Tag Archive for: Asia–Pacific

Thinking about the future

The topic I was given at the recent Submarine Institute of Australia conference was ‘The Strategic Environment in the period 2020-2050’. That gave me a chance to reprise in part a lecture I gave in 2010 at the Australian National University, when I was asked to prognosticate about the Asian security environment in 2050.

As Neils Bohr is reputed to have said, prediction is difficult, especially about the future. (He was half right, as we’ll see below.) But at least this was a topic on which I wasn’t handicapped by any pretence of being an expert, which would’ve increased my chances of being wrong. So I started off thinking about the lessons of history; how I would’ve done had I been asked in 1910 to talk about the European security environment in 1950. I would’ve started with the status quo; in 1910, the major powers would be those in the first column of the table below.

In 1910, I’d know about aeroplanes and submarines—and the experts of the time would assure me that while they’ll likely be of some marginal utility in warfare, they’ll be unlikely to replace, or even seriously rival, tried and tested military systems such as the newly commissioned HMS Dreadnought. And I’d know about the political and economic theory of Marx and Engels. But even if I read widely, I’d have no way of knowing about the atomic nucleus, the discovery of which was announced by Rutherford a year later.

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Australia as US satrap

Deputy SheriffThe former diplomatic mandarins of Oz think Australia is so committed to the US alliance it has mislaid its primary focus on Asia. A leading light of the ex-mandarins, John McCarthy, says Asia sees Australia as a US satrap, stating: ‘We have lost our way on Asia.’

The lament comes from a man who served as ambassador to Vietnam, Mexico, Thailand, the United States, Indonesia, Japan and India—a mandarin’s mandarin.

McCarthy says Australia’s decision not to join China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank illustrates the satrap image problem. The National Security Committee of Cabinet ruled against membership of China’s Asian bank on ‘strategic grounds’, after strong lobbying from President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. Read more

Transpacific pragmatism on cybersecurity

Cyber security in the Asia Pacific

Each year the US Department of Homeland Security holds a National Cyber Security Awareness Month. By virtue of time zones, this year’s edition got a bit of a headstart, (unofficially) kicking off in Brisbane at the 50th Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Telecommunications and Information Working Group (APECTEL50). This year saw the Security and Prosperity Steering Group (SPSG) hold an awareness-raising activity via live-webcast on issues ranging from mobile device security to adapting policing to tackle cybercrime. While a useful exercise, given the proliferation of international cyber fora, what value can APEC bring to the cybersecurity space?

Cybersecurity is a natural fit for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), with APECTEL in a clear position to own the space. The organisation has long recognised that its economic goals are dependent on the ‘integrity and security of the e-commerce environment’ and the interdependence of networked economies makes international efforts critical. And while APEC has long faced scrutiny over its existence, there’s real work to be done in smoothing economic transactions, building norms, and sharing best practices. Read more

Athens and Sparta come to the South China Sea

Prime Minister of Malaysia Najib Razak. Mr Najib's speech to the 28th Asia-pacific Roundtable was delivered in his absence, as he is currently in China commemorating the 40th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China. A few millennia after recording the basic tenets of hard-edged power politics and creating the historian’s craft, Thucydides has popped up in the South China Sea.

Malaysia’s Prime Minister has dipped into the historian, philosopher and general’s works to quote his most famous sentence on how raw power works in relations between states. Here’s how Najib Razak invoked Athens and Sparta, launching the 28th Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur:

Imagine a world where institutions, rules and norms are ignored, forgotten or cast aside; in which countries with large economies and strong armies dominate, forcing the rest to accept the outcome. This would be a world where, in the words of the Greek historian Thucydides, ‘The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’.

The theme running through my previous posts, from the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, was that trust has been lost and the region’s now desperate for a bit of law and order. The Roundtable in KL offers more of the same.

Najib’s speech kept returning to that theme of power politics usurping Asia’s order. The Prime Minister’s final line was a plea for Asia to prosper and progress by ‘observing the rules and norms and institutions we have developed and built together’.

The distance from Singapore to KL, however, is more than a 45 minute flight. At Shangri-La, Japan, the US and Australia were all vocal in labelling China the great disruptor challenging the status quo and international norms.

Not so in Malaysia’s keynote address. In Najib’s speech, China wasn’t mentioned, although the South China Sea was one of the major problems discussed. And Najib didn’t actually deliver his speech in person. The Malaysian PM has been in China to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. So mark this as a Malaysian discussion of China delivered indirectly and by inference; the old ASEAN way in action.

One irony that struck me is how Malaysian demonology has shifted. In many years of listening to speeches by Dr Mahathir, I always knew who the PM was talking about when he railed against a brutal and unprincipled superpower. Not only did the US impose its raw power on everyone else, according to Dr M, the Americans also set the unequal rules for the global economy. So the US was guilty on two counts—in the way it used its military power and the way it policed economic norms. In KL demonology now, China is the power that does what it wants and challenges ‘the norms and institutions’ Asia has built. Just don’t state that case too loudly or too directly.

Malaysia steps up next year to take the ASEAN chair and KL will inherit the job of holding ASEAN together while responding to the mounting pressure from China. KL thinks that it has an important asset in doing that job because Malaysia prides itself on having a special bilateral relationship with China; that was the motif of Najib’s China tour.

One bit of evidence KL offers for this special relationship is the fact that China has never sought to muscle-up against Malaysia over their conflicting claims in the South China Sea. It’s an interesting perspective because of what it assumes about the overall coherence of what China has been doing—monster the Philippines, challenge Vietnam but leave Malaysia alone. That presumes a China that knows exactly what it’s doing and who should be on the receiving end—the calculated imposition of power to change the system. Thucydides would understand.

Graeme Dobell is the ASPI journalist fellow. He is reporting from the 28th Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur. Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

Hard power: ‘That’s a knife!’

Chinese surveillance ships sail in formation in waters near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea.2014 is the year hard power re-emerged as the driving force in international affairs. Hard power is the actual or threatened use of military force to achieve national objectives. It’s an ugly thing, supposedly a relic of an uglier past abandoned by modern states in favour of diplomacy. But after Ukraine, Syria, the Senkakus and the South China Sea, can anyone doubt that the supposed rise of the post-modern peaceful state is an illusion? Hard power is back—indeed, it never really went away. So how should we deal with that reality?

Russia’s open military annexation of Crimea and barely-disguised subversion of Kiev’s authority in Ukraine’s eastern provinces constitute a show of hard power as naked as Hitler’s march into the Sudetenland. On the pretext of protecting ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia’s northern and western regions, the Wehrmacht occupied the Sudetenland in 1938. Hitler’s domestic status grew; Chamberlain and Europe appeased; America avoided entanglement; hard power won. The comparison with Putin’s behaviour in 2014 is irresistible. Russia will pursue its strategic objectives unconcerned about how badly that pursuit plays in the New York Times, or the Hague. Thus far, Putin must be amazed at the low price imposed on his achievements. Token sanctions amount to nothing when Western slaps-on-the-wrist are countered by massive energy deals with China. Read more

Cyber maturity in the Asia-Pacific region

Cyber metric banner croppedThe Ukraine-Russia Cyber War is Heating Up’, ‘Catastrophic Heartbleed bug exposes 60% of private internet data’, ‘NSA surveillance program reaches ‘into the past’ to retrieve, replay phone calls’. The public discussion surrounding cyberspace is fraught with dire warnings, fear mongering and outright panic. The reality is that cyberspace is as complex and multifaceted as the tactile world in which it’s entwined. While risks to privacy, assets, and even security are real, cyberspace also drives social mobility, economic empowerment, and connectivity. For this reason, to truly understand and act in cyberspace, a more comprehensive dialogue on the opportunities and pitfalls of the most unique of global commons must be developed.

Today, ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre releases its inaugural Cyber Maturity in the Asia-Pacific Region 2014 report (PDF). The report attempts to capture this complexity and organise it in a digestible manner, using metrics to provide a snapshot through which government, business, and the public alike can garner an understanding of the cyber profile of regional actors. Cataloguing hardware and capabilities provides only a thin description of the cyber domain. Maturity on the other hand looks at the presence, implementation and operation of cyber-related structures, policies, legislation and organisations. These maturity indicators encompass whole-of-government policy and legislative structures, military organisation, business and digital economic strength and levels of cyber social awareness. Read more

QDR 2014: more reassurance than worry

US ARMY GARRISON GRAFENWOEHR, Germany - U.S. Army Lt. Col. Carleton Lee, U.S. European Command exercise director receives the report of nearly 40 nations participating in exercise Combined Endeavor 2013, Sept. 12, 2013. Despite the 'rebalance' and a strong US-Australia alliance, the QDR 2014 emphasises the primacy of Europe as the US' principal partner in promoting global security.

Peter Jennings’ recent post on the 2014 QDR led me to read the report—and its 50% longer, more ambitious and less focussed 2010 predecessor.

I’ll adopt Peter’s format of worries and hopes/opportunities for Asia-Pacific allies and partners (the majority of states in this region). The 2014 document and the comparison with its predecessor left me with three worries, three reassurances/opportunities and a net assessment that the reassurances significantly outweigh the worries. Read more

Reader response: getting serious about Asia — it isn’t either/or

Evaluating Defence Minister Johnston’s address to ASPI’s national security dinner, my colleague Benjamin Schreer warns that pundits tend to over-analyse government statements. Then he dives into searching for markers of policy change. Let me do the same.

I think Ben’s right to detect signs of a new mood that the next defence white paper should focus more on Northeast Asia and less on our immediate neighbourhood. Johnston’s initial criticism of the previous government’s white paper, just six months ago, suggested he felt it got the strategy ‘in terms of our diplomatic and defence posture correct’ but funding aspects badly wrong. Since then, the way Beijing announced its ADIZ has seemed more a small chomp than what Ross Terrill calls ‘nibbling away on multiple fronts for more space and clout’. Beijing’s reaction to our reaction has alarmed us too.

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Asia Essentials: the great Chinese puzzle

China’s the great question mark, but its power isn’t in question. Pose this central conundrum of the Asia Essentials in the succinct terms of the question that Hillary Clinton put to PM Rudd in 2009: ‘How do you deal toughly with your banker’?

The words of Secretary Clinton encapsulate the American dilemma, facing a China which is both principal rival and chief economic partner. This shapes the associated Asia Essential: the US military role in Asia is still vital, but shifting relativities mean the US may no longer be the definitive power. Read more

Asia Essentials: the US chameleon must adapt again

Chameleon

The security system the US has evolved in Asia has dealt with upsets, defeats, setbacks and even the dangers of victory. The US suffered a bitter draw in Korea that’s had a half-life equal to the San Francisco treaty system, and has experienced defeat in Vietnam, the loss of the Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines and the loss of the Soviet Union as the obvious enemy—a cruel thing to have happen to an alliance system. Through it all, the US system endures. The creation of the new superbase on Guam is a major statement of 21st century intent. The pivot that turned into a rebalance notches up the volume of the statement.

Compared to the multilateral depth and unified command of NATO, the US alliances in Asia can change shape, form and colour from country to country. The previous column saw these alliances in three layers: formal treaty alliances on top, de facto or virtual alliances in the middle and the bottom layer consisting of quasi or partial alliances that could more politely be called relationships or partnerships. The various Asian customers have a choice of size, function, tempo and commitment in what they ask of the US military chameleon. Read more