Tag Archive for: Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s geopolitical balancing act

Strategically located as a link between South Asia and the rest of the Indo-Pacific, Bangladesh has emerged as a highly sought-after partner in the region’s ever-changing geopolitical landscape. It is a willing participant in China’s ambitious project Belt and Road Initiative, but Dhaka’s new Indo-Pacific policy emphasises neutrality and achieving close economic engagement with both China and the US. The struggle for influence between these rivals has forced emerging economies like Bangladesh into a delicate balancing act.

But in an intriguing development, Bangladesh is now on the verge of joining BRICS, an influential global south bloc currently made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

Bangladesh’s interest in BRICS has substantial geopolitical implications, especially considering the state of relations between Dhaka and Washington in recent years. Since coming to power in 2009, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her government have faced vocal US criticism over human rights issues and the controversial 2014 and 2018 elections. In 2021, the US imposed sanctions on Bangladesh’s elite paramilitary force, accusing it of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and human rights violations. In the same year, US President Joe Biden did not include Bangladesh in his 110-country-strong Summit for Democracy.

In May this year, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced a new visa policy to ‘promote democratic elections in Bangladesh’. Under this policy, the US can restrict visas for individuals it believes are responsible for undermining the democratic election process in Bangladesh. Perhaps predictably, Bangladesh’s government opposes the policy and the opposition party is in favour of it.

In response, one influential parliamentarian in Bangladesh claimed that the US was seeking control over the strategically important Saint Martin Island, and Hasina has alluded to a regime-change conspiracy, musing that ‘maybe the US doesn’t want me in power’.

Most recently, the US joined with a dozen other Western countries in issuing a statement condemning the violence that broke out last month following a brutal attack on an independent candidate, Ashraful Alom, who had stood against the ruling party candidate in a by-election. Dhaka responded by summoning the US and other nations’ ambassadors for an explanation, saying they had shown an ‘undiplomatic attitude’.

Despite these challenges in the relationship, Washington has been consistently seeking Bangladesh’s involvement in the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Bangladesh’s announcement of its interest in BRICS would seem to foil those efforts.

China, meanwhile, has seized the opportunity to demonstrate its unwavering support for the current regime. While promoting democracy in an avowedly democratic country may not be unfair, China’s newly appointed ambassador to Dhaka, Yao Wen, felt it necessary to write a column criticising US concerns about democracy in Bangladesh. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson then accused the US of meddling in Bangladesh’s internal affairs under the pretext of democracy and human rights, and affirmed China’s readiness to work with Bangladesh to oppose ‘power politics’.

Hasina is scheduled to participate in the BRICS summit in South Africa this month, where it’s expected that Bangladesh and several other emerging economies will gain membership. In September, the prime minister will visit India for the G20 summit as a special guest.

In the current regional context, Bangladesh’s inclusion in BRICS may be seen as an implicit rejection of the US and its Indo-Pacific strategy. At the same time, it can be seen as the product of a natural evolution of the warm relations the regime has enjoyed with BRICS nations since coming to power.

Bangladesh’s next elections are scheduled to be held by January 2024. The opposition in Bangladesh has raised objections to the electoral system and is demanding a non-partisan government system during elections. However, the government hasn’t addressed these demands.

With Bangladesh engaged in multibillion-dollar projects with China, Japan, India and Russia, it is reasonable to speculate that the progress of some of those projects may be influenced by a change in government. Consequently, many of the world’s major powers will be closely monitoring the upcoming elections in Bangladesh. Recent regime changes in South Asian countries like Pakistan and Sri Lanka have demonstrated the involvement of geopolitics. Similarly, in 2018, China and the United States were engaged in rhetorical jostling around national elections in Maldives.

With its refusal to address opposition demands and so much controversy surrounding the last two elections, it seems unlikely that the regime can avoid further criticism in the forthcoming election. Another disputed election in Bangladesh could jeopardise the current regime and its drift away from the US as an expected member of BRICS.

The world should continue to watch events in Bangladesh closely. What takes place in this crucial buffer zone in the Indo-Pacific over the next several months will have implications across the globe.

The threat spectrum

Planet A

Bangladesh has secured US$500 million from the World Bank to strengthen climate-resilient agricultural practices and enhance food security. The program aims to assist Bangladesh to revolutionise its agriculture sector by promoting crop diversification, food safety and climate resilience. Ultimately, the initiative hopes to help Bangladesh meet its goal of achieving upper-middle-income status by 2031.

The funding will support sustainable food production by improving agricultural efficiency and promoting stress-tolerant and nutrient-dense crop varieties. The program will also expand access to digital agricultural services, improve food-safety processes and facilitate female and youth entrepreneurship. Other areas of emphasis include modernising and enhancing data management, supporting research and development activities, and facilitating collaboration with global agricultural research institutions and the private sector.

The financing agreement has a 30-year term and includes a five-year grace period. The International Fund for Agricultural Development will co-finance the initiative, providing US$43 million.

Democracy watch

Judges at the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals determined that Felicien Kabuga, facing trial for crimes allegedly committed during the 1994 Rwandan genocide in which over 800,000 civilians were killed, was unfit to meaningfully participate in the trial. Kabuga, now 90 years old and suffering from dementia, was charged with genocide, incitement to commit genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide and crimes against humanity.

The court reportedly intends to proceed with an alternative finding procedure—essentially a trial to determine the facts of the case without pursuing a conviction. Kabuga had been in hiding for almost 30 years, and finally appeared before the Residual Mechanism in 2020 after being arrested in Paris.

These developments reveal a key issue in international justice—that it is often too little, too late. It also reiterates the mixed achievements of international justice mechanisms so far. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda convicted 62 of the 93 high-level perpetrators it indicted, but it also cost more than US$1 billion. And almost 30 years since the genocide, numerous suspects still evade justice. Overall, the court’s success in dispensing justice remains questionable.

Information operations

The US is actively collaborating with its allies to combat the violation of ‘information space integrity’ on a global scale, as disclosed by a senior State Department official. In an effort to effectively counter Russian disinformation, the US has entered into a memorandum of understanding with North Macedonia and aims to establish similar agreements with Bulgaria and Slovakia. The significance of this policy was highlighted in the lead-up to Montenegro’s early parliamentary elections, during which the country faced a barrage of Russian-influenced disinformation and propaganda, primarily originating from Serbia.

The goal of the agreements is to empower partner countries by equipping them with the necessary tools and best practices to expose covert manipulation and ensure the transparent and accountable dissemination of information.

While the State Department’s Global Engagement Center doesn’t use artificial intelligence tools to counter foreign disinformation, ongoing discussions are exploring the potential implications of AI for US policy in this area.

Follow the money

The UK government has implemented new sanctions against Belarus in response to its support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The measures went into effect immediately and include an import ban on gold, cement, wood and rubber, which are key revenue sources for the Belarusian regime.

Last year, the EU and the UK imposed sanctions on Belarus for its role in aiding Russia’s war efforts, resulting in significant economic damage. However, differences between the two sets of sanctions enabled some trade between Russia and Belarus to persist. The latest round of UK sanctions aims to close the loopholes and further restrict Belarus’s access to UK financial markets to limit its capacity to raise funds.

This package builds on previous measures targeting President Alexander Lukashenko, including travel bans, asset freezes and exports restrictions. By aligning its sanctions with the EU’s, the UK will help restrain Belarus’s foreign exchange income and thwart attempts to circumvent sanctions.

Terror byte

Last week, China, Pakistan and Iran conducted their first trilateral meeting on counterterrorism and regional security in Beijing. The meeting concluded with a decision to institutionalise these trilateral consultations. Discussions took place against the backdrop of overlapping terrorist threats facing the three countries, rooted in broader regional instability.

Low-level but persistent insurgency in Balochistan, a province in Pakistan’s southwest that is rich in natural resources and borders Iran, poses a key obstacle to the multibillion-dollar China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. Pakistan accuses Iran of providing sanctuary to Baloch insurgents who oppose the project and have carried out deadly attacks against Chinese officials in the past. Meanwhile, Iran has claimed that Islamabad isn’t reining in cross-border terrorism.

The three countries are also closely watching how instability in neighbouring Afghanistan affects terrorism within their borders, including through the strengthening of groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement in China and the Islamic State Khorasan.

Building Bangladeshi–Australian ties for regional prosperity and security

Australia’s economic opportunities in South Asia extend far beyond India. While the tariff reductions and other measures under the new economic cooperation and trade agreement will support the Australia–India economic relationship, Bangladesh is another country offering opportunities for growth.

Bangladesh is South Asia’s largest economy after India, thanks to impressive growth in recent decades and resilience to economic shock. While many economies contracted during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Bangladesh’s economy rose by 5.2% in 2020, though in the past year it has felt the effects of high inflation, a fuel-price crisis that is hitting the average Bangladeshi hard and weak foreign exchange reserves. In January, the International Monetary Fund approved a support package for Bangladesh, which has generally been seen as a sensible precautionary measure to achieve economic stabilisation and structural reform.

However, despite the volatility of the past year or so, the long-term trajectory of Bangladesh’s economy is good. In line with the country’s economic growth, Bangladesh’s population, estimated at nearly 170 million, is increasingly becoming middle-class and urbanised, and the United Nations has projected that Bangladesh will graduate from its status as a ‘least developed country’ by 2026. For Australian investors, this means that there is a vibrant and emergent market to tap into.

Bolstering Australia’s economic engagement with Bangladesh will consolidate the already strong foundations of the bilateral relationship. After a violent war that led to the secession of East Pakistan from Pakistan in 1971, Australia was among the first countries to recognise the new nation of Bangladesh. Others, including the United States, were slow to recognise Bangladesh’s independence because of Pakistan’s opposition to East Pakistan’s secession.

In the 50 years since the establishment of diplomatic ties, the relationship between Australia and Bangladesh has flourished. As an impoverished country at the time of its birth, Bangladesh received, and continues to receive, aid from Australia. Australian aid to Bangladesh today is organised under the two pillars of health security and societal stability. However, Bangladesh is gradually reducing its reliance on international aid as its economic development gathers pace. Rather than being merely a passive recipient of aid, Bangladesh is now a provider of aid to other countries such as Sri Lanka, Maldives and Sudan.

After a strong period of growth in two-way trade, which increased sixfold in the 2010s, Bangladesh became Australia’s 32nd largest trading partner in 2020. As a result, there’s significant scope for the Australia–Bangladesh trade relationship to further grow. Today, the top imports from Bangladesh to Australia include apparel, textiles and footwear. Top exports from Australia to Bangladesh include vegetables, iron, steel and fertilisers.

People-to-people links between the two countries are also increasing. Census data shows that the Bangladesh-born population in Australia grew from approximately 41,000 to 51,000 between 2016 and 2021. International students form a key portion of this—more than 7,000 Bangladeshi students were enrolled in Australian courses between February and November 2022.

To further expand their economic relationship, Australia and Bangladesh signed a trade and investment framework arrangement in 2021. Even though it’s not legally binding, the agreement is expected to increase bilateral trade and investment—which is just what Australia needs to be doing in a period of strategic and economic uncertainty. The economic coercion by Beijing of recent years and the supply-chain impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have demonstrated the need for diversification. A more robust program of trade and investment with Bangladesh will help Australia diversify its markets.

But Australia’s engagement with Bangladesh shouldn’t stop at economic cooperation. Bilateral ties involve creating an environment of mutual trust and cooperation in all areas of joint regional concern. The importance of the Australia–Bangladesh relationship beyond economic engagement was demonstrated at last year’s meeting in Dhaka between Australia’s assistant foreign affairs minister and Bangladesh’s foreign minister, which served as an opportunity for the countries to talk about Australia’s engagement in the Indian Ocean region.

Climate change, transnational crime and public health are critical areas in which Australia and Bangladesh could expand their cooperation. For example, Bangladesh, where an estimated one million Rohingya refugees are still living after fleeing neighbouring Myanmar, recently called on Australia to take in more Rohingya to combat regional people smuggling.

Ultimately, enhanced engagement between Bangladesh and Australia will not only ensure mutual prosperity but has the potential to create a safer and more secure Indo-Pacific region.

Kick-starting a new strategic and defence partnership with Bangladesh

Australia’s 2020 defence strategic update identifies the northeast Indian Ocean as a priority area as part of our immediate region, but it’s also where our security relationships are the least developed. A new report published by the National Security College examines Australia’s interests in that region and options for enhanced security relations with Bangladesh.

For at least a decade, Australia has rightly concentrated on India as its key South Asian partner, but it is now time to broaden that strategy to include other countries in that region. Enhanced security, political and economic relations with Bangladesh should be part of that. Despite being one of the first countries to recognise an independent Bangladesh, Australia has not properly developed the relationship.

Improved connections with Bangladesh would also be part of a developing web of relationships with existing and emerging middle powers across the Indo-Pacific. These can supplement relationships with major powers and, potentially, also help mitigate some of the impacts of major power competition.

Australia has significant strategic equities in Bangladesh, reflecting economic opportunities and potential threats emanating from the northeast Indian Ocean.

Bangladesh is one of the big economic success stories in Asia. Over the past several decades, Bangladesh has grown from one of the poorest countries in the world to a middle-income country. In the years prior to the Covid-19 crisis, its economic growth averaged around 7% to 8% per annum. It could well become one of Asia’s new economic ‘tigers’ and a key trading partner for Australia.

It’s in our interests to support a stable and independent Bangladesh as it pursues development while balancing external pressures. Bangladesh is located at the fulcrum of the Bay of Bengal, between India and China, and is the subject of growing strategic competition between them. Recent threats by the Chinese ambassador if Bangladesh dared to develop relations with the Quad will likely be shrugged off by Dhaka. Indeed, such bullying may only further highlight the value for Dhaka of building partnerships with countries like Australia and Japan that can add further ballast to Bangladesh’s regional relationships.

Australia also has other security interests in the region, including in managing risks of climate change, people and drug smuggling and violent extremism, all of which could have a significant impact on Australia.

The ethnic cleansing of Rohingya people from Myanmar has resulted in more than 1 million refugees in Bangladeshi camps, creating risks from unregulated population movements and violent extremism.

Climate change, including sea-level rise and severe weather events, may also have a major impact on Bangladesh in coming years, potentially triggering large-scale population movements and regional instability.

Extended civil unrest in Myanmar also creates risks of a surge in drug smuggling or refugee movements. Myanmar is already Australia’s largest source of opium and now methamphetamines, and a breakdown in order could flood those drugs onto the Australian market.

Australia may increasingly need Bangladesh as a regional partner to help address these threats. But our security relationship is very thin. Official military visits are rare and there is no resident defence representative. But Bangladesh has recently flagged its interest in developing closer security relations as part of a more comprehensive relationship with Australia.

Much can be done to kick-start engagement at minimal cost. Australia can start by focusing on low-hanging fruit, building relationships between the defence forces, building Bangladesh’s maritime security capabilities in selected areas and seeking opportunities for collaborative regional engagement.

Bangladesh has a large, professional and well-funded military. Although it has a democratic civilian-led government, the armed forces play a prominent role in public affairs. Good relationships across the Bangladeshi military are not only essential for defence cooperation, but are also a valuable element in broader political engagement.

Current arrangements for servicing the relationship through Australia’s defence adviser in Colombo are far from optimal. Australia needs a defence representative on the ground to have credibility, fully engage with the Bangladeshi military and explore further opportunities. This should include opportunities as a potential supplier in niche defence technologies or surplus equipment in light of Bangladesh’s military modernisation program. A resident defence adviser would also improve Australia’s visibility of security developments in the region.

Australia has long used military education to develop relationships with regional partners. We should provide opportunities (including on a paid basis) for senior Bangladeshi officers at the Australian War College, the National Security College or the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security. Networks could also be developed through targeted exchanges of personnel, for example, between the Bangladeshi and Australian peacekeeping training centres.

A port visit by one or more Australian naval ships could be undertaken as part of a future Indo-Pacific Endeavour activity in the northeast Indian Ocean.

Australia should undertake targeted capability-building activities with Bangladesh on selected maritime security issues where Australia has direct interests. These should focus on playing to Australia’s strengths in experience and expertise, in areas such as maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, and port security, where Australia can provide valuable expertise and training.

Bangladesh’s assumption of chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Association in 2021 provides an opportunity to collaborate on regional initiatives in maritime safety and security, the blue economy and environmental security. BIMSTEC, the regional political grouping in the northeast Indian Ocean, could also be a useful vehicle to demonstrate Australia’s renewed interest in the region.

India is without doubt Australia’s most important partner in South Asia and has been one of Australia’s key foreign policy focuses for some years. But India’s smaller neighbours also have important roles to play as we consider opportunities and risks in the region. An improved relationship with Bangladesh can provide valuable heft to regional relationships and additional options for Australia.

Myanmar’s five Ms: misunderstanding, mistrust, misinterpretation, misconception and mistreatment  

Since regaining its independence in 1948, Myanmar has endured essentially constant internal armed conflict.

These stresses, compounded by the missteps of successive administrations, have led the country to fall into a deep chasm of political and ethnic disunity and its development to lag behind other countries in the region.

In addition, despite its strategic location—Myanmar constitutes the bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia and abuts both China and India—Myanmar’s internal difficulties have left little scope to leverage its geography.

The political context in Myanmar is complex. Numerous key actors are generating competing and complicated dynamics that constitute a weak and unstable foundation for effective governance.

The persistent reality of internal armed conflict, and the associated weakening of the country’s economic, social and political infrastructure, present a long-term challenge to national security. Equally, of course, because it occupies a geopolitically strategic space, Myanmar’s fragile security circumstances inevitably affect its neighbours.

In broad terms, Myanmar’s national security infrastructure has been shaped by four main factors: politics, economics, social issues and diplomatic relations. Myanmar’s complex and stressful domestic circumstances also profoundly complicate its national security outlook.

Myanmar currently faces a wide range of pressing issues, including internal armed conflicts between the Myanmar Armed Forces (the Tatmataw) and ethnic armed organisations; the peacebuilding process among the government, the Tatmataw and the ethnic armies; the ongoing Rakhine crisis; constitutional contention between the government and the Tatmataw; nationalistic sentiments and religious tensions; economic hardships; the potential spread of terrorism and violent extremism; the prediction of more frequent and intense natural disasters driven by climate change; the prevalence of illegal drugs and narcotics, especially along the border areas; daunting inadequacies in the education and health sectors; and contentious diplomatic relations with some neighbouring countries.

The ongoing civil conflicts have been the primary root cause of Myanmar’s current political difficulties and a major hindrance to establishing a peaceful and prosperous nation.

There are more than 20 ethnic armed organisations in Myanmar, a larger number than any other state has had to deal with. The emergence of these groups is a legacy of the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy from the colonial era that left deep ethnic sentiments of discrimination and segregation.

The National League for Democracy–led government has been making a strenuous effort to halt these internal conflicts and put the nation on a path of peace and national reconciliation. But the dogmatism of some parties in the peace dialogue has damaged mutual trust and confidence, resulting in a political stalemate.

Despite the Tatmataw’s offer to extend its unilateral ceasefire, continued fighting in Rakhine State and some northern areas indicates that a dependable peace in Myanmar may still be a long way off. The Tatmataw and the ethnic armed groups, as the main actors in Myanmar’s peace process, need to see diversity as a reality and potential strength and continue building peace within and beyond the framework of the nationwide ceasefire agreement.

In recent years, the Rakhine crisis has become a flashpoint drawing global attention and threatening national security. Four major issues in the Rakhine crisis remain unresolved: the delays in the repatriation of refugees in Bangladesh’s refugee camps; the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and its radicalisation of vulnerable refugees; the severity of socioeconomic underdevelopment in Rakhine State; and the ongoing fighting between the Tatmataw and the Arakan Army, an armed ethnic group in northern Rakhine State.

The relationship with China is vital. Myanmar shares its longest border with China, which is the country’s biggest trading partner and investor and a strategic partner that has traditionally supported and defended Myanmar in the face of international pressure, especially from the United Nations and Western countries (particularly the United States).

China also possesses considerable influence over the ethnic armed organisations residing along Myanmar’s borders and plays a critical role in the nationwide peace process.

Myanmar’s relationship with China has always been a priority for successive governments, including the Tatmataw. Despite the continued suspension of the mega-dam project in conflict-prone Kachin State, newly ambivalent public sentiment towards China and the incumbent government’s favourable relations with the West, Myanmar’s highly asymmetric bilateral relationship with China remains strong.

China, of course, exercises the influence it has on Myanmar politics in pursuit of its own strategic interests, but it remains the case that any erosion of Chinese interests will have significant effects in Myanmar.

As a consequence of the Rakhine crisis, Myanmar’s most immediate and acute foreign policy challenge is to manage its relationship with Bangladesh.

Each country has accused the other of lacking the political will to meet the requirements for the repatriation of refugees.

Myanmar and Bangladesh signed an agreement on repatriation as far back as November 2017. Yet its implementation has been hampered by ongoing delays.

From a security perspective, Bangladesh’s energetic lobbying for international diplomatic support in the face of Myanmar’s Rakhine crisis will further impact implementation of the repatriation process, whether it is bilateral or assisted by the concerned UN agencies.

Consequently, the situation is likely to result in a growing distance and more misunderstanding between the two countries, leading to further delays in the repatriation process that may heighten the security risk to the region, as well as to the two neighbours.

Myanmar’s national security has been challenged directly and indirectly by these intertwined and interconnected issues, and the government must be tactful and forward-looking in addressing each of them. Avoiding misunderstanding, mistrust, misinterpretation, misconception and mistreatment (the so-called five Ms guideline for policy development and implementation) constitutes sound advice for the future of Myanmar.