Tag Archive for: Asia & the Pacific

Crowded and complex: The changing geopolitics of the South Pacific

Australia faces an increasingly crowded and complex geopolitical environment in the South Pacific. While the most important external powers in the region have traditionally been Australia, New Zealand, the US and France, a number of new powers are increasingly active, most notably China, Russia, Indonesia, Japan and India. South Pacific states, particularly Papua New Guinea and Fiji, are emerging as regional powers to constrain Australian influence. South Pacific states are also becoming more active on the international stage, further taking them outside Australia’s and their other traditional partners’ sphere of influence.

The geopolitical environment in the South Pacific has implications for Australia’s strategic interest in ensuring stability, security and cohesion in the region. If Australia is going to ensure that it’s able to respond to the complex and crowded geopolitics of the South Pacific, it needs to prioritise the region in a clear, consistent and sustained way in its foreign and strategic policy planning.

The future of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation: Indonesia’s chance to promote a new era of regional law enforcement cooperation

For 13 years, the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) has served as a regional rallying point for much-needed counterterrorism capacity development and cooperation.

Since its inception in 2004, with strong bilateral support from the Australian Government,1 JCLEC’s operating and donor environments have evolved considerably. The strong relationship between the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) and Australian Federal Police (AFP) that has raised and sustained JCLEC is in a state of decline. Regional partners and donors are now considering JCLEC’s future.

There are some big decisions to be made, the most pressing of which is whether JCLEC should become a truly regional body or an Indonesian Government institution.

France and security in the Asia–Pacific: From the end of the first Indochina conflict to today

France’s defence- and security-related activities in the Asia–Pacific are often underestimated, sometimes distorted or simply ignored. This paper surveys France’s growing presence in the Asia–Pacific from the Indochina War and efforts to resolve the Cambodian conflict, through to the country’s 21st century contributions driven by strategic engagement related to globalisation, new threats, multilateral regional cooperation and increasingly interconnected strategic zones.

Does France carry weight in the major strategic balance in the Asia–Pacific? The answer to this question is ‘No; not directly’. But if the question is whether France contributes to regional security and to the development of defence and security capabilities in a large number of countries in the Asia–Pacific, then the author believes that the answer is clearly a positive one.

From Hollywood to Bollywood? Recasting Australia’s Indo/Pacific strategic geography

Australia’s strategic geography is being revolutionised. China and India’s rising maritime power, coupled with a Eurasia-wide ‘connectivity revolution’, is drawing together two formerly disparate theatres: the Asia–Pacific and the Indian Ocean region.

This report argues against the Indo-Pacific idea and presents the case for a more regionally differentiated ‘Indo/Pacific’ alternative. The hyphen at the heart of the Indo-Pacific aggregates two distinct regional security orders that have differed widely in their historical evolution and that today present different challenges and regional order-building opportunities for Australia.

By contrast, an Indo/Pacific strategic geography explicitly differentiates the Asia–Pacific from the Indian Ocean region and calibrates Australia’s strategies for regional engagement accordingly.

The Asia–Pacific and the Indian Ocean region thus present increasingly interconnected—but still durably distinct—security orders. For this reason, Australia should pursue a regionally differentiated ‘triple track’ strategy of order-building.

Assessing the South China Sea award

The Philippines had a major, if unenforceable, win against China in the 12 July South China Sea Arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. But the implications go beyond the bilateral dispute between China and the Philippines and it carries great legal weight as an authoritative ruling by an international judicial body.

Bearing in mind that the award is legally binding only on the parties to the arbitration, there’s the question of what might this assertion mean for third countries who may opt to exercise navigational rights based on the Tribunal’s rulings on the status and maritime entitlements of features in the Spratlys.

The South China Sea award has produced a diverse range of opinions on ASPI’s blog The Strategist. This Strategic Insights assembles a selection of those articles.

Authors: Sam Bateman, Allan Behm, Anthony Bergin, Jay L Batongbacal, William Choong, Helen Clark, Malcolm Davis, Peter Jennings, Amelia Long, Donald Rothwell & Feng Zhang.

Improving on zero: Australia and India attempt strategic convergence

India no longer sees Australia as merely a strategic stooge of the US. And Australia is starting to accord India the importance India always saw as its right. Those are big changes in attitude and policy—and in the two countries’ understanding of each other’s interests.

Strategy: The Australia–India strategic relationship was in zero territory—often in negative mode—for much of the 20th century; indeed, effectively since India’s independence. In the 21st century, though, Australia and India can reach for greater strategic convergence.

People: Australia in the 21st century can have a set of relationships with India based on people as much as on economic and strategic need.

Economics and trade: As China slows economically, Australia turns to India. The negotiation of an Australia–India free trade deal—a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement—aims to match the bilateral agreements Australia reached with China, Japan and South Korea.

Improving on zero: The previous negative relationship was based on a lot of hard history (White Australia, the Cold War, alliance versus non-alignment and India’s nuclear weapons status). This time it’s different—our astigmatism and the antagonisms should not derail the opportunity, and the need, to see each other clearly and do much more together.

Agenda for Change 2016: Strategic choices for the next government

The defence of Australia’s interests is a core business of federal governments. Regardless of who wins the election on July 2, the incoming government will have to grapple with a wide range of security issues. This report provides a range of perspectives on selected defence and national security issues, as well as a number of policy recommendations.

Contributors include Kim Beazley, Peter Jennings, Graeme Dobell, Shiro Armstrong, Andrew Davies, Tobias Feakin, Malcolm Davis, Rod Lyon, Mark Thomson, Jacinta Carroll, Paul Barnes, John Coyne, David Connery, Anthony Bergin, Lisa Sharland, Christopher Cowan, James Mugg, Simon Norton, Cesar Alvarez, Jessica Woodall, Zoe Hawkins, Liam Nevill, Dione Hodgson, David Lang, Amelia Long and Lachlan Wilson.

ASPI produced a similar brief before the 2013 election. There are some enduring challenges, such as cybersecurity, terrorism and an uncertain global economic outlook. Natural disasters are a constant feature of life on the Pacific and Indian Ocean rim.

But there are also challenges that didn’t seem so acute only three years ago such as recent events in the South China Sea, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and ISIS as a military threat and an exporter of global terrorism.

The incumbent for the next term of government will have to deal with these issues.

Launch Video

Peak Japan and its implications for regional security

This paper examines Japanese security policy under Abe, identifies the constants and constraints that frame that policy, and attempts to project where Japan will go in the near-term future.

Its conclusion may unnerve many: structural constraints in the Japanese economy, self-imposed limits deriving from Japanese national identity and an increasingly beleaguered polity will narrow Japanese options.

The chief task of friends and allies of Japan, including Australia, will be to engage Tokyo and ensure that there’s a place for Japan in regional security policy.

Net worth: Australia’s regional fisheries engagement

This paper argues there’s a need for a whole-of-government approach to Australia’s external fisheries policy that recognises clear linkages between fisheries and foreign, trade, and strategic policy.

Extending and complementing current stakeholder engagement practices is the key to this approach. Regional fishery management organisations (RFMOs) and arrangements allow Australia to promote a strong approach on sustainable and responsible fishing practices and develop regional instruments to protect our fish stocks and wider regional interests.

Time to start worrying again? Cross-strait stability after the 2016 Taiwanese elections

The study argues that the Taiwan Strait will remain dangerous and that Canberra needs to pay closer attention to the evolving cross-strait situation. Of crucial importance is the question of whether Australia should support its US ally in a future Taiwan contingency.

The report calls for a comprehensive dialogue between Canberra and Washington to avoid a future ‘expectation gap’ on the Taiwan issue. As well, Australia should acknowledge Taiwan’s potentially constructive role in regional maritime territorial disputes. Finally, Canberra should proactively take steps to enhance Taiwan’s regional political and economic integration as a means to contribute to long-term cross-strait stability.