Tag Archive for: civil liberty

Safety versus security: an asymmetrical opportunity for right-wing extremism in Australia

In 1922, German political theorist Carl Schmitt wrote a seminal essay arguing that sovereignty is defined by the power to suspend state law during times of extraordinary threat to national security. The government can then neutralise that threat unencumbered by the laws that normally balance state power with civil liberties.

After 9/11, Schmitt’s thesis, not in name but in concept, became the foundation for the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ and US foreign policy for the next 20 years. It provided the juridical reasoning for the US government–sanctioned use of torture, or ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, by military and intelligence agencies on the basis of national security, which contravened domestic legislation and international human rights conventions to which the US was signatory.

In Australia, as in the US, there have been concerns about civil liberties being eroded by the passage of new surveillance and detention laws in order to help law enforcement and intelligence agencies prevent terror attacks. But public and political discourse suggested this was largely perceived as a justified rebalancing of national security risks and democratic freedoms, to protect citizens from the extraordinary threat at hand.

Today, reeling from successive Covid-19 lockdowns, closed borders and a delayed vaccine rollout, this trade-off is being interpreted very differently by many Australians. Current legislative efforts to neutralise the exceptional threats we face are subject to greater scrutiny as to their impacts on civil liberties—for example, the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act, used in the recent organised crime bust led by the Australian Federal Police with a host of international partner agencies, including the FBI.

Managing the balance between security and liberty is an ongoing and necessary part of a democracy. But current concerns are fuelled by growing mistrust in government among parts of Australian communities. The protests that coincided with the ‘state of emergency’ passed by the Victorian parliament in 2020 are an example of this mistrust bubbling over, with citizens objecting to increased policing powers to enforce public health orders. It’s also where mainstream distrust of ‘oppressive’ and ‘unlawful’ government policy was seeded in the Australian far right.

Right-wing and Islamist violent extremists, along with organised criminals, are increasingly exploiting the relatively unpoliced nature of the internet to recruit new followers and conduct business. Operation Ironside demonstrated the vast and resilient organised crime networks operating domestically but embedded in broader, globalised business models. It also highlighted how significant the role of police access to encrypted messaging apps can be in leading to arrests and seizures. Yet the recent passage of legislation that increases the online powers of police and intelligence agencies to disrupt and prevent these threats has left Australians divided, concerned by potential unintended consequences and privacy ramifications.

According to the AFP, instrumental to Operation Ironside’s success was TOLA, which was used ‘for the first time in combination with the legal authority from the FBI’. TOLA has withstood significant public, industry and political criticism, fuelled by potential privacy considerations and ramifications for the tech industry, which is now legally required to decrypt and supply data to police and intelligence agencies in exceptional circumstances. A parliamentary review into the act is pending.

The great irony is that the global rise of right-wing extremism and neo-Nazism—which has also been seen in Australia—has accelerated during Covid-19 due to grievances about restrictions on personal freedoms by mandatory public health orders. In Australia, these groups have achieved some level of coordination and coherence by coalescing around the idea of oppressive governments using police to enforce Covid-19 lockdowns. This concern has a legitimate basis, found in the democratic argument that seeks to ensure government and law enforcement are not excessively empowered. But it is weakened by the proliferation of conspiracy theories rife with extremist ideology and narratives that the groups propagate and weaponise in online forums. Examples include disinformation campaigns against public health orders and the vaccine rollout, such as the well-worn lie that Covid-19 is a conspiracy and a hoax.

Recent polling suggests that trust in Australian federal and state governments has increased across the mainstream population during the pandemic, while a smaller cohort remains distrustful. But there has been a consistent downward trend in this metric since the 2007 poll, indicative of a general, long-term decrease in trust in government. These trends dovetail with the surge in right-wing extremist ideology, given that anti-government sentiment is often a foundational element.

The vibrant debate about the federal government’s efforts to increase the powers of policing and intelligence agencies is symptomatic of a healthy democratic political system, built on robust public discourse. But the growing number of people radicalising through right-wing extremism, which in 2021 has grown to 40% of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation’s counterterrorism caseload, indicates that something is amiss for at-risk individuals and groups with whom anti-government and other right-wing extremist ideologies resonate.

What’s at stake here is trust that the sovereign power of the federal government is exerted to protect the freedom as much as the security of Australians.

The implication for government and law enforcement efforts to stem growing radicalisation enabled by anti-government sentiment is that counterterrorism policing efforts, while necessary, are fundamentally not addressing the factors driving radicalisation. They need to be reframed to account for right-wing extremists’ grievances. Efforts aimed at fostering community resilience to right-wing extremist ideologies and the Covid-era mis- and disinformation campaigns enabling them are critical.

Hitting the sweet spot: public safety, national security and civil liberties

The 5 October special meeting of the Council of Australian Governments focused on security and counterterrorism. Premiers and chief ministers agreed to establish the National Facial Biometric Matching Capability and signed the Intergovernmental Agreement on Identity Matching Services. They discussed new criminal offences for terrorism and allowing police to detain people for 14 days without charge, which is currently possible only in New South Wales.

At the heart of what COAG was seeking to do was harmonise databases and make it easier and quicker for state and federal police to access them. Currently, it can take up to a week to identify people across the system; in terrorism cases, where time is of the essence, that could be too long.

In the US, the 9/11 Commission underlined how fragmented the US intelligence and security establishment had become. That led to the establishment of a cabinet-level post to oversee the different security agencies: the director of national intelligence. It also led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which brought 22 executive-branch agencies, such as Customs, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Coast Guard and the Secret Service, under a single department. President Bush’s goal in establishing DHS was to improve efficiency and coordination.

One reason for the consolidation was that two of the 9/11 hijackers had been on a Federal Aviation Administration watch list, which wasn’t shared with the FBI: the two government agencies were debating which organisation’s letterhead should be on a new list that they were both working on.

In the current threat environment, there are legitimate reasons for new security measures in Australia; as Prime Minister Turnbull said, national security isn’t something you can ‘set and forget’. Justice Minister Michael Keenan pointed out that the current information-sharing system is antiquated and ill suited to dealing with contemporary threats.

But there’s also a need to consider some of the civil liberties implications of these measures.

The 9/11 terrorist attack and its aftermath have prompted governments to adopt counterterrorism legislation that at times challenges core democratic values, such as by suspending habeas corpus, allowing the use of ‘enhanced’ physical interrogation techniques, and establishing military tribunals.

There’s often no sunset clause in these legal and policy measures: they become permanent.

In 2015, following the Paris attacks in which 130 people died, the French government declared a state of emergency. Some of the emergency powers have now being normalised under a new counterterrorism bill. For example, police have the authority to detain people without search warrants, declare public spaces as secure zones (which can lead to the prohibition of large gatherings) and temporarily close places of worship.

However, those provisions were debated in the National Assembly, and a core promise of Emanuel Macron as he ran for the presidency was to introduce more effective counterterrorism measures while protecting French citizens’ liberties.

We’re living in a new era when it comes to security, as threats from non-state actors have drastically changed our lives. Before 9/11, who would have thought that civilian airliners could become bombs, or that explosives could be synthesised in flight from components brought on board by passengers?

Western governments now need to engage more openly with civil society on stricter security measures, while also encouraging security professionals to interact with the public at large.

In the US, Congress regularly holds open and closed hearings in which legislators speak with the heads of the CIA, FBI and NSC, and US intelligence leaders give media interviews. Those forums give the public a chance to hear from the professionals about the threat spectrum, and allow security professionals to defend proposed new measures. It’s not just about politicians dominating the conversion.

Greater transparency on new security measures is needed: many of the newer measures that are being rolled out here and in other Western nations are invasive and expensive.

In the US, for instance, it’s estimated that since 9/11 the country has spent around $1 trillion on security, of which around $500 billion was on intelligence, on defending the home front from terrorism, and on radically revising the intelligence and security architecture.

Over time, a shift has taken place in the DHS psyche: when it comes to countering terrorism, there’s real value in resilience programs and programs that call for public awareness (‘If you see something, say something’).

Americans have come to embrace the idea that an effective way to deal with terrorism is to refuse to be terrorised when acts of terror take place. DHS has looked to places such as Israel and the UK where resilience is high. And it has also recognised that threats to the homeland come in different shapes and forms, from climate change to domestic right-wing terrorism to the compromising of critical infrastructure.

Governments spend an enormous amount of money and time looking for the best system to ensure our democracy, the rule of law, our core values and our way of life, but they spend little political capital when introducing legislation that will have profound impacts on our daily lives.

Our policymakers should mount the soapbox more often and engage the public on the need for stronger security measures. They should be encouraging senior national security officials to make the case for change.

Persuade us that we need these stronger measures. As Atifete Jahjaga, Kosovo’s president, observed, ‘When there is debate, there are solutions.’

Reader response: security vs civil liberties

PendulumMy colleague Tobias Feakin suggests that the discussion about any balance between security and civil liberties is inadequate for analysing counter-terrorism measures: it leads to ‘the establishment of rigid political positions which tend to overlook external perspectives—especially those of the public’.

Toby says that concepts of ‘balance’ have contributed to the widespread assumption that the relationship between the two can be considered as a ‘zero-sum’, and ‘that the balance model misunderstands the complexity of the relationship between security and civil liberties’.

I beg to disagree. The world is full of constraints: in a practical public policy sense, democratic governments will always need to balance national security objectives with civil liberties.

We can’t avoid the question of where the best point of balance lies because the two claims, both in law and policy, will always have some degree of tension between them. Read more