The United States has long been the leader of global innovation, but a recent report (PDF) by the National Science Board (the advisory board to the President on research in science and engineering) suggests that America’s innovation advantage is slipping. Knowledge-based economic activity is gradually shifting towards Asia, and in particular China—America’s greatest strategic competitor. While America’s strength in science and technology will continue for decades, China is now in an enviable position. After all, growing pains are preferable to the aches and pains of an old man.

China’s research and development (R&D) activity is growing impressively across a number of indicators. This includes its share of global high-technology economic output, which has risen sharply from 8% in 2003 to 24% in 2012. The graph below demonstrates current trends in this area:

Output of high technology industries 1997–2012 

Source: US National Science Foundation Science and Engineering Indicators 2014 (p.5)

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Registration opens today (here) for ASPI’s 8-10 April 2014 international conference ‘The Submarine Choice.’ The conference will bring together senior political decision-makers, military officials, industry representatives and leading academics from Australia and overseas to discuss key issues related to Australia’s Future Submarine (FSM). As Government is moving closer to a decision on what’s going to be Australia’s most expensive procurement decision to date (likely to be $30 billion plus), an informed public debate on the strategic rationale as well as the pros and cons of building the FSM in Australia is critical.

The conference will focus primarily on the options most likely to be pursued and around which most work to date has been done. But the run-up to the event provides a good opportunity to debate here on The Strategist some of the ‘holy cows’ regarding the FSM. The previous government had its views on the way(s) ahead, but the incoming government would be well served by taking a ‘first principles’ look at the issues before developing its policy.

For example, various interest groups in Australia have worked to lock in the view that the FSM ‘has’ to be built in-country. The primary reason given is that this would be critical to save the ship-building industry from the looming ‘valley of death’ and to develop the foundation for a world-class naval shipbuilding industry. This view has become received wisdom and has almost been left uncontestable. However, while industrial arguments about the FSM certainly should be weighed in the final decision, domestic ship-building is not an end in itself and shouldn’t be the primary driver. Read more

In my previous post on project timelines, I made the point that defence projects these days are taking longer to deliver than in the past. The reasons are many and varied–and we shouldn’t rule out poor governance—but a significant driver is the sheer complexity of modern systems. By demanding ever higher levels of performance and (especially) integration, it’s taking longer and longer to deliver them.

But there’s an associated question that’s the subject of this post—why aren’t we accurately predicting how long it will take? I’m just finalising a report card for the 2000 Defence White Paper and a striking observation is just how poor the estimates of project delivery timeframes were. I’ll spell out the grizzly details in a forthcoming paper, but the average planned duration of major projects was around 7 years. In 2013, we’re still waiting on a number of them to be delivered, and the best guess at the moment is that the actual average duration will be closer to 13 years—a schedule overrun of more than 90%. Read more

The March 2013 edition of Quadrant magazine features an essay I wrote examining defence policy during the Rudd and Gillard governments.

The essay will form a chapter in a book to be published this month by Connor Court, entitled State of the Nation: Aspects of Australian Public Policy.

The headline chosen by Quadrant was ‘The Terminal Decline of Australia’s Defence’. It is a catchy headline and I use those words in the article. I explain that we should consider that a defence force is in terminal decline ‘… where its capabilities are at, or will soon be at, a state from which they will not be able to be revived in any reasonable period of time’.

The title that I suggested was ‘A Strategy Free Vantage Point’, implying that those that are determining what passes for defence policy in Australia are overseeing that policy from a position devoid of anything that passes for strategy.

Day after day in the media and in blogs, we debate the merits of 6, 12 or 24 subs, 59, 70, 100 or even 200 joint strike fighters and a fourth air warfare destroyer, and we wrap ourselves around our various axles as we define and redefine what a maritime strategy really is. It was almost with joy that I welcomed the tenth anniversary of the Iraq invasion! Read more

Airpower enthusiasts have always faced three significant difficulties when it comes to converting unbelievers to their cause. Two of these have their antecedents deeply rooted in what occurred during the Second World War; the origin of the third objection is far subtler. In the light of Andrew Davies’ recent post, in which he unequivocally demonstrated the terrible effectiveness of the air offensive, it would seem worthwhile re-examining the actual record of strategic bombing.

Advocates have always held out the seductive idea that airpower could achieve victory without getting involved in a long, drawn out land campaign. It was, ironically, the mismatch between this vision and the far more limited accomplishments of strategic bombing that was the source of early disillusionment about its effectiveness. Although Germany suffered a great deal of destruction in the years before mid-1944, the air offensive was extremely costly in terms of resources. Additionally (and perhaps most crucially) it failed to significantly cripple the German war effort. It hadn’t lived up to its promises.

Then, in the final year of the war and just as the air campaign was beginning to achieve its long-promised results—the invasion of France stole the oxygen of publicity from the airmen. Indeed, after witnessing the tactical effectiveness of strategic bombers (the ones that didn’t miss the target and kill Allied troops) generals became reluctant to allow the aircraft to return to their strategic role. They wanted to task the bombers for operational missions. Even the most senior officers had no real understanding of the extent and effectiveness of the campaign.

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