Tag Archive for: climate security

Stop the World: Climate change and security with ‘Climate General’ Tom Middendorp

In this episode of Stop the World, Justin Bassi speaks to retired General Tom Middendorp – also known as the ‘Climate General’ – about the links between climate change, defence and security. They discuss the impact of climate change on the military and its role in disaster preparedness and response.

With a growing global population meaning a growing demand on natural resources, the conversation also explores how we can adapt and learn to do more with fewer resources. They consider the role that technology and innovation can play in responding to climate change, as well as the importance of supply chain security.

They also discuss the different climate risks in South and Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and how countries like Australia and the Netherlands can work together to support these regions and help address the combined climate and security threats we face.

Guests:
⁠Justin Bassi⁠
⁠General Tom Middendorp⁠

Tag Archive for: climate security

National resilience for Australia—learning the lessons

The last four years have been tough for Australia. We have seen the disastrous 2019-20 fire season, the Covid-19 pandemic, devastating floods and cyclones, the most comprehensive punitive trade measures used against any country in recent history, a doubling of cybersecurity incidents, including some of the largest data breaches and the most serious ransomware cases, more Australians targeted for espionage and foreign interference than at any time in Australia’s history, the re-emergence of right-wing extremism as a more visible and a growing threat to national security, and an acute threat to Australia’s supply chains sparked by the pandemic and exacerbated by the war in Europe.

Never have we found ourselves facing such a range of challenges and risks at the same time. In a new report National resilience: lessons for Australian policy from international experience for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, I discuss how new uncertainties at the planetary level, including a climate and biodiversity crisis, an energy and industrial transformation and an explosion of new technologies will shape societal dynamics for decades. The Indo-Pacific region has become the focus for great-power dynamics, bringing a growing possibility of major-power conflict, as well as increasing calls to prepare for war. New ideological and populist forces are influencing the polity of Australia, Australia’s social cohesion is increasingly threatened, and our democracy is under rising pressure. Australia can no longer rely on the verities of our past to meet those challenges. We must adapt and transform to the new realities, preserving our core national values and institutions, while creating innovative new ways of addressing emergent challenges and reducing our fragility.

The Government has warned us that ‘Australia expects to face a future punctuated by more complex crises—particularly crises that occur at the same time or directly after one another. These types of crises are likely to exacerbate a range of pre-existing vulnerabilities in Australia’s systems, institutions and supply chains, placing our communities under enormous pressure and making recovery even more challenging.’ Experts have suggested that ‘the nation’s foundational institutions and civic infrastructure have become fragile and complacent, lacking the robustness and resilience to face the unexpected and prevail.’

National resilience provides a means to deliver a more systemic approach to preparing for and managing a future in which we face more frequent, severe, complex, cascading and compounding crises. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese recognised the importance of a more encompassing, all-hazards approach to national resilience in his pre-election speech to the Lowy Institute in March 2022, noting that ‘fundamental to our national security is our national resilience’.

National resilience is a powerful concept to help nations develop the capacity to weather threats and challenges and emerge from crises in a better state than before. It is the ability to plan for, adapt to, prepare for, resist, respond to and recover from change and crisis, whether natural or man-made, singly or concurrently.  A national resilience approach to crises helps to frame an understanding of the interconnected and interdependent nature of the systems that a nation relies upon to function and provides a structure for making decisions during times of concurrent and cascading crises. National resilience also provides a powerful framework for deterring threat actors by ensuring that no single threat can overwhelm the basic functioning of society and the state. It helps governments to identify, resource and prioritise their investments in preparedness for, response to and recovery from crisis.

A comprehensive national resilience framework would also make economic sense for Australia.  According to a 2021 report on the economic costs of natural disasters in Australia, they currently cost the economy $38 billion per year, with this cost to rise to at least $73 billion per year by 2060. That report suggests that ‘The Australian economy is facing $1.2 trillion in cumulative costs of natural disasters over the next 40 years even under a low emissions scenario. This shows there is the potential for large economic gains from investments to improve Australia’s resilience to natural disasters.’   Australian and international studies show that investments in resilience can reduce the costs of natural disasters by at least 50% annually. Investment decision making focused on building multi-use national resilience capabilities can also leverage investments for natural disaster preparedness, economic resilience, civil and national defence needs, ensuring that Australia is resilient for a diverse range of crises in the most efficient ways possible and potentially saving Australia hundreds of billions of dollars over the long term.

In my report, I have reviewed the national resilience practices of other nations and analysed case studies of crises where national resilience, or the lack of it, has come to the fore.  There are many lessons that we can learn from their experience in developing national resilience, particularly as many countries, including several key partners of Australia, started down the path more than 10–15 years ago.

The report highlights the importance of a whole-of-society response to the challenges ahead, pointing to the important role that the community plays in its own resilience, and how other nations have harnessed the community to strengthen their democracies and for defence and national security. The safety and security of Australia isn’t a task that can be left to governments alone. The national industrial base, the active involvement of civil society and an informed and engaged community are all necessary elements of building our national resilience.

Australia has the necessary tools and capabilities to meet our future challenges and create a more resilient nation that’s better able to ensure the resilience of its society, its economy and its system of governance. Doing so will require a frank, honest and trusted appraisal of our vulnerabilities and a new culture of being willing to work together to use all the elements of our national power to their best effect. The report has identified some key learnings for Australia should it embark on a more formal consideration of national-resilience concepts.

The report presents nine recommendations to government:

Institutionalise national resilience through:

  • a national resilience strategy led by the Australian Government in collaboration with states and territories, industry and the community.
  • a national risk assessment, prepared by the federal government as a classified document after consultation with the states and territories, industry and the citizenry, plus a publicly releasable version presented to the Australian Parliament and the nation.
  • a national preparedness audit developed by the federal government in collaboration with state and territory governments, industry and civil society.
  • a national preparedness plan agreed by the national cabinet.

Create institutional capability and capacity through:

  • establishing a coordinating office of national resilience within either the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet or the Department of Home Affairs.
  • building national resilience training programs for governments, industry and civil-society leaders.

Establish a whole-of-society national resilience endeavour through:

  • establishing a national resilience council with industry, chaired by the office of national resilience.
  • forming national resilience community liaison teams within the office of national resilience to work with communities.

Build national resilience for deterrence and grey-zone defence through:

  • adopting a whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach to the national defence strategy to be delivered in 2024.

Now is the time to commence action to deliver a national resilience framework for Australia. Collective, collaborative action, enabled by governments, built on the capability and capacity of Australian industry and the community and aimed at the goal of a resilient Australia, can ensure that we’re well placed to face the future with confidence.

As the planet warms, risks of geoengineering the climate mount

Nations meeting to advance action on climate change at COP27 in Egypt know we’re headed for dangerous climate impacts. The UN Environment Programme confirmed in its 2022 emissions gap report that there is no longer a ‘credible pathway’ to keep global warming below 1.5°C based on 2030 commitments. The report, titled The closing window, suggests that we may still have a shot at keeping warming to 2.0°C, but only if all countries fully meet their net-zero pledges. That’s far from guaranteed or likely given the lack of detail in those pledges. We’re already seeing extreme climate events annually—but even more dangerous impacts are locked in.

The good news is that our efforts to deploy clean energy have succeeded enough to rule out the worst-case projected emissions scenarios and it’s now unlikely that we’ll reach catastrophic warming beyond 4.0°C. There’s one important caveat: modelling suggests that any warming over 1.5°C will increase the risk of self-reinforcing tipping points in the global climate system. Tipping points are temperature thresholds at which significant greenhouse gases can be released suddenly, greatly amplifying global warming—for example, a release of frozen stores of carbon dioxide and methane gas from thawing Arctic permafrost.

Because a climate-disrupted future remains possible, another danger needs our attention. As the impacts of warming become more extreme, countries are more likely to turn to riskier measures to combat them, including geoengineering.

Geoengineering can entail modifying local weather conditions (such as seeding clouds to change rainfall), removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (separating it out and storing it) or managing solar radiation (reducing the amount of sunlight that can get trapped as heat in the atmosphere). These options have been discussed in climate circles for many years—at various times considered a last resort, a moral hazard that could delay decarbonisation of economies, or generally a dystopian nightmare.

Solar radiation management is the most troubling geoengineering idea. The objective is to block sunlight entirely by deploying satellite sunshades between the earth and the sun, to dim the skies by dispersing reflective sulphate aerosols in the stratosphere, or to increase the reflectivity of clouds (cloud whitening) or surface objects like rooftops (or, in an extreme case, glass beads scattered across the Arctic).

In theory, these approaches could rapidly cool global temperatures—especially the dispersal of sulphate aerosols, whose effect would be somewhat like what happens naturally from massive volcanic plumes. The eruption of Mount Pinatubo in mid-1991, for example, is estimated to have cooled global temperatures by 0.5°C for two years. Some geoengineering proponents believe that releasing sulphate aerosols into the atmosphere could achieve a similar result and help blunt the threat posed by climate change in the near term.

The danger with these approaches is that deep uncertainty exists about their impacts. They could drive severe consequences that—like global warming itself—don’t respect borders. Dimming sunlight with sulphate aerosols could diminish crop productivity while altering precipitation patterns and increasing the acidity of rainfall, all of which would further stress climate-change-affected regions and the global food system. The massive and rapid changes in atmospheric conditions from such cooling could have simultaneous and devastating consequences for food-insecure communities globally.

Other geoengineering approaches could backfire in other ways. For example, deploying a massive number of glass beads to enable the Arctic to reflect more sunlight could instead trap more sunlight as heat, likely resulting in faster melting of sea ice.

Scientific uncertainty about the use and consequences of geoengineering is a legitimate concern, but there are barriers even to studying it (particularly in the case of solar radiation management). The UN Convention on Biological Diversity has banned all but small-scale geoengineering experiments for over a decade. Earlier this year, a group of concerned scientists and governance experts published an open letter calling for a total ban on solar geoengineering on the grounds that its impacts can never be fully understood or equitably governed in the international system. The main international body that helps coordinate and prioritise climate science research, the World Climate Research Programme, is still determining what role it should play in research on geoengineering.

In response to a recommendation by the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine in 2021 to help address uncertainties, the US began developing a research plan on solar geoengineering in mid-2022. Readiness to develop research isn’t matched with an eagerness to address governance issues, however. Under a different US administration, a 2019 proposal led by Switzerland asking the UNEP to produce a report on geoengineering was blocked by the US and Saudi Arabia.

What makes governance of these approaches difficult is that they may be cheap enough to be deployed by many state and non-state actors. The incremental cost of avoiding 1.0°C of warming with sulphate aerosol dispersion may be only US$18 billion a year, a significant but achievable budget allocation for many advanced and emerging economies, high-net worth individuals or companies.

In addition, it’s difficult to know when techniques like solar radiation management should be used because global average temperature rises will result in variable impacts. For example, 2°C of warming will be difficult for all countries but will threaten the existence of some. The cross-border and likely uneven impacts of geoengineering make it difficult to know who would benefit or suffer, further complicating a consensus decision on when the risks of something like sulphate aerosol dispersion would justify its use.

These dynamics mean it’s time to establish multilateral institutions and global norms for geoengineering research and use. We need to do that now. A fence needs to be set around geoengineering so that it can’t be used to justify backsliding among advanced economies to delay decarbonisation. Instead, the principles of its use and study must be informed explicitly by the countries that are the most exposed to climate impacts at any level of warming above 1.5°C and the least able to adapt.

Multilateral institutions are our best hope for governing geoengineering. As ineffective as they may seem at managing our shared atmosphere, particularly as we return to a multipolar world, they’re the reason we’ve avoided the worst-case emissions scenario—and are recovering our ozone layer. Energy markets and economic self-interest may drive the transition, but it was global scientific consensus and the UN that established the knowledge, imperative and targets driving global efforts.

There should be no doubt that geoengineering is an absolute last resort we should fear—for a worst-case scenario we can still avoid. Of course, we need to rapidly reduce emissions to avoid dangerous warming in the first place and redouble investments in adaptation. But as the UNEP emissions gap report suggests, we still need to prepare for dangerous climate impacts—including the possibility of disruptive tipping points. That planning process must include getting a better understanding of geoengineering and deciding what part it will play in our response.

We’re running out of time and can’t keep kicking the can down the road. With everything else climate change brings, in an era of renewed strategic competition, Australia cannot afford to sit this issue out.