Tag Archive for: ASPI Washington

Two years of ASPI in DC: deepening partnership in an uncertain world

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ASPI’s Washington DC office was announced in September 2021 as Australia and the United States celebrated the 70th anniversary of the ANZUS alliance and as the AUKUS partnership was being established with the United Kingdom. And as we prepare to mark the second anniversary of ASPI DC this weekend, NATO is holding its 75th annual meeting in the US capital—arguably one of the most important meetings in the alliance’s history.

ANZUS and NATO are old and enduring alliances, but they are facing new and evolving challenges. Liberal democracies and countries that value the stability born by rules and norms need to find new ways to cooperate and combine their strengths. ASPI established its Washington office precisely with the foresight that the world was only getting more difficult and uncertain and that Australia’s alliance with the US, as well as the importance of robust debate about national security policy, would only grow.

That’s exactly what happened. Since ASPI DC was conceived, Russia began its war on Ukraine, which has settled into a long and grim battle of attrition; conflict has erupted in the Middle East following the 7 October Hamas terrorism attack against Israel; China has increased its aggression in the South China Sea and over Taiwan; Moscow and Beijing have formed an unforeseen partnership to undermine international rules and create spheres of influence; and a technological revolution has gathered pace with artificial intelligence.

And this is why cross-pollination of ideas in national security, beyond traditional diplomacy, should be encouraged by anyone who believes we get better and more trusted policy if we share and contest our thoughts before applying them. Throughout history, progress has been fuelled by trade and exchange—and this applies as much to ideas as it does to goods.

This Saturday, 13 July, marks two years since Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles formally opened ASPI’s Washington office. And if the strategic judgments were tough in mid-2022, they are only more so today. To some extent, gravitational forces are binding democratic alliances more tightly, even if there remains some scepticism or even resistance to their pull due to misjudgement that there is some way to deflect the world’s problems so that they don’t impact too heavily on one’s own national interests.

There are some discernible and related strands to the response we need.

First, it’s more important than ever that we work together. And in these times that means working as nations, not just as governments. The role of the private sector is crucial and so is the role of civil society, including think tanks. The work of ASPI, including its Washington office, contributes to policy improvement by fostering debate, convening and facilitating discussion and, broadly, by bringing people together. This includes providing input on US perspectives to Australian government decision-making and also conveying Australian priorities—notably the importance of US engagement in the Indo-Pacific—in Washington.

Working together doesn’t mean having to always agree or self-censor. Bipartisanship in Australia and the US for national security being strengthened through contestability is a comparative advantage for democracies over authoritarian regimes like Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, which may deceptively claim unity while coercing and putting their boots on the throats of their critics.

As then defence minister Peter Dutton outlined in his announcement of the office in 2021, ‘ASPI can further strengthen our relationship by becoming a more active participant in the lively Washington DC think tank debate about defence and national security’. And Marles has said: ‘ASPI’s analysis and insights have been instrumental in informing our defence policy and strengthening our alliance with the United States. Their presence in Washington DC has facilitated crucial dialogue and collaboration on key security issues.’

ASPI DC’s engagement with US think tanks, universities and the private sector provides a forum for deepening understanding of the rationale behind Australian government decision-making, how it might affect the United States, and the decisions that might be anticipated through real-time insights. This is reciprocally true for an Australian audience. Presence thereby equals impact—and the impact is deeper partnerships.

The prime example of a new generation of partnerships is AUKUS, which binds not just the Australian, British and US governments but also, importantly, their industrial bases. Another is the Quad, which reformed in 2017 both to protect the four regional powers from China’s malicious rise and to identify practical alternatives for the region. And NATO’s concept of the Indo-Pacific 4 is a direct reflection of the inability now to separate the trans-Atlantic from the Indo-Pacific or indeed to treat Russia and China separately.

Second, we must not be mere onlookers as boundaries are collapsing. Security, economics, technology, diplomacy—while never quite discrete disciplines—are more enmeshed and interdependent than ever. Scholarship, research and discussion that sits at the intersection of these fields is critical to navigating this new world.

Third, governments cannot respond alone, with the risk of a disconnect between policymakers on one side and the general public on the other. There’s the old joke, for instance, that one’s concern about China increases in proportion to one’s security clearance. That’s a problem. The mandate needed for increased defence and security resourcing is not going to come without a proper understanding among the Australian public of the strategic challenges and threats that Australia faces. Think tanks play a crucial role here, and this is a key priority for ASPI DC.

As we head towards November’s presidential election, polls show that Donald Trump is the frontrunner. There is no doubt this brings greater uncertainty for the international system, its institutions and groupings, including NATO, given Trump’s overt scepticism of alliances and his transactional approach to relationships. Yet, regardless of the election outcome and any extra challenges presented, the health of the Australia-US alliance will remain vital as the threat to our sovereignty and way of life will still come from Russia and China (and their proxies) and their abuse of technology. There is a clear requirement to identify, develop and harness the next generation of American leaders who will still need to work with trusted and reliable partners.

ASPI DC helps provide Australia with a unique platform to convene and drive valuable discussions that are in Australia’s national interest, from the value of the alliance and AUKUS to the importance of the Indo-Pacific and international rules.

Tag Archive for: ASPI Washington

The U.S. Can’t Lead on Quantum Computing Alone

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Quantum computing will be one of the most defining technologies of the century. It will intersect and enhance capabilities across sectors such as climate change, manufacturing, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence.

China is ranked second to the United States in terms of research about this technology, according to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Critical Technology Tracker, and the race to achieve quantum supremacy is intensifying.

In particular, the United States must work to mitigate the risks that quantum computers pose to national and economic security. These computers will be able to surpass existing cybersecurity encryption standards in minutes, even in situations that would take a conventional computer years to solve, compromising the confidentiality and integrity of the security used for everything from banking to data storage and internet communication.

Preparations for such a scenario are already being undertaken in the United States by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which has released its first batch of four cryptographic algorithms designed to withstand decryption by a future quantum computer.

However, the United States can’t safeguard its leadership on quantum computing by acting alone. In a similar situation to the semiconductor industry, there is a limited global talent pool of expertise in the sector, and Washington needs to coordinate the human capital, research and development, and the advanced manufacturing capabilities needed to bring quantum computing online in a time frame conducive to the pacing threat that China poses.

The United States has already acknowledged the pressing need to secure advanced technology supply chains through the passing of the CHIPS and Science Act in August 2022. As the country looks to place similar export controls on advanced technologies such as quantum computing, it must not cut its allies out.

Instead, Washington needs to leverage the complementary strengths of each nations’ advanced technology ecosystems. That collaboration must begin with semiconductors.

Conversations on the security of advanced semiconductor supply chains and the importance of investment in quantum computing often occur independently. Yet, Washington’s ability to maintain global leadership in the quantum computing industry hinges on secure access to advanced semiconductor manufacturing.

Advanced semiconductors serve as the processors of quantum computers. They contain “qubits” (short for “quantum bits”) that enable these computers to process algorithms and equations significantly faster than standard computers. The more qubits that a quantum computer contains, the more powerful it is. In the global race to develop a useful quantum computer that is commercially scalable, access to advanced semiconductor manufacturing will be a determining factor in winning.

China is being forced into domestic manufacturing of advanced semiconductors due to U.S. export controls imposed under the CHIPS and Science Act. However, in August, Chinese telecommunication giant Huawei released its latest smartphone, containing an advanced, Chinese-manufactured 7 nanometer chip, which suggests that China’s semiconductor industry is adapting to the export controls designed to slow its advancements. China is also developing its advanced foundry capabilities, which are used in the chip manufacturing process, and this will further aid its quantum computing industry.

Australia is a natural partner for the United States on quantum computing. Despite having only 0.3 percent of the global population, Australia is home to 10 percent of the world’s quantum scientists; these scientists are supported by a national quantum strategy. Announced in May, the strategy lays out the ambitious goal of building the world’s first error-corrected quantum computer and the importance of collaboration with trusted partners in the private sector to create it.

Collaboration between the United States and Australia in quantum computing sciences dates to the late 1990s, when there was engagement between the U.S. Army Research Office and Australian quantum computing research centers. In 2021, a landmark statement of intent was signed between the two governments to cooperate and share the benefits of quantum information and science technologies.

But commitment must continue to go beyond government-to-government engagement and involve academia and industry, as well. One example of these partnerships was made in September 2023, when Australia-based companies Q-CTRL, a quantum infrastructure software developer, and Diraq, a leading innovator in silicon-based quantum computing, announced a joint venture in pursuit of projects funded by both the U.S. and Australian governments, with the shared goal of accelerating the commercial adoption of quantum computing.

Alongside the U.S.-Australia bilateral relationship, the AUKUS security arrangement offers the two nations an endorsed pathway to deepen innovation ties and achieve scalability alongside the United Kingdom. Quantum computing has been identified as a priority for AUKUS partners under their technology-sharing agreement as one of eight specified areas of advanced capability collaboration. While global collaboration should not be limited to AUKUS partners, it provides a starting framework for coordinating strategic investment between the three nations.

U.S.-based quantum computing company PsiQuantum is a prime example of partnerships between the quantum industry and semiconductor manufacturers within an alliance ecosystem. With Australian origins and a presence in the U.K. quantum computing industry, PsiQuantum has established a strategic partnership with the U.S. semiconductor manufacturer GlobalFoundries.

Investment from the U.S. semiconductor industry alongside the Australian and U.K. quantum computing industry can facilitate access to the advanced manufacturing capabilities needed to develop quantum computing technologies. The collaboration utilizes otherwise disparate talent pools, provides U.S. industry with access to additional advanced research and development, and has the dual benefit of diversifying advanced manufacturing supply chains for the United States.

The United Kingdom and Australia host a range of quantum organizations that could be grown through similar partnerships with U.S. semiconductor foundries. In the U.K., the National Quantum Computing Centre is backed by government support. Similarly in Australia, there are several global quantum front-runners.

Beyond AUKUS, the United States can also look to other nations for examples of successful public-private partnerships, such as that of Canadian quantum company Xanadu, which has partnered with the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology in South Korea to develop a quantum workforce pipeline. The institute also undertakes advanced semiconductor research, and South Korea is, of course, a key player in global advanced chip manufacturing supply chains.

While industry players understand the technical needs of their technologies, support from government is key to accelerating these activities. It provides access to capital and markets that encourage industry growth where, under natural market conditions, it might have been slower.

The United States and allied governments therefore need to collaborate to provide investment incentives to encourage public-private partnership between quantum computing companies and mature U.S.-based chip manufacturers. Collaboration will require relationship building, infrastructure investment, and research and development coordination that should begin now.

Moreover, as global leaders in quantum computing, the United States and allies also can shape the industry as it develops through the establishment of international standards and norms, ensuring that the technology is brought online responsibly. This includes the ability to shape strategic supply chain development and ensure that infrastructure such as specialized data centers and a highly skilled workforce are built and cultivated within a trusted alliance ecosystem that can withstand geostrategic competition.

The United States is already throwing everything it can at slowing down China’s access to the technology and the expertise it needs to gain a competitive advantage in key technology areas. Access to talent, research and innovation, and advanced semiconductor manufacturing are vital ingredients in achieving quantum computing leadership. As global technology competition continues to intensify, a strong history of allied partnership is an advantage that the United States holds over adversaries, and it needs to be bullish about leveraging it.

The Role of the Private Sector in Cyber Competition

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The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) workshop on ‘The future of cyber competition’ was held to further an understanding of what lessons the US, and its allies, could take from how cyber has been used during Russia’s war on Ukraine. Discussion between senior US government officials, private sector experts and academia over the two days was key in highlighting that it is important to define what successful public-private partnerships look like, and how effective relationships can be built to best prepare for future conflict.

The importance of public-private partnership is at the forefront of policy debate as global technology competition continues to intensify. The passing of legislation in the United States, such as the CHIPS and Science Act 2022, aimed at securing semiconductor supply chains, and inquiries by Senators into Elon Musk reportedly thwarting a drone attack on Russian targets by denying the use of SpaceX’s Starlink satellites, is indicative of the undeniable presence of the private sector in strategic competition and global conflict. Going forward, US and allied governments need to make considerations around the normative parameters for collaboration and private sector engagement in cyber conflict, particularly given critical digital infrastructure and large troves of personal data is largely operated and managed by private sector entities.

A point raised throughout the CGSR workshop, was that strengthening and encouraging the private sector’s ability to act in geostrategic competition is not necessarily a status quo that should be reinforced. ‘Big tech’ companies are in some instances, operating with the scale and influence of countries, as is the case with SpaceX, which has been central in providing critical communication infrastructure during the Ukraine war. These companies are not bound to national interests and typically view themselves as international organisations headquartered around the world with their primary activities driven by commercial interests. This perspective was raised in conjunction with the point that while Ukraine has demonstrated an adept ability to use soft power to harness private sector support, this is not necessarily replicable in future conflicts. The US and allies need to consider if it is within their interests to normalise the independent involvement of private sector entities with the capacity to function on the scale of a combatant country during conflict particularly in a scenario where a large private entity might aid a foreign adversary.

Regardless, while the nuances of the normative parameters for private sector involvement in geostrategic competition are still developing, the private sector will continue to hold an integral role in cyber and technology competition. Another key point emphasized during the workshop, was the importance of developing a roadmap for engagement and timely communication between government and the private sector. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the need to have these strategies in place prior to a conflict, as opposed to being built mid-flight. Related to this, is the importance of building the skills within both public and private sectors to effectively communicate in technical areas to non-technical audiences, and vice versa when it comes to explaining strategic policy priorities and how the technical capabilities of the private sector might support them. Cyber is a multidisciplinary field, and having individuals that can act as a conduit between technical and high level geostrategic or commercial audiences is vital, and is a function that should exist ahead of a cyber conflict scenario. The private sector is not a uniform entity, and trust and relationships at an individual level need to be built between public and private entities if constructive collaboration is to occur. Building these relationships will also help identify scenarios where collaboration is needed, and the degree of risk appetite and priorities for both the government and private sector entities. This feeds into a need for public-private partners to candidly understand each other’s unique incentives, which the CSGR workshop was clear in highlighting as important for ensuring partnerships of value can be built.

This is where there is an opportunity for greater collaboration between allies and learning from different approaches for public-private engagement in cyber. Notably, Australia is at the forefront of public-private collaboration in scenario planning for major cyber incidents. In 2023, the Australian government held war gaming exercises with major banks and financial service companies to test response strategies to cyberattacks that target critical infrastructure assets. How allies can execute similar programs to work in tandem with global companies to drill scenarios and understand the capabilities, intentions, and limits of private sector entities will help lay the groundwork when real-time responses are needed.

For the private sector, engaging in these activities does not necessarily commit them to supporting a government position during a conflict, but enables them to define the parameters of their willingness to collaborate prior to the fact, build useful relationships and trust, and think through any legal and public relations considerations they might face.

The CSGR workshop was key in highlighting that in the man-made domain of cyber, collaboration is vital, both with allies and the private sector. As geostrategic competition in the Indo-Pacific continues to intensify, China will also be looking to the lessons of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to determine where improvements to their utilization of cyber as a tool for information warfare and disruption can be improved. China’s relationship with the private sector differs greatly to the US and its allies, where China has a higher degree of integration. While the discussion at the CSGR workshop raised the point that this reduces China’s private sector’s ability to act quicky, be agile and innovative in their activities and responses, it did not diminish the fact that the US and partners should continue to collaborate to improve their readiness in the ever-changing cyber domain.

Reconsider Using Undersea Cables as Military Sensors

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The  United States should think twice about the defense sensing potential of subsea cables.

Advancements in fiber optic technologies mean that subsea cables hold potential as undersea sensors that can detect tsunamis, earthquakes, marine life and, critically, naval vessels.

While the technology is still in its nascent stages, subsea fiber-optic cables have dual-use potential as sensors that could revolutionize naval defense intelligence, surveillance activities and serve as an early warning for the United States and its allies of unwanted foreign operations in the region.

Operationalizing dual-sensing technologies could hold significant potential for defense intelligence in the maritime domain. There are, however, potential risks that sensing technology poses to global economic and communication security, which require careful consideration.

Discussion regarding sensing capabilities for subsea cables is driven by the emergence of distributed acoustic sensing, or DAS, which is an innovative technique that relies on fiber optics to detect pressure waves emanating from acoustics of seismic activity. It requires the use of an unused fiber in the cable, known as a “dark” fiber. Light pulses are sent across the dark fiber using a specialized device called an interrogator.

Advanced signal processing can translate any fluctuations in the reflected light that the interrogator senses as it encounters defects along the fiber.

What makes the technology different to current oceanic sensing is that it doesn’t rely on discrete acoustic or seismic sensors placed along the seabed. Instead, it can potentially cover far greater distances by leveraging dark fibers in existing commercial subsea cables.

Distributed acoustic sensing has incredible potential in subsea defense activities by providing the ability to track both surface and subsurface targets. Whilst limited in range from between 30 to 60 miles at the current stage of development, the data could be effectively integrated into naval intelligence capabilities. From a practical standpoint, the use of dark fibers could impact the capacity of the subsea cables.

DAS sensing would likely be improved if an entire cable were dedicated to that purpose, as opposed to leveraging single dark fibers available in commercial cables. While the dual use aspect of the technology is still in its nascent stages, new commercial subsea cable infrastructure could eventually be leveraged for defense purposes.

Subsea cable development in the strategically important Indo-Pacific highlights the issues and risks due to the intersection of defense interests with critical commercial infrastructure development.

There are significant risks of compromising stability and eroding trust in commercial subsea cable providers if subsea cables increasingly become a point of tension in the strategic competition between China and the United States. Currently, subsea cable infrastructure accounts for 99 percent of global data traffic integral to internet, communication, financial and defense systems worldwide. Disrupting these for defense purposes could place subsea cable infrastructure at increased risk of sabotage by adversaries.

The United States has demonstrated success in routinely blocking Chinese companies — specifically HMN Tech, which has ties to Huawei and the Chinese government — from winning bids to build international cables. Currently, HMN Tech is expected to provide equipment for only 10 percent of existing and planned global cables. Three other cable suppliers — U.S.-owned SubCom and NEC and French-owned Alcatel Submarine Networks — account for approximately 90 percent of new subsea cable construction since 2017.

However, any question of commercial cables being used for defense sensing compromises the image of integrity that industry players have built, and the security and economic advantages this brings.

The market for subsea cables has almost doubled each year given the demand from content providers such as Google, Meta, Microsoft and Amazon, which rely on the cables to deliver their online and cloud services. Consequently, subsea cable industry resources are stretched thin.

As it stands, the subsea cable industry is currently reluctant to explore in depth the potential of sensing technology on commercial cables.

This reluctance is due to more pressing concerns regarding the costs of construction, availability of specialized resources including the 60 cable ships globally, waiting time for permits and costs of maintaining existing cables. The significant cost of laying subsea cables means that construction is generally supported by consortia of content providers or government entities that manage the initial and ongoing costs.

Specifically, there is concern that subsea cable securitization would result in increased regulation, malicious targeting and legal risk regarding data security.

As distributed acoustic sensing technology continues to develop, there is an opportunity for the United States and its allies to lead in engaging with industry and states to set standards regarding the use of subsea cables for sensing. Given that these nations already have a market advantage in subsea cables infrastructure development, they must ensure the technology is not misused, particularly given the intensification of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.

The subsea cable industry is an arena for international partnership, as opposed to competition. The announcement of a cofounded U.S., Australian and Japanese subsea cable connecting Micronesia is a clear example of the opportunities for collaboration with multiple beneficial outcomes.

The world relies on the interconnectivity that subsea cables provide to the global commons. It is unwise to let this vital infrastructure fall victim to the geopolitical tensions of the day.