Tag Archive for: Australian Government

An Australian view of nuclear deterrence

No Australian minister has made a full-blooded speech on nuclear deterrence for many a long year—not since the early 1990s, I suspect. In truth, that’s not surprising: it’s been proliferation that’s grabbed all the attention since then. Moreover, talking about nuclear weapons requires the speaker to perform a delicate balancing act between upholding the current reliance upon nuclear weapons and endorsing a longer-term post-nuclear vision. Because nuclear weapons are—by their nature—scary, the speech has to contain core elements of reassurance and moderation. And there are no votes in it.

True, a succession of governments over the last couple of decades have nailed their colours to the mast on deterrence as part of formal declaratory defence policy. Those wanting to trace the issue through a succession of Defence White Papers (DWPs) since the end of the Cold War should have a look at paragraph 9.7 in the 1994 DWP, paragraph 5.15 in the 2000 DWP, paragraph 6.34 in the 2009 DWP, and paragraph 3.41 in the 2013 DWP. Echoes from those DWPs can subsequently be heard in other ministerial comments—in Stephen Smith’s response to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament report of late 2009, for example. Read more

Reader response: Northern Australia

Andrew Davies invited a response to his recent post on Northern Australia. So I thought I would provide one.

My sense is that the whole country was a ‘power projection’ base in World War 2—as was New Zealand. If we get involved in some conflict in Northeast Asia or the South China Sea, though, I wonder whether any part of Australia has any geographic advantage in terms of proximity to the fight.

I note that while the Army was suckered into Army Presence In the North (APIN), the RAAF and in particular the RAN held firm in the southern locales. Apparently the distance to the Defence of Australia air-sea gap was less critical to them. Read more

The Canberra officer (8): politicisation

Members of the 1st Signal Regiment, who formed the guard of honour for the centenary parade, prepare to present arms as they commemorate 100 years since the inception of the 1st Division.The avowed purpose of the Canberra officer project is to get an officer corps that can better serve Australia’s political leaders and win the bureaucratic battles. An undeclared purpose is the creation of political nous. This is the taboo of politicisation, discussed in the previous column of this series through the experience of one Chief of the Defence Force.

Creating the Canberra officer is a good and proper project, but a clear effect is that senior officers dance closer to the political flames. To be positive, call this need for nous merely proper attention to the nature and needs of government; the negative rendering sees a politicisation that blurs the clear demarcations of roles and responsibilities between military and ministers. The dynamic reaches to both dimensions. Read more

Where do Australian interests stop?

Men from the 2nd South Australian (Mounted Rifles) Contingent, who fought in the Boer War. Third from left is Trooper Harry "The Breaker" Morant. South Africa, c. 1900.As dawn broke on 1 January 1901, the splendidly-attired band of the Royal New South Wales Lancers was busy polishing its kit (including the new kettle-drums to be carried on a beautiful white Clydesdale draft-horse). The regiment would soon provide a ceremonial guard for Lord Hopetoun, our first Governor-General, as he travelled in state to Centennial Park. There, he’d soon proclaim Australia a nation. A couple of hours later, as the sun rose in South Africa, other Lancers were also rising for duty. But the troopers there weren’t preparing for parades—they were too busy fighting the Boers.

Before the turn of the new century, a squadron of volunteers had paid their own way to travel to England and train with the Dragoon Guards. Those soldiers were on their way back to Australia when the ship docked at Capetown. Between the troopers’ leaving London and arriving in South Africa, the Empire had declared war on the Boers. But as the ship docked on 2 November 1889 a telegram from the NSW Premier, Sir William Lyne, was rushed aboard.

There’d been a major political debate back in Sydney. Many believed if the Empire was at war, NSW was too. They insisted the squadron should disembark and fight. Others, including many conservatives, felt the quarrel between the free Dutch settlers (who’d left the Empire to win and establish their own land) and the English settlers of the Cape was none of Australia’s business. Read more

Reader response: a parliamentary vote on military action?

House of Representatives Front BenchHeath Pickering argues that ‘in the interests of democratic scrutiny and ensuring that any intervention occurs with broad political support, RAAF air strikes in Iraq (and potentially Syria) must be supported by a parliamentary vote in both houses’.

He cites the precedent of the UK where David Cameron lost a non-binding parliamentary vote last year (285–272) to support a British intervention in Syria. Prime Minister Cameron wasn’t legally required to hold the vote, but chose to do so (to avoid a repeat of the country’s swift backing for the invasion of Iraq). No British government has previously lost a vote over matters of military involvement since at least the mid-19th century.

I’d support Heath’s call for greater information to be provided to parliament on decisions about defence deployments. That might include governments providing a statement to parliament outlining the basis of the decision and reporting on the progress of military operations. Read more

Process makes perfect: easy steps to white paper happiness

At the Sea Power Conference in Sydney I set out a number of steps that the new Government should take in developing the promised 2015 defence white paper. In my last post, I discussed what white papers need in terms of content but here I’d like to focus on process. Let’s start with the basics: government should emphasise a strong commitment to what could be called the ‘five Cs’: base work on classified assessments; use Cabinet as a direction-setting forum; make choices; consult widely within official circles; and finally, engage the broader community.

Using classified assessments as the basis for decision-making is a critical way to focus government on the difficult and hard-edged judgements about strategic developments. Equally, governments need access to realistic assessments about the strengths and weaknesses of ADF capabilities. The unclassified white paper statement explains policy to a wide audience, but it should only be the final stage of a more through-going process. Likewise, Cabinet’s deep involvement is important, to make sure that key minsters have the opportunity to talk issues through and decide on outcomes they’re prepared to commit to. Read more