The Australian government’s linear, one dimensional strategic thinking is again on open and disturbing display. It simply appears to consist of ‘three cheers for the hegemon’!

Prime Minister Turnbull recently welcomed the prospect of growing the US Navy from ‘274 ships to 350’ seemingly backing Rudy Giuliani’s suggestion that the build-up would form the basis of a strategy of confronting China with ‘a military that is modern, gigantic, overwhelming and unbelievably good at conventional and asymmetric warfare’.  That’d represent an abandonment of any possible balance of power arrangement in East Asia in favour of an aggressive assertion of the hegemonic status of the US.

Will the fiscal conservatives in Congress be willing to acquiesce to the enormous boost to the Defence Budget required to achieve a 350 ship navy? Especially given the effect of the Budget Control Act of 2011. The capital cost of the platforms will be only a fraction of the full cost that will also include weapons fit out, personnel and operating and maintenance costs. Arriving at an agreed funding base for the additional numbers consistent with constraints in the Budget Control Act could be a contested process. Any prospect for success of the planned naval expansion will probably also in part depend on whether Trump wins a second term.

Strategic events are dynamic and play out in space and time. The USN’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is already public and if fully implemented would result in a 308 ship force. To rejig this plan to accommodate that force would take significant staff work and be subject to political horse trading in Congress. The Congressional Budget Office is already at odds with the USN over the estimated cost of the current plan.  The design and acquisition process almost certainly would be time consuming, as would be the gearing up of the US shipbuilding industry to meet the new demand.

China and Russia will predictably respond to that aggressive signal. And they’ll have adequate time to do so. Tactically they could have an advantage over the US in that it’s probably easier and cheaper for China and Russia to acquire an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forces than for the US to acquire additional power projection capability. Technological innovations in A2/AD options between now and when the USN could be expanded might generate additional cost pressures for the US.

What are the strategic risks for Australia? If China took the threat seriously it could be expected that Beijing might use the gap between announcement and realisation of the naval expansion to cement its economic and political influence in the region. It’d certainly have an incentive. China could accelerate its One Belt One Road project to shift more of its economic and trade interests away from maritime East Asia. Moreover, the almost certain demise of the TTP and Trump’s general antipathy towards trade agreements leaves a huge vacuum in the Asia–Pacific trade arrangements that China will almost certainly move to fill to its advantage.

Australia is now exposed. The Prime Minister’s uncritical cleaving to the US threat to confront China with overwhelming military force in East Asia, irrespective of whether it eventuates or not, can only negatively affect relations with Beijing. That’s indeed the strategic paradox Australia now faces. Australia’s support for the incoming Trump administration’s more hostile stance towards China will have been noticed by Beijing. Relations between China and Australia could worsen on the trade and investment fronts and China might be tempted to squeeze Australia out of any future regional economic arrangements.

Assuming the new Trump administration is successful and sticks to the expansion plan, Washington will try to translate Australian enthusiasm into concrete actions. The size of the naval build-up would require significant forward basing and extensive support facilities in-theatre. Is Australia prepared to homeport major US naval vessels, including nuclear powered and armed platforms? Are Australians willing  to become a high priority target if the strategic competition between China and the US evolves into a hot war?

Perhaps not. The Lowy 2016 survey found that almost half (45%) of Australians believed ‘Australia should distance itself from the United States if it elects a president like Donald Trump’. A bare majority (51%) agreed Australia ‘should remain close … regardless of who is elected US President’.

Turnbull’s motive in backing a more aggressive US stance against China was presumably driven by domestic politics. But any move towards a future hegemonic stance by the US will only increase the likelihood of conflict with China. This should be a time for nuance and sophistication in Australia’s foreign and defence policies rather than unvarnished support for ill-judged strategic ambitions.

On 20 January 2017, Donald Trump will be sworn in as America’s 45th president. I’m not expecting an immediate revolution in strategic affairs; his priorities will be unashamedly domestic. Indeed, like most politicians—who campaign in poetry and govern in prose—I suspect the new president will spend the first year getting on top of his portfolio and letting his appointees do the same.

The outpouring of vitriol that’s followed Trump’s election reflects in part the sudden disappointment of Clinton’s supporters shocked at the outcome. But Trump’s not Hitler or Mussolini; dictatorship hasn’t come to the US; the republic isn’t dead, and neither is its Constitution. (For those wanting to ‘locate’ Trump in the vast gallery of US leaders, Walter Russell Mead’s depiction of Trump as a Jacksonian is an interesting read.)

Trump’s a dealer. And, as P.J. Harvey once observed, dealers don’t live on the moral high ground. So as president he won’t be much like Barack Obama. In foreign affairs he’ll be more of a politician and less of a statesman. In defence policy he’s already signalled a preference for using force massively or not at all—a classic preference of military leaders rather than civilian ones.

But it’s already clear that ‘America First’ will be the long pole in Trump’s strategic tent. That’s his natural instinct, and it aligns with both the preferences of the US public, and an international structure of growing—if uneven—multipolarity. He’s not going to walk away from US alliances, least of all the ANZUS alliance which ties together three members of the close-knit ‘five-eyes community’. But he has put allies on notice that he expects them to carry more of their weight. And that leaves him an important and immediate task of assurance—convincing America’s partners that the US still has their backs. The dimensions of that challenge shouldn’t be underestimated.

It’s now not only possible but likely that the US will be absorbed in an agenda of ‘America First’ while large-scale strategic transformation plays out in Asia. That’s worrying, and not just for us. Indeed, our worries will probably seem trivial to US allies living closer to authoritarian great powers, or to risk-tolerant adversaries like North Korea. At a minimum, an America focused on domestic priorities will encourage Asian nations to hedge more intensively. At a maximum, it might lead to a cascade of nuclear proliferation both within and beyond the region, an event which would signal the death of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and render impotent any UN-led negotiations to ban nuclear weapons.

Why would nuclear weapons—the symbols of an earlier age of total war—suddenly look so appealing? Basically because there’s not a wide range of alternatives. Academics write a lot about the growing ‘webs’ of intra-Asian security cooperation—webs that are supposed to complement the hub-and-spokes ‘wheels’ of current US alliances—but in reality there’s less to multilateral security cooperation in Asia than meets the eye. Whatever cooperation does exist is clustered at the confidence-building end of the spectrum; actual agreements to come to each other’s aid in the event of an attack don’t exist.

Look at Australia’s own options. If we judged that the ANZUS treaty was becoming a less reliable guarantor of our security, where would we source new increments of security? From other US allies caught up in a similar predicament to our own? From other Asian middle powers, with whom we’d hope to make common cause in the future though we seldom did in the past? Well, yes, we might do a little more of each. But surely the conclusion we’d quickly come to would be that the fastest way to add serious strategic ballast to our own position would be through a small arsenal of, say, 20 nuclear warheads, plus a credible delivery vehicle. That Australia would look a whole lot less vulnerable to coercion than the Australia we have today. If we do think a ‘come-as-you-are’ war is a real possibility in Asia, it’s an option even we might want to think about.

On the other side of the ledger, Trump might well be a driver for an era of US reinvigoration. That’d be good news—albeit over the longer term. Even Obama came to power promising to rebuild the US middle class. Back in 2009 he argued that a strong middle class had been the basis of US global dominance in the 20th century, and would be again in the 21st. But the US middle class didn’t recover under Obama—indeed, it shrank. So, if Trump can pull that off, he’d chalk up some serious strategic kudos, as well as political and economic ones.

What’s our best strategic course? Well, ANZUS has no termination date. As Article X says, it’s meant to last indefinitely. So my money is on its still being there when Donald Trump’s presidency has come and gone. But we’d be wise to think through our other options for strengthening Australia’s position in a shifting regional order.

Professor Desmond Ball AO, a towering figure of issues strategic and defence, passed away on Wednesday after a long illness. While Graeme Dobell will reflect on Des’ enormous impact in his Monday column, a few key links follow here. First, in this cracking 2012 interview (51 mins) Des talked about his contemporaries and mentors, the obligations of the academy (including the importance of championing the next generation of thinkers), and the contributions and controversies of his career, among others topics. The interview was tied to the release of a collection of essays in Des’ honour, titled ‘Insurgent Intellectual’ (available here, and also written-up in the SMH). He was a central figure in the life of ANU’s SDSC, having once headed the Centre, which this week released A National Asset, a book of essays reflecting on the SDSC at 50. Des, too, was a national asset—an unalloyed pioneer, a fearless scholar, a warm and generous man. Vale Des Ball.

This time next month American voters will have cast their ballots. This week brought the launch of 30 days, 30 songs, a campaign by Artists for a Trump-free America, which kicked off with Death Cab for Cutie’s effort, Million Dollar Loan. On the Trump candidacy, two short clips from the recent New Yorker Festival: one from comedians Sarah Silverman and Andy Borowitz; the other, a panel on Trump’s first term. This was also the week that Foreign Policy endorsed a Presidential candidate in Hillary Rodham Clinton—the first time the magazine has done so. Another from FP: an exceedingly useful 18 Questions feature, released in advance of the second “debate” held last Monday.

Three key reads: first, from The Conversation, an absorbing piece on sound as a weapon to foment fear, from the biblical Battle of Jericho through to the sirens of WW2 dive-bombers though to drones, sonic weapons and music torture (feat. Black Sabbath and Britney Spears). Second, a long read on social media in war from the cover of The Atlantic. And third, continuing his savvy hunt for new media opportunities, President Barack Obama has guest edited the November issue of Wired. Check out his optimistic essay here.

Kicking off this week’s smorgasbord of fresh research is this excellent longer publication from CSIS (PDF) on the future of US–India security cooperation under the next administration—notably recommending that the Oval Office occupant meets with Indian PM Narendra Modi within their first 100 days on the job. A brand new report from RAND recommends that the US should use a military strategy that embraces a preventative form of A2AD to defeat the A2AD challenges of potential US adversaries—based on case studies involving China, Russia and Iran. For your weekly dose of AI, check out this new commentary from RSIS (PDF) which argues the benefits of using advanced robotics to enforce the law. And a new study from ICSR (PDF) recommends a re-think of radicalisation based on findings about the convergence between criminal and jihadist social environments.

And finally, Thailand is in mourning this week after the passing of 88-year-old King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who held the Thai throne for over 70 years. The Economist has a fascinating piece that looks at the career of King Bhumibol and the uncertain succession planning process. But from this sad news for Thailand comes a lighter story from Foreign Policy on the controversial miniature white poodle named Air Chief Marshal Foo Foo, who was owned by the now-heir to the throne, Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn.

Podcasts

In the latest episode of War on the Rocks’ new podcast series ‘Pacific Pundit’ (29 mins), host Van Jackson focuses on a handful of prominent trilaterals that are shaping the Asia–Pacific. From the demise of ANZUS to the challenges of China–Japan–ROK cooperation, as well as an overview of the success rate of trilateral negotiations, the show is definitely worth a listen for any geopolitics wonk.

CSIS has released a brand new podcast series, ‘Building the Future: Freedom, Prosperity and Foreign Policy,’ hosted by Dan Runde. There are three episodes out already, each showcasing a different aspect of global development, foreign policy and US national security. Keep an eye on the site for new releases!

Videos

In an epic 2-hour long special, Frontline delves into US efforts to undermine and confront ISIS in the Middle East. With footage from Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey showing how each state is coping with the strain of the terrorist group, this video is a must-watch.

In his weekly interview series, Charlie Rose sat down with John Carlin—who’s nearing the end of his time as the US assistant attorney general for national security—to discuss government responses to cyber security threats and counterterrorism. Check out the interview here (55 mins).

Events

Canberra: Fresh of the back of a visit from CNAS president Richard Fontaine, Canberrans can hear another mind from the DC outfit, Patrick Cronin, tackle some of the prickly questions on order and leadership in the Asia–Pacific. Get along on 24 October.

Sydney: The University of Sydney China Studies Centre’s crown jewel, the 2016 Sydney China Business Forum, will also take place on 24 October—and tickets are selling fast. Expect discussion on China’s economic transformation and the future of China–Australia business relations.

In mid-March 1996, about two weeks after the federal election that brought John Howard’s Coalition to power, the new defence minister Ian McLachlan set off in a RAAF VIP plane to visit some of the more out-of-the-way parts of his new portfolio. The CDF, General John Baker, and I went along, to take advantage of the long hours in the air to talk over with him some of the big issues he would be dealing with. It was an engaging task, because the new minister, though no expert on defence, was quick, tough, sometimes quirky and always a pleasure to deal with. We haven’t had a better defence minister since, and only one who was as good. McLachlan was the true father of ASPI.

Somewhere over the Gibson Desert, flying from Alice Springs to Geraldton, during a long discussion about the US alliance, McLachlan suddenly changed the subject. ‘Look, this is all fascinating, and I’m impressed by what you both have to say about it all. But I do not want to rely only on you and your colleagues for advice. I want to get expert advice from others as well—from outside Defence. Who can I talk to?’

It was an interesting question. John Baker and I replied that while lots of people talked about defence, very few outside the Defence Organisation itself really addressed the big policy choices that Governments actually face, especially about capability priorities and the alignment with strategic objectives and funding. Defence was, we explained, one of the last areas of policy where there was no sustained contest of ideas between the bureaucracy and experts outside it. ‘Well’, McLachlan said in his brisk and rather patrician way, ‘we must change that. Please put some ideas together about how that can be done’. And so the seed was sown.

Of course it took another five years for the idea to bear fruit, by which time McLachlan had left Defence and retired from politics. One might have expected his idea to die with his departure. Instead it survived and flourished because it was picked up and pursued quite vigorously by his successor, John Moore, and by John Howard himself. And it’s worth asking ‘why?’ ASPI today has an air of inevitably as an established and respected part of the defence and security landscape. But why did three politicians as different as McLachlan, Moore and Howard—and they were very different characters—all put real effort into making ASPI happen?

After all, there were always going to be risks and costs including, in particular, significant political risks. When in 2000 the Cabinet came to decide to actually establish the institute in its current form, real concerns were raised about the problems ASPI might cause when, as seemed inevitable at least occasionally, it published views contrary to the Government’s. Howard especially was never one to take such risks lightly, so why did they push ahead?

To answer that question we need to recall that in their mind ASPI’s primary purpose wasn’t to contribute to public debates about defence policy, but to provide an alternative source of policy ideas for government. This was plainly set out in the cabinet submissions and decisions, and in the public presentation of the initiative. The aim was to help government itself make better defence decisions.

Now that seems rather strange. One gets little sense that today’s governments feel much doubt about the quality of their defence decision-making, or much interest in hearing and debating alternative views. Indeed one gets little sense that politicians on either side of the aisle think much about defence policy at all. So what was different back then?

I think one can spot three factors. First, in the mid-to-late 1990s people’s approach to defence policy was still heavily influenced by the examples and standards set in the 1970s and 1980s. These were exemplified perhaps most strikingly by the Dibb Review, which was published just a decade before that conversation over the Gibson Desert. Compare the rigour, clarity and detailed argument of the Dibb Review, and the 1987 White Paper that followed it, with the sloppy rhetoric of our three more recent White Papers and you will see how different expectations were.

Second, as the ASPI seed was germinating in the mid to late-1990s Australian leaders were becoming increasingly aware that some of the assumptions underlying the policies of the 1970s and 1980s were no longer valid. Already they saw how two big trends—instability in our near neighbourhood and the shifting major-power balance in Asia—required new policy responses. Ministers like McLachlan, Moore and Howard wanted and expected those new responses to be developed and debated with the same rigour and discipline shown in the Dibb Review, and they saw the kind of contestability that ASPI could provide as central to that.

But then, third, the politics of defence and security were transformed. In the 1990s these were really politics-free zones, but that all changed within a few weeks of ASPI’s formal establishment in August 2001. After 9/11 these issues moved to the centre of national politics, and came to define John Howard’s leadership. Looking strong on national security became the key political imperative, and no one wanted to think too carefully about whether the things they were doing to look strong made any real policy sense. The quality of defence policy slumped, and demand from government for independent policy advice largely evaporated. ASPI’s focus inevitably swung round to contributing to public debates not government policy-making.

This it has done very successfully. But the imperative for a lively contest of policy ideas within government is even more urgent now than it was when McLachlan first expressed it over the Gibson Desert. To fulfil his vision, Governments need to start asking ASPI—and others—to nourish their own thinking about defence in a much more vigorous way.

Hillary Rodham Clinton today delivered her speech to close the 2016 Democratic National Convention, and in doing so made history (herstory?) as the first woman to officially clinch a major party’s nomination for President of the United States. It’s been a huge week for #DemsInPhilly, with well-received speeches from Barack and Michelle Obama, Bill Clinton, Joe Biden (‘malarkey!’), Tim Kaine, Lena Dunham, Michael Bloomberg and a stack of others. Here’s the fact-check on HRC’s speech. As with #RNCinCLE, superbrain Andrew Sullivan was closely tracking developments for New York magazine (nights 1, 2, 3 and 4). Having been on the public radar since her Wellesley commencement address 47 years ago, plenty has been said and spilled about Clinton. One piece that’s particularly worthwhile weekend reading is Hating Hillary, a 1996 profile published in The New Yorker.

If you needed a reminder that The Donald has no serious international advisors, look no further than his off-the-chain comments inviting Russia to meddle in the US election process. The piece in The New York Times was the most commented on article in the masthead’s history. The astounding development was captured by two editorials in The Times, first in reaction to Trump’s announcement, and then on the Putin–Trump admiration society. (Also, the Putin–Trump fallacy in the NYRB.) Vox has an explainer, while DefenseOne has a piece on Putin’s ‘best summer ever’.

Two useful terrorism picks this week. First, CNN has done some legwork to map ISIS’s actions and impact, with the headline finding that 143 attacks in 29 countries (other than Iraq and Syria) have killed 2,043 people. (Related: this NYT interactive on the human toll of terror.) And second, Anthony Cordesman of CSIS has published a new report on terror trends and metrics in 2016.

The National Bureau of Asian Research has been pumping out the goods this week with three excellent new reports on developments in the Asia–Pacific. The latest edition of the Bureau’s peer-reviewed journal Asia Policy was released earlier this week, and includes pieces on Sino-Indian strategic competition in the Ocean, Chinese economic diplomacy and how Japan might securitize the TPP, among many others. Be sure to keep an eye out for a couple of ANU heavies offering their thoughts. A second piece of analysis looks at the prospects of improving US–ROK–Japan trilateralism and offers some policy recommendations pitched at the three countries’ leadership, and the third examines the impacts of low oil prices on the Asia–Pacific’s natural gas sector.

Also in the region, for the second time this year, Indonesian President Joko Widodo has reshuffled his cabinet, booting out 13 ministers who were either overly invested in reformist policies or involved in public controversies. Significantly for Canberra, Trade Minister Thomas Lembong has been demoted after attempting to reform Indonesia’s protectionist stance on trade—with potential implications for the FTA Indonesia and Australia hoped to finalise by 2017. For a good run-down on who’s in and who’s out, check out this commentary from RSIS, along with this wider overview of Jokowi’s balancing act between the interests of reformists and elites from Future Directions.

Finally, an open letter from someone who is definitely not Vladimir Putin urging American voters to vote Trump, and #NeverHillary. And a piece from someone who definitely isn’t Hillary Clinton.

Podcast

The excellent Global Dispatches podcast had an interview (30 mins) earlier this month featuring UN Secretary General candidate and former Prime Minister of New Zealand Helen Clark. Clark delves into her pathway to politics and some of the most significant foreign policy decisions she made during her time as PM. (A little closer to home, Kevin Rudd’s own bid for the UN’s top job took a nose-dive today as the PM ruled out nominating K-Rudd for the position. See this piece from Greg Sheridan on why we’re at ‘a truly pathetic moment.’)

Videos

To mark the release of their recent report on male guardianship in Saudi Arabia, Human Rights Watch has pulled together a series of snappy cartoon vids to illustrate their advocacy. The spots are available here, along with a piece which captures the practical impacts of the law.

This week, US Defense Secretary Ash Carter and Joint Chiefs chairman General Joseph Dunford gave a press conference on US goals in the fight against Daesh and the potential escalation of military cooperation with Russia on the ground in Syria. Check out footage of the briefing here (36 mins).

Events

Canberra: Want to get your head around how India is viewing Beijing’s One Belt One Road and Maritime Silk Road initiatives? Look no further than the ANU’s upcoming event with Jayant Prasad, Director General of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi. Head along next Wednesday evening.

Melbourne: Join ASPI and RMIT for a joint symposium on the future of innovation in Australia’s defence industry on 1 September. There’s only two weeks left to register, so get in now!