Tag Archive for: Australia

People, the capability that matters most

Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Lieutenant General David Hurley, inspects the Australian Defence Force Academy 2010 Graduation Parade

Military organisations have a formalism for describing capability that involves a number of factors but there’s distressing tendency to focus on equipment and systems at the expense of some of the others. This focus is a useful, particularly when thinking about acquisitions. However, as the Australian Army knows, the capability that matters most is the quality of its people, which explains why it spends so much time and money on education and training.

Recently I had the privilege of speaking at the 2nd Commando Regiment’s new Captains course in Holsworthy. The topic was the educational requirements of future operations, and I felt privileged because it was good to be in the presence of young officers who were seeking ways to improve themselves and the institution they love.

As I reflected on what I would say I could not help but return to one of the points I made in my The Future of War Debate in Australia paper. There is no doubt that the Army possesses smart people, including many who hold advanced degrees similar to those that the 2 Cdo captains and I discussed. Yet I could not help myself from thinking that that was not enough. Having educated smart people is just one part of what is needed to make an effective Army. An institution that knows how to manage and get the best out of such people is the real enabling factor for creating a force that prides itself on achieving outcomes rather than outputs. Read more

Reader response: Australia’s underbelly in the Asian Century

Image entitled 'Mafia_guy' by Flickr user sacks08In his recent post Jacob Townsend pointed to organised crime as the dark side of Asia. He notes that the subject didn’t attract much attention in the ‘rivers of gold’ emphasis of the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper.

In a way that’s surprising: the Australia Crime Commission, established in 2003 to combat serious and organised crime, made a (classified) submission to Ken Henry’s White Paper team. The ACC explained (PDF, p.69) the relationship between serious and organised crime and the Asian region, and opportunities for improved law enforcement cooperation internationally. By virtue of making a submission, the ACC has flagged of the potential impact of organised crime on Australia’s relations with Asia.

But while focusing on Asian organised crime, let’s not forget that Australia too has its dark side. Read more

Australia’s Antarctic ambitions

Neko Harbour

Our Antarctic claim is about the size of Australia, minus Queensland. So it’s pleasing to see that the new Asian Century White Paper gave a decent acknowledgement to the cold continent (p. 248):

The development of the close relations we have with our Asian regional partners involved in Antarctica will be increasingly important in protecting the Antarctic region as well as in frontier marine, biological and climate research in the Asian century. Australia’s scientific research and basing capacities in Hobart and in Antarctica have fostered closer cooperation with China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia and other partners on Antarctic research and logistics. This cooperation can be elevated through the Australia’s Antarctic science strategic plan, working within the Antarctic Treaty system.

Asia doesn’t operate as a bloc in Antarctic affairs. But there’s an eight year old Asian Forum for Polar Sciences. It coordinates research among India, Japan, China, Korea, and Malaysia. At some point we might consider requesting observer status at AFoPS.

Malaysia joined the Antarctic Treaty system last year. It had previously actively promoted the idea at the UN that the common heritage of mankind regime should apply, like the international seabed, to Antarctica. But unlike the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, Antarctica’s subject to sovereign claims.

China already has two stations inside Australia’s Antarctic Territory and we’ve recently concluded an MoU with China on Antarctic cooperation: China’s now an important player in climate change science in Antarctica. Read more

The Asian Century: underbelly

Security and prosperity in the Asian Century have a dark underbelly: the region has witnessed a rapid and complex proliferation of organised criminal networks. They have had considerable impact on economic and social development, the quality of institutions and the security of all in the region, Australia included.

The government’s newly launched Asian Century White Paper understandably focuses on major power capabilities and interests. That’s where the ‘flashpoints’ are but organised and transnational crime—mentioned only in passing in the White Paper as a potential area for practical cooperation with international partners—is more corrosive than explosive. For Australia, the problems of crime in the region defy easy separation into direct, indirect, human and traditional security threats. Nevertheless, the physical, political and economic spaces in which criminal networks fester are gaps into which the region’s future may stumble.

Australia might consider three vectors by which organised crime undermines Asian stability and prosperity: through politics, resource allocation and community insecurity.

Politically, there are two main problems entangled with crime. Read more

Afghanistan: the end game and after

A Special Forces soldier observes a valley in Uruzgan as a Blackhawk circles above.The Prime Minister’s statement to the Parliament yesterday on Australia’s Afghanistan strategy continues to demonstrate planning for a relatively quick ADF exit from Uruzgan province. Any international pretence about nation building in Afghanistan has long been abandoned in favour of a pragmatic acceptance that the situation there is about as good as it is going to get.

Australia can claim some part of the credit for four positive outcomes in Afghanistan. First, and as PM Gillard said, ‘today, international terrorism finds no safe haven in Afghanistan’; well yes, for as long as the drones and special forces continue their operations. Second, as long as the US remains engaged, the Taliban won’t be able to take power in Kabul again unless it’s through some politically negotiated and internationally acceptable power-sharing agreement. A third positive is that Afghanistan, and Uruzgan province with it, has its best chance probably since the 1970s to handle its internal security challenges. These aren’t perfect outcomes but Strategist readers will understand that pursuing perfection is the enemy of peace. That’s why Gillard and Obama are wise to resist any call to keep going for just one or two more fighting seasons in order to show that counterinsurgency, or counter terrorism (‘regular’ or ‘lite’) strategies can work. They can’t. Read more

The Asian Century White Paper: one plan to rule them all

The Australia in the Asian Century White Paper is an ambitious document, and it’s one Strategist contributors will analyse from different perspectives over the next few days. Broadly speaking, there are some important and positive aspects to the statement: it is the most comprehensive expression of Australia’s foreign policy objectives in over a decade; it focusses on a region of enormous importance to us; and it allows for a very modest growth in our diplomatic engagement with the region. But the downsides to the report are equally apparent: it is largely unfunded; the planning complexity rivals the Barry Jones ‘noodle nation’ education plan that was sunk by its own cleverness; and (as I have argued here) the narrow focus on Asia’s emerging powers is a necessary but insufficient start point for Australian strategic policy.

The chapter on ‘Building Sustainable Security in the Region’ is the only point in the White Paper that discusses the consequence of potential risks to Asian stability and growth. There is a welcome emphasis on the importance of continuing US military engagement in the region and on the essentiality of the US policy of extended deterrence to its allies. The chapter points to the growing range of defence capabilities in Asia. In China’s case, it says that this growth is ‘natural and legitimate’ and it emphasises the importance of building trust as a means to prevent potential conflict. We’ll have to wait for the 2013 Defence White Paper to see the finer detail.

The most curious inclusion in the security chapter is a reference to ballistic missile defence: Read more

UN Security Council – down to work

The Security Council Summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament unanimously adopted resolution 1887 (2009), expressing the Council's resolve to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. Shown here is a wide view as the vote takes place. 24/Sep/2009. United Nations, New York. UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe.

In a recent post, Peter Jennings and I argued that if Australia won a seat at the global decision making peak body, the UN Security Council, we’d benefit from picking some signature issues where Australia could contribute most effectively to solutions to pressing international problems.

Our suggested to-do list included leveraging our expertise to help build the UN’s capacity to help stabilise countries at risk of failing; highlighting Timor-Leste’s continuing needs; championing global opposition to the use of Improvised Explosive Devices; promoting efforts to strengthen maritime security, such as counter-piracy (see ASPI’s latest report on this issue); and developing cooperative measures to address information security.

Now we’ve won our fifth two year term on the Council, (proving wrong those naysayers that predicted our ties with the US, and strong support for Israel would spell defeat), we’ll need to respond to a whole host of global issues. Read more

Pine Gap – technically speaking, Australia has a choice

Cam Hawker’s recent Strategist post, ‘Stuck in the middle with you’, suffers from five major fallacies. First, it assumes that Australia–US joint facilities predetermine the strategic relationship between Canberra and Washington. Second, it assumes that the facilities’ predetermination of policy is automatic—meaning, as Cam puts it, that ‘there is no choice and has not been for decades.’ Third, it argues that the pre-eminence of the joint facilities ‘hardwires’ Australian decisions about the use of force to US decisions—that once the US goes to war, Australia must follow. Fourth, it insists that in the typical rush to war, Australia would in any case have no time to think through possible constraints on the use of the joint facilities in a conflict to which Australia was not a party. And fifth, it suggests that recent signs of innovation within ANZUS, like the stationing of the US marines in Darwin, are largely irrelevant because our strategic policy is already a prisoner of Washington’s.

These are big, meaty assertions. Cam’s piece is one of the strongest examples I’ve seen in recent times of what’s called ‘the dependency thesis’—that Australian strategic and defence policy is dependent upon that of its great and powerful ally. But on all five points the article is fundamentally wrong-headed. The Australia–US strategic relationship is a broad one, and its character and content is not predetermined by the existence of the joint facilities. True, the facilities began their life as actual US bases, but evolved into joint facilities during the 1980s. As joint facilities, they serve both US and Australian defence forces, and US and Australian national interests. Changing US submarine deployment patterns have, over the years, made the Northwest Cape communication facility less relevant to the US and more relevant to us. And technological innovation meant the functions of the Nurrungar defence satellite support facility could essentially be fulfilled from the Pine Gap site. Pine Gap remains an important facility, but thinking that the arcane SIGINT relationship runs the broader strategic one is simply mistaken. Read more

Stuck in the middle with you: Pine Gap and Australia’s strategic choices

Pine Gap

Australia has less room to maneuver in balancing between Washington and Beijing than many analysts suppose.

Much of the commentary on Australia’s management of its relationships with the United States and China is framed around the idea that having to choose between our traditional ally and our largest trading partner would be against our interests. Books such as Hugh White’s China Choice are premised on the idea that Canberra can act as an ‘honest broker’ between the two powers, lest their relationship deteriorate to the point that we are someday forced to choose between them. Back in 2004 the then Foreign Minister Alexander Downer indicated that Australia would not necessarily choose to join the US against China in a war over Taiwan should the dispute ever escalate that far.

More recently, the decision to rotate a small force of Marines through Darwin, prompted business leader Kerry Stokes to accuse Canberra of ‘taking sides’, while the respected analyst Michael Wesley queried the decision on the grounds that it may limit our strategic choices.

In fact there is no choice and has not been for decades. Read more

Look behind you, Mr Richardson

Dennis Richardson

Dennis Richardson is preparing to leave the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to join Defence as its new Secretary, and he’ll be the twelfth person to hold that job since Sir Arthur Tange created the modern Department of Defence in the mid-1970s. Richardson and Tange have a lot in common: both notorious for being tough and no-nonsense, they share the distinction of having been Secretaries of both Foreign Affairs and of Defence—a remarkable double in any career. Both started as Defence Secretary at a time when Australia was deeply involved in tough overseas wars—Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively. Tange dealt with a declining Defence budget post-Vietnam and Richardson faces a similar challenge as the government takes savings from Defence even before an Afghanistan drawdown. Tange was a structural reformer, Richardson more a problem solver. That’s just as well, as he’ll have more than a few problems to solve at Defence.

What does the record tells us about the performance of a dozen Defence Secretaries over the last 42 years? Constructed from disparate sources of information, the table below requires close attention. Our twelve Secretaries have all been male. Unlike New Zealand and the UK, Defence in Australia has yet to see a female civilian head. The average age of the Secretaries on taking office was 57 years, Allan Hawke being the youngest at 51 and Richardson the oldest at 65. Eight of the twelve had previous experience as Secretaries of other departments. Four did not: William Pritchett, Ric Smith, Nick Warner and Duncan Lewis, although the latter was National Security Advisor previously. Read more