Tag Archive for: Australian Defence Force

‘Doing good deeds quietly’: The rise of intelligence diplomacy as a potent tool of statecraft

‘Intelligence diplomacy’ – using intelligence actors and relationships to conduct, or substantially facilitate, diplomatic relations – is a potent tool for statecraft; useful in specific circumstances to either enhance conventional diplomacy or create subtler lines of communication. Intelligence diplomacy, its increasing utility and potential hazards, is the subject of Doing good deeds quietly, the latest report from ASPI’s Statecraft & Intelligence Centre.

The report finds that governments turn to intelligence diplomacy when a variety of circumstances – and critically those governments’ assessments of related capabilities and effectiveness of their intelligence services – makes use of intelligence actors or relationships attractive and advantageous.

Furthermore, Doing good deeds quietly finds that governments should use intelligence diplomacy selectively and purposefully, in concert and collaboration with other arms of policy, and with robust, agreed policy objectives and parameters. They should also be wary of over-use, for the effective utility of intelligence diplomacy depends in part on prudent and selective application.

For politicians, policymakers and the interested public, understanding the important role intelligence diplomacy can play in international relations provides a fuller sense of what it is that intelligence agencies actually do in their name.

US land power in the Indo-Pacific: Opportunities for the Australian army

The US Army is undergoing its most consequential period of transformation since the end of the Cold War. The re-emergence of great power competition and a deteriorating strategic environment is forcing the US Army to rethink not just its approach to land warfare but also its future role alongside the US Marine Corps in key regions around the globe. In the Indo-Pacific, this doctrinal and structural transformation is informing a new approach to joint exercises and ‘no gaps’ defence collaboration to deter Chinese aggression. These developments hold important insights for key US allies and partners, including Australia and Japan.

Australia’s new unifying strategic approach to national defence and the high degree of convergence this has with US defence strategy offers a timely window of opportunity for the Australian Army to explore the combined use of land power in a heighten threat environment. This work should be mutually reinforcing and constitute part of Australia’s approach to managing risk and threats and balancing its contributions to deterrence.

This report aims to provide the Australian defence establishment and military leaders with well-considered options for engaging the US on matters of mutual interest. The report provides an overview of the US Army’s changing force posture and approach to land warfare, followed by a brief analysis of its evolving role as an essential enabler of joint force operations in a maritime environment. The report then explores the US Army’s ‘campaigning’ activities in the region and its efforts to increase allied and partner capacity for high-end military contingencies in all domains. Finally, the report highlights opportunities for the Australian Army to enhance interoperability with US land forces in a deepening US-Australia alliance.

Australia’s north and space

This report examines opportunities for the development of sovereign space capability in the Northern Territory, Queensland, and Western Australia. Given that those northern jurisdictions are closer to the equator, there’s a natural focus in the report on the potential opportunities offered by sovereign space launch, particularly in the Northern Territory and Queensland. However, I also consider the potential for other aspects of space besides launch, including space domain awareness, the establishment of satellite ground stations, and space industry. I explore the potential for the co-location of space industry—domestic and international—within or close to launch sites, which would result in the development of ‘space hubs’ in strategic locations in Australia.

Benefits are gained by situating space-launch sites as close to the equator as possible, and two sites—Nhulunbuy near Gove in the Northern Territory and Abbot Point near Bowen in Queensland—are now under development. The closer a launch site is to the equator, the greater the benefit in terms of reduced cost per kilogram of payload to orbit, due to velocity gained by a rocket from the Earth’s rotation.

The report then explores the transformation of Australia’s space sector that’s occurred within the past decade, from one solely dependent on foreign-provided satellite services and locally developed ground-segment capabilities, including for space domain awareness, to the growth of sovereign space industry and the establishment of the Australian Space Agency in 2018. I note that, since the establishment of the agency, Australia’s commercial space sector has expanded rapidly, but now faces headwinds, with the recent cancellation of the National Space Mission for Earth Observation being a serious blow to Australia’s space industry. The Australian space industry sector must now fight to sustain funding. In this report, I argue that the best way to achieve success is to emphasise sovereign launch as a focus for Australian space activities and to reinforce the potential opportunities offered by the north, including for defence and national-security requirements in space.

An inflection point for Australian intelligence: Revisiting the 2004 Flood Report

The 2003 Iraq war, and more particularly intelligence failure in relation to Iraqi WMD, led to a broad-ranging inquiry into Australian intelligence conducted by Philip Flood AO. Flood’s July 2004 report has proven an inflection point between the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) of the immediate post–Cold War period and today’s National Intelligence Community (NIC).

Flood laid out an ambitious vision for Australian intelligence and forcefully advocated for sovereign intelligence capability. The scope of his review extended beyond more than ‘recent intelligence lessons’ – that is, Iraq’s WMD, the 2002 Bali bombings and the unrest that led to 2003’s Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands – to the effectiveness of oversight and accountability within the AIC (including priority setting), ‘division of labour’ between AIC agencies and their communications with each other, maintenance of contestability in intelligence assessments, and adequacy of resourcing (especially for the Office of National Assessments – ONA).

It was in addressing these matters that Flood laid the foundation for the future NIC, upon which would be constructed the reforms instituted by the L’Estrange-Merchant review of 2017.

Importantly, Flood’s recommendations significantly enhanced ONA’s capabilities—not just analytical resources but also the resources (and tasking) needed to address the more effective coordination and evaluation of foreign intelligence across the AIC. This was a critical step towards the more structured and institutionalised (if sometimes bureaucratic) NIC of 2023 and an enhanced community leadership role for, ultimately, ONI.

In addition, the Flood Report identified issues that remain pertinent and challenging today – including the vexed issue of the public presentation of intelligence for policy purposes, the central importance of the intelligence community’s people (including training, career management, recruitment and language proficiency), intelligence distribution (including avoiding overloading time-poor customers), the need to maximise collaborative opportunities between agencies, and how best to leverage intelligence relationships (including broadening relations beyond traditional allied partners).

North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 7

The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 7, is a series of articles published in The Strategist over the last six months. It builds on previous volumes by identifying critical intersections of national security, nation-building, resilience and Australia’s north.

This issue, like previous volumes, includes a wide range of articles sourced from a diverse pool of expert contributors writing on topics as varied as critical minerals, rare earth, equatorial space launch, agriculture, advanced manufacturing, fuel and water security, and defence force posturing. Importantly, it addresses the Defence Strategic from a northern Australian perspective. It also features a foreword by the Honourable Madeleine King MP, Minister for Northern Australia.

Minister King writes, “Northern Australia is central to the prosperity, security and future of our nation and will be the engine room of Australia’s decarbonisation effort and drive towards net zero.”

The 24 articles propose concrete, real-world actions for policy-makers to facilitate the development, prosperity and security of Australia’s north. The authors share a sense that those things that make the north unique – its vast space, low population density, specific geography, and harsh investment environment – are characteristics that can be leveraged, not disadvantages.

The big squeeze

Video Explainer

Executive Director’s foreword

This is a very different year for the defence budget. We are in a time of significant change and upheaval.

Uncertainty is rife, but some fundamentals can help in working through uncertainty, especially in the world of defence policy, planning, capability programming and budget. The order of those words is important.

Defence budgets are not arbitrary. Capability requirements must drive budgets. It doesn’t mean that the budget is unlimited but it demands that governments consider proposals for what is required and assess what can be afforded. If budgets drive capability, it risks the true capability needs not being put to government which results in failure to ask of government what they are elected to do – make decisions based on all available information.

The oft-cited metric of defence spend as a percentage of GDP is helpful as a point of comparison on the rate of effort of specific economies towards defence outcomes. It establishes a baseline from which we can measure – and therefore tell a story about – defence spending over time, and in the context of broader geopolitics. The low percentages across major European economies helps to illustrate why deterrence failed against the Putin regime and should be a lesson for all in relation to why defence spending is so important for managing tension and long-term peace.

But a percentage in isolation is not helpful in assessing whether the budget allocated to Defence will allow it to deliver the capabilities for which the government has asked.

The Albanese government released the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and its Portfolio Budget Statements (Budget) within weeks of one another. The DSR establishes the future strategic direction for the Department of Defence and the ADF, including by identifying priorities that must be acted upon in the immediate term. The Budget represents a continuity approach with the strategic and budgetary guidance from the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2016 Defence White Paper.

There is, therefore, a disconnect between the two. This can be addressed and will be through a series of further reviews and specific activities to be progressed by Defence in the coming year. There are significant additional bodies of work yet to be finalised that will affect the future defence budget; all indications point to a steady and possibly substantial rise.

Australia must of course invest in defence capability commensurate with the challenges of the strategic environment. Crucially, however, the role of defence to help deter wars, while being ready for times of conflict, requires spending even in times of relative peace. A detailed discussion of how defence is budgeted to both deter and win wars, and the external and internal dynamics that drive budget (and other) programming and management, is more important today than at any time in the post-Cold War era. This document is a must read for those interested in current and future defence spending and for increased understanding of its importance to the government’s overall budget theme of providing increased certainty to Australians in an increasingly uncertain world.

Executive summary

Defence has long been seen as a necessary burden on the federal budget. However, it is assuming the status of an urgent priority in the wake of the AUKUS agreement and the far-reaching reform urged by this year’s Defence Strategic Review (DSR). Both are responding to a much more challenging geopolitical environment and the realisation that Australia doesn’t have the luxury of time to achieve readiness.

This year’s Defence budget reflects the urgency of the demands upon Defence to the extent that it includes the initial spending on the nuclear-powered submarines and the first response to the DSR, despite there being only very approximate estimates for how that spending is to be scheduled and for the savings that will pay for them.

However, the urgency of the demands upon Defence isn’t reflected in its short-term funding. The only increase in the Defence budget over the next three years is compensation for the increased cost of imported military equipment flowing from a fall in the value of the Australian dollar.

Excluding this, the core funding of Defence (not including the Australian Signals Directorate) has actually been reduced at a time when unprecedented demands are being placed upon it. Between 2023-4 and 2025-6, Defence funding, excluding compensation for adverse foreign exchange movements, drops from $154.0 billion to $152.5 billion.

Both the AUKUS submarines and the DSR conclusions highlight an approach in which capability will drive budget conversations – not vice versa. That is welcome. But there is clearly much more work to be done to clarify the capability implications of the DSR, and then reflect those accurately – and at the appropriate time – in the budget.

The difficulty in bringing the DSR reforms and the spending on submarines into the budget is understandable. The timing of the DSR meant it reached the staff compiling the Defence budget very late in the annual process, while the nuclear-powered submarine program is of historically unprecedented complexity for any government project. The broad outline of the submarine program was only announced in March 2023.

New programs responding to the DSR such as a long-range strike capability or the hardening of the northern Australian bases, are not the subject of budget measures, with Defence expected to provide the additional funds needed with savings obtained from other programs.

Funding in each year continues to move faster than the predicted annual rate of inflation, consistent with the recommendations of the 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP) and the 2020 Defence StrategicUpdate (DSU).

However, the Defence Department’s financial controllers have fewer real resources to work with over the next three years than they were expecting in March 2022, when the Budget still contained the French submarine program and the DSR hadn’t even been commissioned.

The surge of inflation over the past year has made the constraints of a reduced funding base even tighter. The Treasury now expects inflation to reach 6% this year, or double the level it predicted a year ago. Inflation is being powered, both in Australia and globally, in large part by an overheated economy that’s the result of record low interest rates and large government deficits and further exacerbated by the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on food and energy markets.

With unemployment at near record lows, Defence has been unable to meet its recruitment targets, which has been further exacerbated by increasing separation rates among uniformed personnel.

Defence had planned for the ADF to raise its numbers this year (2022-23) by 2,201 but instead faced a contraction in size by 1,389 uniformed personnel.

The rigid constraints on Defence funding over the next four years reflect the Treasury’s judgement that total government spending must be curbed if inflation is to be brought under control. Treasury’s economic forecasts assume that the combined efforts of government and the Reserve Bank of Australia will succeed in taming inflation over the next 18 months, bringing inflation back into the Reserve Bank’s target band by 2024-25.

The government will start providing increased funding for defence from 2027-28 onwards. An amount of $30.5 billion has been set aside for defence spending out to 2032-33. It’s expected that this will increase the defence share of GDP from around 2.05% to more than 2.3%. The additional funding will lift Defence’s share of government spending from about 8.2% now, including both operational and capital spending, to about 9.7% by 2032-33.

However, the principal task for Defence over the year ahead is to decide how to reconfigure its force structure and capability acquisition programs in line with the DSR and the difficult budget constraint.

That work is to be completed ahead of the planned 2024 National Defence Strategy, which is expected to be released before next year’s budget. The uncertainty surrounding the existing Integrated Investment Program (IIP) will affect defence industry as the scope and schedules of major programs are reviewed. Although Defence has raised the share of its procurement sourced domestically from about 45% to 55% over the past five years, it’s possible that the pressure to acquire new capabilities quickly will result in more ‘off-the-shelf’ imports.

Given the intense re-ordering of the Defence capital program expected over the year ahead, this year’s ASPI defence budget brief isn’t a detailed examination of the major acquisition programs. Rather, it’s a guide for the government, industry, academia and citizens interested in Australian defence strategy, capability and budget.

The strategic context for the 2023-24 defence budget is complex and extremely challenging. There’s currently a gap, and quite a significant one, between the rhetoric of the 2023 DSR and the 2023-24 defence budget (and forward estimates). How Defence and the rest of government will work together to bridge the gap will become clearer over the coming year. This publication focuses on what ASPI can usefully contribute to that process, and where the key issues lie in the defence budget.

Impactful mateship: Strengthening the US–Australia defence relationship through enhanced mutual understanding

AUKUS, and the Australian Government’s release of the 2023 report of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR), reinforce to Canberra and Washington DC that there’s an urgent need to continue strengthening the US–Australia alliance. Those efforts underpin allied cooperation within the Indo-Pacific, which is an increasingly complex security environment. 
 
This report highlights 9 opportunities for both US and Australian defence decision-makers at a vital time in the relationship as it develops in complexity and builds towards the ambitions of AUKUS over the coming decade. 
 
A series of ‘quick wins’ for the US DoD are recommended, including arranging more training for inbound DoD personnel and conducting allied-centric training for relevant US-based action officers and planners at US headquarters. US DoD Funding should be provided for US action officers to visit Australia to build rapport with their counterparts and facilitate appreciation for the relationship in person. Broadly, US professional military education at every level should incorporate Australian Defence-centric views when appropriate, and the DoD can better leverage its US liaison network throughout Australia earlier in planning and when considering new initiatives. 
 
Recommended quick wins for Australian Defence to include further leveraging of US-based Australian Defence personnel and encouraging greater transparency with US counterparts regarding capacity. Enhanced transparency would provide maximum clarity on capacity challenges at all echelons, especially regarding the potential impacts of a future crisis within the Indo-Pacific. It’s also recommended that Australian Defence provide greater clarity regarding sovereignty and security concerns for the US DoD. 
 
Finally, this report also makes a major long-term recommendation that will require more resourcing, coordination and focus from US and Australian defence decision-makers, and that’s to establish and empower a US Forces Australia headquarters (USFOR-A) to synergise US DoD efforts with the Australian defence establishment. It’s inevitable that the US–Australia defence relationship will grow in scope and complexity. That will quickly outgrow and challenge the current coordination structure, which was built and implemented decades ago. This report also notes that there are lessons to be learned from the US–Japan bilateral coordination mechanisms, especially in the light of the US–Japan–Australia defence relationship, as it is set to grow in importance in the coming years.

Escalation risks in the Indo-Pacific: A review for practitioners

The outbreak of war in the Indo-Pacific is a real possibility. Increased competition, a growing trust deficit between global and regional powers and potential miscalculations heighten the risk. There needs to be a more engaged Australian discussion on conflict-escalation risks and how they might be managed.

Policymakers and leaders need to understand escalation risks as they manage Australia’s relationship with the US, China, North Korea and Australia’s key regional defence partners over coming decades. In rhetoric and in action, Australia also needs to be attentive to how the acquisition and employment of our own new capabilities—strike missiles, evolving cyber capabilities and nuclear-propelled submarines—affect strategic stability dynamics in a fast-changing world.

Multiple factors mean that there are all-too-imaginable possibilities for inadvertent and accidental escalation around flashpoints like the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and in the East and South China Seas. Moreover, the maritime nature of the Western Pacific as a military theatre, combined with emerging technologies like hypersonics, means that decision makers could face very strong pressures toward pre-emption in a crisis. Put more simply, the fear-driven pressure to ‘shoot first’ could be very strong and very dangerous.

Managing these risks has clearly been made a priority by the Australian government – with senior ministers frequently talking about ‘guardrails’ – and the report suggests some options for doing so.

‘Impactful projection’: long-range strike options for Australia

Executive Summary

The Australian Government has stated that the ADF requires greater long-range strike capability. This was first stated by the previous government in its 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU), which emphasised the need for ‘self-reliant deterrent effects’. The present government has endorsed that assessment: Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles has stated that ‘the ADF must augment its self-reliance to deploy and deliver combat power through impactful materiel and enhanced strike capability—including over longer distances.’ He’s coined the term ‘impactful projection’ to describe the intended effect of this capability, which is to place ‘a very large question mark in the adversary’s mind.’

The term may be new, but the concept is not. To us, it’s a restating of the concept of deterrence by denial; that is, having sufficiently robust capabilities to convince an adversary that the cost of acting militarily against us isn’t worth any gains that might be made.

But the need for the ADF to have those kinds of capabilities has become much more urgent. As the 2020 DSU noted, we no longer have 10 years of warning time of conventional conflict involving Australia. Moreover, this is not just the prospect of conflict far from Australia’s shores. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) force-projection capabilities have grown dramatically in the past two decades and include long-range conventional ballistic missiles, bombers and advanced surface combatants that have already transited through Australian waters.

The ‘worst case’ scenario for Australia’s military strategy has always been the prospect of an adversary establishing a presence in our near region from which it can target Australia or isolate us from our partners and allies. PLA strike capabilities in the archipelago to our north or the Southwest Pacific, whether on ships and submarines or land-based missiles and aircraft, would be that worst case. That could occur as China sought to ‘horizontally escalate’ a conflict with the US to stretch its military resources. So, an enhanced ADF long-range strike capability is not primarily about a conflict off Taiwan or in the South China Sea.

Unfortunately, the ADF’s strike cupboard is rather bare. Defence is acquiring more modern maritime strike and land-attack missiles for its existing platforms. But, even if equipped with better weapons, strike systems built around fighter planes or surface combatants are unlikely to have the ‘affordable mass’ or range needed to deter or defeat a major power’s attempts to project force against Australia.

There’s no doubt that the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) commissioned by the Albanese government is considering new strike options. According to the review’s terms of reference, those capabilities need to be delivered by 2032–33. In this report, we consider options to increase the ADF’s strike power in that time frame.

We start with the US Air Force’s B-21 Raider bomber, which was recently rolled out in California. The B-21 has become a topical issue here but so far there’s been little reliable information to inform the public discussion. This report is a first step in investigating the public data that is currently available on the B-21, while also analysing the B-21’s suitability for Australia’s needs.

As an extremely stealthy bomber that can deliver large amounts of ordnance across our near region, the B-21 is the ‘gold standard’ in strike capability. It could potentially be delivered by 2032–33. But that capability comes at great cost. We estimate the total acquisition cost for a squadron of 12 aircraft to be in the order of $25–28 billion and have a sustainment cost that would put it among the ADF’s most expensive current capabilities (but be significantly less than nuclear-powered submarines).

But that cost is potentially offset by a number of factors. A single B-21 can deliver the same effect as many F-35As. Moreover, B-21s would not require the ‘overhead’ of supporting capabilities such as air-to-air refuellers when operating in our region. Moreover, the B-21 can prosecute targets from secure air bases in Australia’s south, where it has access to workforce, fuel and munitions.

Of course, there are other options for long-range strike. These have their own constellations of cost, capability and risk. Long-range missiles, including hypersonics, have also received much recent attention. But they may be deceptively expensive; the further we want a missile to fly, the more expensive it is, and none of its exquisite components are reusable. Moreover, history suggests that very large numbers of missiles will be needed to defeat an adversary—more than we’re ever likely to be able to afford or stockpile.

Any assessment of capability options needs to be informed by robust cost–benefit analysis. The B-21 certainly has a high sticker price, but if, by virtue of its stealth, it can employ cheaper, short-range weapons, then in the long run it may be more affordable and deliver greater effects than long-range missiles alone. It was analysis of this kind that persuaded the USAF to go down the path of a new bomber. Of course, such exercises are assumption-rich activities, and all assumptions need to be rigorously tested; what’s valid for the US might not be for Australia.

Then there are several options that fall under the heading of the ‘Goldilocks’ bomber: a strike system that doesn’t have the eye-watering cost of the B-21 but still delivers a meaningful capability enhancement. One option is provided by ‘palletised munitions’ dropped from military cargo aircraft. There are two attributes of this approach that have appeal in Australia’s circumstances. The first is that many of the components, such as the missiles and aircraft, are already in ADF inventory or are being acquired. The second is that airlifters can operate from the short and unprepared airfields found in our region. More strike aircraft operating from more locations enhances the survivability of our strike system and complicates the adversary’s operating picture.

Another Goldilocks approach is potentially provided by autonomous, uncrewed systems. They will still need to be large to provide the range needed for impactful projection. However, it’s possible to discern what the solution could look like; for example, a larger version of the Ghost Bat that can deliver ordnance across our near region. At some point, the future of strike will involve larger crewed and uncrewed systems supported by large numbers of ‘the small, the smart and the many’—cheap, disposable systems that Australian industry can responsively produce in mass. The key question is: can that be done within the DSR’s 2032–33 target time frame?

There is potentially a way for Australia to have its cake and eat it too: by hosting USAF B-21s. Under the Enhanced Air Cooperation stream of the US Force Posture Initiative, USAF B-1, B-2 and B-52 aircraft visit northern Australia. In future, having our major ally rotate B-21s through northern Australia could obviate the requirement for Australia to have this kind of long-range strike capability in its own order of battle. Ultimately, the issue comes down to how much independent, sovereign strike capability the Australian Government requires. And any sovereign Australian capability adds to the overall alliance pool, which is the core concept underpinning AUKUS.

This report also examines some of the main arguments against the B-21. While all of them need to be considered seriously, we would also note that the world has changed. The September 2021 AUKUS announcement under which Australia will acquire a nuclear-powered submarine capability demonstrates that. Things that were previously inconceivable are now happening, so we shouldn’t dismiss the B-21 out of hand. Our recommendation is that the Australian Government should engage with the US Government to gain access to the information on the B-21 program so they can make an informed decision on its viability for Australia.

This analysis will form part of wider ASPI program of work looking at the strategic and capability questions that Australia is grappling with, including deterrence and long-range strike.

‘With a little help from my friends’: Capitalising on opportunity at AUSMIN 2022

The annual Australia-US Ministerial Consultations have been the primary forum for bilateral engagement since 1985. The Australian Minister for Defence and Minister for Foreign Affairs will meet with their American counterparts in Washington in 2022, in the 71st year of the alliance, and it’s arguably never been so important.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute is proud to release ‘With a little help from my friends’: Capitalising on opportunity at AUSMIN 2022, a report featuring chapters from our defence, cyber and foreign policy experts to inform and guide the Australian approach to the 2022 AUSMIN consultations.

In this report, ASPI harnesses its broad and deep policy expertise to provide AUSMIN’s principals with tangible policy recommendations to take to the US. The following chapters describe Australia’s most pressing strategic challenges. The authors offer policy recommendations for enhancing Australian and US collaboration to promote security and economic prosperity.

The collection of essays covers topics and challenges that the US and Australia must tackle together: defence capability, foreign affairs, climate change, foreign interference, rare earths, cyber, technology, the Pacific, space, integrated deterrence and coercive diplomacy. In each instance, there are opportunities for concrete, practical policy steps to ensure cohesion and stability.”

Tag Archive for: Australian Defence Force

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