Tag Archive for: Asia & the Pacific

When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia

China’s covert foreign interference activities in the Pacific are a very important, and yet under-researched, topic. This report uses New Caledonia as the case study to examine China’s hidden front, 隐蔽战线, throughout the wider Pacific.

Successive months of violence and unrest in New Caledonia in 2024, have heightened regional and international awareness of the uncertain future of the territory, and the role of China in that future. The unrest erupted after France pushed through legislation extending voting rights in the territory.

The CCP has engaged in a range of foreign interference activities in New Caledonia over many decades, targeting political and economic elites, and attempting to utilise the ethnic Chinese diaspora and PRC companies as tools of CCP interests. Local elites have at times actively courted China’s assistance, willingly working with CCP front organisations.

Assessing the extent of China’s foreign interference in New Caledonia is a legitimate and necessary inquiry. The debate about China’s interests, intentions and activities in the territory has lacked concrete, publicly available evidence until now. This study aims to help fill that lacuna. The report draws on open-source data collection and analysis in Chinese, French and English. It was also informed by interviews and discussions that took place during my visits to New Caledonia and France in 2018, 2019, 2022 and 2023, as well as conversations in New Zealand.

My research shows that the French Government and New Caledonian authorities are working to manage risks in the China – New Caledonia relationship. Moreover, civil society, the New Caledonian media, many politicians, and Kanak traditional leadership have also had a role in restraining the extent of the CCP’s foreign interference activities in New Caledonia. Few Pacific Island peoples would welcome a relationship of dependency with China or having the Pacific become part of a China-centred order.

The report concludes by recommending that New Caledonia be included in all regional security discussions as an equal partner. New Caledonia needs to rebalance its economy and it needs help with the rebuild from the riots. Supportive partner states should work with France and New Caledonia to facilitate this.

Ice panda: navigating China’s hybrid Antarctic agenda

Antarctica is often overlooked in strategic discussions, but its role in geopolitical competition deserves attention.

This report assesses the continents importance to Australian security, China’s hybrid Antarctic activity, and the need for Australia to develop a balancing strategy capable of bolstering the Antarctic Treaty and ‘pushing back’ against growing Chinese power in Antarctica.

Antarctica offers significant strategic advantages for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Although Beijing’s actions in Antarctica may not overtly violate the Antarctic Treaty (AT), they effectively undermine its principles and, by extension, Australia’s strategic interests. Currently, the PRC is adeptly navigating the AT System to challenge the status quo without explicitly breaching the treaty.

China’s domestic policies, which merge civil and military sectors, appear to contravene the spirit of the AT’s military prohibitions, even if they have not yet resulted in direct military activity on the continent. This evolving dynamic underscores the pressing need for Australia to safeguard the existing Antarctic status quo.

With robust Australian foreign and security prioritization, the AT can counter Beijing’s growing ambitions, which may directly impact Australian interests. We must protect and uphold the principles of the AT.

With diverse domestic and international priorities, Australia must not neglect Antarctica, as Beijing continues to exploit the strategic gap left by our limited focus. Australia, with its rich history and commitment to Antarctica, must assert its role as an Antarctic claimant and clarify that China’s presence is contingent on Australian and other claimants’ cooperation. It’s time for Australia to lead in Antarctica and protect our strategic interests.

The geopolitics of water: How the Brahmaputra River could shape India–China security competition

This report assesses the geopolitical impact of a possible dam at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra. In particular, it exams the dam as a potential source of coercive leverage China may gain over India. A dam there would create four likely strategic effects: it would very likely consolidate Beijing’s political control over its distant borderlands; it would create the potential for massive flooding as a tool of violence; it may affect human settlement and economic patterns on the Indian side of the border, downstream; and it would give Beijing water and data that it could withhold from India as bargaining leverage in unrelated negotiations.

To mitigate those challenges and risks, the report provides three policy recommendations for the Indian Government and its partners in Australia and the US. First, it recommends the establishment of an open-source, publicly available data repository, based on satellite sensing, to disseminate information about the physical impacts of the Great Bend Dam. Second, it recommends that like-minded governments use international legal arguments to pressure Beijing to abide by global norms and conventions. Third, it recommends that the Quad—the informal group comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US—use its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) guidelines to begin to share information and build capacity for dam-related contingencies.

Full tilt: The UK’s defence role in the Pacific: Views from The Strategist

Britain has a new prime minister, Keir Starmer, leading its first Labour government in 14 years. Key questions for us now are how Britain under Labour will approach the security partnership with Australia and whether London will remain committed to investing defence resources in the Indo-Pacific.

This report provides vital context for addressing these questions. In this series of articles, originally published in ASPI’s The Strategist this year, ASPI authors review the historical underpinnings and future course of Britain’s strategic recoupling with Australia and this region, especially the Pacific Islands, from perspectives ranging from deterrence to climate resilience.

The report makes some recommendations for how to strengthen the Australia-UK defence partnership and shape Britain’s approach to our region.

North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 9

The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 9, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months.

Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include;

1. Defence in the North,

2. Developing Northern Australia,

3. Northern Australia and the Indo-Pacific

4. Critical Minerals, Energy, and Commodities,

5. Space, Food Security and Climate Trends

As in previous editions, Volume 9 contains a range of expert opinions across these varied topics.

Volume 9 also features a foreword by the Hon. Eva Lawler, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Lawler calls readers attention to the relevance of northern Australia in light of the National Defence Strategy and updated Integrated Investment Program as well as Australia’s economic ambitions, stating “the strategies in this volume can inform our efforts to unlock northern Australia’s full potential and build a stronger, more resilient nation.”

The 36 articles discuss practical policy solutions for decision makers facilitating development, prosperity and security of northern Australia. These policy solutions tackle both the challenges and opportunities present in the north, and reflect the potential of the north to increasingly contribute to Australia’s national security and economic prosperity.

Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is delighted to share its latest report – the result of a multi-year project on Artificial Intelligence (AI), technical standards and diplomacy – that conducts a deep-dive into the important, yet often opaque and complicated world of technical standards.

At the heart of how AI technologies are developed, deployed and used in a responsible manner sit a suite of technical standards: rules, guidelines and characteristics that ensure the safety, security and interoperability of a product.

The report authors highlight that the Indo-Pacific, including Australia and India, are largely playing catch-up in AI standards initiatives. The United States and China are leading the pack, followed by European nations thanks to their size, scope and resources of their national standardisation communities as well as their domestic AI sectors.

Not being strongly represented in the world of AI governance and technical standards is a strategic risk for Indo-Pacific nations. For a region that’s banking on the opportunities of a digital and technology-enabled economy and has large swathes of its population in at-risk jobs, it’s a matter of national and economic security that Indo-Pacific stakeholders are active and have a big say in how AI technologies will operate and be used.

Being part of the conversations and negotiations is everything, and as such, governments in the Indo-Pacific – including Australia and India – should invest more in whole-of-nation techdiplomacy capabilities.

Authored by analysts at ASPI and India’s Centre for Internet and Society, this new report ‘Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence: A techdiplomacy playbook for policymakers and technologists in the Indo-Pacific’ – and accompanying website (https://www.techdiplomacy.aspi.org.au/) – explains the current state of play in global AI governance, looks at the role of technical standards, outlines how agreements on technical standards are negotiated and created, and describes who are the biggest ‘movers and shakers’.

The authors note that there are currently no representatives from Southeast Asia (except Singapore), Australia, NZ or the Pacific Islands on the UN Secretary-General Advisory Body on AI – a body that’s tasked to come up with suggestions on how to govern AI in a representative and inclusive manner with an eye to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

The capacity of the Indo-Pacific to engage in critical technology standards has historically been lower in comparison to other regions. However, given the rapid and global impact of AI and the crucial role of technical standards, the report authors argue that dialogue and greater collaboration between policymakers, technologists and civil society has never been more important.

It is hoped this playbook will help key stakeholders – governments, industry, civil society and academia – step through the different aspects of negotiating technical standards for AI, while also encouraging the Indo-Pacific region to step up and get more involved.

Deterrence, escalation and strategic stability: Rebuilding Australia’s muscle memory

To build an effective deterrence strategy, Australia needs urgently to improve its skills and understanding of deterrence, and raise the topic’s profile in our public and policy discussions. Despite having previously been a global thought leader on nuclear weapons and deterrence half a century ago, Australia today doesn’t have a strong grasp of the basics of modern deterrence.

Knowledge of and literacy in deterrence are vital for adapting and applying such concepts to meet today’s extraordinarily complex, multidomain and multidimensional requirements. A lack of understanding of deterrence can critically undermine the ability to get strategy and policy right. The implications for Australia’s national interests are urgent and serious. The limited debate in Australia about what good deterrence strategy looks like and its key components can’t be advanced without better understanding of key terms and ideas that are fundamental to deterrence theory and practice.

There are, of course, obvious limits to what Australia can achieve alone. Our ability to integrate and combine our military capabilities with those of the US and other critical partners is fundamental to our ability to achieve our security objectives, but some of our partners are working more closely together on building deterrence strategies. We have some catching up to do.

This report explains what deterrence is and why it matters. It looks at Australian deterrence policy in practice and at deterrence efforts by some of our partners and allies and it highlights a number of gaps in Australia’s strategic and deterrence planning.

The report makes a series of policy recommendations for government, and especially for the Department of Defence, to rebuild Australia’s position as a thought leader on deterrence.

Truth and reality with Chinese characteristics

Chinese, French and Spanish translations are now available.

Executive Summary

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is leveraging its propaganda system to build a toolkit to enable information campaigns. Its objective is to control communication and shape narratives and perceptions about China in order to present a specific version of truth and reality, both domestically and internationally. Ultimately, the CCP aims to strengthen its grip on power, legitimise its activities and bolster China’s cultural, technological, economic and military influence.

The CCP seeks to maintain total control over the information environment within China, while simultaneously working to extend its influence abroad to reshape the global information ecosystem. That includes not only controlling media and communications platforms outside China, but also ensuring that Chinese technologies and companies become the foundational layer for the future of information and data exchange worldwide.

This research report finds that the CCP seeks to harvest data from various sources, including commercial entities, to gain insights into target audiences for its information campaigns. We define an information campaign as a targeted, organised plan of related and integrated information operations, employing information-related capabilities (tools, techniques or activities) with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt or manipulate information — including the individual or collective decision making based on that information — and deliberately disseminated on a large scale. The party also invests in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and immersive technologies that shape how people perceive reality and engage with information. The aim is to gain greater control, if not dominance, over the global information ecosystem.

To understand the drivers, tools and outcomes of that process, this report and its accompanying website (ChinaInfoBlocks.aspi.org.au) examine the activities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the information domain, particularly its investments in technology and research and development (R&D) companies that might serve as ‘building blocks’ for the party’s information campaigns.

Specifically, this research comprehensively maps the CCP’s propaganda system, highlighting the linkages between the Central Propaganda Department, state-owned or -controlled propaganda entities and data-collection activities, and technology investments in Chinese companies, many of which now operate globally.

This research illustrates the various ways in which the party-state is leveraging the propaganda system and commercial entities to gain access to data that it deems strategically valuable for the propaganda system and its ongoing information operations. It also shows how the propaganda system uses new and emerging technologies, including generative AI, mobile gaming and immersive technologies, to establish and maintain control of the narrative and continuously refine its toolbox and techniques.

It’s imperative that policymakers develop robust defences and countermeasures against future disruptive information campaigns from Beijing and to ensure an open and secure global information environment. In mapping those companies linked to China’s propaganda system that are seeking market dominance in key technologies, and how their activities may support CCP efforts to shape the global information environment, this project aims to inform government and industry decisions on digital supply-chain security, supporting policies for safer and more secure digital technologies.

The first section of this report lays out the fundamentals of CCP theory that have, over decades, defined the party-state’s strategy in the information domain. A theoretical understanding of how the CCP conceptualises its goals is important in unpacking the different tools used to achieve them. The second section outlines the CCP’s complex and vast propaganda system and how it works. Later sections expand on the ways in which CCP theory underpins the propaganda system and its activities, including through practical examples and case studies.

This report is accompanied by a website that offers detailed network diagrams of the relationships between China’s propaganda system and the companies associated with it: directly, through a state-ownership structure linking back to the propaganda system, or indirectly, through significant state support. The website also hosts case studies relevant to the report findings. The map can be explored on the website, Identifying The Building Blocks of China’s Information Campaigns (ChinaInfoBlocks.aspi.org.au).

figure 1
Source: Screenshot of ChinaInfoBlocks.aspi.org.au dataset, ASPI.

Research methodology

The CCP’s propaganda efforts on social media have been widely studied, enabling a baseline understanding of common narratives and tactics. Previous ASPI research, for example, has tracked a persistent, large-scale influence campaign linked to Chinese state actors on Twitter and Facebook.1 Several other research institutes have published important research on how the Chinese party-state attempts to control the information environment globally.2

China’s propaganda system is a vast structure. Under its direct control or with its direct support are a web of additional entities whose portfolio contributes to the party’s ability to meet its strategic aims in the information environment. Countries that understand the ‘invisible architecture’ of the CCP’s propaganda system and technologies will be better able to address and respond to its global efforts to skew the information environment.

Important research questions remain understudied. In particular, research on the building blocks that need to be in place to support and inform successful efforts to shape the information environment is limited. What’s the Chinese party-state doing to build its capacity to control ‘truth’ and influence how external audiences perceive, engage with and question reality?

To bridge that knowledge gap, this project examines how the party-state is leveraging the propaganda system:

  1. through commercial entities, by collecting data or gaining access to datasets that it deems strategically valuable that could be used for propaganda purposes, including potentially for current or future information operations (for example, undertaking data-collection activities that build the party-state’s capacity to generate insights on current or potential targets of information operations)
  2. through state support, by investing in R&D and access to new and emerging technology to shape or distort the information environment both domestically and globally.

Our project is based on ASPI’s 2019 report, Engineering global consent. That report first identified Global Tone Communications Technology (GTCOM), a machine-translation company that’s controlled by the CCP Central Propaganda Department. GTCOM claims that it accesses data from social media and has downstream access to datasets of the internet of things (IoT) and software products that it supplies, mainly to other PRC technology companies, to generate insights to support China’s state security and propaganda work.3

Building on Engineering global consent, we’ve sought to identify and explain how the Chinese party-state’s expansive propaganda system exploits new and emerging technologies and seeks to shape or distort the information environment both domestically and globally. To answer these questions, we generated network graphs describing the relationships between companies in our dataset, which are mostly Chinese state-owned or backed by state funds, with direct links to the propaganda system and other entities. We used that research to better understand areas of business activity associated with the PRC’s propaganda system, especially when such activity is related to data collection, aggregation and processing.

Our research effort involved identifying entities linked to the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee (‘the Central Propaganda Department’), provincial-level propaganda departments, or other party-state bodies linked to the propaganda system, such as the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. This project began with a months-long effort to build a network graph of companies that were directly and indirectly linked to the Central Propaganda Department. Our research included looking for subsidiaries, shareholders and strategic cooperation and MoU partners of the companies we identified. Our information sources focused on PRC-based company databases and shareholders, and included company websites, company press releases and corporate disclosure documents. We then narrowed the scope of our research to focus on the specific case studies covered in this report.

Party-state news and publishing outlets were included in our research because the Central Propaganda Department is responsible for the supervision of news and publishing work, and those outlets are key platforms for disseminating information. However, rather than simply mapping out the names of media and publishing outlets, and their publication outputs domestically in China and overseas, our research emphasis was on identifying where those outlets are establishing branches or partnerships that expand their business activity into areas of business related to new and emerging technology.

While this research has revealed large amounts of previously inaccessible information on Chinese companies with links to the CCP’s propaganda institutions, it relies on publicly available information sources that are accessible outside mainland China. Continued research on these connections, as well as on connections between these types of companies and other parts of the party-state bureaucracy, is required.

Key findings

The report places the PRC’s propaganda system in the context of the CCP’s overall strategic frameworks, which are filtered down to specific policy outputs. Key findings are as follows:

  • The Chinese party-state sees data as central to its ability to modernise its propaganda efforts in the global information environment. Unlike the legislation of other state actors, China’s 2021 Data Security Law clearly articulates a vision for how data and data exchanges contribute to an overall national strategy (see ‘The propaganda system and its feedback loop’ at page 13). It prioritises data access and the regulation of data flows as part of its efforts to ensure control.
    – That data is global. For example, China’s People’s Public Opinion Cloud combines about half a million information sources across 182 countries and 42 languages to support the Chinese Government’s and PRC enterprises’ international communication needs.4 The platform has both government and corporate applications and provides tools for public-security agencies to monitor the information environment and public sentiment on sensitive events and topics.5
  • The CCP sees emerging technology, such as e-commerce, virtual reality and gaming, as a means to promote a CCP-favoured perspective on truth and reality that supports the official narrative that the CCP seeks to project (even if those technologies may also be potentially hazardous to the party’s interests). This is especially true in relation to the CCP’s ability to conduct information campaigns and shape global information standards and foundational technologies.
    – The CCP’s national key cultural export enterprises and projects lists (both the 2021–22 and 2022–2023 versions), name dozens of mobile gaming companies and mobile games that receive state support (see ‘The perception of reality’ at page 19), including subsidies, so that they can continue to enjoy global success and help advance the mission to boost China’s cultural soft power.
    – In e-commerce, for example, companies such as Temu (which became the most-downloaded free iPhone app in the US in 20236) also collect large amounts of data that’s likely to be shared with the PRC’s propaganda system.7 In gaming, popular video games such as Genshin Impact, the developers of which receive Chinese state support linked to the propaganda system, create similar security risks due to the strategic value of the user data that they generate and collect.
  • Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the CCP has renewed its emphasis on a national strategy of media convergence that brings together traditional and ‘emerging’ media across various dimensions—content, channels, platforms, operations and management—to enhance the agility of propaganda initiatives in responding to real-time shifts in public sentiment.8 Media convergence is directly linked to the perception that an absence of guidance on public opinion risks China’s security and stability. The party uses digital media, particularly the data resources that digital media help to generate, to improve its ability to use media effectively in its communications strategy and to create feedback loops in China and internationally.9

Policy recommendations

Policymakers face two key challenges: first, to apply the CCP’s way of thinking to efforts to counter information campaigns, before they’re conducted; and, second, to resist China’s efforts to shape global information standards and core foundational technologies for Web 2.0 and beyond.10

Informed by the findings contained in this report, we make the following recommendations for governments, civil society, social-media platforms and hardware and software developers and vendors:

  1. Governments should exert pressure on technology companies to conduct more thorough reviews of their digital supply chains to ensure that their Web 2.0 and future Web 3.0 foundations, and the companies and technologies that they rely on, are transparent and secure. Improving due diligence, transparency, trust and security by design in the digital supply chain, at both the technology and systems/applications layers, must be considered, especially for companies engaged in government procurements. That can be achieved by imposing more stringent reporting requirements, developing high-risk vendor frameworks, imposing and enforcing privacy and data requirements, and developing consistent data-minimisation approaches. Already the US and partner nations have sought to enhance software security by requiring companies working with governments to provide software ‘bills of materials’. The Quad Cybersecurity Partnership’s ‘joint principles for secure software’11 is an excellent template for considering enhanced transparency regulation.
    – Technology companies, including vendors, platforms and developers should commit and adhere to the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, develop security by design standards, and impose greater moderation and fact-checking standards across online platforms, social media, etc. to reduce the potential for attacks on the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of data, products, services, and networks and highlight mis- and dis-information and propaganda. As China’s information campaigns seek to weaponise truth and reality, increasing vigilance, verification and veracity must be asserted to ensure information consumers are offered the best chance of identifying mis- and dis-information influences.
  2. Governments must exert significantly more policy attention to the regulation of technologies used for surveillance and related immersive technologies. Few governments have developed broad definitions of those technologies or studied their privacy and data-security impacts. As a consequence, their regulation hasn’t been effective or focused on their future societal and national-security implications. More specifically:
    – Governments should define machine learning and cloud data as surveillance or dual-use goods. For example, the European Union has identified dual-use applications of AI systems as an area of concern in their assessment process as part of the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI.12 The Council of Europe has also raised concerns with the Pegasus surveillance software.13 The US has identified cloud data as an export under the Export Administration Regulations that may attract dual-use controls. While these efforts are significant, regulation still lags the use of machine learning and cloud data by companies and governments, resulting in inconsistent application, a situation rife for exploitation by authoritarian regimes. Governments should standardise and tighten regulation on the technologies and services not traditionally understood as surveillance or dual-use (data) products, including data-generating products and services in e-commerce gaming industries. Doing so would enable them to apply traditional tool sets for preventing access to goods of that nature, such as export controls, technologies and services not traditionally understood as surveillance or dual-use (data) products, including data-generating products and services in e-commerce gaming industries.
    – Additionally, increased transparency in regard to which technology actors and entities, whether they’re involved in R&D activities or product sales, are acting on behalf of state interests could clarify what data is used for surveillance purposes and what data can be used to undermine another state’s sovereignty.
  3. To further increase transparency, governments should also more clearly define which individual actors and entities are required to register under foreign-agent registration schemes. That includes Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme, the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and emerging equivalents elsewhere, such as the UK’s upcoming foreign influence registration scheme. The US, for example, used FARA to force PRC state-owned media companies such as Xinhua and CGTN to register as state agents.14Based on the same logic, any technology company linked directly to China’s propaganda system or receiving state support to facilitate the party-state’s propaganda efforts could be required to register.
  4. Internationally, governments should work to standardise the ways in which data is shared, and proactively regulate how it can be produced and stored. Efforts thus far have failed to reach accord, and many have been siloed within specific functional domains (such as meteorological data, social services, food and agriculture, finance and so on). Such efforts can reduce opportunities for authoritarian regimes to collect, use and misuse data in ways that harm ethnic communities, disparage and denigrate alternative perspectives and silence dissent in the global information environment. The International Organization for Standardization, together with the UN Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business, among others, should establish joint government–industry standardisation mechanisms.
  5. Multilaterally, democratic governments should work together to develop a stronger institutional understanding of the future vulnerabilities and risks of new technologies, particularly in the digital technology ecosystem. That understanding should guide the development of new standards for emergent technologies and assist industry to commercialise those technologies with the goal of safety and security by design. The Quad Principles on Critical and Emerging Technology Standards are a good example of work that needs to occur on the future vulnerabilities and risks of new technologies.
  6. Locally, governments and civil society should establish guardrails against the negative impacts of CCP efforts to shape the information environment, including through information campaigns such as media literacy and critical thinking campaigns targeting individuals and communities. Efforts should not only help users understand what’s ‘real’ and what’s ‘fake’, but also ensure that they have broader awareness of how entities supporting foreign information campaigns may be present in their supply chains, so that risks associated with them are identified and more reliably controlled.

Full Report

For the full report, please download here.

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Chinese translation is available here.

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French translation is available here.

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Spanish translation is available here.

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  1. Tom Uren, Elise Thomas, Jacob Wallis, Tweeting through the Great Firewall, ASPI, Canberra, 3 September 2019, online; Jacob Wallis, Tom Uren, Elise Thomas, Albert Zhang, Samantha Hoffman, Lin Li, Alexandra Pascoe, Danielle Cave, Retweeting through the Great Firewall, ASPI, Canberra, 12 June 2020, online; Albert Zhang, Tilla Hoja, Jasmine Latimore, Gaming public opinion, ASPI, Canberra, 26 April 2023, online. ↩︎
  2. Freedom House, for example, found in its survey of CCP media influence in 30 countries that ‘the Chinese government and its proxies are using more sophisticated, covert, and coercive tactics—including intensified censorship and intimidation, deployment of fake social media accounts, and increased mass distribution of Beijing-backed content via mainstream media—to spread pro-CCP narratives, promote falsehoods, and suppress unfavourable news coverage.’ See ‘Beijing’s global media influence 2022: Authoritarian expansion and the power of democratic resilience’, Freedom House, 8 September 2022, online; ‘New report: Beijing is intensifying its global push for media influence, turning to more covert and aggressive tactics’, Freedom House, 8 September 2022, online. The National Endowment for Democracy’s work on sharp power has similarly examined how the PRC and authoritarian states engage in activities that undermine media integrity; see Christopher Walker, Jessica Ludwig, A full-spectrum response to sharp power the vulnerabilities and strengths of open societies, Sharp Power and Democratic Resilience series, National Endowment for Democracy, June 2021, online; Sharp power: rising authoritarian influence, National Endowment for Democracy, December 2017, online. ↩︎
  3. Samantha Hoffman, Engineering global consent: the Chinese Communist Party’s data-driven power expansion, ASPI, 14 October 2019, online. ↩︎
  4. ‘People’s Public Opinion Cloud’ [人民舆情云], People’s Cloud, no date, online. ↩︎
  5. ‘People’s Public Opinion Cloud’ [人民舆情云], People’s Cloud, no date, online. ↩︎
  6. Sarah Perez, ‘Temu was the most-downloaded iPhone app in the US in 2023’, TechCrunch, 13 December 2023, online. ↩︎
  7. Temu has also reportedly engaged in controversial business practices, such as forced and exploitative labour practices, and copyright infringement. See Nicholas Kaufman, Shein, Temu, and Chinese e-commerce: data risks, sourcing violations, and trade loopholes, US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 14 April 2023, online. ↩︎
  8. Patrick Boehler, ‘Two million “internet opinion analysts” employed to monitor China’s vast online population’, South China Morning Post, 3 October 2013, online. ↩︎
  9. ‘CMP dictionary: media convergence’, China Media Project, 16 April 2021, online. ↩︎
  10. Web 2.0 refers to a shift in the way websites and web applications are designed and used, characterised by user-generated content, interactivity and collaboration, marking a departure from static web pages to dynamic platforms facilitating social interaction and user participation. See Ashraf Darwish, Kamaljit Lakhtaria, ‘The impact of the new Web 2.0 technologies in communication, development, and revolutions of societies’, Journal of Advances in Information Technology, November 2011, online. ↩︎
  11. Quad Senior Cyber Group, ‘Quad Cybersecurity Partnership: joint principles for secure software’, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Government, 20 May 2023, online. ↩︎
  12. High Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, ‘Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI’, European Union, 8 April 2019, online. ↩︎
  13. ‘Pegasus spyware and its impacts on human rights’, Council of Europe, 20 June 2022, online. ↩︎
  14. National Security Division, ‘Obligation of CGTN America to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act’, Department of Justice, US Government, 20 December 2018, online; National Security Division, ‘Obligation of Xinhua News Agency North America to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act’, Department of Justice, US Government, 18 May 2020, online. ↩︎

Regional security and Pacific partnerships: Recruiting Pacific Islanders into the Australian Defence Force

The security and stability of the South Pacific and Australia are deeply intertwined. Australian Government policies have for more than a decade consistently prioritised the Pacific for international engagement, including in defence, development and diplomacy. The Australian Government’s ‘Pacific Step-up’, first announced in 2016, delivered a heightened level of effort by Canberra in the region, as did Australia’s strong support for the Pacific Islands Forum’s Boe Declaration. The Albanese government’s increased policy focus on the region, and on a coordinated whole-of-government approach to the Pacific, demonstrates the centrality of our immediate region to the Australian Government’s strategic planning.

Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) outlined the need for innovative and bold approaches to recruitment and retention in the Australian Defence Force (ADF), which is seeking to grow by 30% by 2040 but is not yet hitting existing recruitment targets. Budget figures released for 2023 show that ADF personnel numbers dropped by more than 1,300, or more than 2% of the total force. The Budget projections for 2024 to 2026 indicate that the government requires more than 6,000 additional personnel—in addition to replacing those lost through attrition in the next three years—to meet stated growth requirements. In the context of a competitive recruitment environment in Australia, especially for skilled labour, that trend indicates that the Defence organisation will struggle to meet forecast requirements using existing recruitment options and will need to seek alternatives. This challenge of competition for talent and to retain skilled workers is not limited to defence nor Australia. It is an economy wide issue, and global.

As a result, there has been an ‘on-again, off-again’ public debate about whether the Australian Government should consider the recruitment of foreigners into the ADF, with a specific focus on Pacific islanders. Obviously, such an initiative could help the ADF’s recruitment numbers, but, importantly, it could open up economic, skills and training opportunities for Pacific islanders. It could also provide a powerful cultural and practical engagement opportunity for the ADF, while also providing Australia with avenues to help shape the region’s security environment in positive and culturally relevant ways. Such recruitment—especially if it involves bilateral agreements between governments—would also put Pacific Island governments in a unique position to inform Australia’s security assessments and contribute to shared outcomes. Those outcomes could include enhanced regional interoperability, especially for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and supporting combined stability operations, and stronger two-way cultural and social engagement, bolstering familiarity and understanding between the ADF and Pacific Island countries (PICs). There are, of course, arguments against such recruitment. For example, the recruitment of Pacific islanders to fight for Australia could be viewed by some as ‘colonialist’ in a region understandably sensitive to that history. But this concern could be addressed through PICs retaining agency through bilateral arrangements. In addition, any scheme seeking to relocate workers to Australia could be seen as taking skills from a much smaller nation, and risking brain and skills drains. We look at these, and other, considerations in this report.

Below, we identify and assess the key recruitment and retention problems faced by the ADF that foreign recruitment, particularly the recruitment of Pacific islanders, may help to resolve. Our report then delves into various arguments for and against the recruitment of Pacific islanders into the ADF including background information that contextualises the current debate. Ultimately, there are many benefits to opening up pathways for Pacific islanders to serve in the ADF, with the clear caveat that any process to formally establish a program must be culturally and politically sensitive, be informed by detailed risk and impact assessment, and have strong monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in place.

We then explore three options for the recruitment of Pacific islanders:

  1. Direct recruiting from the Pacific region into the ADF
  2. Closer integration and operation between existing Australian and PIC forces
  3. A broader partnership model drawing on lessons from the US’s ‘compacts of free association’ and from the UK’s defence recruitment initiatives.

We analyse key impacts that those options may have, both in the Pacific and for the ADF. The potential policy options offered aren’t exhaustive. However, they are plausible and represent different approaches (which could be combined) to achieve outcomes related to ADF recruitment and retention as well as to improved regional collective security.

A critical consideration in developing these options was a two-way flow of benefit: from the Pacific to Australia and from Australia back to the region. For example, we recommend that, where possible, Pacific recruits receive focused training in HADR, which would help build sovereign PIC capabilities and facilitate the application of learned skills upon recruits’ return to their home countries.

An important part of this research was ensuring that PIC military and security personnel were engaged and could feed into and shape the development of this research report, including the three options put forward for potential recruitment. This occurred in multiple ways. We collected feedback and perspectives through a dedicated roundtable discussion, in a series of interviews and then during the research process to ensure that this report was informed by regional, cultural and local considerations (see details regarding some of that data collection on page 16). The report captures five specific insights from the Pacific island military and security community that are relevant in considering the implementation of any of the three recruitment options.

Finally, we acknowledge that further research is needed to resolve the complexity of some of the policy and legal issues associated with the options suggested. We nominate some specific areas that warrant further investigation.

Reclaiming leadership: Australia and the global critical minerals race

Climate policy, geopolitics and market forces are coalescing to deliver Australia a global leadership opportunity in critical minerals. To grasp that opportunity, Australia needs both to utilise its domestic mineral endowment and its mining knowledge and technology and to leverage the global footprint of Australian companies to help build a global supply chain network.

How Australia responds will not only determine economic benefits to the nation but will also affect the world’s ability to achieve minerals security and the sustainability required for the global energy transition and inclusive economic growth.

The global energy transition and other high-technology applications have increased demand for critical minerals, particularly in countries that have strong complex manufacturing industries. At the same time, the concentration of production of many critical minerals, the dominance of China in supply chains and its actions to restrict supply and influence markets, are disrupting both minerals production and availability.

In response, developed nations have formulated critical minerals strategies and entered into bilateral and multilateral agreements, involving supplier nations and customer nations, to build alternative supply chains that are more diverse, secure and sustainable. Australia has committed in multiple agreements to work with like-minded nations to achieve this.

This report is intended to provide the government with a road map to ‘step up’ to (re)activate Australia’s global mineral leadership.

Tag Archive for: Asia & the Pacific

ASPI luncheon briefing with Korean ambassador, His Excellency Mr Kim Wan-joong

ASPI’s Justin Bassi, Afeeya Akhand and Dr Alex Bristow had the pleasure of briefing the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea, His Excellency Mr Kim Wan-joong, on ASPI’s report about the future of the Australia-Republic of Korea partnership. The meeting took place over lunch at the Ambassador’s residence.

Co-authored by Afeeya Akhand and Dr Alex Bristow, the report recommends ways to strengthen cooperation across the Australia-Republic of Korea Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, including in defence, critical technology, clean energy and people-to-people ties.

ASPI also had the opportunity to brief stakeholders from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Defence, National Security College and Korean Institute for Defense Analysis through the report’s pre-launch event at the ASPI office.

The report can be accessed here.

Left to Right: Ms Jung Hyunjung, Ms Afeeya Akhand, His Excellency Mr Kim Wan-joong, Mr Justin Bassi, Mr Jeon Joyoung, Dr Alex Bristow

Roundtable on Western strategies in the Pacific islands

On Tuesday, 3 October, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s DC office hosted an invitation-only, closed-door roundtable with Dr Anna Powles from Massey University and ASPI Senior Fellow Jose Sousa-Santos.

Our guests offered insights following the second U.S.-Pacific Island Forum Leader’s Summit. They discussed security trends in the Pacific region, including how Australia, the US can work with partners to counter Chinese influence, advance common interests, and support the human security efforts of Pacific island states.

Participants included representatives from the US Government, think tanks, and commercial actors.

ASPI DC Roundtable on Chinese online information strategy

On May 5th, ASPI DC hosted a roundtable, chaired by Vicky Xu, on Chinese online information strategy. The event was attended by US government officials, think tanks and media, and spurred discussion about CCP information warfare and strategies, and contributed to broadening awareness of common tactics and techniques used against individuals.

ASPI DC hosts visit from Speaker of Assembly of Tonga, Lord Fakafānua

On 12th April, ASPI DC hosted a visit with the Speaker of Assembly of Tonga, Lord Fakafānua, retired Ambassador Steven McGann and Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Cleo Paskal. During the visit Australia’s strong relationship with Tonga and diplomatic relations in the Pacific were discussed, as well as a shared love for sports diplomacy!

Iain MacGillivray was interviewed by the Georgetown University podcast Initiative for US-China Dialogue on Global Issues

On November 16th, ASPI DC Analyst, Iain MacGillivray was interviewed by the Georgetown University podcast Initiative for US-China Dialogue on Global Issues. The episode, China leans on pragmatism in the Middle East, unpacks the complexities of China’s perception by Middle Eastern states and explored the notion that China might displace the regional security role played by the US.

Darwin US fuel storage facility

Fifteen kilometres from Darwin CBD, there’s a plot of mud and dirt that is about to become a $270 million asset for the United States defence force.

By September 2023, the East Arm fuel storage facility is expected to be able to store 300 million litres of military jet fuel to support American defence activities in the Northern Territory and Indo-Pacific region.

Dr Teagan Westerdorf speaks to ABC News. Read the full piece here. 

Indo-Pacific cooperation on critical technologies – launch of ASPI-ORF report

On 15 October 2020 India’s Observer Research Foundation (ORF) hosted the launch of the ASPI-ORF report: Critical technologies and the Indo-Pacific: A new India-Australia partnership as a part of its CyFy2020 conference.

The report argues that as the India-Australia bilateral relationship continues to grow and evolve, both governments should invest in the construction of a new India–Australia partnership on technology. The foundation for such a partnership already exists, and further investment areas of complementary interests could stimulate regional momentum in a range of key critical and emerging technology areas including in 5G, Artificial Intelligence, quantum technologies, space technologies and in critical minerals. The report contains 14 policy recommendations that will help build this new technology partnership.

Australia’s High Commissioner to India, Barry O’Farrell, joined a number of the report co-authors including Aakriti Bachhawat, Danielle Cave, Dr Rajeswari Pilla Rajagopalan and Trisha Ray to discuss the current India-Australia relationship, how it continues to evolve and expand and how the two countries can better leverage their competitive advantages in the technology sector.

Watch the launch event here.

Xinjiang Data Project website launch

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre has launched the Xinjiang Data Project, along with two new major pieces of research, on Xinijang’s detention system, and on the destruction of mosques and significant Uyghur cultural sites in the region. One of the most effective research methods in both of these projects was the collection and analysis of satellite imagery, including the examination of night-time satellite imagery from Xinjiang.

Since 2017, a government crackdown in the far-western region of China known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has seen over a million Uyghurs and other Turkic and Muslim minorities extrajudicially detained in a vast network of purpose-built detention facilities. There have also been media reports about incidents of mosques demolished or repurposed, along with other Uyghur cultural sites. 

Credible data on the extent of Xinjiang’s post-2017 detention system is scarce. But researchers at ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre have now located, mapped and analysed 380 suspected detention facilities in Xinjiang, making it the most comprehensive data on Xinjiang’s detention system in the world. This new database highlights ‘re-education’ camps, detention centres, and prisons which have been newly built or expanded since 2017, and we believe it covers most such detention facilities. 

The findings of this research contradicts Chinese officials’ claims that all “re-education camp” detainees had ‘graduated’ in December 2019. It presents satellite imagery evidence that shows newly constructed detention facilities, along with growth in several existing facilities, that has occurred across 2019 and 2020. 

The second key piece of research on our new website is a project investigating the rate of cultural destruction in Xinjiang. This research estimates 35% of mosques have been demolished; and a further 30% have been damaged in some way, usually by the removal of Islamic or Arabic architectural features such as domes, minarets or gatehouses. We estimate approximately 16,000 mosques have been damaged or totally destroyed throughout Xinjiang (65% of the total). The majority of demolished sites remain as empty lots. 

Further, 30% of important Islamic cultural sites (sacred shrines, cemeteries and pilgrimage routes) across southern Xinjiang have been demolished since 2017, with an additional 28% damaged or altered in some way. This includes the complete demolition of the ancient pilgrimage town of Ordam Mazar. 

This new research and associated maps and satellite imagery, can be viewed at the Xinjiang Data Project website. 

On China Podcast. Dr Malcolm Davis

For China’s military, space is a critical domain that enables complex operations, and the denial of it to adversaries during conflict is a high priority. Join Malcolm Davis and me in looking at China’s military space strategy.

Top US China specialist Peter Mattis announced as ASPI distinguished fellow

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is pleased to announce Peter Mattis – Research Fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation – as a distinguished ASPI fellow for 2019.

Peter will be spending the next month at ASPI working with the Institute’s different China specialists on a range of research projects.

Peter will also be a keynote speaker at ASPI’s inaugural China masterclass being held on 15 April in Canberra (almost sold out) and 17 April in Melbourne (tickets still available).

Executive Director Peter Jennings says: “ASPI is delighted to attract someone of Peter’s analytical calibre to spend a full month at our institute. Peter has made an enormous contribution to building the world’s knowledge of how the Chinese Communist Party, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and China’s intelligence systems operate – both at home and around the world. Peter’s work spans across a broad range of topics, from better understanding PLA activity in cyberspace, to Chinese party-state influence operations, espionage and military modernisation. ASPI is looking forward to hosting Peter so that he can continue some of this important work over the next month”

Peter was formerly a Fellow in the China Program at The Jamestown Foundation where he edited China Brief and was an international affairs analyst for the US Government. He received his M.A. in Security Studies from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and earned his B.A. in Political Science and Asian Studies from the University of Washington in Seattle. He also previously worked as a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Asian Research in its Strategic Asia and Northeast Asian Studies programs.

Peter is in Australia from now until 18 April. For media enquiries please contact reneejones@aspi.org.au / 0400 424 323

Tag Archive for: Asia & the Pacific

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