Tag Archive for: Climate Change

Indonesia in 2035: Climate risks to security in the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific region is particularly exposed to climate impacts, and Indonesia, like many countries, will be severely affected by climate impacts in the decade to come. The effects of climate-amplified disasters, combined with the political, social and economic consequences of climate impacts originating from within and across the region, will strain Indonesia’s economic and national-security interests.

This report presents the findings of a narrative-driven scenario to stress-test Indonesia’s climate risks emerging by 2035. Its objective is to identify opportunities for Indonesia and its economic and strategic partners to prepare for and mitigate the risks.

While Australian policymakers have devoted significant attention to the existential risks that Pacific island countries face, Southeast Asian countries are also highly exposed and often face similar risks. Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s climate risks have received very limited attention despite its high exposure to climate hazards, its very large population (over 10 times larger than all Pacific island countries combined) which is densely concentrated in vulnerable coastal areas and small islands, and its history of political unrest associated with disruptions to food and energy security. It’s also one of the closest neighbouring countries to Australia. Figure 1 on page 5 provides a visual summary of the interacting hazards, risks and consequences highlighted in this report.

The population size of Southeast Asian countries and their often-close proximity to one another means that climate impacts in one country will often have consequences beyond their borders and for their neighbours across the region. Gaining a better understanding of how Indonesia, as the largest country in Southeast Asia, will be affected by climate developments is vital, given both the domestic and regional consequences.

Even below the ‘safe’ threshold of a 1.5°C rise in global average temperature—the aspirational target set in 2015 by the signatories to the Paris Agreement—countries around the world are already experiencing serious, record-setting, climate-driven disruptions on a large scale. The era of climate-induced disruption is clearly already upon us—and it will intensify rapidly.

Building resilience while preparing for future disruption requires an enhanced appreciation of climate risk that goes beyond adapting to more frequent and severe natural hazards, such as floods and fires.

Development-assistance and defence communities have embraced the importance of treating climate change as a threat to human, economic and traditional military security. The challenge is to build the capacity and tools to assess the broad suite of security-related risks of climate change—and to translate that information into measures to mitigate the risks. Understanding the complexity and uncertainty associated with climate trends is a daunting task, greatly complicated by the need to incorporate the many ways climate change affects social, political and economic systems.

The scenario developed in this report isn’t a prediction of the future, but rather a description of a possible future. It identifies many climate impacts, but suggests three primary pathways through which Indonesia may face compounding and destabilising climate disruptions:

  • Significant food insecurity from losses to domestic production due to shifting precipitation timing and extremes across the wet and dry seasons, heightened sensitivity to shocks in global food prices, and reduced government ability to absorb economic shocks, such as food-price hikes.
  • Large-scale coastal population displacement driven by Indonesia’s high coastal population density and the significant exposure of that population to sea-level rise and climate-induced coastal flooding.
  • Slowed economic growth from lost agricultural output, declining revenues from stranded fossil-fuel assets, rising disaster costs at home and abroad affecting economic infrastructure and supply chains, and rising challenges in responding to domestic crises driven by food insecurity and population displacements.

A major finding of this research is that, in little more than a decade, Indonesia is likely to experience major climate disruptions that also amplify climate and security risks in the region, resulting in a range of additional and cascading risks for Australia. A second overarching finding in the report is that Indonesia may be underestimating the likely scale of the climate risks and should devote greater attention to analysing them. It’s in Australia’s interests to do the same and, as a good neighbour, to coordinate an Australian whole-of-government effort to support Indonesia to mitigate the risks, including cross-border risks.

Cyclone Tracy: 50 years on

This year marks a powerful milestone in Australia’s history: the 50th anniversary of Cyclone Tracy, a disaster that reshaped the nation’s approach to resilience and recovery. When the cyclone struck Darwin on Christmas Day in 1974, it killed 66 people, displaced thousands, and left the city in ruins. Yet, it also sparked an extraordinary national response that redefined how Australia prepares for and recovers from natural disasters. Darwin, once devastated, now stands as a modern, resilient city—built not just to recover, but to withstand the worst.

ASPI’s new report, released in honour of this anniversary, takes a deep dive into Cyclone Tracy’s lasting impact on Australia’s disaster management. It explores how the event prompted major shifts in urban planning, building codes, and national security frameworks. From the pivotal role of the Australian Defence Force in the immediate response to the Whitlam government’s establishment of the Darwin Reconstruction Authority, Tracy set a blueprint for modern disaster recovery. But the legacy goes beyond infrastructure. The report also highlights the resilience of First Nations communities and the growing role of the private sector in disaster preparedness—elements that continue to shape Australia’s response to climate risks.

As we face increasingly frequent and severe climate events, the anniversary of Cyclone Tracy serves as a sharp reminder: resilience is not just about bouncing back—it’s about building forward. The report argues that northern Australia must go beyond traditional recovery strategies, urging a renewed focus on proactive resilience measures that address not only infrastructure but governance, community involvement, and climate adaptation. Tracy’s lessons are not just historical—they are essential to ensuring Australia’s future readiness.

National resilience: lessons for Australian policy from international experience

The strategic circumstances that Australia contemplates over the coming decades present multiple, cascading and concurrent crises. Ensuring a safe and secure Australia, able to withstand the inevitable shocks that we’ll face into the future, will require a more comprehensive approach to strategy than we’ve adopted over the past seven decades. We can’t rely on the sureties of the past. The institutions, policies and architectures that have supported the nation to manage such crises in our history are no longer fit for purpose.

The report highlights lessons drawn from international responses to crisis, to assist policymakers build better responses to the interdependent and hyperconnected challenges that nations face. The report brings together the disciplines of disaster management, defence strategy and national security to examine what an integrated national approach to resilience looks like, and how national resilience thinking can help Australia build more effective and more efficient responses to crisis and change.

The report concludes that now is the time to commence action to deliver a national resilience framework for Australia. Collective, collaborative action, enabled by governments, built on the capability and capacity of Australian industry and the community, and aimed at the goal of a resilient Australia, can ensure that we’re well placed to face the future with confidence.

China, climate and conflict in the Indo-Pacific

This paper surveys the current reporting and analysis on climate and security to explore the implications that climate change may have for China’s ability to prosecute its security goals in the region’s three major hotspots: the SCS, Taiwan and the India–China border conflict. Those three hotspots all involve longstanding border and territorial disputes between China and other nations and may draw in various levels of US involvement should China continue to escalate tensions.

China, climate change and the energy transition

This report surveys China’s enormous energy transition to renewables. It begins by sketching the energy challenges China faces and its climate-change-related energy policies, in the context of the global geopolitics of the energy transformation. Next the report focuses on conventional energy sources (oil and natural gas), followed by electricity, and energy technologies. Although the report is intended primarily to survey developments to date, it concludes with some brief observations about the considerable energy challenges China faces in the years ahead.

‘With a little help from my friends’: Capitalising on opportunity at AUSMIN 2022

The annual Australia-US Ministerial Consultations have been the primary forum for bilateral engagement since 1985. The Australian Minister for Defence and Minister for Foreign Affairs will meet with their American counterparts in Washington in 2022, in the 71st year of the alliance, and it’s arguably never been so important.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute is proud to release ‘With a little help from my friends’: Capitalising on opportunity at AUSMIN 2022, a report featuring chapters from our defence, cyber and foreign policy experts to inform and guide the Australian approach to the 2022 AUSMIN consultations.

In this report, ASPI harnesses its broad and deep policy expertise to provide AUSMIN’s principals with tangible policy recommendations to take to the US. The following chapters describe Australia’s most pressing strategic challenges. The authors offer policy recommendations for enhancing Australian and US collaboration to promote security and economic prosperity.

The collection of essays covers topics and challenges that the US and Australia must tackle together: defence capability, foreign affairs, climate change, foreign interference, rare earths, cyber, technology, the Pacific, space, integrated deterrence and coercive diplomacy. In each instance, there are opportunities for concrete, practical policy steps to ensure cohesion and stability.”

Assessing the groundwork: Surveying the impacts of climate change in China

The immediate and unprecedented impacts of climate change are becoming increasingly apparent across China, as they are for many parts of the world. Since June 2022, China has been battered by record-breaking heatwaves, torrential downpours, flooding disasters, severe drought and intense forest fires.

In isolation, each of those climate hazards is a reminder of the vulnerability of human systems to environmental changes, but together they are a stark reminder that climate change presents a real and existential threat to prosperity and well-being of billions of people. 

Sea-level rise will undermine access to freshwater for China’s coastal cities and increase the likelihood of flooding in China’s highly urbanised delta regions. Droughts are projected to become more frequent, more extreme and longer lasting, juxtaposed with growingly intense downpours that will inundate non-coastal regions. Wildfires are also projected to increase in frequency and severity, especially in eastern China. China’s rivers, which have historically been critical to the county’s economic and political development, will experience multiple, overlapping climate (and non-climate) impacts.

In addition to these direct climate hazards, there will also be major disruptions to the various human systems that underpin China, such as China’s food and energy systems as are discussed in this report. These impacts deserve greater attention from policy analysts, particularly given that they’ll increasingly shape China’s economic, foreign and security policy choices in coming decades.

This report is an initial attempt to survey the literature on the impact that climate change will have on China. It concludes that relatively little attention has been paid to this important topic. This is a worrying conclusion, given China’s key role in international climate-change debates, immense importance in the global economy and major geostrategic relevance. As the severity of climate change impacts continue to amplify over the coming decades, the significance of this gap will only grow more concerning.

The geopolitics of climate and security in the Indo-Pacific

Climate change is much more than an environmental crisis—it’s a systemic crisis that will transform the geopolitical landscape. And the consequences for the Indo-Pacific, already the most exposed region in the world to climate hazards and home to the world’s fastest growing populations, economies and geopolitical rivalries, will be profound.

In this volume, leading experts explore the impacts of this rapidly emerging climate threat on regional systems by interrogating a 1.5°C 2035 climate change scenario developed by the ASPI Climate and Security Policy Centre.

The chapters here attempt to understand the unpredictable effects of climate change on the region’s already fragile human systems, from great-power competition and militaries, governance and politics, food and water insecurity, and ethnic separatism, to energy and trade systems, sovereign risk and digital disinformation.

What emerges is a vivid demonstration of the dangers of underestimating the systemic connections between those factors, including how risks in one thematic area amplify risks in others, completely reshaping the regional security picture.

Watch the publication launch event.

Agenda for change 2022: Shaping a different future for our nation

In line with previous Agenda for Change publications from 2016 and 2019, this piece is being released in anticipation of a federal election as a guide for the next government within its first months and over the full term. Our 2022 agenda acknowledges that an economically prosperous and socially cohesive Australia is a secure and resilient Australia.

ASPI’s Agenda for change 2019: strategic choices for the next government did, to a great extent, imagine a number of those challenges, including in Peter Jennings’ chapter on ‘The big strategic issues’. But a lot has changed since 2019. It was hard to imagine the dislocating impacts of the Black Summer fires, Covid-19 in 2020 and then the Delta and Omicron strains in 2021, trade coercion from an increasingly hostile China, or the increasingly uncertain security environment.

Fast forward to today and that also applies to the policies and programs we need to position us in a more uncertain and increasingly dangerous world.

Our Agenda for change 2022 acknowledges that what might have served us well in the past won’t serve us well in this world of disruption. In response, our authors propose a smaller number of big ideas to address the big challenges of today and the future. Under the themes of getting our house in order and Australia looking outward, Agenda for change 2022 focuses on addressing the strategic issues from 2021 and beyond.

An informed and independent voice: ASPI, 2001-2021

To mark its establishment in August 2001, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has published an intellectual history of its work over two decades: An informed and independent voice: ASPI, 2001–2021.

ASPI’s mission is to ‘contribute an informed and independent voice to public discussion’. That was the vision embraced by the Australian Government in creating ‘an independent institute to study strategic policy’, designed to bring ‘contestability’ and ‘alternative sources of advice’ to ‘key strategic and defence policy issues’.

The story of how the institute did that job is told by ASPI’s journalist fellow, Graeme Dobell. He writes that ASPI has lived out what its name demands, to help deliver what Australia needs in imagining ends, shaping ways and selecting means.

An informed and independent voice covers the terrorism era and national security; the work of the Defence Department; Australia’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; the evolution of Australia’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific; relations with China and the US; cyber and tech; Japan, India and the Quad; Indonesia and Southeast Asia; Australia’s island arc—the the South Pacific and Timor-Leste; Northern Australia; Women, peace and security; Climate change; Antarctica; 1.5 track dialogues; the work of the digital magazine The Strategist; and ‘thinking the ASPI way’.

The submission to cabinet on ASPI’s founding said that the principles of contestability had ‘not yet been effectively implemented in relation to defence and strategic policy, despite the vital national interests and significant sums of money that are at stake’. That demand, at the heart of the institute’s creation, has been met and still drives its work.

Introduction: sometimes we will annoy you

A senior diplomat from one of Australia’s close ‘Old Commonwealth’ partners tells a story about hosting an Australian visit from his country’s defence minister, an aspiring political operator. The minister came to ASPI for a 90-minute roundtable with senior staff. Mark Thomson briefed on Defence’s budget woes—this was one of those years when financial squeezing was the order of the day, and a gap was quietly appearing between policy promises and funding reality.

Andrew Davies reported on the challenges of delivering the Joint Strike Fighter, the contentious arrival of the ‘stop-gap’ Super Hornet and the awkward non-arrival of the future submarine. Rod Lyon spoke about the insurmountable problems of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and our own government’s foreign policy foibles. It was, like many ASPI meetings, a lively and sustained critique of policy settings. Driving back to the High Commission, a somewhat startled minister muttered to his diplomatic escort: ‘Thank God we don’t have a think tank like that back home!’

The genius of ASPI is that it’s designed to be a charming disrupter. Sufficiently inside the policy tent to understand the gritty guts of policy problems, but with a remit to be the challenger of orthodoxies, the provider of different policy dreams (as long as they’re costed and deliverable), the plain-speaking explainer of complexity, and a teller of truth to power. Well, that’s perhaps a little too grand. ASPI aims to be a helpful partner to the national security community, not a hectoring lecturer. But the institute ceases to have any value if it just endorses current policy settings: the aim is to provide ‘contestability of policy advice’. Not always easy in a town where climbing the policy ladder is the only game.

The story of ASPI’s creation has been told by several present at the creation1 and, very enjoyably, by Graeme Dobell in the second chapter in this volume. With the release of the Howard government cabinet records for the year 2000, we now get to see that the National Security Committee of cabinet deliberated carefully over ASPI’s composition, charter, organisational location, geographical location and underlying purpose. The annual expenditure proposed ($2.1 million) was, by Defence’s standards, trivial even in 2000. What the government was chewing over was the sense or otherwise of injecting a new institution into the Canberra policymaking environment.

The case for a strategic policy institute was set out in a cabinet submission considered on 18 April 2000:

There are two key reasons to establish an independent institute to study strategic policy.

The first is to encourage development of alternative sources of advice to Government on key strategic and defence policy issues. The principles of contestability have been central to our Government’s philosophy and practice of public administration, but 2 An informed and independent voice: ASPI, 2001–2021 these principles have not been effectively implemented in relation to defence and strategic policy, despite the vital national interests and significant sums of money that are at stake. The Government has found in relation to the COLLINS Class Submarines project for instance, and more recently in relation to White Paper process, that there are almost no sources of alternative information or analysis on key issues in defence policy, including the critical questions of our capability needs and how they can best be satisfied. The ASPI will be charged with providing an alternative source of expertise on such issues.

Second, public debate of defence policy is inhibited by a poor understanding of the choices and issues involved. The ASPI will be tasked to contribute an informed and independent voice to public discussion on these issues.2

‘An informed and independent voice’. There couldn’t be a better description of what the institute has sought to bring to the public debate; nor could there be a more fitting title for this study of ASPI’s first 20 years by Graeme Dobell, ably assisted by the voices and insights of many ASPI colleagues.

The April cabinet meeting agreed that ASPI should be established, but the government went back to Defence a second time to test thinking about the institute’s organisational structure.

In July, the department proposed several options, including that ASPI could be added as an ‘internal Defence Strategic Policy Cell’, or operate as an independent advisory board to the Minister for Defence, or be based at a university, or be a statutory authority, executive agency or incorporated company. Having considered other possibilities, the government accepted Defence’s recommendation (endorsed by other departments) that ASPI be established as a government-owned incorporated company managed by a board ‘to enhance the institute’s independence within a robust and easy to administer corporate structure’.3

The most striking aspect of this decision is that the government opted for the model that gave ASPI the greatest level of independence. There were options that would have limited the proposed new entity, for example, by making it internal to Defence or adding more complex governance mechanisms that might have threatened the perception of independence. Those options were rejected. A decision to invite a potential critic to the table is the decision of a mature and confident government. It’s perhaps not surprising that there aren’t many ASPI-like entities. Prime Minister Howard was also keen to see that the institute would last beyond a change of government. ASPI was directed to be ‘non-partisan’, above daily politics. The leader of the opposition would be able to nominate a representative to the ASPI Council. ASPI would also be given a remit to ‘pursue alternate sources of funding and growth’, giving the institute the chance to outgrow its Defence crib.

Interestingly, the August 2000 cabinet decision to establish ASPI as a stand-alone centre structured as an incorporated company and managed by a board of directors also stated that: ‘The Cabinet expressed a disposition to establish the centre outside of the Australian Capital Territory.’4 By the time ASPI was registered in August 2001 as an Australian public company limited by guarantee, the institute’s offices were located in Barton in the ACT, where they remain to this day.

The government appointed Robert O’Neill AO as the chair of the ASPI Council, and the inaugural membership of the council was appointed in July 2001, meeting for the first time on 29 August 2001. That month, the council appointed Hugh White AO as the institute’s executive director and Hugh set about building the initial ASPI team. A fortnight later, the world fundamentally changed. Terrorist attacks on New York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon and one unsuccessfully aimed at the White House jolted the strategic fabric of the Middle East and the world’s democracies. ASPI couldn’t have started at a more challenging time for strategic analysis.

Writing in ASPI’s first annual report, Hugh White reported that the institute in 2001–02 ‘did a small amount of work directly for government, including a substantial assessment for the Minister for Defence, Senator Hill, of the implications of September 11 for Australia’s defence’.5

ASPI’s first public report was a study by Elsina Wainwright, New neighbour, new challenge: Australia and the security of East Timor. This was followed by the first of Mark Thomson’s 16 editions of The cost of Defence: the ASPI defence budget brief 2002–03. This included a rundown of the top 20 defence capability acquisition projects. The slightly cheeky cartoon covers—state and territory seagulls pinching Defence spending chips is my favourite—didn’t start until 2003–04, but the first Cost of Defence began the trend to report Defence’s daily budget spend: $39,991,898.63. (The 2021–22 Cost of Defence records the daily spend at $122,242,739.73.)

Hugh White closed off his 2001–02 Director’s report with ‘Clearly the task of defining our role in the policy debate will take some time to complete, but we believe we have made a good start.’ It was quite a foundation year: tectonic global security shifts, challenging regional deployments, defence budget and capability analysis. ASPI’s course was set, and the rest, as they say, makes up the history that Graeme Dobell and ASPI colleagues cover in this book. Graeme’s analysis makes sense of what, to the participants, might have felt from time to time like one damned thing after another. But patterns do emerge, and they coalesce into the realisation that ASPI’s first 20 years have marked some of the most turbulent shifts in Australia’s security outlook. All of which puts, or should put, a tremendous premium on the value of strategic policy, contestable policy advice, an informed and engaged audience and a new generation of well-trained policy professionals.

ASPI today is a larger organisation working across a wider area of strategy and policy issues.

The annual report for 2019–20 lists 64 non-ongoing (that is, contracted) staff, of whom 45 were full time (22 female and 23 male) and 15 were part time (11 female and four male). The overall ASPI budget was $11,412,096.71, of which $4 million (35%) was from Defence, managed by a long-term funding agreement. A further $3.6 million (32%) came from federal government agencies; $0.122 million (1%) from state and territory government agencies; $1.89 million (17%) from overseas government agencies, most prominently from the US State Department and Pentagon and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Defence industry provided $0.370 million (3%); private-sector sponsorship was $1.241 million (11%) and finally, funding from civil society and universities was $0.151 million (1%).6

Behind those numbers is a mountain of effort to grow the institute and sustain it financially.

Think tanks need high-performing staff, and high-performing staff need salaries that will keep them at the think tank. The nexus between money and viability is absolute. Around the world, there are many think tanks that don’t amount to much more than a letterhead and an individual’s dedicated effort in a spare room at home. The reality is that building scale, research depth, a culture of pushing the policy boundaries and a back-catalogue of high-quality events and publications takes money. In the early stages of ASPI’s life, I recall the view expressed that the institute couldn’t possibly be regarded as independent if the overwhelming balance of its resources came from the Department of Defence. More recently, the charge is that the ‘military industrial complex’ or foreign governments must be the tail that wags the dog. The Canberra embassy of a large and assertive Leninist authoritarian regime can’t conceive that ASPI could possibly be independent in its judgements because, well, no such intellectual independence survives back home. ASPI must therefore be the catspaw of Australian Government policy thinking.

None of those contentions are borne out by looking at the content of ASPI products over the past two decades. There are plenty of examples (from critiques of the Port of Darwin’s lease to a PRC company; analysis of key equipment projects such as submarines and combat aircraft; assessments of the Bush, Obama, Trump and now the Biden presidencies; assessments of the Defence budget; differences on cyber policy) in which the institute’s capacity for feisty contrarianism has been on full display. In my time at ASPI, I haven’t once been asked by a politician, public servant, diplomat or industry representative to bend a judgement to their preferences. It follows that, for good or ill, the judgements made by ASPI staff, and our contributors, are their views, and their views alone. ASPI is independent because it was designed to operate that way. Its output demonstrates that reality every day.

And as you will see in these pages, ASPI has views aplenty. It became clear several years ago that the institute needed to broaden its focus away from defence policy and international security more narrowly conceived to address a wider canvas of security issues. That’s because the wider canvas presents some of the most interesting and challenging dilemmas for Australia’s national security. We sought to bring a new policy focus to cyber issues by creating the ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre. This was followed by streams of work addressing risk and resilience; counterterrorism; policing and international law enforcement; countering disinformation; understanding the behaviour of the PRC in all its dimensions; and, most recently, climate and security.

Does ASPI’s work have real policy effect? One of the curiosities of the Canberra environment is that officials will often go to quite some length to deny that a think tank could possibly shift the policy dial. To do so might be to acknowledge an implicit criticism that a department or agency hasn’t been on its game. Changing policy is often more like a process of erosion than a sudden jolting earthquake. It can take time to mount and sustain a critique about policy settings before the need for change is finally acknowledged. And it has to be said that the standard disposition of Canberra policymakers is to defend current policy settings. That shouldn’t be too surprising: current policy settings in many cases will be the result of government decisions, and, at times, the role of the public service is to raise the drawbridge and defend the battlements. So, it’s often the case that a department’s response to the arrival of an ASPI report isn’t a yelp of joy so much as the cranking up of a talking points brief for the minister that explains why current policy settings are correct, can’t be improved upon and quite likely are the best of all possible worlds.

ASPI’s influence is therefore more indirect than that of the Australian Public Service (APS), but, as Sun Tzu reminds us, ‘indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.’7 The institute has some natural strengths in this approach. ASPI has the advantage of being small and flexible; it has a charter to look beyond current policy settings; it can talk to a wide range of people in and out of government to seed ideas; it can engage with the media; it allows expertise to develop because more than a few ASPI staff have stayed in jobs for years and built a depth of knowledge not necessarily found in generalist public servants who frequently change roles.

Taking a longer view, I would suggest that ASPI has indeed managed to influence the shape of policy in a number of areas. The institute has helped to create a more informed base of opinion on key defence budget and capability issues. This has helped to strengthen parliamentary and external scrutiny of the Defence Department and the ADF. ASPI is really the only source providing detailed analysis of defence spending and has helped to lift public understanding about critical military capability issues, such as the future submarine project, the future of the surface fleet, air combat capabilities, the land forces, space, and joint and enabling capabilities.

ASPI has had substantial impact on national thinking about dealing with the PRC, and that has helped at least set the context for government decision-making on issues such as the rollout of the 5G network, countering foreign interference, strengthening security consideration of foreign direct investment and informing national approaches to fuel and supply-chain security.

ASPI has sought to make policy discussions about cyber, critical and emerging technologies more informed and more accessible. The institute has offered many active, informed and engaged voices on critical international issues of importance to Australia, from the Antarctic to the countries and dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, the alliance with the US, the machinery of Defence and national security decision-making, the security of northern Australia and even re-engaging with Europe.

It’s best left to others to judge the success or otherwise of the institute. Both from the approval, and sometimes disapproval, that ASPI garners, we can see that people pay attention to the institute’s work. That’s gratifying and motivates the team to keep doing more. 

Coincidentally to ASPI’s 20th anniversary, the Australian Parliament’s Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee has been conducting an inquiry into funding for public research into foreign policy issues. In making a submission to that inquiry, I offered what I hoped was useful advice about the contours of what a notional ‘foreign policy institute’ should look like if the government wanted to promote in the field of foreign policy what ASPI seeks to do for defence and strategic policy. That led me to suggest the following seven approaches, presented here with minor edits:

  1. A foreign policy institute must be genuinely independent, with a charter that makes its core functions clear and a governance framework that supports its independence. If the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) were to be the prime source of funding, it should be made clear that DFAT should not influence the policy recommendations of the institute’s work. A government-appointed council, including a representative of the leader of the opposition, should provide overall strategic direction for the institute. Any entity that is part of a larger government department will inevitably come to reflect the parent. A clear separation between the parent department and the institute is essential.
     
  2. The institute should not be part of a university, because university priorities would weaken the institute’s capacity to retain a sharp focus on public policy. The committee might like to test this proposition by seeing whether it can identify any contemporary foreign policy research outfit that is part of a university which has substantially shaped Australian foreign policy. My view is that you will search in vain. This is true in the main because universities have priorities other than shaping public policy outcomes. How universities recruit, reward and promote, what they teach and the outcomes they regard as constituting excellence are shaped towards other ends than providing contestable and implementable foreign policy.
     
  3. The institute needs scale to develop excellence. Successful think tanks—such as those at the top end of the University of Pennsylvania’s ‘Go To’ index—attract people interested in policy ideas and with lateral thinking skills and with some entrepreneurial flair. The quality of their thinking is strengthened by being able to test their ideas with colleagues and collaborate on interesting policy work. Some scale is needed to bring a group of people like that together, offering terms and conditions that allow people to develop skills over a few years. This approach stands in contrast to the instinct of some departments to offer one-off, short-term, small funding grants. In my experience, multiple ‘penny-packet’ grants become difficult for departments to administer, produce reports that lack an understanding of how public policy is really done and do not develop skills.
     
  4. The institute will need some time to establish itself. ASPI is 20, and every day is a story of how we manage the tasks of offering policy contestability, engaging with our stakeholders and sustaining ourselves financially. It took probably 15 years for an acceptance to be built in the rather tightknit defence and security community that ASPI was not simply to be tolerated but could add value and even be constructively brought into policy discussions. A foreign policy institute will take a similar amount of time to build an accepted place for itself. Hopefully, an institute would start producing good material on day one, but it will take years for such a group to be seen as a natural (indeed, essential) interlocutor in critical foreign policy discussions.
     
  5. The institute must be non-partisan, reaching out to all parts of parliament. Because foreign policy is a public policy good, it is appropriate and likely that the bulk of funding for a foreign policy institute will come from the public sector. If it is successful, the institute will survive through changes of governments, ministers and senior officials. As such, it can’t afford to be partisan in the way that many private think tanks are. That will still leave scope for engaged debate on policy options, which leads to approach number 6.
     
  6. Accept that the institute will, from time to time, annoy you. This is the price of contestability of policy advice. There is no question that ASPI has annoyed governments, oppositions and officials over the years on all manner of issues, from key bilateral relationships to defence equipment acquisitions, military operations, budgets and the rest. To advance policy thinking, it’s necessary from time to time to question existing policy orthodoxies. The test for the institute’s stakeholders is whether the value of contestable policy advice is worth the occasional annoyance. The test for the foreign policy institute will be whether the issue in question has been appropriately researched and thought through.
     
  7. A professional outfit needs appropriate funding. To succeed, a foreign policy institute needs to be able to attract a mix of staff who can be remunerated in line with their skills. As in all walks of life, one gets what one pays for. Funding of between $2 million and $3 million would set up an institute able to build some critical mass, working out of offices fitted out to an appropriately modest APS standard. The institute should have a remit to grow its funding base through its own efforts. This would be sufficient to enable a promising start to a potentially nationally important organisation.

    ASPI was designed to place the executive director position at (approximately) the level of the APS Senior Executive Service Band 3 (deputy secretary) level. Salary and conditions are determined by the Remuneration Tribunal. The executive director, on direction from the ASPI Council, determines salary levels for ASPI’s staff, who are recruited on contracts. The intent is to recruit people with the mix of policy skills and hands-on public policy experience who can realistically shape policy thinking. Government departments and agencies are, in general, willing to support staff taking positions at ASPI, using options for leave without pay from the APS. For more senior staff, the hope is that some time spent at ASPI will enhance their careers, perhaps enabling them to return to the APS with new skills and capacities. For more junior staff, the aim is to equip them with skills that will make them attractive new hires for departments and agencies.8

Of course, I was doing little more than describing the ASPI business model developed more than 20 years ago and validated through two decades of enthusiastic policy research and advocacy by many dozens of ASPI staff.

Speaking personally, it has been the privilege of my professional life to spend almost a decade as the executive director of the institute since April 2012, and a few more years before that as ASPI’s director of programs between 2003 and 2006. My commitment to the organisation comes about because of the value I believe it adds to Australia’s defence and strategic policy framework. These policy settings matter. They’re the foundation of the security of the country, the security of our people and the very type of country that Australia aspires to be. Australia would be better defended if we had more lively debates about the best ways to promote our strategic interests. ASPI has truly been a national gem in sustaining those debates.

At the core of this book is Graeme Dobell’s sharp take on the intellectual content of hundreds of ASPI research publications, thousands of Strategist posts and many, many conferences, seminars, roundtables and the like. Graeme has done a wonderful job of breathing life into this body of work, reflecting some of the heat and energy that came from ASPI staff and ASPI contributors investing their brain power into Australia’s policy interests. In these pages, you read the story of Australia’s own difficult navigation through the choppy strategic seas of the past 20 years. It’s a thrilling ride and a testament to the many wonderful people who have worked at or supported the institute.

We should all hope that ASPI reaches its 40-year and even 50-year anniversaries, because there’s no doubt in my mind that Australia will continue to need access to contestable policy advice in defence and strategic policy. The coming years will be no less difficult and demanding than the years recounted here. In fact, Australia’s future is likely to face even greater challenges. 

Never forget that strategy and policy matter. Profoundly so. That’s why ASPI matters.

Peter Jennings

Download

Readers are encouraged to download the full publication in PDF format here.

About ASPI

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices.

ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our annual report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements. It is incorporated as a company, and is governed by a Council with broad membership. ASPI’s core values are collegiality, originality & innovation, quality & excellence and independence.

ASPI’s publications—including this report—are not intended in any way to express or reflect the views of the Australian Government. The opinions and recommendations in this report are published by ASPI to promote public debate and understanding of strategic and defence issues. They reflect the personal views of the author(s) and should not be seen as representing the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue.

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2021

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.

ISBN 978-1-925229-67-7 (print)
ISBN 978-1-925229-68-4 (online pdf)

Funding statement: No specific sponsorship was received to fund production of this report

  1. See, for example, Kim Beazley, John Howard et al., ASPI at 15, ASPI, Canberra, October 2016, online. ↩︎
  2. Cabinet memorandum JH00/0131—Establishment of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute—Decision, 18 April 2000, online. ↩︎
  3. Cabinet decision JH00/0216/CAB—Australian Strategic Policy Institute—alternate models to establish a strategic policy research centre—Decision, online. ↩︎
  4. Cabinet decision JH00/0216/CAB. ↩︎
  5. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Annual report 2001–2002, ASPI, Canberra, October 2002, 10, online. ↩︎
  6. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Annual report 2019–2020, ASPI, Canberra, October 2020, online; staff numbers are on page 10; funding data is on page 154. ↩︎
  7. Sun Tzu, The art of war, translated by Lionel Giles, Chapter V, 5, online. ↩︎
  8. My submission to the inquiry is available via the internet home page of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Inquiry into funding for public research into foreign policy issues, online. ↩︎

Tag Archive for: Climate Change

Climate risks to security in the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia in 2035

Australian policymakers are vastly underestimating how climate change will disrupt national security and regional stability across the Indo-Pacific.

A new ASPI report assesses the ways climate impacts could threaten Indonesia’s economic and security interests in the next decade, driving consequences across the Indo-Pacific at a crucial time for both the country and the region.

If we fail to anticipate and adapt to accumulating climate-driven risks, we risk stumbling blindly into crises that could lead to severe losses in security, finance and life. Indonesia is one of Australia’s nearest neighbours and will play an increasingly important role in regional affairs in the years ahead. We must understand and address the full implications of climate change for Indonesia and, by extension, our shared future.

The report identifies three key pathways to compounding and destabilising climate disruptions in Indonesia.

One is significant food insecurity that comes from declining domestic production due to shifting rainfall patterns and seasonal extremes, heightened sensitivity to global food price shocks, and a diminished government capacity to absorb these economic disruptions.

The second is large-scale population displacement. Indonesia has a high coastal population density and so is particularly vulnerable and exposed to climate-amplified coastal flooding from sea-level rise and storm surges.

The third is slowed economic growth resulting from reduced agricultural output, declining revenues from stranded fossil-fuel assets, and rising disaster-related costs affecting infrastructure and supply chains.

While the physical impacts of climate change are already intensifying, the most concerning outcomes globally will arise from social, economic and political disruptions which are far more difficult to predict or manage than isolated disaster events.

Given an already unstable global context of rising geopolitical tensions, climate impacts will only magnify this volatility. For example, in 2023, a drought rendered the Panama Canal impassable, just as Red Sea shipping was being disrupted by Houthi attacks. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 constrained a major source of global wheat supply, while India’s ban on certain rice exports further strained global food markets, affecting many communities globally that were already food insecure.

We have focused this report on Indonesia because of its geopolitical significance, rapidly growing economy, large population and its high exposure to complex climate risks. While we do not assess Indonesia’s considerable capabilities to manage these risks, we highlight the intensity of challenges that may be underestimated by policymakers.

With this in mind, the Indonesian government and its regional partners—including Australia—must work together to anticipate and prepare for climate disruptions of this scale. The report makes research and policy recommendations to guide those efforts and lays the foundation for proactive diplomacy and effective international development interventions in the Indo-Pacific. These include:

—Conducting future analyses of the systemic economic impact of climate change across the Indo-Pacific, with a particular focus on Indonesia;

—Prioritising regional collaboration on climate-amplified population displacement;

—Strengthening regional and global diplomatic efforts to enhance cooperation and reduce volatility in the global food system; and

—Expanding food security initiatives to mitigate the effects of climate change on domestic food production.

The report also suggests that Indonesia and its partners should prepare for diminishing economic and disaster relief support across Southeast Asia, including by advancing the value proposition for continued public and private sector investment in regional climate resilience

We hope this report sparks a vital conversation about how Indonesia, Australia and regional partners can better prepare for significant and rapidly emerging climate disruptions. In coming months, we plan to apply the same analytical approach to other countries across the region, as we have done by highlighting the significant risks Australia faces and the need for it to rapidly build climate resilience.

Beyond Indonesia’s preparedness, there is a pressing need for a deeper public discussion in Australia about cross-border climate risks. Despite Australia’s future being inextricably linked to the Indo-Pacific, awareness and discussion of these issues remain limited.

Neither the Office of National Intelligence’s national assessment of climate and security risks (or even de-classified findings from it), nor the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water’s National Climate Risk Assessment have been released publicly. In the absence of their release, more analyses like those in this report are needed to fill the gap in strategic public conversations on climate issues

We must clarify and prioritise national efforts to reflect the scope and scale of investments needed to adapt to climate change at home and abroad. Exploring complex climate risks also helps us better understand the underestimated high costs of inaction and the consequences of failing to prevent worst-case climate futures.

In the absence of this forward-looking conversation, we leave blinders on our security and economic outlooks, leaving us unprepared for climate-amplified disruption.

Centring people of colour to close the climate justice gap

Australia must do more to empower communities of colour in its response to climate change.

In late February, the Multicultural Leadership Initiative hosted its Our Common Future summits in Sydney and Melbourne. These summits focused on the importance of multicultural climate advocacy, the disproportionate impact of climate change on people of colour and the need to build climate resilience at a grassroots level.

These summits brought together a range of First Nations, Pasifika, people of colour, and culturally and linguistically diverse advocates and stakeholders. The need for a conference of this nature is clear: although climate change threatens us all, people of colour are often marginalised within mainstream climate-change discourse. As highlighted by Minister for Climate Change Chris Bowen in his keynote speech at the Sydney summit, we need to dispel the myth that climate change is only ‘a concern for inner-city Anglo-Celtic elites’.

The inclusion of people of colour in this conversation is an ethical imperative, as climate change often disproportionately affects people of colour. In Western Sydney, for example, more than half of the population speaks a language other than English at home and the proportion of low-income earners is higher than the rest of Sydney. This area is typically six to 10 degrees hotter than the rest of the city during extreme heat events. These events therefore pose a significant challenge to low-income migrants with English as a second language, who often lack access to quality healthcare and housing.

This is also evident in developing countries. Although the Global South contributes a relatively small amount to global greenhouse gas emissions, these countries are on the frontline of climate change. One only has to look at international headlines to see the severity of climate disasters, including floods in South Asia and rising sea levels in Pacific island countries such as Tuvalu.

These are not one-off events. They are emblematic of a broader trend of climate injustice: rich, developed countries are doing relatively little to respond to climate events, despite contributing more to climate change. In her report to the General Assembly, UN special rapporteur E Tendayi Achiume highlighted that ‘discrimination at the core of environmental and climate justice’ means that ‘race, ethnicity and national origin continue to result in the unjust enrichment of some, and the utter exploitation … and even death of others’.

International climate negotiation forums have also faced criticism for marginalising specific racial groups. At COP26 in 2021, many African voices were underrepresented due to limited funding and difficulty securing Covid-19 vaccines, both of which were necessary for in-person participation. This undermined the ability of African advocates to highlight the severity of domestic climate effects, such as prolonged drought in Zambia, which left about one million people in need of food assistance in 2021.

If Australia and Pacific island countries are successful in their joint bid to host COP31 in 2026, Australia will have the opportunity to address these inequities in climate negotiations. Discussions must focus on improving climate financing for the Global South, especially countries that are industrialising and therefore need access to energy sources. As green energy solutions are often costly, uptake in developing countries will require financial support from wealthier, developed countries.

Centring communities of colour within the climate movement will also help build grassroots resilience to climate impacts. As seen during the Covid-19 pandemic, governments often struggle to reach multicultural Australians, especially community members with limited English language proficiency or those who are recent arrivals. As climate effects become more frequent and severe, empowering multicultural community leaders to act as climate spokespeople at a grassroots level will improve Australia’s broader climate resilience.

While governments have traditionally relied on directly translating messages into community languages, multicultural leaders can more effectively influence their respective communities. Religious leaders, business owners, youth leaders and other prominent figures in multicultural communities are best placed to distil climate messaging.

Community leaders can tangibly illustrate the impacts of climate change on the wellbeing of multicultural communities. For example, they could point to increasingly common pollution-related health effects and highlight the effect of climate change on grocery and fuel prices.

During climate disasters, such as floods, bushfires and cyclones, these same community leaders are already well-placed to conduct tailored outreach to community members in line with government messaging, building community resilience.

Centralising the voices of communities of colour in the climate movement is integral to building national resilience and addressing the disproportionate effects of climate change on people of colour. The Multicultural Leadership Initiative’s summits in Sydney and Melbourne were the first of their kind, shedding light on issues faced by many in the multicultural climate advocacy space. The conference paved an optimistic path forward by finally centring people of colour as autonomous and empowered actors within the climate movement.

High-impact climate risks, low-probability? Think again

In a recent presentation, I recommended, quite unoriginally, that governments should have a greater focus on higher-impact, lower-probability climate risks. My reasoning was that current climate model projections have blind spots, meaning we are betting on best case scenarios.

Irresponsible at best and ‘fatally foolish at worst’, this approach is inconsistent with other security issues—I don’t know many analysts assessing nuclear escalation or a potential Taiwan Strait crisis from the best-case angle.

Globally, January 2025 was the warmest January on record. This included severe heatwaves across Australia, with maximum temperatures as high as 17 degrees C above average.

This warming was unprecedented and, importantly, unexpected. This is an ever-increasing climate-related trend—reality continues to outstrip scientific expectation. Given this, my use of the term ‘lower-probability’ was itself, in hindsight, an example of this best-case mentality: designating high impact climate events as low probability is likely, at best, a dangerous underestimate.

Beyond blind spots in climate model projections, theories and scientists (their calculations and biases) are not infallible. Therefore, the accuracy of probability estimates depends on the accuracy of the underlying logic. Regarding probability:

… if climate modellers wish to determine the implications our greenhouse gas emissions will have … their model/theory will not be adequate [at predicting relevant system features at useful levels of precision and frequency] unless it tells them the changes in the local temperature and precipitation.

Yet, current models seem unable to adequately predict global, let alone local, climate changes. In June 2024, for the first time, global mean surface temperatures reached the Paris Agreement’s aspirational threshold of 1.5 degrees C of warming for 12 consecutive months—again, much earlier than expected.

This is particularly concerning given that most climate impact research of the past decade has been based on temperature rises of 2 degrees C and below, this despite greenhouse gas trajectories setting the world on track to warm by more than 3 degrees C by 2100. Various studies even suggest that we cannot discount increases of up to 6 degrees C.

Various factors drive the mismatch between warming estimates and research coverage. Firstly, as 2 degrees C is the benchmark of international targets, research likely reflects policy demand. Secondly, due to well-funded misinformation campaigns, scientists have been labelled alarmist and want to avoid such dismissal. Thirdly, the consensus process of the International Panel on Climate Change is inherently conservative, which also compounds the previous factors.

How can we deem potential climate impacts low probability if we haven’t properly researched them and their potential dynamics under the higher temperatures we are headed towards?

Further, we today are locking in the events that will undoubtedly happen tomorrow. This is often overlooked and underestimated by security practitioners—unlike military conflict, for example, people are not fully in control. Feedback mechanisms exist within Earth’s systems that, once initiated by rising temperatures, will cause abrupt, self-perpetuating and effectively irreversible changes.

Thermal inertia reinforces this lack of control. The ocean stores more than 90 percent of Earth’s excess heat. Even if man-made greenhouse gases were to cease tomorrow, the world would continue warming for at least another several decades as this stored heat is released.

Due to the factors outlined above, there is uncertainty regarding the reliability of probability estimates for specific events, when they might occur, and the chains of cause and effect that may trigger them.

However, uncertainty does not equal low probability. A lack of certainty around calculation inputs merely lowers confidence in the accuracy of probability estimates. Consequently, the actual likelihood of a particular event occurring may be much higher than predicted.

Moreover, given existing blind spots and biases, it is highly likely that probabilities around singular high-impact climate risks are underestimated, particularly within the security community.

If we analyse climate threats on a cumulative risk basis, the margin for error grows, increasing the collective probability estimates of climate events occurring. Hence, we can have confidence, given our current trajectory, that the collective probability of at least some high impact climate events materialising is high. We shouldn’t use terminology suggesting otherwise.

We must stop analysing events in isolation and begin to better comprehend event compounds, cascades, and concurrency—and fast. This is especially true for probability, as it informs much of the world’s risk and security analysis and management.

All trajectories are subject to change and human decision. But until this change happens, we are heading into uncharted territory.

We can, however, learn from another high-stakes area in which decisions rely on scientific evidence: public health. Patients are not treated by scientists undertaking clinical research, but rather by general practitioners. Justine Lacey and Mark Howden argue that a similar separation between scientist and practitioner would support better climate-science advice to policymakers.

This separation can facilitate relevant and targeted advice encompassing a range of views, largely independent of specific researchers. It could improve the interpretation and translation of advice, enhancing decision-makers’ understanding. This could reduce conflicts of interest and avoid narrowly informed and disciplinary-siloed advice. It would also create shared responsibility, alleviating pressure on the climate science community.

Although intermediaries cannot remove uncertainty, they could help manage it—to the benefit of probability estimates, decision-making and the public.

Tackling climate change in the age of Trump

There is no denying the reality of global warming. Each year is hotter than the preceding one. Last month alone was the hottest January on record. Recurring natural disasters—floods, fires, droughts and hurricanes—are becoming more extreme and frequent. The world has blown through the goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees C above the pre-industrial level. At this rate, climate change could define the second half of this century.

National and international efforts to stem climate change are not succeeding. The Global South views the problem as one that ought to be fixed by richer countries that developed sooner. Many countries, including China, prioritise near-term economic growth over reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, and freeriding on other governments’ efforts is widespread, partly owing to public opposition to taxes that could curb energy use or encourage climate-conscious behaviours.

Since returning to the White House, Donald Trump has led the United States swiftly into this camp, withdrawing from the Paris climate agreement, rescinding emissions-reduction targets and ending climate-related initiatives. His administration is focussed on increasing fossil-fuel production, even though the US is already the world’s leading producer of oil and gas and has only modest potential to increase output.

The reasons are not only economic but also cultural and political, with many Americans resenting or rejecting experts’ climate warnings. The good news, though, is that a range of potential initiatives that are consistent with the Trump administration’s priorities could still slow climate change.

Those who acknowledge the seriousness of the climate crisis can repeat the same arguments, attend the same global conferences and advocate for the same policies in the hope that at some point what has mostly failed will mostly succeed. But they would be better off trying a different approach, one that reflects political realities in the US and around the world but could still make a meaningful difference.

Such an approach must begin with realistic goals. Climate change can be managed, not stopped or solved. Global emissions continue to rise, fossil fuels still account for 80 percent of world energy use and talk of a transition away from them is mostly just that: talk. And energy use will only continue to increase as the global population increases, Africa develops, electrification expands and new data centres required for artificial intelligence are built.

Given this, embracing energy coexistence is unavoidable. Fossil fuels will be here for decades to come. While developed countries are abandoning coal (albeit not completely), its use in the developing world continues to increase, where the goal should be to accelerate the shift toward cleaner natural gas. The same holds for practices that limit methane emissions. Renewables are growing in importance and should be encouraged through public-private partnerships. There is no reason that a US president prepared to be tough on China should allow it to dominate green technological innovation. The private sector, which has made enormous investments and stands to gain from future ones, should weigh in.

Policymakers should also emphasise adaptation and resilience at the national, state and local levels. Building codes and zoning regulations need to be rethought to limit vulnerability to climate-related extreme heat, fires, storms and flooding. Investment in such infrastructure could create jobs and make it possible for people to live where they want. Solutions that increase the efficiency of the energy grid, water systems and household appliances should also be adopted. Here, Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) should weigh in.

Likewise, a feasible climate-change policy must treat nuclear energy as indispensable for achieving reliable clean power. This can only happen by streamlining permitting processes to accelerate deployment of new reactors. China is building nuclear plants in under five years; there is no good reason the US cannot match this. Similarly, roadblocks to much needed renewable projects, mining of critical minerals and development of energy infrastructure ought to be reduced. Here, too, DOGE could have a role to play.

The federal government and states (together with companies) should also invest in technologies such as direct air capture, better scrubbing systems for coal plants and carbon capture, utilisation, sequestration and storage. Again, there is no reason that economic growth must be sacrificed.

A greater focus on what communities and cities can do to reduce their vulnerability to fires, floods and the like can help manage the effects of climate change without engaging the ideological debate. It would also help to engage new climate allies, including religious leaders, educators and business leaders. Many young people are already there.

At the same time, global efforts should be restructured. The annual United Nations climate change conferences are falling short. What is needed are smaller groups (what some call minilateralism) focussing on specific aspects of the climate challenge and involving the governments and companies that matter most. Trade offers a model here: whereas global efforts have failed, regional and other small clusters have flourished.

Nature-based climate stewardship of the oceans and forests is also needed, because it preserves and expands the most powerful carbon sinks. Assistance of all sorts should be channelled to encourage forestation and halt or slow deforestation. Trump considers himself an environmentalist. Here is a way he can act on it.

Lastly, solar geoengineering, or reflecting solar radiation back into space, deserves more exploration. Federal investment through US national labs could ensure responsible development and governance. While controversial, it represents the kind of bold, game-changing initiative that should appeal to Trump. If successful, solar geoengineering could one day meaningfully slow or stop additional climate change and even offset some existing effects. And even if its promise proves to be less dramatic, the technology could complement existing and planned mitigation and adaptation efforts.

There are no doubt other ideas that are both desirable and feasible. What is certain is that we cannot address the climate crisis effectively by insisting on an approach that is not succeeding. Stopping climate change might well be beyond our reach, but managing it in a cost-effective way need not be.

La La Land under siege

The devastating wildfires in California have turned the City of Stars into a scene from an apocalyptic Hollywood movie.

It’s hard to fathom that a disaster of this magnitude could strike a major coastal city today, and difficult to understand how we’re still seeing widespread destruction of homes and businesses. About 12,000 structures have been lost since the fires began on 7 January, with many more likely to follow.

Like Los Angeles, Australia’s capital cities are close to national parks and are vulnerable to bushfires. In 2003 a massive fire hit Canberra. Almost 500 houses burned down, but the city lost no critical infrastructure.

Whether that was thanks to good luck or good preparations, we need to look again at protection of major cities’ critical infrastructure against increasingly frequent and severe natural disasters.

Amid the devastation in LA, some buildings remain unscathed. These structures show the importance of preparedness and attention to disaster-resistant design and resilient building materials.

Two particular examples of resilient building design and materials that have been making headlines worldwide are in Malibu and the Pacific Palisades. Buildings there incorporate a range of wildfire-proofing measures, including fire-resistant roof materials and absence of eaves and roof vents.

Internal features include tempered glass and class-A wood, which is as ignition resistant as concrete or steel. The structures also have walls that resist flame and heat for up to one hour. Externally, sparse desert-style landscaping and concrete retaining walls provide effective setbacks.

Meanwhile, the Paul Getty Museum is an example of resilient infrastructure. It sits on a ridgeline in the Santa Monica Mountains and has withstood several wildfires, with this month’s Palisades fire coming within 1.8 metres of the eastern walls. Completed in 1997, the museum features fire-resistant landscapes, materials and systems, including a network of underground pipes connects to a one-million-gallon water tank for emergency sprinkler activation.

Built to the highest fire-resistive standards, it has exterior features including 300,000 travertine stone blocks, and roofs covered in crushed stone. Interior walls are concrete, and the building’s self-contained design includes air pressure systems to separate different areas and prevent smoke infiltration.

So far, the LA wildfires have destroyed an area of about 60 square miles (approximately 16,000 hectares), an area larger than the city of Darwin. In comparison, the Australian 2019-20 Black Summer bushfires burnt more than 16 million hectares of land, resulting in a loss of about 5900 buildings and an estimated insurance loss of $1.34 billion. The economic, social and environmental impacts are still felt.

Reinsurers in Los Angeles have indicated that they will face significant losses and will seek to recover their costs. This will have affect insurance premiums globally, and any may result in rising insurance costs and difficulties in securing coverage. According to climate-change risk analysis modelling, one in 10 properties in Australia will be uninsurable within the next decade. Meanwhile, Australia is experiencing a cost-of-living crisis, where insurance is increasingly seen as a luxury expense and is often deprioritised in favour of essential needs such as housing and groceries.

As insurance becomes unaffordable, the government should shoulder the burden of protecting infrastructure. This raises an important question: how well-prepared are our major cities’ critical and social infrastructure to withstand and respond to the increasingly frequent and severe natural disasters that climate change is driving?

50 years ago, Cyclone Tracy was, at the time, the worst natural disaster in Australian history. As reflected in ASPI’s special report Cyclone Tracy: 50 years on, the disaster played a pivotal role in the development of the National Construction Code, which established a standard to enhance resilience against natural hazards such as bushfires, floods and earthquakes. It wasn’t until 1991 that an Australian standard was set for improving the fire resistance of homes in bushfire-prone regions.

The LA wildfires have shown that natural disasters do not respect boundaries set by urban planning. Many of our major cities, including major Canberra, Sydney and Melbourne, are bordered by big national parks, making the urban edges highly vulnerable to bushfires, especially as climate change makes conditions hotter and drier.

A reform of the National Construction Code and Australian fire resistance standards are needed to ensure new infrastructure can withstand major weather events. This could be similar to the implementation of sustainability and energy-efficiency standards for new buildings. Governments at all levels can lead by example by improving the disaster resilience of their own assets.

Implementation of a government-led rebate system, similar to the Australia’s solar rebate system, is an example of how government can help offset the costs of adapting existing structures to make them more resilient.

In the short term such a reform would not only reduce the loss of structures during natural disasters; it would also cut building-lifetime energy costs. Over the long term, it would help lower the cost of insurance premiums and, importantly, reduce post-disaster recovery time.

The LA wildfires have underscored the urgent need for governments to rethink their assumptions about bushfire risk and infrastructure resilience. LA is facing a long road ahead to rebuild its infrastructure and restore essential services. Australia must take steps to avoid experiencing a similar crisis.

What mercenaries can teach us about climate-fuelled disaster responses

The devastating fires in Southern California, many of which are still burning out of control, have exposed a controversial and increasingly attractive disaster response alternative that engages the private sector.

California’s private firefighting industry, which most haven’t even heard of, is growing rapidly in the face of deteriorating climate conditions. Proponents contend that private industries ‘can fill gaps when public fire departments aren’t able to meet the demands of their local communities’. However, without careful planning and public sector engagement, expanding the industry may actually exacerbate those gaps.

We can learn from another type of privatised force: mercenaries, or private military companies.

The United Nations Mercenary Convention defines a mercenary as an individual who, among other factors, is recruited to fight and is motivated to take part by the desire for private gain. As private firefighters can be similarly defined, we can use the experiences of mercenaries in warfare to predict challenges and inform policy.

Mercenaries are paid far better than their counterparts in national armed forces. Similarly, private firefighters in California are allegedly being paid up to US$2000 an hour for their services. Comparatively, the average public firefighting wage is US$30 an hour.

The profit-fuelled growth of such private industries at the expense of losing personnel and expertise from public services presents community risks. Private contractors will act in the interest of their stakeholders and not necessarily in the interests of affected communities. For example, private firefighters may be contractually obliged to remain on standby to respond to requests from clients, rather than helping others at risk.

Public sector personnel shortages can also force governments to outsource operations to contractors, initiating cycles of dependency. This is already occurring within defence organisations: In a paper published by the Land Warfare Studies Centre, Lieutenant Colonel Ian Wing wrote that ‘many functions are now so reliant on contractors for their performance that modern military forces would find it very difficult to deploy for prolonged periods without them.’

Wing also wrote that military contractors ‘may not wish to completely resolve conflict, as to do so would remove the requirement for further contracts.’ This is concerning in the context of disaster response: firefighter arson is already a well-known phenomenon. Greater monetary incentive, in addition to desires for excitement and recognition, could further motivate contractors to commit arson and delay the extinguishing of fires.

Government employment of private contractors can also subvert accountability and undermine trust—an important aspect of effective disaster management. Compared with public operations, private contractors’ activities ‘can be attractive [to governments] as their undertakings are not as visible or readily scrutinised by the citizenry who empowers them’. For example, in the warfare mercenary context, it is alleged that the Australian government was able to maintain domestic political palatability of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars by increasing the number of contractors and thereby reducing ADF commitments and fatalities.

Although many governments may accept such a scapegoat, a lack of transparency and accountability can undermine public trust in government, jeopardising disaster management as a result. From heeding early warnings and emergency information to accepting help and guidance from institutions, trust is essential for community resilience and recovery.

Nevertheless, the benefits (for example, agility, precision, and surge capacity) of private contractors in disaster situations can be significant, if the risks have been addressed. The Australian government should begin planning and preparing for an increase in demand for large-scale private disaster industries. This should be done in consultation with states and territories, as well as local communities. The government should develop an enabling regulatory framework and identify which areas of disaster management are best placed to be supported by contractors.

Private contractors are potentially well-suited to supporting disaster planning, training, and mitigation. However, given the associated risks, Australia should consider whether these entities should be involved in disaster response.

Diverse approaches can help build resilience if they are coordinated and complementary. The government must ensure that such approaches do not come at the expense of community cohesion, and do not undermine national preparedness and efficient disaster response.

Lessons from Cyclone Tracy: preparing for a future of cascading disasters

On Christmas morning in 1974, Cyclone Tracy unleashed catastrophic destruction on Darwin, forever altering the city and Australia’s approach to disaster resilience. As the intensity of climate-driven catastrophes grows, the main lesson of Cyclone Tracy is clear: we must do more to prepare, and we must do it now.

With wind speeds surpassing 217 km/h, the Category 4 cyclone killed 66 people and injured hundreds. It obliterated more than 70 percent of Darwin’s buildings, displacing most of its population. Fifty years on, the lessons from Cyclone Tracy remain as urgent and relevant as ever, as Australia confronts a new era of escalating climate change and increasingly frequent extreme weather events.

ASPI’s new report commemorating Cyclone Tracy’s anniversary highlights the need for proactive, comprehensive disaster resilience in the face of rising climate risks. The aftermath of Tracy revealed deep vulnerabilities in Australia’s preparedness, from inadequate building codes to insufficient community awareness. This reshaped our approach to disaster management, laying the foundations for national disaster-response frameworks that continue to guide Australia.

The immediate aftermath of Cyclone Tracy brought Australia together in a way that was unprecedented in peacetime. The Australian Defence Force led a coordinated relief effort, showcasing the power of military, government and civilian agencies working in unison. The cyclone also prompted establishment of the Darwin Reconstruction Authority, a centralised body that drove the city’s rebuilding efforts and set a benchmark for future disaster recovery initiatives. These responses proved that a structured, collaborative approach to recovery can lead to resilience.

The reconstruction of Darwin not only transformed the city into a modern urban centre; it caused a shift in how Australia views the intersection of disaster response and urban planning. The introduction of stricter building codes, designed to withstand Category 5 cyclones, became a cornerstone of our disaster preparedness. The recovery also highlighted the importance of local leadership, community involvement and a whole-of-nation response to disasters.

While we’ve made progress since Cyclone Tracy, the growing threat of climate change means that disaster resilience today requires an even more multifaceted approach. Our report explores the need to look beyond building codes and infrastructure and include advancements in predictive technologies such as satellite monitoring and early warning systems. Equally important is empowering local communities, particularly those in vulnerable regions like northern Australia, to take proactive measures and adapt to changing conditions. We cannot afford to be reactive. We must be anticipatory in our approach to future disasters.

In this context, Cyclone Tracy offers not only a historical lesson but a clear call to action. The resilience of Darwin in the face of overwhelming destruction was impressive, but future threats demand that we take a more proactive, strategic approach. Australia’s National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework is a step in the right direction, but it must evolve to meet the demands of an increasingly volatile climate. The growing frequency of cascading disasters—whether bushfires, floods, or cyclones—requires even greater collaboration and resource-sharing between government, industry and the private sector.

The 50th anniversary of Cyclone Tracy must not only be a moment of reflection but a reminder that disaster resilience is a dynamic, ongoing process. Northern Australia is particularly vulnerable to cyclones, heatwaves and flooding, and it cannot afford complacency.

As climate risks continue to escalate, we need to invest in smarter, more resilient infrastructure, better systems of disaster response, and more informed, empowered communities. Traditional knowledge, particularly from Indigenous communities in northern Australia, must also be integrated into disaster planning, offering invaluable lessons on sustainable living and resource management.

The legacy of Cyclone Tracy is clear: resilience is not just about recovery, but about preparation. As Australia faces the challenges of climate change, we must build on the lessons of the past to ensure a safer, more resilient future. This anniversary is an opportunity to strengthen our commitment to disaster preparedness, ensuring that Australia remains a global leader in disaster resilience and recovery.

By taking Cyclone Tracy’s lessons and adapting them to today’s climate risks, Australia can create a more resilient future for all its communities, ensuring that no one faces disaster alone.

Climate security is an opportunity in Australia’s regional strategy

From Pacific leaders to regional intelligence analysts, climate change is consistently identified as the foremost security issue for the Pacific island region. Yet Australia’s current defence and intelligence approach to regional engagement, focused mainly on traditional defence, fails to adequately address this existential concern, leaving a gap in its strategy.

Greater integration of climate security issues into Australia’s defence and intelligence establishments, drawing inspiration from the United States’ approach, could improve Australia’s Pacific reputation. It would demonstrate that Australia takes the threat of climate change seriously and streamline regional mitigation, adaptation and preparedness efforts. With growing geopolitical competition in the region and the likely US retreat from climate-security leadership, this has never been of greater strategic importance.

Australia’s National Defence Strategy is clear that deepening Pacific relationships is key to our strategy of deterrence by denial. We seek to build and maintain these relationships mainly through traditional security arrangements, particularly by delivering what the strategy calls a ‘comprehensive package’ of maritime security infrastructure, equipment and training.

However, this approach doesn’t seem to be greatly enhancing our strategic influence in the Pacific. This should come as no surprise, as the strategy fails to account for the full breadth of security priorities and threat perceptions of its subject countries.

Since the early 1990s, Pacific island leaders have made it clear that climate change is their greatest security challenge. As the high commissioner of the Solomon Islands to Australia said in 2020, ‘climate change, not Covid-19, not even China, is the biggest threat to our security’—a threat, and plea for action, that Australia is perceived to have largely ignored.

Australia remains one of the largest greenhouse gas emitters per capita. Considering this—along with sentiments such as Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr’s statement that world leaders who remain inactive on climate issues ‘may as well bomb’ Pacific nations—how can Australia expect to be the Pacific’s partner of choice?

In contrast, the US has been a global leader when it comes to matters of climate security. It was an early advocate and placed climate change ‘at the heart’ of its national security. With the recent US Framework for Climate Resilience and Security, the 2022 National Security Strategy and the 2021 National Intelligence Estimate, the US’s defense and intelligence community leads the way in monitoring, analysing and assessing climate security threats. This information is crucial to streamlining mitigation and adaptation policies, identifying priority areas of investment and ensuring adequate preparedness not only domestically, but for partners across the globe.

Climate security leadership gave the US a significant and under-recognised advantage in the Pacific: it demonstrated its commitment to, unity with, and genuine respect for the people of the region and advanced the US’s status as the preferred partner.

But with an incoming president who has previously called climate change a hoax, US climate security leadership is likely at its end.

With China’s domination in almost every aspect of the renewable energy transition likely to win Beijing favour throughout the Pacific, climate security is an emerging gap in the West’s regional strategy.

If Australia wants to maintain regional strategic balance, it must urgently step up and lead in the climate security space. Leaving this area uncontested risks further compromising Australia’s regional influence, ceding the upper hand to other players in the region.

Australia’s capacity to engage with matters of climate security is much smaller than that of the US, so identifying and acting upon leverage points will be necessary. Australia should adopt a climate security strategy based on what has been the US strategy—one that considers how Australia’s National Intelligence Community can best be mobilised to monitor and assess climate security threats.

To facilitate this process, Australia should establish a climate intelligence working group.

This group should be a partnership between relevant scientific and intelligence agencies, similar to the United States Climate Security Advisory Council. It should identify and advise the government on priority areas of focus, which should be resourced and supported accordingly. Group output may, for example, include an annual net assessment, from which public and partner products could be produced.

This enhanced incorporation of climate security issues into our defence and intelligence establishments will demonstrate the seriousness with which Australia considers climate security threats. By affirming our commitment to and partnership with Pacific island nations in overcoming these threats, Australia may garner substantial favour throughout the region.

Furthermore, Australian leadership in this space would highlight Pacific islanders’ calls for urgent global climate action. As stated by Whipps, ‘the hardest challenge, I think, is sometimes you get drowned out—people denying that it actually is happening ….’

Australia can ensure that our neighbours’ voices are amplified, not drowned out.

If we want to persist with our current strategy, rather than adopt one that relies less on our Pacific partners, it’s time to take climate security seriously.

As former Samoan prime minister Tuila’epa Sa’ilele Malielegaoi said, ‘We all know the problem, the solutions. All that is left would be some courage to tell people there is certainty of disaster.’

To work with US on climate, focus on national security and economic ‘value propositions’

Even as the US is set to withdraw again from the Paris Agreement, and potentially the entire UN Framework Convention on Climate Change process, Australia can leverage its partnership with Washington to continue its support for strategically important climate efforts.

To do so, Australia must emphasise that the value propositions for US investments in a climate-resilient Indo-Pacific region are based in US national security and economic interests. It is far cheaper to prepare for future impacts than to react to increasingly intense and concurrent disasters. These investments will also ensure a more stable region less influenced by China’s own, often competing, investments.

This is easier said than done, but the goal is to use the next four years to build global resilience to intensifying climate impacts. The strategic and moral imperative of that goal means doing everything we can with the hand we’ve been dealt.

Early indications of the Trump administration’s approach to global climate resilience can be gleaned from Trump’s cabinet preferences and the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 policy documents—if incoming officials do indeed heed them.

Ideologically motivated perspectives exist. This includes Trump’s choices for secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth, and director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, who have both recently attacked climate as a security issue. Similarly, Project 2025 is critical of most US climate efforts, and includes recommendations that would damage US leadership in climate science.

So how can Australia and likeminded countries mitigate these risks and grasp opportunities?

Regardless of how loudly the administration might attack climate change as an ideological issue, key prospective officials seem to understand its relevance to national security—both in geopolitical competition and in adaptation for future climate impacts.

The geopolitical dimension will likely be important to keeping the US engaged on climate issues. The proposed national security advisor nominee, Mike Waltz, has been vocal about risks of depending on China for clean energy, particularly for critical-minerals supplies. As secretary of state, it’s clear that Marco Rubio will focus on holding China accountable for its responsibility to rapidly reduce its outsized and growing share of global emissions.

The national security case for adapting to climate impacts—traditionally less politicised than emission reductions—will also be apparent, regardless of whether it’s framed with climate-specific language. Rubio and Waltz have acknowledged the need to build resilience to climate-amplified disasters. As Floridians, they’ve seen first-hand the devastating effects of intensifying hurricanes and sea-level rise.

Even Project 2025’s chapter on foreign aid agency USAID, while advocating a wholesale redistribution of sources and engagement in the provision of aid, and cutting climate strategies and programs broadly, still says ‘USAID resources are best deployed to strengthen the resilience of countries that are most vulnerable to climatic shifts’. While it’s unlikely that an administration following Project 2025 will provide any support for multilateral climate finance programs, it could continue delivering bilateral and minilateral climate resilience investments.

Australia may have more in common with the US on climate than is apparent on first look, particularly with officials such as Waltz and Rubio. The Australian government will disagree on a broad range of issues with the new administration, including criticisms of climate science, the need for emission reductions, and the link between climate and national security.

We do not have the luxury of time to align on every issue, however, so we must advance mutual climate interests for the sake of a more resilient future. Identifying the specific areas where US national interests align with climate resilience can help deliver regional assistance where it’s needed most.

Many defence assets are exposed to climate impacts. Rising disasters at home and abroad will continue to distract the US military and its partners). Ignoring this will diminish military readiness and capability of the US and partners in the Indo-Pacific amid rising regional tensions.

Indo-Pacific geopolitics are sensitive to both climate impacts and investments in resilience. Pacific islands have long identified climate change as the greatest threat to their security. The US and partners such as Australia cannot take Pacific nations’ support for granted if they are left to deal with climate impacts on their own. They will increasingly turn to offers of support from alternatives, including China.

Southeast Asian countries are also vulnerable to climate impacts. The Philippines has just been hit by a sixth typhoon in a month, bringing this year’s total to 16—double the yearly average. As the Philippines’ secretary of defense noted at an event hosted by ASPI on 11 November, the annual cycle of responding and rebuilding after increasingly intense typhoons is costly.

He noted that this cycle affects the resources available for military priorities. He emphasised the importance of communicating the ‘value proposition’ for US support for the Philippines’ climate resilience. He referred not only to the strategic value of preparedness for military confrontation with China, but also the economic benefits of the Philippines acting as a hub for logistics and subsea cables.

This line of analysis will surely resonate with Rubio as secretary of state, who penned an essay in 2023 arguing for the importance of the US supporting the Philippines as it grappled with an increasingly threatening China in the South China Sea.

Advancing the economic value of climate resilience should also resonate with US national interests, as should the threat of losing out on the economic benefits of leading clean energy industries. The US is far behind China as the world’s largest producer of renewable energy technology. Australia should emphasise the need for the US to catch up on critical-minerals and clean energy supply chains to benefit economically and avoid economic coercion.

This administration will pursue policies that Australia and others will disagree with. These partners must ensure that US actions strengthen global and regional stability, not weaken it further—whether in its approach to ongoing geopolitical tensions, or future humanitarian crises. They must emphasise that the best way to minimise future risks includes reducing emissions, strong climate science, and investments in adaptation.

They can do so knowing what will resonate most with influential voices in the incoming administration.

This will be difficult, but not impossible. Success in climate policy requires coordinating broad coalitions around limited resources regardless of how dire the trends may seem, and how difficult progress may be.

This next four years will be no different.

Pacific land reclamation deserves support

Pacific island countries, and low-lying lands globally, are on the front lines of climate change. From rising sea-levels to intensifying cyclone impacts, vulnerable food and economic security, they face a great many risks. Equally, the history of Pacific islanders revolves around learning and adapting to the unique environments of their homelands—and they are unequivocal about their desire to continue that long tradition of adaptation in the face of amplified climate risks.

To remain a partner of preference in the Pacific, countries like Australia must demonstrate real commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions—but also take the Pacific’s lead when islanders ask for support in managing the security risks posed by climate change. Nowhere is that need clearer than in challenging the long-held assumption that Pacific islanders are doomed to relocate their entire communities. While sea levels and storm surges threaten to flood their lands, a key and viable solution is counterintuitively simple in the face of that immense challenge.

Land reclamation is and should remain a key part of a balanced approach to supporting the Pacific community. Tuvalu demonstrated this in its priorities for Australian support through the Falepili Union. Enabling this is a question of cost, financing and consequences—all of which bear examination in more detail.

Land reclamation in marine environments involves either draining coastal wetlands or depositing a substrate, such as sand, to raise landmasses above sea level. This can be used either to extend existing coastlines or to create artificial islands. It’s far from a novel technique: there is a long global history of land reclamation, and its application is widespread.

A 2023 study found that it had been deployed between 2000 and 2020 by 106 of 135 (78 percent) of coastal cities with more than 1 million people. This activity added roughly 2350km2 of land to the Earth’s surface in that period—slightly more than the land territory of Nauru, Tuvalu, Marshall Islands, Niue, Palau, Micronesia and Tonga combined. Their total population is 308,850.

The cost of land reclamation is a key to making their case, given the significant gap in global public financing for climate adaptation: as of late last year, the amount needed was 10 to 18 times as much as the available financing, according to UNEP. The costs of each project are highly variable and dependent on design parameters as well as capital and labour inputs. An interesting example is the largest land reclamation project in the Maldives—Ras Male. The project is designed to create 11.5km2 of land 2 metres above sea-level (well above average estimates of sea-level rise for 2100), at an estimated cost of roughly US$91 million. Designing to cope with future sea-level rise is an important consideration in cost—of the 106 major coastal cities that have resorted to land reclamation, 70 percent appear at high risk of flooding by 2100 even under a medium global emissions scenario (with a temperature rise of 2°C and 3°C).

Its utility in climate adaptation is clear. Under a high-emissions scenario and without land reclamation, much of the area of Tuvalu’s atolls (including its capital, Funafuti) will be flooded by daily tides by 2050, and the country will be almost totally submerged by 2100. Its work to date under the Tuvalu Coastal Adaptation Project (T-CAP) is shoring up infrastructure around three atolls (including Funafuti) to prevent such flooding, supported by the Green Climate Fund and bilateral partners such as Australia (which is contributing roughly US$26 million to T-CAP).

In the longer term, Tuvalu has been developing its Long-Term Adaptation Plan (L-TAP) with regional and global partners to sustain its resilience to coastal flooding risk. The L-TAP is still being fully costed but could be roughly US$1.3 billion, which will include the creation of a 3.5km2 of land free from the future flooding risks projected by experts from NASA and the UN. This is all balanced with support for limited climate mobility arrangements and disaster response, as found in the Falepili Union.

Australia has also contributed technical expertise towards these reclamation works. Hall Contracting is a Queensland-based dredging company supporting T-CAP. Leveraging this expertise and learning from the experience of land-reclamation projects and proponents are critical to ensuring the future success and sustainable application of land reclamation as its importance rises across the region.

Land reclamation can have significant consequences that must be balanced. The extraction of sand from ocean floors has led to export bans across maritime Southeast Asia. The environmental impact of that extraction is severe, and it can lead to the devastation of marine life and resources that are critical to the survival of coastal communities (a clear concern for low-lying islands). Where water has been pumped out of wetlands (as is notably the case in the Netherlands), the result can be significant damage to ecosystems critical for flood prevention and resilience—on top of damaging sensitive ecosystems and contributing to the release into the atmosphere of stored carbon dioxide and methane that would otherwise remain locked in the ground.

The societal benefit of land reclamation to date has also been mixed. The United Arab Emirates’ experience—as has been argued in the Maldives projects—demonstrates its value for economic and real-estate value, rather than strengthening the resilience of societies under climate stress.

The greatest concerns are surely about the use of land reclamation to advance geopolitical interests. China’s deployment of reclamation to support its unlawful territorial claims across the South China Sea is well documented. Equally, it remains a comparatively cheap way to extend the reach of air power without using aircraft carriers. Navigating the use of land reclamation for military and territorial gain is an entirely different question from its role in helping low-lying islands adapt—although attention should be paid to where the technical capacity and expertise from geopolitical applications could be leveraged as influence to support adaptation.

To be clear, land reclamation alone cannot safeguard Pacific island countries from the risks posed by climate change. Domestic challenges for food production and disaster response and recovery may compound with rising economic difficulties, alongside global disruptions to food and trade supply chains.

Its costs are not prohibitive, however. Countries such as Tuvalu have clearly decided that it forms a key part of their future. To remain a partner of preference, countries like Australia must continue to support those efforts and pay attention to what other forms of support Pacific islanders request as climate change intensifies.