Tag Archive for: Australia-Japan relations

Japan and Australia can fill each other’s defence gaps

Japan and Australia talk of ‘collective deterrence,’ but they don’t seem to have specific objectives. The relationship needs a clearer direction.

The two countries should identify how they complement each other. Each country has two standout areas: Japan has strengths in air and missile defence and in shipbuilding, whereas Australia needs help in both; and Australia has strengths in cybersecurity and its distance from China, both of which offer advantages for Japan.

It’s true that both nations have recently strengthened their special strategic partnership to the point where it has begun to show alliance-like characteristics, such as commitments to consult during regional crises. Yet practical coordination has barely begun. Discussions on bilateral cooperation often end at increasing interoperability—but to what end?

During the Japan-Australia Dialogue and Exchange program, hosted by the United States Studies Centre and the Japan Foundation from July to August last year, I engaged with many Japanese and Australian experts on security issues, including a Taiwan contingency. While many underscored the need for the two countries to deepen defence ties and prepare to fight together should a crisis erupt, there was little clarity on how exactly they should coordinate.

Although some studies are conducted behind closed doors, the overall lack of discussion stems from several factors. Japan has a limited understanding of Australia’s defence capabilities, and the Japanese defence community primarily focuses on implementing established policy. These factors have contributed to stagnation in finding new strategic opportunities.

In Australia, a shortage of Japan-focused security expertise and a preoccupation with the trilateral framework that includes the United States as well as Japan have constrained deeper thinking around bilateral cooperation.

Japanese and Australian foreign and defence ministers said in November that the countries were refining the scope, objectives and forms of their cooperation, a development that will help shape bilateral defence relations. This was in support of what they called strengthening collective deterrence. But all this work is still general rather than specific in nature, and discussion among strategists has been minimal.

Defence cooperation between nations with comparable military power and a reciprocal security relationship typically takes two forms: force aggregation, which enhances overall military capacity through joint operations; and complementary cooperation, which mitigates vulnerabilities by leveraging respective strengths.

Japan and Australia have primarily focused on force aggregation by emphasising interoperability, but this has limitations. China has an overwhelming numerical advantage, with about 1100 fighter aircraft and more than 140 major surface warships. Conversely, Japan has 300 fighters and 52 surface combatants, while Australia has about 100 fighters and plans to expand its fleet from 9 to 26 ships. Given this disparity, simply combining forces would do little to shift the strategic balance without further integration with US forces. Even then, the military challenges would remain immense.

Complementary coordination is needed, too. Both countries face the challenge of China, but their operational priorities differ. While Japan focuses on the East China Sea and the western Pacific, Australia can secure sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific and disrupt adversary lanes. This would help ensure Japan’s access to vital resources and ammunition, sustaining its ability to keep fighting while weakening China’s. Japan’s combat endurance is important for managing the Chinese navy’s threat to Australia.

Functionally, Australia and Japan have distinct strengths, as well as vulnerabilities that the other can help mitigate. Japan faces challenges in cybersecurity and logistical sustainment, while Australia lacks integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) and efficient shipbuilding.

Fortunately, Japan has a strong foundation in IAMD and shipbuilding, while Australia excels in cybersecurity and benefits from a geographically resilient logistical basis. By addressing each other’s weaknesses through increased bilateral exercises, common equipment and systems, and joint defence industry investments, Japan and Australia can build a more resilient defence posture.

Japan-Australia defence complementarity is already taking shape to some degree. Geographic cooperation has been an indirect but longstanding feature for both nations due to US naval strategy since the early Cold War. Functional cooperation has advanced further in recent years. At the Trilateral Defence Ministers’ Meeting in November 2024, Australia, Japan and the US discussed cooperation on IAMD systems. Shipbuilding collaboration will likely begin if Australia chooses a design based on the Japanese New FFM class for its new general-purpose frigates. Cybersecurity cooperation is also advancing through joint exercises between Australia, Japan and the US.

Japan’s ability to sustain a protracted conflict remains a challenge, as its shipyards and ammunition factories are in range of China’s missiles and can be easily targeted. For both nations to make credible contributions to regional deterrence, robust defence-industrial cooperation must be a foundation of effective contingency and operational planning. Beyond shipbuilding, the two countries should look to collaboration on ammunition production to reinforce war endurance capability. They should also consider storing mothballed assets in Australia, such as aircraft that have been retired but are still worth keeping for a while, in case they’re needed.

Deeper ties will need dedicated advocates. Both countries’ strategic communities must define the desired end-state of cooperation and identify opportunities that advance this goal.

Mogami class offers strong technical advantages in Australia’s frigate competition

Japan’s Mogami class is clearly the best choice for Australia’s general-purpose frigate program. Compared with its very capable competitor, the Meko A-200 from Germany, the Mogami design needs a smaller crew, offers deeper magazines and has a newer system for combat control.

The project, Sea 3000, is intended to replace the Anzac-class general-purpose frigates with as many as 11 ships, part of a larger program to expand the Royal Australian Navy’s surface fleet. TKMS’s Meko A-200 and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Mogami class are the shortlisted contenders. Australia plans to order three ships of the chosen design from the winning contractor’s shipyard, taking first delivery in 2029, and build the rest locally. A decision is expected this year.

(An accompanying article looks at industrial and strategic factors in the decision.)

The Australian Defence Force has been suffering from a recruitment and retention shortfall, and the Royal Australian Navy has been especially troubled in finding and keeping people.

Minimising crew sizes is therefore more important than ever as the RAN builds up to an expanded fleet of surface combatants and nuclear-powered submarines. Because the Mogami class is designed for greater automation than the Meko A-200, it has a crew of only 90 instead of 120. So Australia’s frigates could be crewed more easily if they were Mogamis and, should the government expand the program, the smaller crew improves the practicability of operating more than 11 ships.

Alternatively, it would be more feasible for the RAN to give each frigate two rotating crews,  maximising each ship’s operational availability. The United States does this with some submarines and surface ships to reduce crew fatigue and the time ships are unavailable due to crew training requirements.

Implementing a strategy of deterrence by denial requires an ability to rapidly shift mission sets, so the enemy must be wary of complex threats. If recent experience in the Red Sea is any indicator, modern naval warfare will be frenetic and victory will hinge not only on which side has the better equipment but which has the greater magazine depth.

The upgraded Mogami design offered to Australia has 32 vertical-launch system (VLS) missile cells, twice as many as the Meko A-200. Mogamis would therefore spend less time shuttling back to port for re-arming, or, if Australia follows intended US replenishment practice, undertaking exceptionally difficult reloads at sea.

The increase VLS count also gives greater flexibility in loadouts. After accounting for self-defence, the Mogamis would have greater capacity for offensive missiles than the Meko A-200. This means they can be readily retasked and kept in the fight. While frigates can’t carry as many long-range strike missiles as heavier surface combatants can, the magazine depth of the Mogami design allows for a greater distribution of weapons through the fleet, maximizing distributed lethality.

By one important measure, the combination of a small crew and deep magazines results in high efficiency: a Mogami of the upgraded design has only 2.8 crew members per missile cell, compared with 3.4 for the US Arleigh Burke class and 7.5 for the Meko A-200. Between the higher efficiency and magazine depth, the Mogami is well positioned to support the Australian strategy of defence by denial.

A ship is only as capable as the combat management system that ties everything together, however. The Meko A-200 is presumably being offered with a combat control system developed from the one that the RAN already uses in the Anzacs, offering more-seamless integration. While the current system has been improved since its initial release, its age does raise the issue of long-term upgrade costs. The price associated with updating an older baseline rapidly increases and runs into hardware limitations. A case in point is the United States’ destroyer modernisation program, which is costing an estimated $17 billion for 20 ships.

The combat management system the Mogami utilizes was developed alongside the frigate, with initial designs beginning in 2015. This newer baseline means there are potentially large long-term cost savings to be had from the Mogami class.

The RAN would need time to adjust to the new Japanese combat management system, and there would be additional costs associated with integrating weapons  that Australia uses but Japan doesn’t. But these growing pains would better position the fleet for the future. Rather than presenting challenges of backwards compatibility, the combat management system would launch the RAN cleanly into the next generation of fighting ships.

Underpinning the better fit for the RAN is that cooperation with the Japanese strengthens a key geostrategic alliance between Australia and Japan. The shared operating area, threat assessments, and threat capabilities means that the Mogami is already tailor made for fighting and winning in the Indo-Pacific.

The Meko-A200 is a capable platform, and replacing the Anzac class with an upgraded variant wouldn’t be the worst choice. The Japanese bid for the Sea 3000 project, however, represents the stronger choice for Australia. The Mogami offers enhanced flexibility across the board. And there’s icing on the cake: reported costs are lower for Mogamis than for Meko A-200s.

Strategic and industrial factors favour Japan for Australia’s frigate project

It’s not just technical naval capability. Australia has persuasive geostrategic and industrial reasons for choosing Japan over Germany as its partner in building as many as 11 general-purpose frigates in a priority defence program.

The upgraded Mogami class offered by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) does have strong technical advantages for the Royal Australian Navy over the competing Meko A-200 from Germany’s ThyssenKrupp. But Australia must also consider that it and Japan share the threat from China, which is another reason to choose the Japanese design.

Related to that, the two countries can and should help each other. And, industrially, Japan is well positioned to help.

The Australia-Japan ‘special strategic partnership’ has great potential but is underexploited in defence industrial cooperation, largely because of Japan’s historically strict arms export controls. But the controls are gradually loosening as Japan faces an increasingly complex Indo-Pacific security landscape, with three assertive nuclear-armed neighbours—China, North Korea, and Russia—at its doorstep.

In response, Japan has taken significant steps, including establishing a joint public-private committee to support defence exports. This committee brings together representatives from various ministries and major industrial and defence firms such as MHI, Hitachi and NEC. The effort stems from lessons learned following Japan’s unsuccessful bid to sell submarines to Australia in 2016.

The stakes are high this time, since MHI is one of two finalists in the frigate program with an estimated budget of $7-11 billion.

The program, Sea 3000, prioritises rapid acquisition, requiring the first ship to be delivered by 2029. The first three members of the class will be built overseas by the designer and the rest in Australia.

The Mogami class is in Japanese naval service but the upgraded version offered to Australia is yet to be deployed. Thyssenkrupp’s design, Meko A-200 is an evolution of the Anzac class, which the new ships are intended to replace. A choice between the designs is due this year.

Leaving aside the question of which design is better technically suited to Australia (discussed in an accompanying article), Japan can offer more at a strategic and industrial level than Germany can. There are three aspects to consider.

The first is that Australia and Japan both reject Beijing’s moves to treat the South China Sea as its own. Australia and Japan have shared concerns over China’s increasing coercive behaviour that is responsible for the deteriorating strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific. Recent actions include China’s unlawful maritime claims with its 10-dash line (updated from the original nine-dash version), resource pilfering in the South China Sea, dangerous military manoeuvres, such as releasing flares in front of an Australian aircraft over international airspace, and violating Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands.

The steady tempo of China’s coercive measures in the Indo-Pacific prompted action from Australia and Japan. In December 2022, Japan approved three strategic documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Buildup Program. These marked a shift in defence policy, a response to the real threat of military attacks on its territory. Similarly, Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program emphasise a strategy of denial, aiming to deter conflicts and prevent coercion through force.

Together, Japan and Australia view themselves as the northern and southern anchors of Indo-Pacific security, and both stand to play a strategic role in deterring China.

Germany is awakening to the challenge that China poses, but it is not there yet. The government of outgoing chancellor Olaf Scholz introduced a strongly worded China strategy in mid-2023, but his coalition government was deeply divided on China policy. So Berlin maintained Angela Merkel’s risk-averse policy, prioritising short-term economic gain over tackling strategic risks. Moreover, a major flaw in Scholz’s China policy was how strongly influenced it was by German companies with longstanding investments in China. This led to overdependency on China, paralleling the country’s reliance on cheap Russian oil and gas. However, the next German government, under Friedrich Merz, could potentially change course.

The second reason for Japan being a more attractive partner than Germany is that Australia and Japan stand to gain strategically by working more closely together in the Indo-Pacific. Canberra and Tokyo already share significant strategic alignment on China’s intensification of coercive activities, as highlighted in their eleventh 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations in September 2024.

Australia and Japan have also taken steps to strengthen military cooperation with the planned deployment of a Japanese Amphibious Brigade to Australia for joint exercises with US Marines. These measures underline the salience of the special strategic partnership, reflected in the Reciprocal Access Agreement signed in 2022. The agreement, Japan’s first defence treaty with an international partner since 1960, demonstrates the priority both nations place on their bilateral ties.

The third reason is that Australia would benefit from Japan’s industrial capacity and maritime expertise in building advanced warships designed for the same operational environment in the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s limited shipbuilding capacity demands help from partners, and Japan is well positioned to provide it quickly. A clear indication that Japan is serious came from Japan’s defence chief General Yoshihide Yoshida, who said Japan would give ‘priority’ to Australia if the Mogami design was selected for the frigate program.

A related consequence of choosing the Mogami design would be strengthening the interoperability of the Japanese and Australian navies: they’d be using almost identical ships.

Australia must also be wary of risks to export supply from a German arms industry that is suddenly coming under great pressure as the United States tells European countries to look after their own defence. Urgent domestic needs can push their way to the front of the queue. Japan’s industry has been under rising pressure too, but the problem has been building up for years.

Australia stands to gain significantly by deepening its defence industrial cooperation with Japan. By forging a robust industrial partnership, both nations can enhance their defence capabilities, address shared security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and translate their strategic relationship into tangible benefits. Given their shared concerns over China’s coercive behaviour, this enhanced cooperation is necessary for maintaining stability and deterring aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

Diplomacy first: Australia’s diplomatic push in a contested Indo-Pacific

The return of Donald Trump could demote diplomacy as he pursues hard power and economic statecraft. Diplomacy may be more about damage control than prioritising the long game and the art of exercising constructive leadership.

Trump has already fixated on the ideas of buying Greenland and retaking the Panama Canal and is musing that Canada should join the United States as the 51st state. This reflects his style of using coercive diplomacy with maximalist positions to manipulate others’ cost-benefit calculus in his favour. Trump can also rally strong domestic support, showcasing his resolve to punish those he believes are responsible for exploiting US interests and generosity.

Under Trump, the US may demand more from its allies than its rivals, so those allies will need to invest in skilful diplomacy. This ought to be good news for Australia, given its investments in advancing its hard and soft power.

Australia’s foreign policy strategy addresses its fears, advances trust and builds cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. It combines use of hard and soft power to advance a whole-of-nation strategy (including AUKUS and lessening economic dependence on China) and meaningful diplomatic outreach where its goal is to be the partner of choice.

This approach reflects the character of its diplomatic footing that recognises the value of establishing equal partnerships. It means Australia can play an effective leadership role in the Indo-Pacific as others are nervous about a confrontational White House. As the new administration settles in, Australian foreign policy can be a tool to reassure an array of actors Canberra has developed close relations with to show how to better deal with Trump’s America First policy.

Australia’s relationship with the US places it in an enviable position, considering Trump’s relations with some other allies. As Canberra invests more in its relationship with Washington, its regional relations should not fall behind.

Australia’s alliance with the US has helped enhance the Australia-Japan relationship, as shown by the Australia-Japan-US defence ministers’ summit in November last year. Australia and Japan are both Indo-Pacific maritime nations and share concerns about China. They can use their network of strong regional partnerships to shape the regional order in at least three ways.

First, they can increase naval deployments to strengthen maritime cooperation, particularly with the Pacific island countries to counter China’s increasing presence. For example, a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force deployment in 2024 visited more than a dozen countries, including the Philippines, India, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Marshall Islands, Fiji and Palau.

Among them, Palau and the Marshall Islands recognise Taipei instead of Beijing. Beijing may find it easier to corner Taiwan if its last remaining Pacific allies recognise Beijing, which would also enable the Chinese navy to broaden its strategic presence in key parts of the Pacific. As tensions rise, it would be tempting to view Australian and Japanese naval deployments in a security-centric manner. But the missions have dual military and diplomatic purposes as they caution the Chinese navy and reassure their Pacific partners of their freedom to navigate.

Second, Australia and Japan should engage the Pacific island countries on their own terms, given their distinct priorities. Despite the geopolitical competition between the ruling power and the rising one, Pacific partners have their own interests and reject the securitisation of their maritime domain. In fact, Australia’s longstanding engagement with the Pacific through Pacific-led regional organisations, including the Pacific Islands Forum, allows key policy areas to be covered without being swept under the security rug. The Pacific’s interests are in strengthening climate and disaster resilience, increasing economic prosperity and ensuring sustainable resource management, not geopolitical contests.

Third, Australia can learn from Japan’s experiences of dealing with three threatening powers at its doorstep—Russia, North Korea and China. All have intensified their campaign to throw Tokyo off balance. Australia needs to understand how Japan allocates its naval capabilities to control key maritime routes and areas. This can offer insights for its strategy of denial as well as its economic and diplomatic approaches to manage sensitive relations in a complex region.

Trump will likely demand that US allies do more, spend more and take greater risks, particularly in the military domain. AUKUS and military modernisation are essential components of Canberra’s national security strategy. But diplomacy must be at the centre of efforts to work with regional partners to maintain Australia’s status as a partner of choice.

Training in Australia is a big chance for Japan. Let’s make it permanent

Valuable training in the Northern Territory for Japan’s key amphibious force from next year should be only a step towards more extensive use of Australian exercise areas by the Japanese armed forces.

Canberra should now offer Tokyo a permanent arrangement for Japanese armed forces to train in the Northern Territory, similar to the initiative for Singaporean troops training in Queensland.

The plan for the Japanese brigade to begin training in the Northern Territory was announced on 17 November during a meeting in Darwin of the three countries’ defence chiefs. Japan’s Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB), a marine unit of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), will join the training and exercises held by the US Marine Rotational Force–Darwin (MRF-D) and the Australian Defence Force from 2025.

The ARDB incorporates Japan’s former Western Army Infantry Regiment, the dedicated amphibious warfare unit of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. It conducts a full range of amphibious operations and limited training with the US Marine Corps to enhance the skills and doctrine for retaking Japanese territory seized by a foreign power.

To support the ARDB, Japan has bought amphibious assault vehicles. It has also modernised ships for operating F-35B Lightning fighters and MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, both types also used by the USMC.

Peace in Japan since World War II and the country’s pacifist constitution have ensured that its armed forces haven’t fought a war for almost 80 years. Training opportunities of the highest quality are therefore even more important to them than they are for the militaries of other countries.

The Northern Territory provides the space and the multi-domain training that the JSDF needs to better prepare its soldiers and equipment for the battlefield. It is arguably the best place on this side of the world for the sort of unrestrained, combined-arms training the JSDF is seeking.

Japan’s training spaces are limited, because of the country’s high population density. Alternatives in the US don’t have the unique characteristics of the Northern Territory, which provides for multi-domain training across air, land, sea, space and cyberspace.

JSDF presence in the Northern Territory would also be useful in accelerating unilateral, bilateral and multilateral testing and evaluation for dual-use technologies. By adding Japanese systems to those that are already tested an evaluated in the Northern Territory, we can develop a larger and more robust private support industry.

It is good news that the first Japanese Joint Staff liaison officer will be placed in Australia’s Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) in November. Also welcome is the commitment to send an ADF liaison officer to JSDF Joint Operations Command (JJOC) once it is established in 2025.

Australia should continue the momentum of those announcements and focus on initiatives that build the people-to-people linkages.

Canberra should also offer Tokyo a permanent Japan-Australia Training Initiative located in the Northern Territory along similar lines to the long-standing Australia-Singapore Military Training Initiative (ASMTI) based in central and northern Queensland.

Under the ASMTI, Singapore has invested in the development and enhancement of two training areas in Queensland, owned and managed by Canberra. These will support future needs of the ADF and facilitate an increased presence of Singapore Armed Forces personnel. When the ASMTI reaches maturity, up to 14,000 Singaporean troops will train in Queensland for up to 18 weeks a year, split into two nine-week periods.

In deepening the engagement with Japanese forces, there will be political hurdles and challenges posed by public perception, but now is the time to think boldly and act quickly. Japan’s participation in US and Australian training in the Northern Territory has great potential to lead to a more extensive collaboration that’s beneficial to all parties.

Quad leaders face pivotal chance to renew relevance beyond a GINO

The Quad grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the United States is turning 20. And like a young person entering their third decade, the Quad’s time has come to start maturing into its proper potential and making its mark on the world, rather than trying to cling onto the safety and comfort of youth.

That means avoiding the major mistake that was made after the Quad’s creation in 2004 when, for fear of angering China, the four members, in particular Australia and India, began to back away. Worrying that the Quad risked creating provocation rather than delivering stability through regional balance, the member nations let it drift into a decade of stasis until it was revived in 2017 in response to collective concern over Beijing’s newly assertive and coercive stances. The first foreign ministers’ meeting in 2019, in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly, signalled that Quad 2.0 had arrived.

An opportunity to shape Quad 3.0 will come this week when, just ahead of this year’s UNGA, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese meets with his three fellow leaders in Delaware, United States. That meeting needs to produce outcomes that demonstrate that the four countries have learnt from the past and are prepared to give the minilateral group a renewed reassertion of relevance for regional stability and security to avoid its becoming just another yearly meeting.

Beijing would love to kill off the Quad a second time but, having calculated that the group is here to stay, its next best strategy is to hollow it out and make it a GINO—a grouping in name only. It’s to that end that Beijing is applying fresh pressure.

Downplaying the Quad’s security role, and thereby continuing a trend that has been creeping into Quad rhetoric for some time, would go a long way to delivering Beijing its aim. This pattern includes the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s explicit description of the Quad as a ‘diplomatic, not security, partnership’ and Japan’s then Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi—also a leading candidate to be the next prime minister—saying last year that the group was ‘not for security issues, nor military issues’.

What these mistaken messages of reassurance achieve is to help confirm China’s propaganda—consumed by ASEAN—that minilateralism, from NATO to the Quad, is the provocateur. True, the Quad is not a military alliance, but that doesn’t mean—and it can’t mean—that it doesn’t collaborate on security.

Language, moreover, must be backed up by specific plans. The announcement of this Quad meeting referenced a number of areas of security, including maritime security. But the group needs to go beyond such generic prose and explain what it means in practical terms.

Ultimately, this week’s joint statement must clarify the ‘practical co-operation’ previously promised by the Quad and provide a roadmap for the ways the four country-members can work together, including to build military capacity and to prevent aggression in the region.

Vigorous assertion of accountability for Beijing’s regular breaches of the rules and norms must also be part of the Quad’s agenda. These include bullying of neighbours in territorial disputes, cyber attacks and economic coercion, which are all too often left to the victims themselves to protest.

Such breaches should be called out by the Quad and not left to other groups like AUSMIN or the Australia-Japan 2+2 forum.

Accordingly, the Quad statement must expressly support the Philippines and condemn China’s illegal and aggressive behaviour in the South and East China Seas, not just express general support for the law of the sea or country-agnostic concern relating to unilateral actions.

China’s recent illegal incursions into Japan’s territorial airspace need to be referenced, flowing on from Australia’s bilateral support during the recent Foreign and Defence Ministers’ meeting with Japan. And while espionage is a universal practice, the protection of our smaller regional partners should be a priority. The recent cyber attack on the Pacific Islands Forum should be called out.

This clarity on the Quad’s agenda, role and principles is vital for its future. After all, there’s a reason minilaterals—from the Quad to AUKUS—are on the rise. Multilateral bodies should serve global interests by mustering a collective weight of countries that want the right thing for all—international common interests such as security, stability, sovereignty and solutions to global problems such as climate change. Instead, they are being co-opted and neutered by self-interested regimes including Beijing and Moscow.

The role of Quad leaders—particularly for both US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida who should aim to leave a legacy from their last Quad meeting—is to ensure such minilateral groups are effective until the multilateral system repairs itself—or regrettably in the event that it doesn’t.

As Quad leaders and foreign ministers head to UNGA after the meeting, they owe a message to the UN and multilateral bodies—do not fear China and Russia to the extent that lets them reshape international institutions to tolerate their own persistent breaches of international rules and norms.

After Quad 2.0 was launched, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi famously referred to the Quad as nothing more than ‘sea foam’, suggesting it would break up and dissipate—one half of its dubious narrative couplet that the Quad was an Asian NATO and hence provocative, yet at the same time ineffectual.

Recognising that total breakup is unlikely, Beijing is this time determined to render it a GINO. Sea foam, of course, can also be light, airy and insubstantial. As Quad leaders gather, they must seize the chance to reinject weight and substance, and give this minilateral grouping the power of a rising tide of co-operation towards a more secure and stable region.

Australia–Japan 2+2 and the latticework of partners

Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles and Foreign Affairs Minister Penny Wong hosted their Japanese counterparts, Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Defence Minister Minoru Kihara, for 2+2 consultations in Victoria on 5 September. ASPI experts give their perspectives on what was announced and why the Australia-Japan partnership really matters.

 

Alex Bristow, senior analyst

Australian ministers should be applauded for joining their Japanese counterparts in a strong rebuke of China’s coercive actions, including the recent incursions into Japanese territory by the PLA. As Justin Bassi and I pointed out before the meeting, this was necessary and overdue.

The tone was set from Marles’s opening comments, in which he referred to Japan being ‘very much on the front line’ against pressure from China, North Korea and Russia. Such candour is welcome, if sobering.

Wong and Kamikawa framed a series of new initiatives and dialogues—ranging from economic security, Pacific digital development, working with the US on strategic communications and attributing cyber attacks—in terms of coordinating the levers of national power towards a collective purpose.

We’ve heard the spin on so-called statecraft for a while, but thankfully we now seem to be seeing the substance.

 

Cathy Moloney, deputy director

Welcome undertakings included bolstering the commitment to collective deterrence against force and coercion in the Indo-Pacific and an agreement to build deterrence, response capabilities and interoperability through enhanced cooperation.

Australia is emphasising support for Japan’s capability acquisitions, such as long-range missiles, and fostering Japan’s acquisition of counterstrike capabilities.

This reinforces our national defence deterrence strategy, which is augmented by both Japan’s and Australia’s current and future defence efforts on maritime cooperative activities with the Philippines and on networked air and missile defence with the US.

Leveraging the US as the major Australian and Japanese ally in the region will further consolidate our resilience and security capabilities against threats and demonstrate Australia’s dedication to integrated deterrence operations with partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific.

 

Euan Graham, senior analyst

The ministers indicated their interest in exploring new initiatives that will further integrate bilateral and trilateral defence activities, with the emphasis on making Japan’s military footprint in Australia deeper and more regular via mutual staff placements, visiting detachments and joint exercises, including with US forces here.

From later this year, Canberra and Tokyo will embed military officers in each other’s joint structures, a move which should streamline planning and which indicates growing trust.

Also on the agenda are reciprocal deployments of Australian, Japanese and US F-35s, perhaps including Japanese detachments operating from northern Australia. Japan may also participate in joint amphibious training with Australia and the US Marines. This highlights Australia’s importance as a strategic location for Japan to disperse its mobile assets in case its own bases come under military threat.

Significantly, Japan and Australia have underlined their desire to cooperate on counterstrike capabilities, to boost their military reach and deterrence against common adversaries.

 

Raji Pillai Rajagopalan, resident senior fellow

The references to trilaterilising as much work of the two countries as possible, apparently meaning adding the US to their programs, was positive. So was the reference by Marles to an emerging ‘lattice of networks’ and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific as a means to strengthen the rules-based regional order.

It would have been better to include the Quad in this context and not limit the public remarks to the bilateral or trilateral. In this way it was a missed opportunity for both countries to express deep support for the importance of the Quad. It may be that the Quad was underplayed due to a desire not to present it as a security grouping. But the Quad must play both a positive capacity-building role and a security one for it to be most effective. It would have been best for the public and region to hear this clearly.

All partners in these minilaterals, including India, appreciate other partnerships even if they are not involved. They understand that the bilaterals, trilaterals (such as Australia-Japan-US and AUKUS), the Quad and even the Five Eyes all make up the ‘lattice of networks’ that is designed to enhance the security and well-being of the region.

 

Malcolm Davis, senior analyst

Ministers didn’t mention the important area of space in their public remarks.

In fact, it is important for Japan and Australia to strengthen defence cooperation in space. A joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance satellite constellation would allow Tokyo and Canberra to target long-range strike missiles and track and intercept Chinese missile threats.

Space capabilities must be resilient against Chinese counterspace threats. Japan, like Australia, is a member of the Combined Space Operations initiative, which seeks to sustain freedom of action in space, enhance resilience and deter conflict. Working together to deter counterspace threats through building a common space control capability is a step forward for Australia and Japan.

Cooperation between Japan and Australia on operationally responsive space launch, including from launch sites in Australia, would also contribute towards space resilience and deterrence by denial in orbit.