This week is Australia’s inaugural National Biosecurity Week (NBW). The event serves as a vital reminder of the importance of safeguarding our nation’s unique ecosystems and agricultural industries from harmful pests and diseases, underscoring our collective responsibility to preserve Australia’s natural heritage for future generations. Biosecurity is a fundamental enabler for Australia’s food security, a critical but often overlooked element of our national security, and it is time for it to be treated accordingly.

Australia’s biosecurity system is one of the most formidable yet largely unseen and unappreciated elements of our national defence, one that even has the power to compel great powers into compliance when conducting exercises in Australian territory. Most of us interact consciously with the system only when we re-enter the country and fill out our incoming passenger declarations. This interaction represents the tip of a system that cuts across every level of government and society.

It is this tip that is safeguarded by biosecurity arrangements designed to halt exotic pests and pathogens from breaching Australia’s borders. Producers and governments face costs in a breach, and prices rise. We see this now with recent egg purchase restrictions due to the H7 high pathogenicity avian influenza outbreak, which is likely to cost industries and governments more than $100 million. When the primary driver of domestic food insecurity has been the cost of living, that financial impact ultimately increases food prices that only expand the cohort of food-insecure Australians, leading to suffering and discontent.

Varroa mite, fall armyworm, foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus, Xylella fastidiosa, and citrus canker are only the best known among many pests and pathogens that threaten Australian primary production. Australia suffers about 40 new pest incursions every year, and some intruders, like fall armyworm and varroa mite, are now here to stay. Others, such as FMD and Xylella, have been kept out, but should they breach our borders, their impact would be devastating to livestock and plant production industries and the broader economy. The range of exotic pathogens beyond our borders is significant, and many are unheard of by most Australians. They remain unfamiliar because of a combination of luck and a biosecurity system under increasing pressure; the recent incursions of fall armyworm and varroa mite demonstrate that vulnerability.

It is this system that protects and enhances much of Australia’s national power through the protection of our way of life and hundreds of billions worth of economic benefits to the Australian economy. By underpinning our food security, it underpins fundamental pillars of social order, sustainability and national security. To safeguard it, Australia’s biosecurity arrangements must be fiercely protected and enhanced.

But taking biosecurity for granted surrenders to the strategic naivety that has left the world ill-prepared for crises previously considered preventable. A global pandemic, war in Europe, the spectre of nuclear war, kinetic war between Middle Eastern powers and increasing climate threats are all features of our contemporary reality. These threats demand that we avoid strategic missteps by not ignoring the factors that enable them and avoid the agonising between government and industry over what constitutes sustainable resourcing that is leaving the biosecurity system’s future in the balance. That uncertainty is stifling progress on implementing the 2022 National Biosecurity Strategy, a document released with the endorsement of the Australian government and all states and territories.

A strategic and coordinated approach matters because the system protects our heavily trade-oriented agricultural industry’s contribution to global food security via a production surplus far above domestic demand. However, this surplus is also the source of a misguided assumption that Australian food security is guaranteed.

Food security is defined by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization as: ‘when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.’ Under these terms, the Foodbank Hunger Report 2023 found that 36 percent of Australians faced food insecurity in 2023, underscoring the socioeconomic factors at play. Similarly, the number of food-insecure people worldwide has increased since 2020, driven by conflict, climate shocks, economic downturn, growing inequality and Covid-19. Complacency in addressing food security will only drive strategic challenges that contribute to instability and armed conflict.

In this way, the system is equally affected by the same pressures as Australia’s defence organisation. It bears a similar responsibility to protect Australia’s national interest. It therefore must be valued as such and should become subject to the same conventions: that is, to fund the system as a percentage of GDP that reflects its true value to our economy, our environment, our food security and our way of life.

There will always be many competing priorities, but if we are serious about returning to fundamentals to enhance Australia’s national power, our biosecurity system must be accepted as a pillar of our national security.

Kiribati’s polls have closed, and the results are in. There won’t be a president for several weeks, but, regardless of the outcome, Australia will be hoping for a fresh start.

When parliament is formed, it must put forward at least three presidential nominations for another public election. Incumbent President Taneti Maamau was re-elected to parliament and is likely to seek to keep the presidency.

The Kiribati people voted, first and foremost, on issues affecting their daily lives, including climate threats and economic development needs. However, as Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong has said, we are in a ‘permanent contest’ with China over influence in the Pacific. How governments are navigating that contest is increasingly affecting voters across the region.

The Australia–Kiribati bilateral relationship has been in decline, but the election will provide an opportunity for a reset. For the sake of the ongoing development assistance that Australia is hoping to provide our near region to ensure its stability, Canberra must find a way to move forward with any incoming President through more dialogue and greater transparency on our own activities, starting with an invitation to visit our capital at their earliest convenience. The relationship has been challenged by a series of disagreements that Maamau has aired publicly, asserting himself domestically and internationally. If he does return as president, Australia must do more to show we are listening to these concerns.

In 2020, Maamau’s party lost its majority of seats, but he returned for a second term as president based on a campaign that addressed local issues and steered clear, where possible, of concerns about cutting ties with Taiwan and the growing relationship with China. This year, shying away from geopolitics may be more difficult, as the people of Kiribati now find themselves with the Chinese paramilitary, the People’s Armed Police, on the ground in their small island nation.

The presence in Kiribati of the force (revealed only in February this year) concerns the Australian government, which has struggled to respond. The minister for international development and the Pacific, Pat Conroy, said there should be ‘no role’ for China in policing the Pacific islands and offered instead to send Australian police. But such broad comments could risk alienating Pacific countries by disregarding their sovereign decision-making. Australia should be more open about the real risks that come with Chinese police in the region, including their use in suppressing Chinese dissidents, collecting biodata and conducting mass surveillance.

Overenthusiastic and unsubstantiated posturing could jeopardise Australia’s relations in the region; Kiribati has recently shown reluctance to allow other forms of assistance from Australia. For example, it blocked support from the Pacific Media Assistance Scheme.

Maamau’s government signed a memorandum of understanding with Australia in February 2023 ‘nurturing cooperation’ across a broad range of sectors, including economic reform and maritime security. However, any talk of a stronger agreement or treaty has been put on ice. More recently, Maamau was quick to downplay any discussion of Kiribati signing a treaty similar to the Falepili Union between Australia and Tuvalu. A new government could see a shift in Kiribati’s approach to those larger agreements, but transparency and time for proper consultation across groups will remain the key.

Fortunately, Australia has been able to continue with the delivery of a new barracks, headquarters and radio system regardless of the tension. Even if the relationship has soured, Canberra understands that it’s important to continue to support lasting and meaningful development for the country.

Another point of tension is the breakdown of independence in Kiribati’s judicial system after Australian David Lambourne, a long-serving High Court judge in Kiribati, was removed and later deported. Some believe this move was meant to make the opposition’s life more difficult before the election.

Incumbent opposition leader Tessie Lambourne is the partner of David Lambourne. More importantly for the people of Kiribati, she is a former dedicated and decorated civil servant who has filled the role of secretary in many government departments and was Kiribati’s final ambassador to Taiwan before the switch to recognising the People’s Republic of China in 2019.

David Lambourne was removed in ‘proceedings that violated international standards’, according to a United Nations Human Rights special rapporteur, who also voiced concerns over Kiribati’s judicial independence. The change is part of a larger trend of declining public transparency.

Kiribati, like all Pacific island countries, is seeking to solidify its identity, values and place in the region and the world, and each country must navigate those waters in the way that makes most sense to it. Kiribati’s temporary withdrawal from the Pacific Islands Forum in 2022 forced the organisation to ensure that the country’s voice was heard. Similarly, Maamau’s public criticism of AUKUS boils down to resentment that Australia did not consult Kiribati. The criticism reminds partners that Kiribati wants to be seen as an equal and will do things its own way.

A good partner understands those concerns, and Australia has made positive steps to demonstrate that. Canberra will be hoping that it can use the presidential election as a chance to start afresh, even if it is with a returning Maamau. But Australia must also continue strong public consultations about initiatives and support and keep encouraging transparency from all governments and partners in the region, ensuring that the contest for influence doesn’t get in the way of helping our Pacific family.

At face value, the impending resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida next month might worry Australian policy pundits who favour continuity. But a new leader, set to be elected on 27 September, may be empowered to launch bolder reforms on national security policy in ways that Kishida presently is not. That would ultimately benefit Japan’s regional security partners, including Australia.

Kishida’s 14 August announcement that he would not seek re-election as president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the position that makes him prime minister, is not surprising. His party has suffered political funding scandals, and Japan’s economic performance is only middling. These factors saw support rates for both Kishida and the LDP plunge to a record low of in June, leading Kishida to judge that he would not have enough party support to remain as leader.

Nonetheless, he will leave office with a relatively successful foreign and defence policy record. Kishida enhanced the US–Japan alliance, revived Japan–South Korea bilateral relations and trilateral activities with the United States, and upgraded the Australia–Japan relationship to a quasi-alliance. On defence, he overhauled Japan’s security posture, championing major funding increases and force structure changes, including the procurement of long-range strike weapons, mobilising support with the adage ‘Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow’.

Australia wants that trajectory to continue, so it needs Kishida’s successor to be bold on policy and, ideally, politically durable. Similar to when former prime minister Yoshihide Suga resigned in 2021, there are concerns that a return to revolving-door leadership could stall Japan’s ambitious defence reform agenda and blunt its regional foreign policy edge.

Notwithstanding that risk, Kishida’s departure could yet prove beneficial for Australia if his successor is empowered to tackle difficult policy challenges.

It’s true that the leadership change comes at a time when Japan has become increasingly central to Australian regional strategy, marked by the elevation of the strategic partnership in the 2022 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. Kishida implemented crucial defence and foreign policy initiatives, improving practical cooperation between the two countries. If these efforts are stalled, it may perpetuate the views of some in Australia’s policy community that Japan is incapable of moving faster or undertaking ambitious policy reform.

On the other hand, Kishida’s ability and willingness to make difficult policy trade-offs has waned significantly with his declining political fortunes in office. Some also argue that Kishida pursued security policy reforms for reasons of domestic political survival, rather than his own beliefs. Indeed, despite overseeing a revolution in Japanese national security, he may be better remembered for implementing the strategic vision and policy agenda of Shinzo Abe rather than his own. If Kishida had stayed on and failed to revive his public and party standing, his policy ambiguity and dwindling influence could have complicated complex decisions such as Japan’s potential engagement with AUKUS.

For Australia, then, what matters is the extent to which Kishida’s successor can make bold national security policy decisions, rather than simply stay the course.

Many potential candidates have substantial national security experience, including former defence minister and LDP secretary general Shigeru Ishiba, and former foreign minister and current LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi. The list also includes cabinet ministers Taro Kono, Yoshimasa Hayashi, Ken Saito, Sanae Takaichi and Yoko Kamikawa, as well as such other influential politicians as Kato Katsunobu, Shinjiro Koizumi, Takayuki Kobayashi and Shigeharu Aoyama.

Some public surveys place Ishiba at the head of the pack. But the sheer volume of potential candidates and complex LDP factional dynamics means the race is hard to pick.

On national security, conservatives like Ishiba, Takaichi and Aoyama are quite forward-leaning, arguing for bold amendments to Article 9 of the constitution and for transforming Japan’s defence-oriented policy. Ishiba, for instance, has questioned the concept of ‘minimum necessary force’ derived from the constitution’s prohibition of maintaining ‘war potential’, asking whether the minimum threshold for deterring North Korea should be the same for China.

Meanwhile, moderate realists such as Motegi, Kono, Kamikawa, Koizumi and Kobayashi would likely inherit Kishida’s foreign policy brand, balancing defence investments and enhancements to the US–Japan alliance against stable relations with China. Kono, for instance, is known both for his unusual bluntness in framing China-related security challenges and his straight talking on tricky alliance issues.

Whoever replaces Kishida, Canberra and Tokyo will keep working closely with each other and with Washington to manage the deteriorating strategic balance in the region. The key variable for Australia will be the capacity of Japan’s new leader to act swiftly and decisively on policy implementation.

As regional tensions escalate threats to civilians across the Middle East, our leaders need to take concrete steps to prevent further civilian harm.

Those steps should include an immediate embargo on arms and arms components destined for Israel, an affirmation of the existence of the Palestinian state, and expanding targeted sanctions to include Israeli leaders who are responsible and who call for continued unrestricted warfare in Gaza.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese affirmed last month, alongside his counterparts from Canada and New Zealand, that ‘the situation in Gaza is catastrophic. The human suffering is unacceptable. It cannot continue.’ Many Australians agree, watching in horror over the past 10 months as attacks in Gaza continue to intensify: so-called ‘safe zones’ are declared and then revoked amid a persistent looming threat of famine, and a record number of aid workers have been killed, including Australian Zomi Frankcom.

Across Australia, people continue to take to streets, harbours and university campuses to demand an end to civilian suffering. As regional tensions escalate, prompting urgent calls for Australians to leave Lebanon, people are asking, ‘How is this still happening? Are we really doing enough to make it stop?’

As protection practitioners, we know that statements condemning civilian harm are necessary, as illustrated in the outpouring of condemnation following the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel last year. Calling out civilian harm and reminding all parties to the war, including Israel, of their legal obligation to spare civilians during hostilities are critical elements of the political pressure that must continue to be exerted. Yet words are not enough. Australia’s efforts to use its leverage to mitigate the escalating violence that is now extending to Lebanon must include timely and concrete actions.

Our allies know that, and we need to follow suit. In the wake of the landmark ICJ advisory opinion that found Israel’s occupation and annexation of the Palestinian territories to be unlawful, many countries have already taken concrete steps to prevent further violations of international law. Beyond upholding our international legal obligations, concrete action is essential to exert the necessary pressure for a lasting ceasefire and to de-escalate tensions that are threatening civilians across the region.

Those steps follow earlier actions taken by a host of countries, including South Africa, which led a coalition of states to bring a case against Israel to the ICJ, and such EU states as Norway, Ireland, Spain and Slovenia, all of which have recognised Palestine as a state. The new British Labour government is reported to be reviewing arms export licences to Israel, following Canada and the Netherlands, which have stopped shipments of weapons.

Australia can and should take stronger action to protect civilians in Gaza, Lebanon and the wider region, putting practical action behind Albanese’s affirmation that ‘The protection of civilians is paramount and a requirement under international humanitarian law. Palestinian civilians cannot be made to pay the price of defeating Hamas. It must end.’ This has only become more urgent following the assassination last month of Ismael Haniyeh, the lead Hamas ceasefire negotiator, and the increasing fear of retaliatory actions that could spark a regional war, dramatically increasing threats to civilians across the region.

As a middle power, Australia has a critical role to play in upholding the rules-based order and the necessary protections for civilians provided in international humanitarian and human-rights law. We need to be clear in amplifying our democratic and human-rights-based values, which include respect for academic freedom and the right to peaceful protest. And, to be taken seriously, we need to act to protect those legal standards and values when situations like Gaza threaten their erosion. Granting continued impunity in the Israel–Gaza crisis increases threats for civilians everywhere.

There are clear steps that Australia must take. That means an immediate embargo on shipments of arms and arms components, including dual-use exports that can be used for civilian and military purposes. Recent Senate estimates revealed continuing exports from Australia to Israel related to military activities. Even since the assault on Gaza escalated in 2023, the Department of Defence has renewed or signed almost $100 million in contracts with Israeli-owned companies such as Elbit Systems.

In the Netherlands, a court recently ordered the Dutch government to block similar kinds of exports to Israel, highlighting the risks of breaching international law if they were to continue. Aligned with its policy that continues to affirm a two-state solution, the Australian government needs to align with EU allies and others in recognising that two states exist, affirming the existence of Palestine alongside Israel. Australia can build on sanctions announced by Foreign Minister Penny Wong last month by extending restrictions to Israeli leaders who continue to support unrestricted warfare in Gaza, as we have in other conflicts involving breaches of international law—for example, against Russia over its invasion of and ongoing attacks on Ukraine.

Through timely, concrete action, Australia can demonstrate its commitment to protecting civilians in Gaza and the wider region and its respect for the international legal obligations arising from the ICJ ruling. Such actions align with our important role as a middle power, reinforcing our legitimacy through a consistent approach with like-minded countries to defending the rules-based order and protection for all civilian populations.

Last week, the Select Committee on Australia’s Disaster Resilience released its long-awaited report, Boots on the ground: raising resilience. It’s an excellent summary of input from across the disaster-response community in Australia and makes many sensible recommendations for advancing disaster resilience. 

It does not, however, solve the core problem that it identifies: how to displace the ADF’s role in anything but last-resort domestic disaster response. Until that problem is solved, the requirement for ADF support during emergencies will continue to increase—leaving it distracted from its core defence mission amid rising geopolitical uncertainty. 

What Australia needs is a future disaster-response capacity commensurate with rapidly accelerating climate impacts—driven by an intergenerational strategy for climate-amplified disaster response. 

To do so, governments must give emerging generations a seat at the table in designing a future disaster-response force that they will lead. This strategy must be complementary to the forthcoming National Adaptation Plan and ongoing energy transition efforts. Rather than mandating sacrifice through inaction and poor preparation, governments should invest in and give young people hope for a safe climate-resilient future that they can build.

On the select committee’s core finding: this is far from the first time that the ADF’s role in domestic disaster response has been flagged as a challenge. The issue was acknowledged in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and the 2024 National Defence Strategy, both of which pointed out the operational trade-offs involved in the concurrency of the ADF’s increasing engagement in domestic disaster response and its core national defence missions. ASPI commented on this with the DSR’s release last year, but little has changed in public decision-making since then, despite rising disaster intensity and frequency driven by climate change. 

This defence and disaster-response concurrency challenge is also not unique to Australia. The Center for Climate and Security in the US has been tracking the rising number of military responses to climate hazards around the globe. NATO’s latest annual Climate change and security impact assessment report demonstrated how its strategic competitors, Russia and China, face the same climate-amplified disaster-response and adaptation challenges as allied militaries. In large part, the effectiveness of future militaries will depend on their ability to decouple themselves from disaster response. 

Rising disaster-response needs also drive Australia’s support to partners in the Indo-Pacific and further abroad. Australia’s proposal to establish the Pacific Response Group (PRG) reflects this: a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief focused initiative between the militaries of Australia, Fiji, France, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga. The PRG may play an increasingly important role in the years to come, including by helping to meet Australia’s disaster-response commitments to Tuvalu under the Falepili Union, if Tuvalu were to request a multinational response. 

International responses also eat into domestic non-ADF disaster-response capacity. There’s a longstanding tradition of countries sharing disaster-response capacity. For example, Australian firefighters have recently deployed to help combat Canada’s western wildfires. Such cooperation contributes not only to Australia’s partners’ disaster resilience, but also secures needed capacity in Australia during times of need. While international dynamics were not factored explicitly into the select committee’s report, they are critical to planning and preparing for future disaster-response capacity. 

Of course, the ADF can reduce its involvement in domestic disasters only if our civilian capacity for disaster management is strengthened significantly. As Raymond Whitehead noted in his testimony to the committee, a civilian force will need to be able to 

… provide heavy logistic and tactical support to local frontline services, including such things as: communications and IT support, medical support through deployable hospitals, heavy logistics support. It would also have access to equipment such as helicopters of different sizes, specialist observation and situational awareness aircraft, a fleet of transport planes, and tactical and strategic water bombers ….

It will also need far greater numbers of emergency-response personnel than are available today. While there’s an excellent body of Australian disaster-response experts—including ADF veterans contributing to Disaster Relief Australia—the ADF is facing a recruitment crisis. Beyond needing to limit requests to the ADF for disaster response, Australia will also have dwindling numbers of ADF-trained disaster-response experts available to train and supplement a future civilian force. This necessitates significantly increasing the scope and breadth of trained disaster responders in the near term. 

The obvious solution is to ask emerging generations, who will bear the brunt of climate-amplified disasters, to fill out those ranks—but how governments do that is crucial. 

Young generations know they face a burden of higher global temperatures and climate impacts: up to 75 percent of Australians aged 16 to 25 years are concerned about climate change, according to a YouGov report last year. That’s understandable: global temperatures may breach the Paris Agreement’s lower ‘safe’ threshold of 1.5°C by the 2030s and reach catastrophic levels of warming by the end of this century without further action by governments. Youths’ commitment to tackle this head on has been clear through their climate activism and protests, demonstrating their desire to effect change rather than be paralysed by climate anxiety. 

The federal government should leverage that concern and energy, but its efforts will be rightly met with cynicism if they’re not matched by far more ambitious emissions-reduction and climate-adaptation action. What basis should youth have for a sense of voluntary disaster-response duty when past governments and generations have failed to take on the costs of emissions reductions? Failing that voluntary sense of duty, given the strength of protests against insufficient climate action, how will they react to being drafted into a pathway of complicated (and arguably ineffective) mandatory national service? 

The path forward should begin with a genuine process to engage Australia’s young and emerging generations about how they want to build their future. Success will also depend on how much the participants develop a genuine sense of ownership and agency. 

Governments at all levels in Australia should seize this as an opportunity: our climate trajectory is dire, but not hopeless, as long as many required changes are made. Emissions must be reduced rapidly as part of an equitable energy transition that grows future economic opportunity. Climate-adaptation funding and resilience building must be scaled significantly to minimise the extent of future risk. The considerable disaster-response expertise and resilience among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities should also be sought and supported, as the committee notes, including by funding Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community response units. 

At the federal level, bold commitment is needed to devise what should become an intergenerational strategy for climate-amplified disaster response. Heavily informed by younger generations, this would be complementary to Australia’s forthcoming National Adaptation Plan, while laying out a roadmap to train, equip and organise young and future generations to meet rising disaster risks at the local and national levels. 

To be clear: enhancing Australia’s disaster-response capacity alone will be insufficient. While the ADF’s involvement in disaster response must be limited, the much greater task here is getting buy-in from emerging generations for future disaster-response capacity. If that can be done right, future generations can be given a meaningful way to build a safer and more resilient future for themselves, while freeing the ADF to focus on its core missions.