First up this week, a couple of good military blogs to bookmark (if you aren’t already acquainted). The Modern War Institute at West Point runs the cracking War Council Blog, which surveys all aspects of the modern battlefield. Here’s a fascinating MWI read that makes the case for concrete as a weapon: ‘No other weapon or technology has done more to contribute to achieving strategic goals of providing security, protecting populations, establishing stability, and eliminating terrorist threats.’ Back home, props to the Australian Army for opening up the conversation around the future of land power and army modernisation through the Land Power Forum. And on the back of the Submarine Institute of Australia’s recent Canberra conference, it’s germane to also give a shout-out to their nascent blog effort, Deep Thinker.

Linda Jakobson and her team China Matters have done a great deal to promote a deeper discussion around the challenges and opportunities in the Australia–China relationship. And it’s not just a conversation for seasoned voices, with China Matters recently hosting their inaugural young professionals meeting in Canberra. You can catch up with meeting summary, policy recommendations, agenda, discussion papers and more here.

Here’s some long reads on which to slide into the weekend. David Remnick’s masterful profile on Obama after the election of Donald Trump. It’s an immense and insightful piece of writing. And in case you missed it, Jeffrey Goldberg turned it up to 11 in reporting his interviews with Henry Kissinger for The Atlantic.

In our populism pick of the week, over at Project Syndicate, Princeton’s Harold James likens the rise of populism to the interwar period in the 20th century which saw the rise of Italian fascism in response to Soviet communism. He also asks an important question for anyone peering into the future: ‘Can a firewall be built to prevent such political contagion?’

Kicking off this week’s fresh research is a great new report from New America which offers five policy recommendations for government and media officials based on a close examination of media reactions to Orlando’s Pulse nightclub attack; War and Tweets: Terrorism in America in the Digital Age is a must-read for any media politics wonks. A sinister read from the Atlantic Council, The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses (PDF), unpacks how Russia is using ideologically friendly politicians, parties and press in France, Germany and the UK to create a pro-Russia current under the country’s mainstream politics and media. A longer effort from RUSI offers some thoughts on the long road and important task ahead of Antonio Guterres, the next Secretary-General of the UN: committing the organisation to gender equality goals to improve its peacekeeping operations. And finally, two great new releases from the Center for a New American Security: the first on the effects of the Third Offset Strategy on the US–ROK alliance, and the second, which prescribes eight policy recommendations to bolster the security efforts behind the US rebalance to Asia.

Whether it’s a hoax created by the Chinese to oust US manufacturing or a global phenomenon one needs to have a ‘totally open mind’ about, it’s pretty clear that the president-elect knows next to nothing about climate change. A great piece from New York magazine fact-checks the section of DJT’s recent interview with The New York Times where he discussed his views on climate change—which at one point descended into a ramble on the evils of wind turbines and how they ‘kill all the birds’. Another read on from The Economist urges countries to stay the course on COP 21 commitments, even if the US backs away from its leadership position.

If that’s too depressing for you, then now’s a great time to remind yourself about the process of DiCapriation: ‘evidence of a man’s tendency to follow a predetermined track of beauty’ that’s just as applicable to the ugliness that’s taken hold of America as it is to Leonardo DiCaprio’s A+ looks. Right now, the US is at its rock-bottom The Revenant Leo-D phase, but as the graph reminds us, America will be handsome again.

Podcast

In the latest podcast from The GroundTruth Project (18 mins), GT fellow Chris Bentley visits the watery northwest coast of Jakarta as it slowly sinks into the megacity’s rivers. As whole neighbourhoods are razed to accommodate waters crumbling the edge of Indonesia’s capital, Bentley asks what processes Indonesians are using to adapt to the flooding more damaging than the effects of climate change.

Videos

Strategy supremo Eliot A. Cohen of Johns Hopkins University delivered a keynote to the first-ever War Studies Conference hosted by the Modern War Institute at West Point. Cohen spoke on the domestic political challenges of deterrence, before sitting down to for a chat with the NYT’s David Sanger (72 mins).

Stopping an enemy ballistic missile after it has been launched is no easy task. This short CSIS informational video (3 mins) looks at just one of the technology challenges involved, determining what part of the ‘threat cloud’ released by a missile is actually the warhead that must be destroyed—a process called Midcourse Discrimination that’s carried out by sea, air, land and space capabilities.

Events

Melbourne: Lowy’s Rodger Shanahan and Lydia Khalil will take to the stage next week to explore the future of the foreign fighter threat. Register here.

Canberra: On 29 November, join an all star cast of speakers for ANU’s Energy Update 2016. This all-day event will see speakers from government, business and academia unpacking a host of issues, ranging from new technologies and energy security to global and regional outlooks for the world’s energy sectors.

The Beat

Petrobas probe deepens

Former Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is the latest high-profile politician facing prosecution for his role in the evolving Petrobas corruption scandal. On Tuesday, Judge Sérgio Moro, a central figure in the ongoing Operação Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash) investigation, ruled that Lula must stand trial on corruption and money laundering charges. The development will add to Lula’s mounting troubles, as he’s already facing trial on obstruction charges. Lula’s administration earnt international acclaim for its popular social welfare programs and robust economic management, but allegedly presided over a US$3 billion bribery scheme involving state-owned oil giant Petrobas. Prosecutors have alleged that Lula received US$1.1 million in home improvements and expenses from construction company OAS in a bid to secure inflated contracts with Petrobas.

Local corruption undermines PRC authority

The Chinese government has cracked down on unruly residents in Wukan, a small fishing village in southern Guangdong province. Five years ago residents took to the streets over a land dispute and against corrupt local officials, forcing the central government into granting them local elections. Fast-forward to earlier this month, the government began retracting this concession by jailing and fining elected chief Lin Zuluan for bribery. In response to the new wave of protests, 2,000 police have been deployed to reassert government control over the village.

CT Scan

Big Apple bombings

US police discovered multiple bombs in New York and New Jersey over the weekend. Details are still emerging regarding the alleged perpetrator, Ahmad Khan Rahami, who’s believed to be responsible for planting the series of devices—one of which detonated, injuring 29. New York’s Wireless Emergency Alerts System was used to broadcast a message warning New Yorkers to keep an eye out for the still-at-large Rahami. Mayor Bill de Blasio highlighted the alert’s contribution to the eventual capture of Rahami, who was found sleeping outside a bar and subsequently fired at officers before being apprehended. Crowdsourcing the intelligence function in times of crisis isn’t a new concept. SAIP, designed by the French government after the Bataclan Theatre attacks, was supposed to warn Twitter users in the event of an attack, but took nearly three hours to notify users after the Bastille Day attacks in Nice.

Informal networks

RUSI’s Raffaello Pantucci argues Daesh’s strategy of embracing smaller, lone actor attacks abroad is a product of the digital age. Communication technologies are making it easier for groups to promote their message and reach out through more informal networks.

Assaf Moghadam has an interesting piece over at War on the Rocks on the recent arrest of British Islamist Anjem Choudary. Moghadam highlights the need to better understand how informal networks like Choudary’s collaborate with terror organisations.

Checkpoint

Uri attack stirs Kashmir conflict

Tensions are running high between India and Pakistan following the deadliest attack on security forces in Kashmir in over 25 years. On 18 September armed militants assaulted an Indian army base near the town of Uri, killing 17 and wounding a further 20. Border skirmishes have erupted with Indian forces killing up to 12 suspected militants. India has blamed Pakistan for the Uri attack, alleging the militants crossed over from the Pakistani border and carried weapons with Pakistani markings. Indian Home Affairs Minister Rahnath Singh branded Pakistan a ‘terrorist state’ on Twitter while Ram Madhav, a senior official in the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, demanded ‘For one tooth, the complete jaw’. The long-simmering Kashmir conflict reignited in July 2016 after Indian security forces killed popular militant commander Burhan Wani. Since then, a series of incidents have claimed 80 lives.

EU border update

Next month Bulgaria will host the launch of a new European Border and Coast Guard Agency. The agency’s remit is to ‘help provide integrated border management at the external borders’ and will staff a minimum of 1,500 border guards. In his 2015 State of the Union Address, EU President Jean-Claude Juncker set a target of deploying 200 extra border guards and 50 vehicles at the Bulgarian external border by October.

First Responder

SNAPPing the bug

On Wednesday 21 September, the UN General Assembly hosted a meeting to address the threat posed by new strands of resistant bacteria, pledging tighter regulation of antimicrobials, cooperation, and research for alternative medicines. Researchers at Melbourne University are designing a new class of agents based on chains of proteins dubbed ‘structurally nanoengineered antimicrobial peptide polymers’ (SNAPP). The polymers were effective during tests on mice infected with antimicrobial-resistant bugs.

RAND released a report last week, ‘Identifying Future Disease Hotspots: Infectious Disease Vulnerability Index’. The report found that 24 of the world’s most vulnerable countries ‘form a solid, near-contiguous belt from the edge of West Africa to the Horn of Africa in Somalia’. The authors are concerned disease could spread across the belt, exacerbating local crises.

Global resilience

Barack Obama, in his last speech to the UN as president, called upon the international community to ‘press forward with a better model of cooperation and integration’ across global institutions in order to manage the challenges of inequality, technology, disease, climate change, governance, and conflict. On the climate front, 20 more nations are expected to sign the Paris Agreement at the General Assembly meeting this week, bringing the total up to 47 of the 55 needed for the agreement to enter into force.

Nearly 15 years after its launch, the United States’ war in Afghanistan is still raging, making it the longest war in American history. Nowadays, the war is barely on the world’s radar, with only dramatic developments, like America’s recent drone-strike assassination of Afghan Taliban Chief Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, getting airtime. But Afghans continue to lose their friends, neighbours, and children to conflict, as they have since the 1979 Soviet invasion, which triggered the refugee exodus that brought the parents of Omar Mateen, the killer of 49 people in a nightclub in Orlando, to the US.

America’s invasion, launched by former President George W. Bush in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, was intended to dismantle Al Qaeda and remove the Taliban from power, thereby ensuring that Afghanistan would no longer serve as a safe base of operations for extremists. With those goals ostensibly accomplished, Bush’s successor, Barack Obama, reduced troop levels in the country, even declaring a year and a half ago that the war was ‘coming to a responsible conclusion.’

But, with a resurgent Taliban stepping up attacks, the war has raged on, exacting staggering costs in blood and treasure. One key reason is Pakistan, which has harboured the Afghan Taliban’s command and control, while pretending to be a US ally.

If there were any doubts about Pakistan’s duplicity, they should have been eliminated in 2011, when Osama bin Laden was killed in a military garrison town near the country’s capital. Yet, five years later, Pakistan still has not revealed who helped bin Laden hide for all those years. Meanwhile, the Obama administration has continued to shower the country with billions of dollars in aid.

The assassination of Mansour on Pakistan’s territory, near its border with Iran and Afghanistan, has exposed, yet again, the deceitfulness of Pakistani officials, who have repeatedly denied sheltering Taliban leaders. Like the raid by US Navy SEALs that killed bin Laden, Mansour’s assassination required the US to violate the sovereignty of a country that, as one of the largest recipients of American aid, should have been supporting the effort. The question is whether the US will acknowledge the obvious lesson this time and change course.

While Mansour’s killing may be, as Obama put it, ‘an important milestone’ in the effort to bring peace to Afghanistan, it also exposed America’s policy failures under the Obama administration, rooted in the desire not to confront either Pakistan or even the Taliban too strongly. Obama’s objective was to preserve the option of reaching a Faustian bargain with the Taliban—a power-sharing arrangement to underpin a peace deal—facilitated by the Pakistani military. That is why the US has not branded the Afghan Taliban—much less Pakistan’s rogue intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—a terrorist organization, and instead has engaged in semantic jugglery.

This approach goes beyond rhetoric. America took almost 15 years to carry out its first drone strike in Pakistan’s sprawling Balochistan province, even though the Afghan Taliban leadership established its command-and-control structure there almost immediately after the US military intervention ousted it from Afghanistan. Instead, the US concentrated its drone strikes in Pakistan’s Waziristan region, allowing the Taliban leaders to remain ensconced.

The US has even made direct overtures to the Taliban, in order to promote negotiations aimed at securing peace through a power-sharing arrangement. It allowed the Taliban to set up a de facto diplomatic mission in Doha, Qatar, in 2013. A year later, it traded five senior Taliban leaders who had been jailed at Guantánamo Bay for a captured US Army sergeant.

What the US did not know was that the Taliban’s founder, Mullah Mohammed Omar, died in 2013 in a hospital in the Pakistani city of Karachi. Omar’s death was kept secret for more than two years, during which time ISI claimed to be facilitating contacts with him.

Finally, last July, Mansour was installed as the Taliban’s new leader—and he was not interested in peace talks. It was Mansour’s intransigence that spurred the US to change its tactics. Instead of using carrots to secure Taliban support for a peace deal, the Obama administration is now using very large sticks.

But even if this approach manages to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, it will probably not be enough to secure a lasting peace deal. If the US is to succeed at ending the war in Afghanistan, it must do more than change tactics; it must rethink its fundamental strategy.

The reality is that the medieval Taliban will neither be defeated nor seek peace until their Pakistani sanctuaries are eliminated. No counterterrorism campaign has ever succeeded in a country when the militants have found refuge in another. While Obama recognizes the imperative of eliminating terrorist sanctuaries, he has failed to do what is needed.

Simply put, bribing Pakistan’s military will not work. Over the last 14 years, the US has given Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid and armed it with lethal weapons, ranging from F-16s and P-3C Orion maritime aircraft to Harpoon anti-ship missiles and TOW anti-armour missiles. And yet Pakistan continues to provide the Afghan Taliban a safe haven within its borders.

A better approach would be to link aid disbursement to concrete Pakistani action against militants, while officially classifying ISI as a terrorist entity. Such a move would send a strong signal to Pakistan’s military—which views the Taliban and other militant groups as useful proxies and force multipliers vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India—that it can no longer hunt with the hounds and run with the foxes.

Obama’s decision last October to prolong indefinitely US involvement in Afghanistan means not only that he will leave office without fulfilling his promise to end Bush-era military entanglements, but also that the US will continue to fight the war on the wrong side of the Afghan-Pakistani border. Perhaps his successor will finally recognize the truth: the end of the war in Afghanistan lies in Pakistan.

Barack Obama’s visit to Cuba is the first by a US president since Calvin Coolidge went in 1928. American investors, expat Cubans, tourists, scholars, and scam artists will follow in Obama’s wake. Normalization of the bilateral relationship will pose opportunities and perils for Cuba, and a giant test of maturity for the United States.

The Cuban Revolution led by Fidel Castro 57 years ago was a profound affront to the US psyche. Since the founding of the US, its leaders have staked a claim to American exceptionalism. So compelling is the US model, according to its leaders, that every decent country must surely choose to follow America’s lead. When foreign governments are foolish enough to reject the American way, they should expect retribution for harming US interests (seen to align with universal interests) and thereby threatening US security.

With Havana a mere 90 miles from the Florida Keys, American meddling in Cuba has been incessant. Thomas Jefferson opined in 1820 that the US ‘ought, at the first possible opportunity, to take Cuba.’ It finally did so in 1898, when the US intervened in a Cuban rebellion against Spain to assert effective US economic and political hegemony over the island.

In the fighting that ensued, the US grabbed Guantánamo as a naval base and asserted (in the now infamous Platt Amendment) a future right to intervene in Cuba. US Marines repeatedly occupied Cuba thereafter, and Americans quickly took ownership of most of Cuba’s lucrative sugar plantations, the economic aim of America’s intervention. General Fulgencio Batista, who was eventually overthrown by Castro, was the last of a long line of repressive rulers installed and maintained in power by the US.

The US kept Cuba under its thumb, and, in accordance with US investor interests, the export economy remained little more than sugar and tobacco plantations throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Castro’s revolution to topple Batista aimed to create a modern, diversified economy. Given the lack of a clear strategy, however, that goal was not to be achieved.

Castro’s agrarian reforms and nationalization, which began in 1959, alarmed US sugar interests and led the US to introduce new trade restrictions. These escalated to cuts in Cuba’s allowable sugar exports to the US and an embargo on US oil and food exports to Cuba. When Castro turned to the Soviet Union to fill the gap, President Dwight Eisenhower issued a secret order to the CIA to topple the new regime, leading to the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, in the first months of John F. Kennedy’s administration.

Later, the CIA was given the green light to assassinate Castro. In 1962, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev decided to forestall another US invasion—and teach the US a lesson—by surreptitiously installing nuclear missiles in Cuba, thereby triggering the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear annihilation.

Through dazzling restraint by both Kennedy and Khrushchev, and no small measure of good luck, humanity was spared; the Soviet missiles were removed, and the US pledged not to launch another invasion. Instead, the US doubled down on the trade embargo, demanded restitution for nationalized properties, and pushed Cuba irrevocably into the Soviet Union’s waiting arms. Cuba’s sugar monoculture remained in place, though its output now headed to the Soviet Union rather than the US.

The half-century of a Soviet-style economy, exacerbated by the US trade embargo and related policies, took a heavy toll. In purchasing-power terms, Cuba’s per capita income stands at roughly one-fifth of the US level. Yet Cuba’s achievements in boosting literacy and public health are substantial. Life expectancy in Cuba equals that of the US, and is much higher than in most of Latin America. Cuban doctors have played an important role in disease control in Africa in recent years.

Normalization of diplomatic relations creates two very different scenarios for US-Cuba relations. In the first, the US reverts to its bad old ways, demanding draconian policy measures by Cuba in exchange for ‘normal’ bilateral economic relations. Congress might, for example, uncompromisingly demand the restitution of property that was nationalized during the revolution; the unrestricted right of Americans to buy Cuban land and other property; privatization of state-owned enterprises at fire-sale prices; and the end of progressive social policies such as the public health system. It could get ugly.

In the second scenario, which would constitute a historic break with precedent, the US would exercise self-restraint. Congress would restore trade relations with Cuba, without insisting that Cuba remake itself in America’s image or forcing Cuba to revisit the post-revolution nationalizations. Cuba would not be pressured to abandon state-financed health care or to open the health sector to private American investors. Cubans look forward to such a mutually respectful relationship, but bristle at the prospect of renewed subservience.

This is not to say that Cuba should move slowly on its own reforms. Cuba should quickly make its currency convertible for trade, expand property rights, and (with considerable care and transparency) privatize some enterprises.

Such market-based reforms, combined with robust public investment, could speed economic growth and diversification, while protecting Cuba’s achievements in health, education, and social services. Cuba can and should aim for Costa Rican-style social democracy, rather than the cruder capitalism of the US. (The first author here believed the same about Poland 25 years ago: It should aim for Scandinavian-style social democracy, rather than the neo-liberalism of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.)

The resumption of economic relations between the US and Cuba is therefore a test for both countries. Cuba needs significant reforms to meet its economic potential without jeopardizing its great social achievements. The US needs to exercise unprecedented and unaccustomed self-control, to allow Cuba the time and freedom of maneuver it needs to forge a modern and diversified economy that is mostly owned and operated by the Cuban people themselves rather than their northern neighbors.

You can see the many currents in the Australia–US relationship by using different lenses: war fighting and alliance, strategy, economics and trade.

Add filters for surprises and rule writing and ambition and history and the nature of the two nations.

Lots of important stuff is flowing through the relationship. Already in 2016, note the Turnbull government’s polite refusal of the US’s form letter asking for extra effort in Iraq and Syria (lenses: surprise, alliance, war fighting.) And the less than all-out-gush in the Prime Minister’s January visit to Washington (every lens, especially history).

Next up, a multi-lens effort when the Defence White Paper is delivered. ASPI’s conference on the meaning of the White Paper starts April 6—microscope metaphors, please.

Later this year, the submarine choice. If Japan loses the race to build the next Oz sub, Washington will be as disappointed as Tokyo.

The submarine is a huge decision—and that’s before you get to the cash. View the submarine choice through lots of lenses: domestic Oz politics, alliance management and strategy (and history and ambition). Not surprising, as Andrew Davies notes, so much attention is on the politics of the build rather than the design.

The just-signed Trans-Pacific Partnership treaty is about plenty more than economics and trade. The benefits of the deal are deeply contested, depending on modelling assumptions. The sceptical argument is that the ‘gain is very small’ and the TPP is no ‘slam dunk’ that should be approved automatically.

The economic arguments over ratification will be intense—nearly as powerful as the politics. This US election year means the American polity wants to defer the ratification wrangle in Congress to next year.

If economics and politics are murky lenses, the clearest arguments for the TPP can be made when viewing it as strategy and rule writing. The TPP is the trade arm of the pivot, an economic hard power weapon. The TPP is about who rules and who writes the rules. This is the Barack Obama proposition: ‘If we don’t write the rules, China will write the rules.’

The surprises in the Oz–US relationship—the unexpected bits—are always revealing. Two recent examples:

1. The decision to lease the Port of Darwin to a Chinese company. Obama expressed Washington’s displeasure at being blindsided in his first meeting with Turnbull: ‘Let us know next time.’ That was about the alliance and the US marines in Darwin and it was about China, China, China.
2. The US form letter to 40 partners, including Australia, asking for extra effort in Iraq and Syria. Australia was gobsmacked when the letter from the US Defense Secretary lobbed without prior consultation. For an excellent account of the letter that made Canberra go ‘Whoa!’ see Karen Middleton:

‘When it comes to seeking support in military operations, there is an understanding between Australia and the US: Australia won’t be asked for a contribution unless and until it is in a position to say yes. If the US wants to ask, the issue will be discussed in a conversation between officials. If the Australians indicate the response will be positive, then a written request will be made—sometimes along with a leader-to-leader phone call—in very specific terms. But if the answer is not going to be yes, then the request is never officially lodged.’

Here was Washington making a formal alliance request in a way that produced a rare formal response from Australia: No.

The surprise lens offers the view that Canberra’s response was about more than war fighting—it was about how the great and powerful friend should treat a close ally.

Amid all the other currents, no great harm done from the two surprises. Do better next time.

The unusual sight of Australia saying ‘No’ provided one filter for Turnbull’s pilgrimage to the White House, with much textual analysis devoted to his Washington speech, ‘Australia and the United States: New responsibilities for an enduring partnership’.

The ‘enduring partnership’ title meant Turnbull stood in line with every Australian leader since Curtin and Menzies.

It’s hard to salute and embrace at the same time. Yet for Australian leaders in Washington, it’s the standard gesture.

Despite Turnbull’s enduring partnership usage, analysts detected change.

James Curran saw a shift beyond the ‘faint whiff of uncritical subservience’ of Julia Gillard and Tony Abbott that exemplified an ‘extraordinary bipartisan intensity’ in the alliance that had distorted how Australia presents itself to the region and the world:

‘Turnbull’s speech in Washington may very well have exhibited a difference in degree rather than kind in terms of alliance rhetoric, but that fits perfectly the current moment. It is a time for shades of grey, not thunderous absolutes.’

One of Canberra’s wise owls, Allan Gyngell, also noted the ‘absence of absolutes’ in the speech.

When using lenses, beware the distortions of magnification. Don’t read too much into one speech.

So the commentary that got it into one phrase, for me, was Bruce Grant’s judgement that Turnbull ‘showed flickers of independence.’

Flicker is about right. And in the White Paper next month the flicker will be invisible amongst the alliance love.

The Turnbull embrace of the alliance will be as fervent as all the official statements that went before—the White Papers of Fraser, Hawke, Keating, Howard, Rudd and Gillard.

Expect the classic Canberra signal to the US where history and politics meet the alliance—the simultaneous salute and embrace.