Tag Archive for: Australian Coast Guard

Australia needs a coastguard to meet modern maritime threats

The maritime domain is increasingly contested. From attacks on shipping and undersea cables in Europe to grey zone threats in the South China Sea, risks to maritime security are mounting. China’s use of maritime militias and reports last week of a China-flagged tanker breaking subsea cables highlight the blurred lines between civil and military threats.

With the third-largest exclusive economic zone in the world, Australia must ask itself the question: is our maritime security architecture ready to deal with the increased threats? My new paper Time for a Coastguard with the Australian Naval Institute argues it is not and it’s time to consider setting up an Australian coastguard.

Australia differs from many of its Southeast Asian, Indian Ocean and Pacific neighbours in not having a coastguard. Several agencies execute Australia’s civil maritime functions. Notably, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority coordinates Australia’s maritime search and rescue functions, while the Maritime Border Command (MBC) coordinates and executes Australia’s civil maritime security operations.

MBC is a multi-agency taskforce under the Department of Home Affairs that relies on Australian Defence Force and Australian Border Force (ABF) assets in executing its role. Importantly, the MBC does not have its own assets or personnel; instead, its structure relies on support from the relevant maritime security agencies.

This is an important distinction, as the MBC is often referred to as ‘like a coastguard’ or a ‘de facto coastguard’. However, the similarities are limited: it is fundamentally a coordination body. Staffed primarily by personnel from the ADF and ABF, the MBC directs assets from those forces.

The Defence Strategic Review recommended that ‘Defence should be the force of last resort for domestic aid to the civil community, except in extreme circumstances.’ Relying on the ADF for maritime constabulary work is another example of resorting to it for civil functions.

The ABF maritime unit workforce is about 550 personnel, and it presently has 11 patrol vessels, one large-hull vessel and two fast-response boats. To assist in its maritime surveillance role, the ABF leases 10 Dash 8 aircraft and two helicopters. This is a small civil maritime footprint for a country with the third-largest exclusive economic zone in the world.

There have been reports of billion-dollar warships being used for constabulary functions. The MBC drawing on Royal Australian Air Force aircraft is just as inappropriate—for example, when $250 million P-8A Poseidon aircraft designed for anti-submarine warfare are needed for supplementing ABF aerial surveillance. Not only is this uneconomical, but it will not be feasible in the event of regional crisis or conflict. The National Defence Strategy is clear that the ADF must be focused on high-end warfighting.

Compounding the MBC’s over-reliance on the ADF is the structure and capabilities of the ABF’s maritime element, which has regularly struggled to meet government-directed targets for sea patrol days and aerial surveillance hours, among other issues.

Maritime security trends in the region suggest these pressures will only intensify, placing more strain on the current structure.

The ABF, as a law enforcement organisation, has been unable to develop the expertise needed to maintain maritime capabilities and execute complex maritime operations. In most regional countries, these responsibilities fall to a coastguard paramilitary organisation.

Despite the secrecy surrounding Australia’s maritime border operations, there has been enough anecdotal media reporting to show that the structure has not worked effectively. This includes reporting on concerns around professionalism, maintenance issues and capacity.

The ABF is a civilian law enforcement organisation that lacks the capability, flexibility and training to manage the nature of grey zone and hybrid maritime threats that Australia will likely face. This is a different level of threat than traditional law enforcement and will require different capabilities and skillsets.

The answer is not simply bolstering the maritime unit of the ABF through increased funding. The structures of the ABF maritime unit are not such that they could readily support such an increase in capability, as it was not designed or trained to undertake the full burden of civil maritime security roles in the absence of the ADF.

The MBC multi-agency command structure relies on ADF skillsets that could not easily be replaced by a bolstered ABF maritime unit. A complete restructure would be required—a coastguard.

Given the reduction in warning time for crises and the increasing complexity of maritime security threats, it is time to rethink Australia’s maritime security structure.

My paper Time for a Coastguard advocates for a layered defence model, including the establishment of a coastguard to address Australia’s civil maritime security and maritime home defence. This would enhance our capabilities while relieving pressure on the RAN and ADF.

We must address Australia’s maritime security structural issues now to strengthen our maritime resilience.

Australia needs a coast guard to fight and win in the grey zone

Australia should establish a coast guard to counter China’s use of grey zone tactics in expanding its territorial claims in the South China Sea. China is using its coast guard, along with civilian vessels and fishing boats, to impose its presence, so Australia and its regional partners should respond in kind.

A dedicated, militarised coast guard would be more effective than joint naval patrols in conducting a proportionate response to Chinese aggression and less likely than direct naval approaches to escalate tensions. An Australian coast guard could build on recent collaborations with the US Coast Guard to match China’s tactics in the region.

Whether or not Australia needs a coast guard is a recurring question in national security circles. Experts point to the lack of resources within the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) to defend Australia’s coast, support allies and protect national interests abroad. A coast guard would reduce the navy’s responsibilities by taking the lead on local constabulary and border protection operations, freeing up the RAN to focus on the business of warfighting.

Furthermore, a coast guard could support the RAN in facing unique threats at sea, namely China’s use of grey zone tactics in its campaign to expand its territorial claims in the South China Sea. Grey zone tactics are designed to coerce other states without rising above the threshold for conventional retaliation.

As an island nation, Australia depends on open sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for the movement of goods and security forces, and China’s territorial claims have the potential to constrict these important passages. Canberra has repeatedly emphasised the importance of free and open SLOCs in its defence policy, and its commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific in its national security strategy. The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper said Australia relied on its SLOCs to connect with the world, and the 2020 Defence Strategic Update stressed the importance of access through the Indo-Pacific for security and trade.

Despite the commitment of Australia and other countries to upholding international law and freedom of navigation, China is steadily making gains in the South China Sea, using its coast guard and ostensibly civilian fishing boats to engage in grey zone tactics.

These tactics put the United States and Australia in a difficult position. If they deploy their warships, China can accuse them of escalating the situation. So, to fight and win in the grey zone, they must also use grey zone tactics and send out civilian vessels—fishing boats and the coast guard ships.

The US Coast Guard has been considering this strategy since 2017 and recently moved the homeport of its cutter Harriet Lane to Pearl Harbour to help South Pacific partners police their exclusive economic zones. Indeed, Australian Border Force officers travelled on Harriet Lane in March as part of Operation Blue Pacific Patrol.

This kind of constabulary cooperation could provide a model for proportionate response to China’s tactics. The deployment of Harriet Lane was not directly aimed at China, but it provided scope for the US to respond to China’s coast guard with corresponding force. China has already protested against the US Coast Guard’s law enforcement activities in the South Pacific.

If Australia wants to counter Chinese aggression without escalation, it must develop its own constabulary maritime force. A forward-deployed coast guard could go head-to-head with China in the South China Sea, working in collaboration with the US (and possibly Malaysian, Indonesian, Vietnamese or Philippine police as sea riders). A dedicated constabulary force would permit a proportionate response, while preventing high tensions from inadvertently escalating into war.

An Australian coast guard would play a balanced role in countering China in the South China Sea. Joint patrols make for good press releases but don’t deter Chinese aggression, while direct naval approaches risk escalating tensions. A constabulary force would lessen this risk and permit a proportionate response. A dedicated, militarised coast guard would allow Australia to set up the right configuration of forces to make an effective stand. It wouldn’t be a quick fix, but it’s what Australia needs to win in the grey zone.