Tag Archive for: China

Rising China, troubled America, crouching Australia

David Hale. Image courtesy of ASPI staff Luke Wilson and Cassandra Joyce.

Not too far back in Australian history, large amounts of anger and angst—buried not too deep in the national psyche—would have arisen if Chinese warships had conducted exercises in Australia’s maritime approaches.

Now, for the first time, China’s Navy has done just that. Two Chinese destroyers and a landing ship carried out the exercise—as legal as it was unannounced—between Christmas Island and Java, before heading out into the Indian Ocean. Little wonder the Australian Air Force ‘scrambled’ and did some surveillance.

No public anger is on show but some low-level angst is about. Rory Medcalf and C.Raja Mohan argue that China’s going Indo-Pacific and the exercise is ‘a wake-up call to anyone still doubting China’s long-term intention to be able to project force in the Indian Ocean.’ Read more

Pushing back on China: a rational approach

Artists impression of the USN's new Ford class carrier with USAF B-2 and F-22 aircraftI appreciated Jake Douglas’ response to the article Ely Ratner and I co-authored, ‘Roiling the Waters‘, in the January/February edition of Foreign Policy. Douglas’ constructive engagement helps to focus and clarify arguments within this important debate.

His basic argument is that the kind of firmer response Ratner and I (among others) are advocating to Chinese assertiveness is misguided because it is pointless. According to his assessment, Beijing is both unswervingly resolute in pursuing its ambitions in the Asia-Pacific and will inevitably be the stronger party as it grows economically. As Douglas writes:

First, China’s resolve is at least as strong as America’s…Backing down now…would be absolutely humiliating for Beijing…Second, China is rapidly acquiring the edge in operational capability in Asia, and there’s little the United States can or is willing to do about it.

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How will Australia and the world cope with the re-emergence of China as a great power?

China Shipping Line vessel in New York harbour.

China’s annual economic growth rate has slowed from double digits during most of the past 33 years to about 7.6%. The slowdown reflects weaker exports as a result of lower growth in the global economy and an unwinding of the aggressive macro stimulus program China introduced during the global financial crisis. The stimulus program led to excessive investment and a large increase in debt. The central bank and the new government now want to deleverage the economy and increase the role of consumption as a growth leader.

A plenary session of the Communist Party Central Committee in November 2013 announced far-reaching reforms to enhance the economy’s performance during the next decade. The plenary communique emphasised that market forces must now play a ‘decisive’ role in shaping China’s economy, whereas previous communiqués said that they’d play only a ‘basic’ role. Under the new plan, China will liberalise its financial system, increase dividends from state-owned enterprises, enhance the role of small and medium-sized enterprises, liberalise the Hukou system (a registration system that determines the citizenship rights of rural people moving to urban centres), terminate the four-year work detention program for criminals or political dissidents, and relax the one-child policy. China needs to increase its birthrate because the labour force is now shrinking and the population is rapidly ageing. The new policy could produce 1.5–2.0 million more babies in two years compared to the 16 million born in 2012. Read more

The rise of China—a view from Singapore

SINGAPORE (May 14, 2013) Republic of Singapore Defense Minister Dr. Ng Eng Hen, right, and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert are given a tour of the littoral combat ship USS Freedom (LCS 1) by the Gold crew commanding officer Cmdr. Timothy Wilke.

Australia’s regional foreign policy seems to have recently veered in the direction of closer support for Japan and away from a more neutral approach to the rise of China—presumably the result of a yet unannounced shift on the part of the Abbott Government. This has been the subject of a fair bit of debate, including an excellent piece by Robert Ayson here on The Strategist and by Hugh White in the Fairfax media the next day. To test the views of another country with a strong interest in the north Asia dynamic, I recently had the opportunity to speak at length to Singapore’s impressive Defence Minister, Dr Ng Eng Hen, to find that he and his Government have a far more nuanced view of the situation than that expressed by many Australian politicians.

Firstly, he explained that the rise of China is a simple fact and that the country is now a global power whose size, aspirations and strength needs to be accommodated and that everyone is going to have to adjust to this new reality. Despite having a very close military relationship with the US—particularly after a 1990 basing agreement—Singapore sees absolutely no need to chose sides over matters such as regional territorial disputes. When pushed on what appears to be Beijing’s aggressive style, he declined to do any finger pointing, instead saying that issues of territoriality in places such as the South China Sea involve a number of parties. Additionally, he took the view that Asia in particular owes China a debt of economic gratitude for saving the region from the worst effects of the global financial crisis. Read more

In a cleft stick: Australia’s Indo-Pacific policy

Australia has a vital interest in preventing its region, defined as the Indo-Pacific in the 2013 Defence White Paper, from becoming an arena of great power rivalry. This includes between India and China. Developing a close strategic partnership with India is an important part of this strategy. However, there’s a fundamental disconnect between Australian and Indian perceptions of the Indo-Pacific. While Australia is keen to avoid being part of any formulation that appears to contain China, mainstream thinking in India opposes the inclusion of China and is increasingly anxious about its visibility in the Indian Ocean region. Australia finds itself stuck in a cleft stick in managing China’s and India’s different views of the Indo-Pacific.

Australia is unlikely to push a concept that’s seen as excluding China. The danger, as argued by Andrew Phillips and Nick Bisley, is that ‘[v]iewed from Beijing, the idea of the Indo-Pacific… appears to be to keep the United States in, lift India up and keep China out.’ However according to Rory Medcalf, ‘[w]hile the new name of the region may suit India, the quintessential Indo-Pacific power will be China, and the indispensible one will remain the United States…far from excluding China, Indo-Pacific Asia includes it by definition.’ At least at the official level, idea of the Indo-Pacific is being promoted as an inclusive concept, in line with Australia’s foreign policy goals of a strong alliance with the US, a strong economic relationship with China, and its overriding aim of preventing instability.

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The Abbott strategic trifecta (3): death by a thousand cuts

Chef's Knife

Tony Abbott is about to understand the pain inflicted by China when it applies the diplomatic version of the death of a thousand cuts. By invoking his strategic trifecta—alliance, interests and values—in standing with the US rather than China, Abbott has most definitely crossed China’s view of its own important interests.

Abbott is proving what is becoming an uncomfortable rule of Oz diplomacy. Any new Australian government will have problems with Beijing and receive the thousand cuts treatment. What happened to Howard and Rudd is to be revisited on Abbott.

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China’s efforts to break the Australia–US alliance

'Go' board gameIn the Chinese Buddhist tradition, as we flail in the ‘bitter sea’ of existential illusion, we only need to ‘turn to the other shore,’ constituted by the Buddhist path, in order to find Enlightenment. Australia is now being urged by China to seek its own enlightenment—to give up the ways of illusion constituted by alliance with the United States and to turn to the other shore, a shore provided by closer political and strategic alliance with the PRC.

The kerfuffle at the recent Australia–China Forum held in Canberra in late November—the third in the series – was an excellent example of these efforts by China. The Chinese delegation to this 1.5 track conclave was led by Ambassador Li Zhaoxing who heads, among other organisations, a People’s Liberation Army front organisation known as the China Association for International Friendly Contact. Despite the bland press release on the conclave offered by the Australian Foreign Minister , with its perhaps less than accurate headline ‘Australia-China Forum forges closer ties,’ a newspaper report by Peter Hartcher, who also attended the conference, more accurately describes what transpired at the event.

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China, strategy and the ADIZ duel

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is greeted by Chinese President Xi Jinping upon entering the Fujian Room at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, on April 13, 2013.China’s ADIZ extension certainly got everyone’s attention. Externally, the consensus was overwhelmingly negative and in encouraging other states to balance with the US against China, the ADIZ decision seems an ‘own goal’, at least to us. Inside China, the converse appears true. The new policy seems to be playing well in the public sphere. This striking difference though points to a flaw—a potentially tragic incoherence—at the heart of Chinese grand strategy.

Many nations seek to maintain their political system but in the case of authoritarian states this means the continuance in power of a particular political group. For China, safeguarding the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership and the socialist system is the primary core interest. Being unable to gain societal legitimacy through electoral means, the CCP relies on demonstrating good governance through being highly effective economic mangers. Read more

Reader’s response: rebalancing on the run?

 (Oct. 12, 2012) The Nimitz-class aircraft carriers USS George Washington (CVN 73), USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), the guided-missile cruiser USS Mobile Bay (CG 53), the guided-missile destroyers USS McCampbell (DDG 85) and USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60) and the guided-missile frigate USS Vandegrift (FFG 48) steam together in formation.In a recent Strategist post, Harry White offers some insightful analysis on China’s recently announced ‘air defence identification zone’ (ADIZ) over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Many commentators simply see ADIZ as a mistake—one likely to generate the type of hawkish reaction from Japan and the United States that it has so far sought to avoid. As Ben Schreer points out, it’s the type of action that seems ill-suited to what China has labelled its ‘peaceful rise’.

White instead argues that this latest episode should be seen as deliberate signal that China is willing to ‘contest those issues it considers in its vital interests’ in the East China Sea. As such, the ADIZ should be construed as the result of strategic deliberations and planning, as opposed to being an ill-conceived mistake. As he notes, ‘most of the responses so far have been obvious’. He’s also quite critical not only of the prevalent view that China’s ADIZ is a bluff but even that Obama has a strong reaction to this dispute. Read more

Changing Asia: China’s high-speed railway diplomacy

Chinese high speed railA new term has become popular in Chinese political parlance over the last few years. This neologism—‘high-speed railway diplomacy’ (高铁外交)—is used to describe the mechanisms by which China’s burgeoning capacities in high-speed railway (HSR) construction are being used in China’s international relations.

The speed at which China has mastered HSR technology is unparalleled. Beginning with the import of technologies only in 2003, China began operating the Beijing-Tianjin HSR by 2008. In that same year, it built a train capable of a speed of 350 kilometres per hour. Today the country boasts the greatest length of HSR track in the world (over 10,000 kilometres of rail capable of carrying trains at speeds in excess of 200 kilometres per hour). Further, China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Corporation Limited (CSR) has achieved global records in terms of speed, with tests reaching 600 kilometers per hour. The scope of the system can be gleaned from the fact that in less than 2 years the HSR line linking Beijing and Shanghai recorded over 100 million passenger trips, while the Chinese government plans to invest over US$100 billion in railway construction this year. Read more