Last month, Prime Minister Turnbull revealed that Australia is undertaking offensive cyber operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. That followed on from the first acknowledgement that Australia possesses offensive cyber capabilities at the launch of the Cyber Security Strategy in April this year. Both announcements are part of a broader discussion taking place about how Australia should leverage cyberspace to support and enhance its national security and power.

Armed forces around the world are taking advantage of the benefits of cyberspace (as well as defending against the downside risks), and that has implications for the Australian Army. In a context of global competition, Australia can’t be complacent compared with its international peers, particularly those in our nearer region. Military advantages accrue from relative advantages, and Australia must remain cognisant of the collective shift towards sophisticated, connected militaries.

There are notable similarities between the characteristics of earlier electronic and information warfare capabilities and concepts and the challenges and opportunities cyberspace presents to armies. As with previous technologies, cyberspace is used to provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance for greater situational awareness and better communication networks for an increasingly accurate shared operating picture. On the offensive, it potentially provides the means to deceive an adversary through misinformation by disrupting their operations. Cyberspace also facilitates information operations more broadly through public messaging activities.

Because of the similarities with previous technological shifts, the big-picture opportunities and challenges of cyberspace for armies could be seen as simply a modern iteration of old dilemmas. But it’d be a mistake to conflate strategic similarities with the assumption that nothing needs to change. Each technology era requires different skills, and the Australian Army must develop new tactics to engage new challenges in pursuit of strategic goals in cyberspace. This idea echoes the Clausewitzian principle: while the nature of war remains the same, its character changes and is determined by ‘the spirit of the age’.

ASPI hosted a roundtable discussion earlier this year to identify the strategic, technological and force structure adjustments that must be made so that the Australian Army can successfully embrace the digital domain. The closed-door discussion between representatives from the Army, the Department of Defence and academia revealed several key issues.

First, at a high level, it’s important for the Army to develop a coherent overarching doctrine for how it’ll approach cyber capabilities. But that long-term process has to be balanced with the ability to quickly implement change and the associated merits of a grassroots “learn by doing” approach.

Similarly, the Army needs to establish clarity around what it wants to achieve through cyberspace. That requires thinking about information assurance, decision-making superiority and information operations value-add that can be delivered through strong cyber capabilities. And the Army’s far from being the only player in this space. Anything the Army does has to be deconflicted with the other services and with broader national and allied efforts through such players as the Australian Signals Directorate.

We won’t get the right strategic effects without the right technology and people for the job. Army’s procurement process is traditionally slow and rigid. Reforming it into a more flexible, iterative process with quicker tech uptake and modular updates will ensure that Army gets innovative technology sooner and isn’t constantly relying on legacy systems. Using commercial hardware and systems architectures could help reduce the impact of slow development and procurement processes.

Then it’s a matter of having the right people to use the gear effectively. The Army currently faces a severe shortage of skilled personnel in a range of technical and professional categories. Attracting and retaining personnel with the necessary skills is essential for ensuring the Army’s ability to achieve its cyber goals. Broadening recruitment profiles, engaging reservists, cooperating with the private sector and academia, and improving the longevity of cyber careers in the Army are vital ingredients in developing a cyber-smart Army.

These key issues are further unpacked in ICPC’s new report, Digital land power: the Australian Army’s cyber future. The report sets out the questions that the Army must consider, and the areas that it may need reform, so that it may reach its cyber potential.

That’s no small challenge for the Army. Fortunately, the current environment is a positive one in which to be implementing daunting cyber reforms, and the money is likely to be there. There’s a convergence of funding from the 2016 Defence White Paper, the Prime Minister’s National Innovation and Science Agenda and the Cyber Security Strategy. The government, private sector and academia are demonstrating increasing interest in cybersecurity, in both their rhetoric and their investments. The Army should take advantage of this opportunity, consider the insights offered in the ICPC’s roundtable report and embrace the reforms necessary to enhance Australia’s digital land power.

Janette Lindesay, Professor of Climatology at the ANU, and the CSIRO’s Mark Howden have pointed out that 2015 was the hottest year on record since modern record-keeping began in 1880.

Lindesey and Howden note that: ‘Every month since February 1985 has been warmer than average, and 2015 is the 39th consecutive year with above-average annual temperatures in an uninterrupted run that began in the mid-1970s. 10 months in 2015 beat previous records for those months’. April 2016 was the warmest April month on record globally and in Australia. It was the 12th consecutive warmest April on record.

These developments were highlighted by Lieutenant General Angus Campbell in his opening address to the 2016 Chief of Army’s Exercise in Adelaide on 6 September.

General Campbell’s speech had a very strong focus on climate change. He pointed out that the top 10 most-at-risk countries with exposure to sea level rise by 2100 are all in the Indo–Pacific. Over 138 million people are at risk. Over 500,000 people live in the small Pacific and Indian Ocean island states that may become uninhabitable between 2050 and 2100.

An unstable planet, he argued, was one of the three issues he believed central to the security challenges we’ll encounter in redefining boundaries for the 21st century land force. (The other two were what he called ’empowered individuals’ and ‘assertive states’, although he said there was some degree of interplay between the three drivers.)

Let me pick up on General Campbell’s specific comments on climate change made at this month’s Chief of Army Exercise, as they constitute the most significant intervention to date from a serving Australian Defence leader. (And for this, he should be congratulated.)

The General said that climate change associated with global warming is causing our planet to become unstable.

He noted that we ‘don’t actually know for certain where the problem of climate change will take us’. That’ll depend on how correct some of the assumptions in our models are, and the effectiveness of mitigation and adaption strategies. But General Campbell pointed out that for military organisations ‘that excel in long-term planning and harnessing great resources and which will be expected to assist in some way, those questions are immediately relevant’.

General Campbell said that Will Steffen of the ANU and the Climate Council was correct in labelling climate change as ‘the ultimate threat multiplier’.

The Chief of Army said that armed forces have their role to play in response to climate change, not just in adopting ‘best practice’ on environmental management and energy needs, but increasing the use of Defence assets in support of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. (I’d note here that the two Canberra-class Amphibious Assault Ships are absolute ‘game changers’ and may  be used in the case of catastrophic disasters at home.)

He summed it up by saying that the scale of climate change problems, their unpredictability, and the level of support required from land forces are ‘key issues for us to better understand’.

This is all good stuff and picks up the fact that the latest Defence White Paper, unlike the White Papers in 2009 and 2013, does acknowledge climate change as a factor in defence planning.

But as I’ve argued before on The Strategist, our major ally is going a lot further.

The US military is transforming itself into a climate resilient force: the US Navy and US Army Corp of Engineers have mainstreamed climate change across their organisations, policies and plans.

The US really ‘gets’ General Campbell’s point that a changing climate poses significant threats.

These risks alter the roles and missions that our military undertake as a result of the physical alteration of the operating environment, as well as changes to the nature, frequency and distribution of conflict.

Sea level rise, increasing temperatures, extreme heat waves and longer and more intense droughts, also portend changes to the way Defence manages and operates its vast estate.

But Defence infrastructure has been largely designed and built on the assumption of a stable climate with known variability. Rising sea levels will pose medium to long-term risk to the Defence estate: disrupting and damaging essential services including buildings, roads, runways, marine infrastructure, electricity supply, communications, water and sewerage and other essential utilities.

There’s also likely to be greater vulnerability of military ranges. The State Mine Fire near Lithgow three years ago was caused by a routine army training activity that, scheduled months in advance and outside the normal fire season, was assumed by the officer-in-charge to be low-risk. But fire seasons are lengthening and conditions are dryer and more volatile.

Climate change calls for a revision of how everyday military training activities are planned and how risks are assessed.

Picking up General Campbell’s important message on climate change as a key security driver, Defence should now appoint a senior military leader to act as a single strategic voice for climate change national security issues, including preparedness and capability.

There’ll always be Donald Rumsfeld’s ‘unknown unknowns’. But those institutions able to identify and adapt to the known risks—the ‘known unknowns’—like a changing climate, will be best positioned to meet the threats.

Counterinsurgency is one of the principal modes of conflict of our time. The component of counterinsurgency operations which remains neglected is the capacity building of allied forces—a subject that is rightfully the subject of a great deal of analysis. The ADF has been involved almost constantly with that task for decades, beginning most coherently with the Australian Army Advisory Team in Vietnam and more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. Capacity building is a concept derived from international development theory and practice which throws some light on the complex process of creating a national army and the role of external expertise in that process.

The strengthening of local allies is emerging as a critical factor in the durability of counterinsurgency outcomes. If partner forces can’t assume prime responsibility for national security after allied withdrawal (though perhaps with ongoing specialist inputs by air power or special forces units), years of military effort with enormous financial and human cost can be put at risk. In that sense capacity building underpins the exit strategy for external forces. In Iraq and Afghanistan, more than a decade has been devoted to both counterinsurgency operations and capacity building of the national army. Yet the effectiveness of the local forces is still subject to serious doubt and the conflict drags on.

The first step in any capacity building program is to assess honestly and in some detail the current status of the partner organisation, encompassing such factors as current strengths and weaknesses, capacity building objectives and strategies, resources required and allocation of responsibilities and priorities. Time invested here will pay off, because the subsequent program will only be successful if it addresses the weaknesses of the partner organisation. The analysis must be hard-headed and frank. We’ll never solve problems we cannot or will not see.

A recurrent temptation in capacity building is to assume that the military force we’re creating is a mirror image of our own. In countries like Iraq and Afghanistan that’s unrealistic since the cultural milieu is different and the resources available to the host government more limited. It’s important to understand in what ways the model we’re pursuing differs from western norms, formulate a strategy to achieve it and devise relevant indicators of progress.

Capacity building is about more than just training. Many practitioners come from a training background and confuse the essential component of skills development with a more holistic process. Effective armies are built on a series of interdependent functioning units (not just combat forces but also logistics, communications, intelligence and administration) which support each other and allies. They’re also dependent, above all, on specific states of mind among all staff and associates. Unlike most other institutions, an army may be called upon to place lives at risk to achieve its objectives. Soldiers therefore need to display not only professional skill but also courage, discipline and the elusive quality of sound judgment.

Capacity building must have a clearly defined end point. The process involves a phased reduction in the scale and volume of external inputs so that the partner organisation gradually assumes full responsibility for its operations. The objective is to reach critical mass at which point the organisation itself can take over capacity development for its own future. Yet a key factor in effectiveness is time. We’re talking about a protracted process. Effective institutions cannot be created overnight, no matter how much money is spent. Capacity building is highly labour intensive—requiring continuity of presence to build up trust and confidence on both sides—and demands patience, flexibility and cultural understanding. That’s often incompatible with military conventions of postings and tours of duty which engender lack of continuity. Yet external allies are often keen to expedite withdrawal in order to minimise casualties unpopular at home and avoid appearing to be a permanent occupying force. Time frames are often therefore imposed politically by people who understand little of what’s involved in building a modern army.

Insurgencies can rarely be suppressed by military means alone. Political initiatives can play a key role in reducing tensions and facilitating conflict resolution. For instance, the Malayan Emergency of 1948–1960 was in part an ideological conflict but more importantly an expression of anti-colonialism. When the British Government announced that it was entering into discussions on independence and then set a date for its achievement, the rationale for the insurgency was seriously undermined. In South Vietnam the unwillingness or inability of the US Government to leverage political reform in a corrupt state was reflected in the increasing reluctance of Vietnamese soldiers to risk their lives defending it.

What all capacity building teams dread is the situation of a perfect storm of factors in which an ongoing conflict (imposing severe time pressures on capacity teams), well organised and highly motivated opponents, a corrupt state and a dispirited and cynical population make it almost impossible to conjure up an effective modern army, no matter how great the need might be.  

The importance of capacity building of allied forces seems unlikely to reduce in the foreseeable future. It’s now a core function of the Australian Army. Western armies could usefully identify capacity building as a specialist military profession with distinct skill needs, and invest in it accordingly.

The new Defence White Paper outlines spending of up to $80 billion on land combat and amphibious warfare out to 2025–26. In terms of equipment modernisation, the plans have focused on greater protected mobility, situational awareness, aviation, firepower, and force sustainability. Those improvements are intended to enhance and broaden the armed forces combat and non-combat capacity.

These are the key proposals that the Army will procure and advance over the next decade:

• An agile procurement system for infantry soldiers that will allow for the continuous upgrade of key infantry weapons systems, personal equipment, and force protection
• New combat reconnaissance, infantry fighting, and protected mobility vehicles
• Upgrades to extend the operational lifespan of the M1 Abrams to 2035
• New armed intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance unmanned aircraft
• The acquisition of a long-range rocket system by mid-2020 that will provide long-range fire support up to 300km to supplement the ADF’s current artillery capability
• Logistic enablers to aid the amphibious operations involving the newly acquired Canberra Class ships
• The re-establishment of Riverine Patrol capabilities, with a fleet of lightly armed boats for river and estuarine operations marked for delivery near 2022
• Special operations forces will receive a boost in wide range of capabilities which include high-end close combat capabilities, force protection, enhanced command and situational awareness networks, the acquisition and improvement of specialist transportation systems, and an armada of light reconnaissance and attack helicopters

The enhancement of combat reconnaissance, infantry fighting armoured and protected mobility fleets will address specific outstanding issues in the current capabilities. Emerging threats have rendered the Army’s M-113 armoured personnel carriers obsolete, notwithstanding an expensive upgrade program in the 2000s. Consequently, they’re slated for replacement along with the 8×8 Australian Light Armoured Vehicle armed reconnaissance vehicle, which will be replaced by new Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles around 2019.

The replacement of Army’s ‘B’ vehicle fleet is proceeding with the replace of a proportion of the existing Land Rover fleet with the locally built Hawkei protected mobility vehicle. The Hawkei will augment the successful Bushmaster fleet, which entered service over the past decade and proved its worth in Afghanistan. However, the 700 strong Bushmaster fleet is set to be replaced around 2025 upon attaining its life of type. The Armoured Personnel Carrier fleet has also been ticketed for replacement around 2024 by new Infantry Fighting Vehicles which will have superior protection, firepower and networking capabilities.

On the aviation front, the Army continues with its modernisation program. After long and troubled gestations the Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopter and the MRH-90 battlefield lift helicopters are at operational capability. However continuing their troubled history, the latter is set for role-specific upgrades in support of domestic counterterrorism and the former are to be replaced by the mid-2020s by either manned, unmanned or a combination of both armed reconnaissance systems. In addition to the in-service Shadow 200 unmanned aircraft, the introduction of advanced armed, medium-altitude unmanned aircraft has been slated for the early 2020s.

Albert Palazzo’s paper Forging Australian Land Power: A Primer and his response to John Blaxland’s critique are of real value in our current hypoxic policy world. Perhaps unintentionally, their contributions highlight three re-occurring themes in defence policy in Australia: the paucity of political leadership in defence matters, inadequate reform and Army’s force structure challenges.

Palazzo and Blaxland highlight a common aspect of defence policy development since Federation: the lack of consistent and clear-sighted political leadership. Ironically I disagree with Palazzo’s view that the 1987 Defence White Paper (Defence of Australia, or DOA) was one such example. Instead it was an attempt to remedy the lack of leadership—although the conclusions drawn regarding Army’s force structure were ultimately proven to be incorrect. But at least it was a good try.

Palazzo’s use of the Maginot Line to illustrate a point against the DOA decisions I believe misses the broader point about the dangers created by a deficit in national leadership. In a recent historical work, James Holland argues that based on purely force structure comparisons, the French were in a strong position to withstand the initial German offensive in the early days of the Second World War. The key difference, Holland states, was that the French lacked the political leadership and the decision-making processes to decisively respond to German actions on the ground. The enduring lesson is that without engaged and informed political leadership in defence matters, national security is at risk.

In recent years, operational commitments have rightly seized the attention of ministers, as has defence acquisition. On the other hand, reform which seeks to achieve real and enduring efficiencies to benefit both capability and the budget has been left to others. While it’s certainly less glamorous and often much harder to achieve in political terms, it’s still central to a Minister’s responsibilities. The much-heralded First Principles Review in 2015 and before that 2009’s Strategic Reform Program have achieved far less in hard efficiency terms than anticipated. There’s no evidence that real reform leading to sustained efficiencies has been achieved. Minister Payne, as with her predecessors, has been silent on the matter. As I’ve argued before, reform requires ministerial leadership and should be high on every minister’s to-do list. With ever increasing demands on the nation’s balance sheet defence ministers need to drive the reform agenda if they are to ensure the ADF’s capabilities continue to match the nation’s expectations.

As I’ve argued here and here, the debate around Army’s role and force structure is frustratingly limited. Palazzo’s primer, while valuable, misses the opportunity to make the options clear. The term ‘land power’ needs to be better defined by the Army; it’s used often and while the profession may understand what it means the broader community struggles. As a result it’s in danger of further confusing the debate around Army force structure and its role. Blaxland rightly points to the need to say something ‘…about fighting a near/peer competitor in an existential conflict or at least a full on war, versus fighting against a third world force—be it in the Middle East or in Australia’s neighbourhood’.

This all matters because the potential force structure options can be quite different. Closer to home is perceived as ‘lower risk’ and as a consequence later phases of LAND 400 can be shifted further right and the number and type of vehicles can be open to semantic debate. Army’s size and harder edge can also be ‘worked’ to create the fiscal headroom for other capabilities and expenditure priorities. I suspect the upcoming White Paper will do just that.

I will leave the last word to the current Chief of the Army, who recently observed:

‘…I am delighted that the media [is] vociferous in their discussion about which is the best fighter for Australia…. I see an excellent discussion arguing the merits and challenges of our submarine program, focussed on identifying the best submarine for Australia’s strategic circumstances… [But] I don’t see an argument about which land system is best for Australia….the tone of media commentary seems to focus on what is good enough… [which] sells the lives of our soldiers so cheaply.’