Tag Archive for: Australian Border Force

Challenges and opportunities for Indonesian–Australian maritime cooperation

Indonesia and Australia share one of the longest maritime boundaries in the world. They also share a unique bond as neighbours at the maritime crossroads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The relationship between the people of Indonesia and Australia started many centuries ago when Makassan seafearers and other Indonesian islanders began trading with the Aboriginal people of northern Australia. Our relationship strengthened when Australia supported the Indonesian struggle for independence in 1940s and was reinforced by the 2006 Lombok Treaty for addressing traditional and non-traditional security challenges.

Recent agreements will further enhance maritime cooperation. During Indonesian president Joko Widodo’s visit to Australia in February 2017, the leaders of both countries committed to boost maritime cooperation. The Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation was signed in the same month by the Indonesian and Australian foreign ministers. An implementation plan, the Maritime Cooperation Plan of Action, was signed in March this year. The plan of action sets an ambitious agenda to strengthen and expand maritime engagement between two countries.

The visit of Scott Morrison to Indonesia in August, just a few days after he became prime minister, resulted in the Joint Declaration on a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Australia and Indonesia. The joint declaration rests on five pillars.

Importantly, the fourth pillar is maritime cooperation, under which both countries will seek to realise our shared vision of a peaceful, secure and stable maritime domain where people, commerce and the environment can flourish. Both countries will promote maritime trade and the sustainable development of the blue economy by:

  • combating transnational crime at sea and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing
  • collaborating on marine science and technology
  • promoting our maritime cultural heritage.

The question is how to implement pillar four. Responsibilities must be made clear. However, each country’s system of government is different, and the names, structures and functions of their government agencies are different. So it could be quite difficult to identify the appropriate partners in both governments to address a particular issue.

Implementation of maritime trade and the sustainable development of the blue economy touches on numerous agencies on the Indonesian side alone, including the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Natural Resources, the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources.

All of these agencies will need to work with each other and with the appropriate Australian agencies to address questions such as what kind of maritime trade and blue economy we would like to develop and how we will do it.

A key area for enhanced trade and cooperation is the maritime defence industry. Under the government’s 2016 defence industry policy statement and 2017 naval shipbuilding plan, Australia is developing its maritime defence industries. And under the 2018 defence export strategy, Australia is seeking to export maritime defence equipment and services abroad. While Indonesia already has a shipbuilding industry, it still needs modern equipment and material for building and maintaining ships, which could be met by more advanced technologies from Australian industries.

In Indonesia every two years the Ministry of Defence organises the Indonesian Defense Exposition, and in Australia every two years there’s the Sea Power Conference, including the Naval Exposition. Those events could be used as opportunities for Indonesian and Australian defence industries to develop business relationships.

The task of combating transnational crime at sea and IUU fishing will also involve many government agencies. There are multiple maritime law enforcement organisations on the Indonesian side, such as the navy, the sea and coast guard, the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla), the maritime police, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and the National Narcotics Agency. To tackle IUU fishing, the Indonesian government has already set up Task Force 115, led by the Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries and supported by the navy, Bakamla, the maritime police, the attorney-general and other government organisations. However, the picture is complicated by the fact that some agencies don’t have the legal authority to combat certain types of transnational crimes at sea.

On the Australian side, there are also a number of relevant organisations, such as the navy, army and air force, the Australian Border Force, the Maritime Border Command, and the Australian Fisheries Management Authority.

So how can the maritime law enforcement organisations from both countries find their right counterparts and work together? And at what level should they cooperate?

Until now, most cooperation has been service-to-service engagement between counterpart agencies. The Indonesian and Australian navies have worked together for many years conducting cooperative activities, such as officer exchanges, training and education, exercises, and coordinated patrols. Bakamla works closely with the Australian Border Force and Marine Border Command, including engaging in regular meetings and exchange visits. The Indonesian Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries works with AFMA, and information-sharing to reduce IUU fishing along the maritime border is going well.

But, unfortunately, there’s no joint services approach to combat transnational crime at sea yet. In the future, we need to establish joint engagement between our maritime law enforcement agencies to achieve better outcomes.

Similarly, in the fields of marine science and technology and maritime cultural heritage, there are a large number of relevant agencies on both sides, but so far the two countries lack an approach that coordinates cooperation between them.

The comprehensive strategic partnership will open a new chapter in the relationship between Indonesia and Australia. It provides the two countries with a robust policy framework to both deepen existing relationships and support new initiatives for maritime cooperation. But, as always, the challenges will be in implementation. The links must be established between the right counterparts and be coordinated in a joint way.  To ensure the partnership’s potential is realised, the relevant ministers will need to meet on a regular basis, to consult and resolve challenges, and report annually on progress.

National security wrap

Image courtesy of Flickr user Neil Forbes.

The Beat

It’s all about that face

Georgetown University’s Center on Privacy & Technology recently released an investigatory report (PDF) on the growing use of facial recognition systems in law enforcement. Among the key findings is the revelation that approximately half of all American adults have searchable images on law enforcement systems. Alarmingly, African-Americans are disproportionately overrepresented in that group. The report documents a myriad of factors, such as fragmented regulatory oversight and poor database management, have led to police searching with few restrictions and an emerging racial bias. US media outlets have raised concerns over this ‘high-tech form of racial profiling’ and other potential civil rights abuses, particularly against innocent individuals whose details have been hoovered up into databases. The authors of the report call on state legislatures and Congress to implement stricter regulation on data retention, searching practices, and profiling parameters such as race, ethnicity or religion.

Italian Mafia makes Daesh an offer they can’t refuse

Italian newspaper La Stampa reports that the Calabrian centred ‘Ndrangheta crime syndicate is running guns for Daesh. The Calabrian mobsters are offering Kalashnikov assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers to Libyan-based Daesh buyers in exchange for ancient archaeological artefacts, which are then sold to Asian and Russian collectors. The commercial arrangement comes despite Daesh’s reported fear of the Italian mob.

CT Scan

Battle for Mosul

The battle to liberate Iraq’s second-largest city from Daesh rule got underway Monday morning. Zana Gulmohamad at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center has an excellent overview (see Part 2 in the PDF) of the ongoing operation. Key players that were interviewed by Gulmohamad explained plans to keep Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces and Kurdish Peshmerga out of the city itself, though many expressed doubts about their ability to do so. Analysts note the many challenges following the expected re-capture of the city, including managing the competing interests of parties involved, governing Mosul’s ethnically and religiously diverse population, and providing aid for displaced residents in what’s expected to be a catastrophic humanitarian emergency for the Iraqi government.

Déjà vu?

In a recent piece for The Telegraph, RUSI’s Raffaello Pantucci warns against underestimating the resilience of groups like Daesh as has been done in the past. He highlights the constantly evolving nature of the group and the risk posed by an influx of returnee fighters. For two interesting takes on previous operations in Mosul, see Michael Knights’ assessment (PDF) of Iraqi forces in Mosul from 2008–2014 and this piece over at War on the Rocks, which looks at how al-Qaeda in Iraq survived underground in Mosul from 2005–2010.

Tailored CVE

A new report from Brookings provides a series of policy recommendations on countering violent extremism for the next President. The report argues for changing the government’s ‘community-oriented approach’, which securitises America’s Muslim communities, and instead focusing on tailored interventions at the individual level.

Checkpoint

Daesh capitulates

On Monday, Turkey’s military announced that security along the Syrian border has largely been restored. Free Syrian Army (FSA) forces, supported by Turkish armour and air power, have captured nine areas, including former Daesh stronghold Dabiq. The Dabiq offensive concludes the third phase of Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield, and removes the threat of cross-border rocket attacks into Turkey. President Erdogan’s spokesperson described Dabiq’s capture a ‘strategic and symbolic victory’ over Daesh. Following these successes, the Turkish-backed FSA forces have commenced the fourth phase of Euphrates Shield and are moving to seize Al-Bab.

The ABF strikes back

Australian Border Force (ABF) officials have disclosed that international crime gangs deliberately targeted Australian airports and seaports during last month’s rolling strikes by Immigration and Border Force staff. ABF assistant commissioner Clive Murray revealed that contraband flowed more freely into the country and said ‘good evidence’ indicated a concerted effort by organised criminals to exploit the temporarily diminished inspection capacity. Officials from the Community and Public Sector Union, which represented the striking workers, disputed the ABF’s assessment labelling the evidence ‘weak’ and arguing that Australia’s borders weren’t compromised.

Passepartout?

Check out ASIO’s Annual Report to Parliament, which details passport cancellations, what ASPI’s Jacinta Carroll describes as one of the ‘few tangible and public measures’ of Australian counter-terrorist efforts.

First Responder

More on climate

At a UN meeting in Rwanda last week, world leaders moved to adopt revisions to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, agreeing to reduce the use of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) by up to 80–85% by 2047. HFCs were developed as an alternative for chloroflurocarbons, the substances targeted in the initial protocol, and are used primarily in refrigerators and air conditioners. The new agreement will most likely require ratification by the US Senate. Some analysts are concerned it’s unlikely to pass a Republican majority that has pushed back on climate issues in the past.

Superbug solutions

After a stern message from UN leaders at last month’s UN General Assembly, who warned that ‘antimicrobial resistance poses a fundamental threat to human health, development, and security’, researchers at Sydney University have scored a win in the fight to combat the so-called ‘superbugs’. The team discovered antimicrobial peptides in the milk of Tasmanian devils and successfully tested the peptide’s ability to kill drug-resistant bacteria.

It’s time to change: a new national ice strategy

Math not meth

Tomorrow, ASPI’s Border Security Program will launch its new Special Report on crystal methamphetamine (‘ice’): Methamphetamine: focusing Australia’s national ice strategy on the problem, not the symptoms.

Australia’s seemingly unquenchable thirst for ice has created major social, health and law enforcement challenges for all levels of government and the bureaucracy.

The problem, although complex, can be summarised simply. A large proportion of Australians (by global standards) use ice—and they do so frequently. Despite law enforcement agencies’ record seizures, the price of ice for Australian users is statistically stable, and the drug’s availability is spreading from capital cities to bush towns. From street dealers to global organised crime syndicates, there are big profits to be made in Australia’s ice market. Australia’s families and communities are feeling the impacts of this problem daily.

There’s no evidence or indication that current strategies are decreasing the demand, supply or harm from the drug. The traditional programmatic approach to counter illicit drugs—with its multipronged health, education and law enforcement strategies—has failed to prevent the problem or address it in a meaningful way.

As is often the case in Australian policy circles, extraordinary challenges result in extraordinary policy measures—in this case, the establishment of the National Ice Task Force.

To be fair, Australia’s National Drug Strategy has a range of innovative and highly successful components. But, as in any large system, if the strategic software for integrating the various subprograms has too many bugs, there’ll be a lot of error messages. While neither arrests nor rehabilitation on their own will fix the ice challenge, that fact doesn’t necessarily support the adoption of extraordinary powers or policies.

To address this problem, the National Ice Task Force must do more than recommend new policy initiatives to target supply, demand and harm reduction.

There are no simple solutions for Australian policymakers trying to address the ‘ice epidemic’. In our report, we outline and discuss an alternative strategic framework to respond to the Australian ice challenge. Contrasting with more traditional responses to drug problems, we argue that Australia needs a paradigm shift in its design and delivery of an ice strategy.

We argue strongly that Australia’s drug policymakers ought to take a principled approach to the development of an ice strategy. This approach needs to be strategically focused on reducing harm to Australian communities, not on seizing drugs or making arrests. With this focus, strategists and policymakers will be able to develop surgical interventions to disrupt the factors that contribute to harm, and not merely the symptoms of the problem.

In our proposed strategy, law enforcement isn’t focused on arrests, prosecutions, custodial offences or seizures, as none of those will have a guaranteed impact on the problem. The focus is on means to reduce the availability of drugs, the disruption of user behaviour and the integration of education and health initiatives.

We don’t advocate the decriminalisation of ice or ice use. Instead, we urge the government to underpin its National Ice Strategy with three key principles: integration, innovation and disruption.

Developing an integrated National Ice Strategy will involve substantially more than a series of good ideas linked under the banner of a single title. Reducing drug harm at the national level requires an array of activities. The policy challenge involves more than the management of a complex system of measures. Rather, genuine strategic harm reduction will require networks of systems that have operational and managerial independence. The education, health and law enforcement systems involved haven’t been developed as a single system. In this ‘system of systems’ environment, the National Ice Strategy will need to link and integrate the various systems so that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

Current law enforcement decision-making, from strategic to tactical levels, is focused on achieving higher seizure rates as opposed to harm reduction. Although those mightn’t always be mutually exclusive goals, higher seizure rates won’t always result in the most efficient harm or supply reduction. From a performance measurement perspective, the performance outcomes of more innovative enforcement actions, such as offshore disruption are often less tangible than direct seizures. While drug seizure rates remain an important performance measure for law and border enforcement agencies, pressure from governments to increase those rates should be reduced. Policymakers should review the impact that the use of drug seizure rates as a police performance measure has on innovation.

Our current strategies’ lack of success highlights the possibility that traditional programmatic or functional approaches to the problem might not be efficient or effective. In part, this could be because the adversarial model doesn’t recognise that the focus of the activity at the strategic level is not on defeating a drug or those who sell or use it. Arguably, the strategic intent of programs such as Australia’s National Ice Action Plan is concerned with reducing the harm to the community that ice creates.