Hassan plays with Muslim women who play their sport in body tights and hijabs as part of the uniform. Programs which facilitate engagement opportunities for women are particularly significant given the rising number of young Australian women who have joined extremist activities overseas.

Those initiatives won’t work for every individual, and it would be counter-productive to try to force everyone who could be deemed ‘at-risk’ of radicalisation into football teams of some variety if they have no genuine interest in the game. Furthermore, selection criteria for those programmes is unclear, as is how they’re publicised within communities. That potentially highlights a vital gap in communication strategy, which is one aspect of community engagement which cannot neglected. However, such programs are a positive step in the right direction.Australia would be wise to continue to tap into the interests of young people to identify areas which could foster social inclusion and make them resilient to extremist ideologies before they even encounter them.

Countering violent extremism: easy does it

Raising the red flag

Countering violent extremism (CVE) may mean different things to different people, but the actual idea of CVE has become the focal point for those working to combat radicalisation. The Attorney-General’s Department identifies their focus as one where ‘countering violent extremism is a shared effort between all Australian governments. The objective of the countering violent extremism programme is to combat the threat posed by home-grown terrorism and to discourage Australians from travelling overseas to participate in conflicts’. Building resilience against terrorism has been identified as focus of the Canadian Government’s counter-terrorism strategy and response. As with many European countries, both Canada and Australia are directing their attention and efforts toward ‘at risk’ communities in an effort to counter radicalisation.

Both Australia and Canada see the de-radicalisation of residents as being of paramount importance. Both countries’ de-radicalisation efforts include preventing and responding to radicalisation. That requires a response that focuses attention on those who are already radicalised or on a path toward being so. Those processes face a number of challenges, one of which is the fact that often the results of any de-radicalisation program will be evident after radicalised individuals are identified as suspects or even offenders. Communities may find this challenging due to concerns that reporting may lead to arrest, detention, prosecution and sentencing.

I would argue that any solution to the challenges ‘at risk’ communities face must first and foremost be met with proactive strategies around engagement and development in those communities. Such engagement must be with the service agencies already active in the communities and can include both cultural and non-cultural groups. The method and actualisation of such development needs to be done with those engaged groups and not implemented through outside organisations. A strategy that’s devoid of community development, building relationships and developing partnerships with those who have credibility in that community may be destined to the same failure we have seen in the past. Leveraging formal and informal community leaders and what they have already built within the community will provide opportunities for local development and the construction of a stronger, heathier and safer society. That can be done through the building collaborative programs which have been successful or feeding off another successful initiative to build a new program. It’s that construct that will allow us to manage the CVE issue in the long term and as well build the relationships we will need today to counter the radicalisation we have seen and will continue to see.

Equally important to de-radicalisation processes is what’s being asked of parents and family members in high-risk communities. Although the importance of being informed in order to take action to combat the scourge of radicalisation is recognised by those, it’s extremely difficult for them to raise a red flag to authorities. As with parents trying to prevent their children from, for example, dealing drugs, parents of a potentially radicalised child are first and foremost trying to save them. This ultimately makes it difficult for concerned parents to contact the police and security agencies if they feel their child will then face social and legal consequences. Those parents will want to find another solution that yields the same outcome of separating the youth from the activity.

We must ensure that there are opportunities for parents or family members to come forward with their concerns without fearing that their child will be branded as radicalised, because not every young person in those circumstances becomes radicalised to the point of acting out and not every radicalised person becomes violent. Sociologists state that a youth needs to have a ‘cognitive opening’ when that individual has a chance to engage with charismatic protagonist, in person or on the internet, when becoming radicalised. It’s at this point and even earlier, building relationships that can alleviate the threat, where we must engage, separate and manage the youth and the situation. At this crucial time, engagement with communities and an aim of disrupting activities prior to radicalisation must be at the forefront of any strategy.

So as we move forward with our plans and programs to combat and counter violent extremism, let’s remember that we want parents and family members as our willing supporters and partners, as their goal and ours goal—to separate the child from the activity and to build safer communities—aren’t that different. As such, building human resilience should be key to any future strategies to counter violent extremism.

Radicalisation and community engagement

In Australia and in my home country of Canada, we’re seeing various responses to radicalisation. Putting security and police officials at the front of the reintegration and de-radicalisation efforts is important, but they won’t be effective without assistance from the communities that they seek to engage. Indeed a collaborative approach is necessary so that communities and officials are jointly committed to finding solutions.

First let’s ask ourselves ‘how big of a problem is radicalisation and is it growing?’ In 2014 the Canadian security agency reported that the number of Canadians in theatre with ISIS grew from approximately 130 to more than 300. Speaking at the Senate hearing in the fall of 2014, officials said that there had been a 50% increase in Canadian foreign fighters in the preceding months. Senior police witnesses appearing before the same committee identified that the number of people requiring close scrutiny as a result of information and intelligence gained was growing daily and that they were moving hundreds of officers from other investigations, including organised crime, to resource new operational requirements.

The communities where radicalization is occurring are often unable to cope with what they are seeing within their own networks of families and friends. In some cases they may have a fear of dealing directly with the authorities who can help them. In Canada there has been some significant progress as a result of recent community engagement initiatives. Police have been successful at intervening early in some significant cases including in May 2015 when Montreal Police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police arrested ten young Canadians who were boarding an aircraft heading to Syria via Turkey to join the jihadists.

In a recent article, the Mackenzie Institute focuses on the challenges facing Canada as its government seeks to develop legislation to deal with radicalization alongside combatting the terrorist threat. Canada hasn’t experienced a mass-casualty terrorist attack and a number of planned attacks have been prevented. In 2006 Canada arrested eighteen suspects in the “Toronto 18” plot to bomb major targets in Toronto and Ottawa, as well as other acts of violence against public officials. A number of other threats have been countered in recent times. In part this was due to the efforts of local communities to engage police and security officials directly with their concerns about particular individuals. And we’ve seen a movement within many nations centered on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), with programs and initiatives focused on education and services within communities.

Some will argue that a more aggressive stance and police action will be successful, but I don’t think that we can “arrest ourselves” out of this problem. By considering the factors that feed into decision making around radicalisation we may be able to find the solutions. Where radicalised individuals were finding themselves on a destructive path, Canadian efforts have been focused on the development of strategies falling within the realm of ‘Crime Prevention through Social Development’ (CPSD). This common sense approach attacks the root cause of what drives or moves people onto a destructive path. Crime prevention through social development as a strategy is a long-term approach requiring the mobilization of those influencers within a community to attack the underlying causes and develop solutions to be implemented. The Canadian Council on Social Development has had real success in their community development initiatives combatting criminal behaviour.

The solution may lie within our education systems, as they engage more young people than any other. But we must remember that the face-to-face interaction of negative influencers are often supported by the internet and its ability to deliver messages quickly, anonymously and in quantities that are difficult to combat. Any community-focused approach needs to keep in mind these outside influencers as well.

The issue of radicalisation is a national security problem but we can offer multiple solutions including a focus on pre-radicalisation as well as de-radicalisation allowing for an upstream approach to what has been primarily seen as a downstream problem.

The role of national values in combatting extremism

Australian values

On Monday, British Prime Minister David Cameron unfurled his Government’s five-year strategy to combat extremism in the UK.

Cameron argued that there are four key reasons that people are drawn to extremist ideology: extremism can appear ‘exciting’, people don’t have to support violence to be attracted to extremism, extremists are drowning out positive Muslim voices and finally, some British-born Muslims experience an ‘identity crisis’.

Responding to this characterisation of extremism, Cameron announced that promoting liberal values will form a core component of the UK’s plan to counter extremism:

‘…any strategy to defeat extremism must confront, head on, the extreme ideology that underpins it… In doing so, let’s not forget our strongest weapon: our own liberal values…We should contrast their bigotry, aggression and theocracy with our values…we can all feel part of this country—and we must now all come together and stand up for our values with confidence and pride.’

Cameron announced a number of initiatives to combat the problem at hand. They include legislating to curb the messages of leaders and foreign channels that propagate extremism, setting up a local community engagement forum that puts government in touch with those challenging extremism, and calling for a report on integration of minorities.

Cameron’s speech was largely well-received. There’ve been some criticisms that the strategy unfairly targets Muslim communities and stifles free speech. But the fact remains that the UK has developed a nuanced understanding of extremism, and created a comprehensive model to address it in a way that goes beyond simple counter-narratives.

As a point of contrast, the US exemplifies the national security benefits that a unifying national narrative can bring. The US hasn’t needed to adopt a strategy to boost its values in combatting extremism – it already has a history of a strong national identity. Recent Pew Polls (see here and here) have consistently found that American Muslims are much more integrated than other Muslims minorities around the world. And while the US has some problems with extremism, it has roughly the same number of nationals fighting for Islamic State as Australia, despite having a population 13 times the size.

What does this mean for Australia? Like the UK, Australia has a history of difficulty in defining its national identity. Anthony Bergin and I argued in an op-ed last week that clarifying and promoting Australian values should therefore be integrated into our own national strategy to combat extremism.

It’s understandable that there’s been difficulty in defining ‘Australianness’. Many Australian citizens have grown up at the intersection of two or more cultures. About a quarter of Australians were born overseas, and almost half the population has at least one parent who was born overseas. As such, forming a clear Australian identity becomes increasingly complex, and there’s legitimate reluctance to discuss this sensitive topic.

Australia’s recent experiences with home-grown extremism suggest that a lack of connection to Australian values can have dire consequences for a small, but significant minority. While almost all of the 54 individuals identified in ASPI’s Gen Y jihadists publication were born in or grew up in Australia, at least 70% of them come from diverse ethnic backgrounds. In the 1990s and early 21st century, the majority of home-grown extremists had Lebanese heritage, but there’s been a notable shift to a much wider range of ethnicities.

If our policy to counter extremism doesn’t address the potential role of identity conflicts, we risk overlooking a vital facet of the radicalisation problem.

In the Australian context, we could build on the traditional notion of the ‘fair go’. Recent research found that 9 out of 10 Australians think that fairness is a core Australian value. Fairness, which is grounded in inclusion, could provide fertile ground for framing a revamped Australian identity.

I’m not suggesting that Australia should reinvigorate how it defines its values for the sole purpose of preventing violent extremism. Merging these two goals risks the strategy being perceived as opportunistic, and could well be counter-productive.

My point is that extremism has exposed weaknesses in the community’s sense and understanding of Australian values. To quote the citizenship discussion paper, ‘citizens who become involved in terrorism are rejecting Australia’s values and commitment to a safe and harmonious society’. We need a longer-term strategy to build community connection with Australian values.

Redefining and promoting national values is a good start. This should also be co-ordinated with the related but separate field of building social cohesion. Ideas of this vein have already been put forward. PhD candidate Hussain Nadim, for example, advocated investing in sport, film competitions and government internships for Muslim youth.

Talking about Australian values doesn’t need to be an agenda of the far right. Australian-bred extremism serves as a grim warning of the importance of having strong yet inclusive values. This debate also provides an opportunity for government and civil society to revitalise what it means to be Australian. There’s a need for all Australians to feel Australian instead of just being Australian, and if they do, the benefits could well transcend national security.

Combatting terrorism: soft power approaches

Countering terrorism: soft power approaches

Over a decade of securitised transnational approaches to combatting terrorist activity and propaganda have shown that such approaches are ineffective on their own. Sometimes, these ‘hard power’ measures can actually damage efforts to roll back the appeal and participation in violent extremism.

While such steps may be justified in domestic contexts where threats are critical or imminent, failure to accompany these with robust ‘soft power’ initiatives will prove fatal in the longer-term. If we are to succeed in countering violent extremism, these are some key strategies to invest in:

Target recruiters

Recruiters for terrorist groups are the middle-men and women in the supply chain of violent extremism.

Focusing on remote figureheads can score largely symbolic goals for governments and taskforces, but influential recruiters at grassroots levels are the lynchpin without which ISIS leaders couldn’t marshal the human resources necessary to wage their battles.

Targeting recruiters shouldn’t just be about removing them from circulation—as a securitisation model would propose. It should also aim to undermine their influence with alternatives that speak to the deeper needs and desires of those susceptible to their influence. Those needs and desires are often bound up with sense of belonging, peer approval, feeling important and needed, the desire to live beyond one’s own immediate experience, and the yearning for active participation and contribution to broader social causes and values.

Recruitment takes multiple forms and proceeds along variable timelines and axes of intersecting influence and resistance. Designing tailored strategies that recognise local dynamics, networks and influences is essential.

It’s vital to work with communities to identify, understand the strategies of and disempower locally influential recruiters to nullify their messages and reduce their reach and appeal. Similar approaches have worked well in reducing recruitment to violent youth gangs in the US, for example, through programs like Colorado’s Open Door Youth Gang Alternatives or the NYPD’s diversion and community outreach programs for youth.

Such approaches could yield new knowledge and tactics. In turn, these could help produce new and effective strategies by concentrating on the pivot in the supply chain of violent extremism at grassroots level.

Demystify the ‘special nature’ of violent extremism

Part of violent extremism’s appeal is that it transcends ordinary criminal violence. It’s characterised as a higher form of social action, in which social, religious and ideological power and aspiration combine to reach beyond the norm.

We need to demonstrate that it’s no different from other mundane forms of violence. Stripped of its romanticised trappings as a higher calling, violent extremism should be treated as part of a broad-spectrum campaign against violence of all kinds.

This approach exposes the ordinariness of violence, its consequences and its failure to achieve the promise of social change that lures many young people.

Community, community, community

A weakness in transnational strategies to date has been the tendency of government agencies to focus relationship-building efforts on selected community leaders.

However, young people are increasingly signalling that an older generation of leaders lacks the credibility to work effectively with younger community members to prevent them radicalising.

Trust is the single most important element in brokering successful joint efforts between governments and communities, and as such, it should go well beyond engagement with a relatively small number of community leaders.

A multi-level strategy—one that targets and builds grassroots trust, transparency and engagement as well as cultivating leadership roles and government liaison—is far more likely to succeed than one that is narrowly focused on selected representatives and structures. These structures often exclude women, young people and voices of difference or dissent within communities.

Women are emerging as key players

Programs to counter violent extremism tend to focus on alienated, angry young men and the ways that certain constructs of masculinity and violence may be linked. But women are emerging as influential players—spokespeople, recruiters, enablers and, in some instances, as fighters.

Yet increasing evidence is emerging that complex issues involving power, disenfranchisement and agency for women are being felt in new ways. This raises the question of whether we need to develop more nuanced strategies that focus specifically on the role of gender in preventing the take-up of violent extremism.

Help researchers by sharing key data

Leading counterterrorism researchers have called for greater leverage of research capacity by government agencies involved in countering violent extremism.  They’ve called for a change in agencies’ reluctance to share primary source data that researchers need to contribute effectively to government efforts. As Marc Sageman has noted, intelligence agencies often have the empirical data but not the methodological skills to analyse and interpret the data while researchers have the analytical and methodological skills but frequently lack the data.

A smart strategy would develop security-sensitive ways of giving researchers the key data they need, enabling them to develop large and robust datasets that will lead to stronger analysis and outcomes.

Develop cognitive and emotional skills to deconstruct extremist ideology

In an age awash with information, many young people struggle with the development of critical skills required to sort and evaluate it. Cognitive and emotional skills need to be embedded in the curricula of schools and universities to help equip young people to evaluate and argue against the interpretations of religion, history, politics and identity that are the bread and butter of terrorist recruitment narratives.

In particular, a better understanding of the nexus between cognition and emotion, and developing in young people the understanding and ability to step back and analyse a situation before acting, should be a primary focus of any counter-terrorism strategy.

Natural hazards—a wicked problem

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This summer has already seen its fair share of fires in Victoria, South Australia, New South Wales and Western Australia, together with the inevitable debate on whether this is climate change in action. Indeed, it seems these types of events are likely to become more frequent, as the Climate Council has spelt out in its recent series of reports covering the bushfire risks for Victoria, NSW, ACT and South Australia.

Yes, fire seasons are becoming longer and extreme fire weather is becoming more common, but that’s not the whole story. From much of the public commentary, one would think that there’re any number of simple solutions to deal with this hazard. The management of natural hazards, including bushfire, is a highly complex issue involving all layers of government, the private sector, and the community itself. Read more

Countering violent extremism – the ‘soft power’ approach

The new National Security Strategy points to the Commonwealth’s Countering Violent Extremism Strategy as a key feature of its approach to countering terrorism, espionage and foreign interference. Community programs designed to counter violent extremism—so-called ‘soft power’ counter-terrorism programs—are being increasingly adopted by governments worldwide, including Australia. They are part of an evolving response to the threat posed by groups and individuals seeking to perpetrate or support violence in pursuit of ideological, political or religious goals.

The prevalence of ‘home-grown terrorism’—defined by the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department as ‘locally-cultivated violent extremism by individuals born, raised or currently living in Australia’—has prompted a re-design of the solely ‘hard power’ approach to counterterrorism that was the hallmark of the immediate response to the 9/11 attacks.

The threat of violent extremism is now more complex and is becoming increasingly difficult to detect, with violent extremists frequently operating in small independent groups or as ‘lone actors’. Under significant organisational pressure, Al-Qaeda inspired affiliates have used online channels such as its Yemeni affiliate AQAP’s Inspire magazine to campaign for local solo attacks. This campaign seems to be paying off for them, and has coincided with a marked increase in the number of such attacks since 2008. And the threat isn’t just from violent jihadism—the attack by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway in 2011 demonstrates the possible presence and lethality of violent extremists across the ideological spectrum (jihadist, right wing, left wing or ethno-nationalist). Read more