Tag Archive for: biological security

Eyes ‘wired’ open: preparing for chemical and biological threats

The 2002 science fiction thriller 28 Days Later, depicting the effects of an outbreak of a virulent genetically engineered plague, was described as the first great apocalyptic movie of the new millennium. The film’s narrative revolves around the idea of science out of control or possibly mismanaged.

Beyond accidental release, the use of chemical and biological (CB) materials against individuals and communities has a long history and appears to be on the rise. Scenes such as the suspected chemical attacks in Syria have opened our eyes to the reality that groups are seeking to acquire, manufacture and deploy these substances to intentionally cause harm.

Since 2001, a number of CB incidents have drawn worldwide attention, including anthrax in the US mail system, ricin-laced threat letters, well-documented assassinations with polonium-210, and the use of nerve agents and mustard gas in Syria and Iraq.

But do we, as a nation, really have our eyes open to the reality of the threat? Are we doing enough at the operational and strategic policy levels to identify vulnerabilities and strengthen communities and national safety?

In 2014, ISIS posted a video urging its followers to poison Westerners through food or water, in addition to using vehicles as weapons. This time-stamped a string of terrorist attacks and threats across the globe, outlined in several news outlets. Countries such as Germany, France, England, Turkey and Indonesia took steps to prepare for such atrocities.

In March this year the UK intelligence community expressed mounting concerns that ISIS affiliates were planning to produce and use ricin and anthrax in the UK, targeting food and water supplies. Recent police raids in Cologne, Germany, have uncovered evidence of a plot to acquire and manufacture ricin with a clear intent to cause harm in a terror-related attack.

That the street finds a use for new technologies and that ‘the dark web’ is a viable means of bringing vendor and client together should be ringing seriously loud warning bells.

The capability to acquire the materials, equipment, information and expertise to manufacture super-toxic materials was once the domain of national programs. A concern for Australia, and of course globally, is that it’s becoming easier to get precursor materials and to find information on how to create toxic substances that can be used as weapons.

We need to improve our understanding of the nature and potential use of these materials and information in the wrong hands.

Let’s consider an example. The potent biological toxin ricin is derived from the seeds of a plant that grows wild in Australia and many other parts of the world. There’s no treatment that can reverse the effects of exposure to it and it’s easier to make than methamphetamine.

Ricin can be produced for a relatively small outlay, using household appliances and store-bought equipment. It would be relatively easy, for example, to manufacture enough toxin to kill a group of conference attendees through a free buffet. The deliberate nature of such an attack could go undetected for hours or even days.

Are relevant Australian agencies ready for that scenario? In the absence of more regulation and restrictions, agencies need to be able to recognise the early warning indicators of a deliberate CB attack and act before it occurs or is repeated.

Finding a needle in a haystack is always easier in retrospect. Australian policing and intelligence agencies, along with relevant biosecurity and regulatory agencies, need to apply as much joined-up capability as possible to detect, protect against and respond to threats before any harm can be done.

One challenge is that, unlike most toxic chemical agents, the release of biological or radioactive materials may go unnoticed for days or even weeks. The public and animal health surveillance systems will be important for alerting agencies to the occurrence of something unexpected.

Such an event would have cascading effects on the community, its infrastructure, economy and psychological wellbeing.

Instead of preparing for the unthinkable, we should focus on developing and strengthening the systems and networks that will ultimately be required to detect, respond to and recover from intentional uses of CB materials. We need to have eyes ‘wired’ open to real and rapidly advancing threats.

The challenges of Australia’s northern border: the Torres Strait

Image courtesy of Flickr user sbamueller

A tuberculosis epidemic is on Australia’s doorstep. As of January 2016, Papua New Guinea’s island of Daru—located in the Torres Strait—has the highest rate of drug-resistant tuberculosis (TB) in the world, with more than 160 of the 20,000 people living on the island infected with the airborne disease. PNG is one of only 14 countries in the world to feature on all three of the World Health Organisation’s high burden country lists on TB, due to its high incidences of TB, TB/HIV and multi-drug resistance TB. In 2014, there were nearly 26,000 new TB case notifications in the country. A leading authority on the infectious disease—which can be spread without any symptoms—recently described the tuberculosis outbreak as ‘a health threat for Australia and…a health threat for the entire Pacific region’.

To put the issue into context for Australia, the distance between Cape York in the far north of Queensland and PNG at the narrowest point is approximately 150 kilometres, with Saibai Island a mere four kilometres from the PNG mainland. The proximity of Australia to PNG across the Strait makes it a critical area for border security. While there are a number of arrangements in place to protect Australia’s sovereignty and biosecurity, the Torres Strait represents a strategic challenge for Australian policymakers. Australia can’t afford to take for granted the current security measures in place due to the unique nature of the border and associated threats, and must give the Torres Strait region the attention it requires.

The Torres Strait has traditionally facilitated the free movement of people between both countries, with Australia and PNG signing the ‘Torres Strait Treaty’ in 1978 to officially delineate the border and protect traditional movements. PNG citizens from 13 nominated villages under the Treaty have free movement privileges and tens of thousands take the opportunity to travel to Australia each year.

The 2015 Human Development Index ranked PNG 158th in the world (out of 188). Australia is ranked 2nd. The Torres Strait links those two asymmetric countries—at least when compared on a human development index—and facilitates the free movement of people. That poses a considerable biosecurity challenge to Australia.

The federal and Queensland state governments previously funded medical services for PNG nationals visiting the Torres Strait Islands. But in 2011, both governments stopped funding those services and began closing down TB clinics in the Strait. Instead, both governments’ policies are now focused on strengthening the health system on the PNG side of the border to minimise the need for health services located in Australia.

That’s a sensible policy, but TB remains a prevalent issue in PNG and should draw more concern in Australia than it currently does.

To put the epidemic in perspective, ABC reporter Jo Chandler recently noted that Ebola, a virus that was declared an ‘international emergency’ by the World Health Organisation in 2014, has killed around 11,000 people in the last three years. By comparison, TB has killed around 9,000 people in PNG in the same time frame—yet the TB epidemic in PNG hasn’t received a fraction of the same attention here in Australia where it poses a major health risk to our nearest neighbour.

Add to those biosecurity hazards the discovery in late March of two Vietnamese fishing vessels illegally fishing in waters near the Lockhart River region in far north Queensland. Lockhart River Mayor Wayne Butcher said the incident was ‘frightening in one sense [that] they can sneak through the Torres Strait’ and along the northeast coast of Queensland.

The incident shows how the Torres Strait can be used as a gateway for unauthorised arrivals into Australia’s sovereign waters. This is an ongoing issue. In June 2015, three Indian men were arrested trying to boat from PNG to Australia via the Torres Strait. Then in August 2015, PNG officials seized a boat near the Australian border in which eight men were identified as victims of human trafficking. As Mayor Fred Gela of the Torres Strait Island Regional Council said at the time, the ‘Torres Strait is unsecured and abandoned…we have a porous border, our communities are in a very vulnerable position’.

With all that said, there are a number of border protection measures in place to protect Australia from those traditional border security challenges. For example, the Maritime Border Command within the Australian Border Force (ABF) is Australia’s lead civil maritime security authority. In December, the ABF bolstered its maritime security presence in the Torres Strait by permanently stationing ABF Cutter Roebuck Bay, a Bay-class patrol vessel, in the region. The increased presence immediately paid off when ABFC Roebuck and ABFC Cape St. George apprehended three PNG fishing vessels operating in Australia’s exclusive economic zone in the same week.  

Despite this, federal government MP Warren Entsch, whose electorate covers north Queensland and the Torres Strait, has called for a greater government presence in the Strait. While there are currently Australian customs and quarantine staff stationed on Saibai Island, Entsch has pushed for the development of a multi-agency facility that could house additional federal and state staff, including health workers, police and immigration officers.

The Torres Strait presents Australia with a number of border security issues. Traditional sovereignty concerns about irregular and unauthorised movements into Australian waters will continue to pose a challenge but are also likely to receive adequate attention; boats and unauthorised movements generally attract consideration from Canberra. But the biosecurity and health challenges posed by PNG’s TB epidemic don’t receive the same concern from a border security perspective.  And it should: health considerations can affect people movement and the stability of our northern neighbour is important to maintaining Australia’s border security. Australia can’t risk becoming complacent on border security in the Torres Strait.