Tag Archive for: Asia & the Pacific

South Korea and Australia in space: Towards a strategic partnership

Space cooperation between Australian and South Korea remains stuck in its infancy and, to some extent, is treated as an end in itself. This report argues that the time is ripe for both Australia and South Korea to embark on joint projects and initiatives that would deliver tangible and practical outcomes for both countries.

For South Korea and Australia, space cooperation and space development serve as key pillars of the bilateral relationship. The two nations elevated their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in December 2021, incorporating space development into core areas of cooperation in the fields of economics, innovation and technology. As a part of that elevation, the leaders of both countries agreed to strengthen joint research and cooperation between space research institutes and industries. Following that, in 2022, South Korea and Australia established a Space Policy Dialogue.

A greater bilateral focus on expanding the scope and opportunities for space cooperation could deliver foreign-policy, national-security, defence and economic outcomes for South Korea and Australia. This report argues that there are opportunities in the bilateral relationship to boost both space cooperation (the collaborative efforts between nations to leverage space advancements for mutual benefit and to foster diplomatic ties and intergovernmental collaboration) and space development (the advancement of space-related technologies, infrastructure and industries) and is pivotal in areas such as national security, economic growth and resource management.

This report first analyses the space development strategies of South Korea and Australia and examines the environmental factors that can increase the potential for cooperation. It then proposes areas where the two countries can combine their technologies and resources to maximise mutual benefits and offers eight policy recommendations to the governments of both countries.

Scott Pace, former Executive Secretary of the US National Space Council, has emphasised that ‘International space cooperation is not an end in itself, but a means of advancing national interests.’ The South Korea – Australia partnership aligns with that principle, and it’s time to realise the opportunity.

State-Sponsored Economic Cyber-Espionage for Commercial Purposes

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has launched the world’s first capacity-building initiative dedicated to raising awareness about the threat of economic cyber-espionage in key emerging economies across the Indo-Pacific and Latin America.

Through a series of research reports, case studies, and learning materials, this initiative highlights how economic cyber-espionage is not just a concern for advanced economies—it is a growing risk for emerging economies like India, Brazil, and Indonesia, which are rapidly digitizing their industries.

Download report.
Download report.
Download report.

What is Economic Cyber-Espionage?

Economic cyber-espionage refers to the state-sponsored theft of intellectual property (IP) via cyber means for commercial gain. As nations undergo digital transformation, securing knowledge-based industries is critical for economic security. However, many countries—especially those with lower cybersecurity maturity—are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-enabled IP theft.

In the modern economy, local businesses that trade internationally, critical national industries, and start-ups as well as universities, research and development organisations and public services rely on secure data, digital communications and ICT-enabled systems and applications.

But trust and confidence in the digital economy is threatened by the practice of some states that deploy offensive cyber capabilities against industries, organisations and individuals in other states. Those who operate in environments with lower levels of cybersecurity maturity are particularly vulnerable to fall victim to cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.

Project Activities and Findings

This project has included a series of workshops and engagements in India, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, bringing together officials and experts to discuss cyber threats that endanger national economies and innovation sectors.

For this project, ASPI has also published three reports, which can be downloaded on the right.

  1. State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Tackling an invisible but persistent risk to prosperity (2022): Highlights how state-sponsored cyber-espionage has intensified, with more targeted industries and universities now based in emerging economies
  2. State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Assessing the preparedness of emerging economies to respond to cyber-enabled IP theft: Evaluates the readiness of 11 emerging economies—including Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam—to counteract cyber-enabled IP theft.
  3. State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Governmental practices in protecting IP-Intensive industries: Reviews how governments around the world are responding to the threat of economic cyber-espionage and considers how states are employing, among others, legislative, defensive, and reactive measures.

On 15 November 2022, ASPI also issued a Briefing Note recommending that the G20 members recognise that state-sponsored ICT-enabled theft of IP remains a key concern for international cooperation and encouraging them to reaffirm their commitment made in 2015 to refrain from economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes.

Videos and Podcasts

Explore the videos and podcasts we have produced to help you make sense of economic cyber-espionage.

Project Team

This team is led by CTS Deputy Director Bart Hogeveen and CTS senior analyst Dr. Gatra Priyandita. We thank the support and contributions of other serving and former ASPI staff, including Urmika Deb, Dr. Ben Stevens, Dr. Teesta Prakash, and Shivangi Seth. This project involved input from researchers from across the world, including those in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. We thank them for their contributions.

The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia

Australia faces an emerging national security threat from Brazilian transnational crime groups. Once a domestic concern, Brazilian organised crime has evolved into a powerful narco-insurgency with transnational reach, making Brazil the world’s second-largest player in the cocaine trade after Colombia.

While Brazilian organised crime previously posed little threat to Australia, this report, The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia, examines how Brazil’s expanding role in global cocaine supply, rising criminal network sophistication, and growing demand in Australia’s lucrative cocaine market are increasing the presence of Brazilian organised crime on Australian shores.

The report highlights how Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has become a major transnational criminal threat, exploiting weaknesses in political, legal, and economic systems. It explores Brazil’s geography and criminal networks with South American cocaine producers and examines the PCC’s global distribution networks, with a focus on how the Pacific is increasingly used to transport drugs destined for Australia. A recent case study demonstrates the prioritisation of the Australian market in these operations.

The report concludes with recommendations for strengthening police cooperation, enhancing financial surveillance, and proactively detecting and disrupting PCC activities. By addressing key enablers of the PCC’s resilience and closing gaps in international information exchange, a coordinated approach will not only mitigate the immediate threat but also bolster Australia’s long-term defences against transnational organised crime.

North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 10

The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 10, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months.

Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include:

  1. Northern Australia and Defence,
  2. Developing Northern Australia,
  3. Northern Australia new policy opportunities,
  4. Critical Minerals, Energy, and Commodities,

Articles are authored by a range of experts across these varied topics.

Volume 10 also features a foreword by The Hon Lia Finocchiaro MLA, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Finocchiaro calls readers attention to the Northern Territory’s unique place in Australia’s defence history, its enduring strategic importance, and the Territory’s defence capabilities.

The 34 articles in this Compendium provide practical policy options which government could implement in the short term. Facilitating both the security and economic prosperity of northern Australia.

Australia and South Korea: Leveraging the strategic potential of cooperation in critical technologies

Executive summary

Cooperation between Australia and the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea or the ROK) in a range of critical technology areas has grown rapidly in recent years. Underpinned by the Australia – South Korea Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cyber and Critical Technology Cooperation signed in 2021, collaboration is currently centred around emerging technologies, including next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing. Such technologies are deemed to be critical due to their potential to enhance or threaten societies, economies and national security. Most are dual- or multi-use and have applications in a wide range of sectors.1

Intensifying geostrategic competition is threatening stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Particularly alarming is competition in the technological domain. ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker, a large data-driven project that now covers 64 critical technologies and focuses on high-impact research, reveals a stunning shift in research ‘technology leadership’ over the past two decades. Where the United States (US) led in 60 of the 64 technologies in the five years between 2003 and 2007, the US’s lead has decreased to seven technologies in the most recent five years (2019–2023). Instead, China now leads in 57 of those technologies.

Within the Indo-Pacific region, some countries have responded to those shifts in technology leadership through the introduction of policies aimed at building ‘technological sovereignty’. The restriction of high-risk vendors from critical infrastructure, the creation of sovereign industrial bases and supply-chain diversification are examples of this approach. But a sovereign approach doesn’t mean protectionism. Rather, many countries, including Australia and South Korea, are collaborating with like-minded regional partners to further their respective national interests and support regional resilience through a series of minilateral frameworks.

The Australia – South Korea technological relationship already benefits from strong foundations, but it’s increasingly important that both partners turn promise into reality. It would be beneficial for Australia and South Korea to leverage their respective strengths and ensure that collaboration evolves in a strategic manner. Both countries are leaders in research and development (R&D) related to science and technology (S&T) and are actively involved in international partnerships for standards-setting relating to AI and other technologies. Furthermore, both countries possess complementary industry sectors, as demonstrated through Australia’s critical-minerals development and existing space-launch capabilities on one hand, and South Korea’s domestic capacity for advanced manufacturing on the other.

This report examines four stages common to technological life cycles — (1) R&D and innovation; (2) building blocks for manufacturing; (3) testing and application; and (4) standards and norms. For each, we examine a specific critical technology of interest. Those four life-cycle areas and respective technologies—spanning biotechnologies-related R&D, manufacturing electric-battery materials, satellite launches and AI standards-setting—were chosen as each is a technology of focus for both countries. Furthermore, collaboration through these specific technological stages enables Australia and South Korea to leverage their existing strengths in a complementary manner (see Figure 1). Supporting the analysis of these four stages of the technological life cycle and selected critical technologies is data from ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker and the Composite Science and Technology Innovation Index (COSTII) jointly released by South Korea’s Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) and the Korea Institute of Science & Technology Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP).

Informed by that examination, this report identifies a set of recommendations for strengthening cooperation that is relevant for different stakeholders, including government and industry.

Policy recommendations

Biotechnologies

Australia and South Korea can enhance knowledge-sharing in biotechnologies-related R&D through people-to-people exchanges. Links should be formalised through an MoU between relevant institutions—such as Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and Biotechnology. An MoU could be used to implement initiatives such as a virtual mentoring program and long-term in-person exchanges (preferably at least 12 months in duration). Such exchanges would support immersive in-country interaction, enabling the transfer of specialised R&D expertise. Australian researchers could share knowledge about advances in early-stage clinical trials processes, while South Korean researchers could contribute insights into synthetic biology and AI tools in drug-discovery clinical-trial methodologies. Financial support from Australia’s National Health and Medical Research Council could facilitate the exchanges.2 There remains a need to address visa constraints impeding the free flow of researchers between both countries. While this report focuses on R&D, we suggest that there’s equal value in considering cooperation in the manufacturing stages of the biotechnologies value chain.

Recommendation 1: Formalise links between Australia’s and South Korea’s key biotechnologies R&D institutions by facilitating long-term people-to-people exchanges aimed at transferring specialised expertise. This includes in areas such as clinical trials, synthetic biology and AI integration in biotechnologies.

Electric batteries

Australian companies should consider the production of battery materials, including lithium hydroxide and precursor cathode active materials (pCAM), through joint ventures with South Korean battery manufacturers. Such ventures would benefit from jointly funded and owned facilities geographically close to requisite critical minerals. Since spodumene is needed for lithium hydroxide and nickel, cobalt and manganese are required for pCAM, Western Australia provides the ideal location for those facilities. Furthermore, BHP’s recent suspension of its Western Australian nickel operations provides an ideal opportunity for a South Korean battery company to purchase those operations— securing nickel sulphate supplies necessary for pCAM manufacturing.3 There’s also the potential for South Korea to invest in cathode active manufacturing (CAM) manufacturing in Australia by taking advantage of the co-location of mining and pCAM operations.

The provision of loans with relatively low interest rates from South Korean Government–owned banks,4 as well as tax credits and energy incentives provided by the Australian Government, would assist in offsetting the relatively high operational costs (including for labour and materials) associated with establishing joint battery-material plants in Australia instead of South Korea.5 Environmental regulations will need careful consideration in assessing such proposals, such as those covering the disposal of by-products. In the case of sodium sulphate, that by-product can be used in fertilisers and even recycled for future use in battery-material manufacturing.6

Recommendation 2: Consider the establishment of facilities in Australia under joint venture arrangements between Australian and South Korean companies to enable expanded production of battery materials (including lithium hydroxide and pCAM).

Space and satellite technologies

Australia and South Korea should establish a government-to-government agreement that would facilitate the launch of South Korean satellites from northern and southern locations in Australia. This would be similar to the Australia–US Technologies Safeguard Agreement. The agreement would increase the ease with which companies from both countries can pursue joint launches by streamlining launch permit application processes, export controls, taxation requirements and environmental regulations. The agreement can establish a robust framework for joint operations and continued R&D in space and satellite technologies while ensuring that both countries protect associated sensitive technologies. Any such agreement should prioritise consultations with community stakeholders to further inclusive decision-making focused on addressing the social and environmental impacts of space launches.7 Engaging with Indigenous landowners to ensure the protection of cultural heritage, sacred sites and traditional land stewardship is particularly key.8

Recommendation 3: Establish a government-to-government agreement similar to the Australia–US Technologies Safeguard Agreement to bolster the ease with which Australian and South Korean companies can conduct joint satellite launches on Australian soil.

Artificial intelligence technologies

Closer collaboration between Standards Australia and the Korea Standards Association in establishing international AI standards will be beneficial. The established positive record of Australian and South Korean stakeholders in relation to international norms and standards relating to critical technologies, and comparative regional strengths, provide a means to ensure that international AI standards continue to evolve in a way that fosters interoperability, innovation, transparency, diversity and security-by-design. One recommended body through which Australian and South Korean stakeholders could coordinate their respective approaches is the international, industry-led multistakeholder joint subcommittee (SC) created by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) known as the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 Subcommittee 42 on AI (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42).

Recommendation 4: Coordinate the approach of Standards Australia and the Korea Standards Association in establishing international AI standards in international technology standards bodies, for example, through ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42.

Full Report

For the full report, please download here.

  1. J Wong Leung, S Robin, D Cave, ASPI’s two-decade Critical Technology Tracker, ASPI, Canberra, 28 August 2024, online. ↩︎
  2. Austrade, ‘Australia: A go-to destination for clinical trials’. ↩︎
  3. ‘Western Australian Nickel to temporarily suspend operations’, BHP, 11 July 2024, online. ↩︎
  4. Government-owned banks in South Korea are currently funding a similar joint venture in the form of the POSCO – Pilbara Minerals lithium hydroxide facility in South Korea. For more information, see A Orlando, ‘POSCO Pilbara Lithium Solution executes US$460 million loan agreement to help fund chemical facility in South Korea’, Mining.com.au, 27 February 2023, online. ↩︎
  5. In particular, the high cost of a joint lithium hydroxide plant in Australia rather than South Korea was the primary reason for the joint POSCO – Pilbara Minerals plant to be built in Gwangyang, South Korea. For more information, see P Kerr, ‘Lithium processing is 40pc cheaper in South Korea, says POSCO’, Australian Financial Review, 22 May 2023, online. ↩︎
  6. M Stevens, ‘Cathode manufacturing: solutions for sodium sulphate’, Worley, 29 May 2024, online. ↩︎
  7. ‘Koonibba Test Range launches large commercial rocket’, Asia–Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR), 6 May 2024, online; J Hamilton, A Costigan, ‘Koonibba looks to the future as a rocket launch site, but one elder is concerned about the impact on sacred sites’, ABC News, 11 May 2024, online. ↩︎
  8. M Garrick, ‘Equatorial Launch Australia lodges plans for expansion to 300 hectares for Arnhem Space Centre’, ABC News, 8 November 2023, online. ↩︎

Persuasive technologies in China: Implications for the future of national security

Key Findings

The rapid adoption of persuasive technologies—any digital system that shapes users’ attitudes and behaviours by exploiting physiological and cognitive reactions or vulnerabilities—will challenge national security in ways that are difficult to predict. Emerging persuasive technologies such as generative artificial intelligence (AI), ambient technologies and neurotechnology interact with the human mind and body in far more intimate and subconscious ways, and at far greater speed and efficiency, than previous technologies. This presents malign actors with the ability to sway opinions and actions without the conscious autonomy of users.

Regulation is struggling to keep pace. Over the past decade, the swift development and adoption of these technologies have outpaced responses by liberal democracies, highlighting the urgent need for more proactive approaches that prioritise privacy and user autonomy. That means protecting and enhancing the ability of users to make conscious and informed decisions about how they’re interacting with technology and for what purpose.

China’s commercial sector is already a global leader in developing and using persuasive technologies. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tightly controls China’s private sector and mandates that Chinese companies—especially technology companies—work towards China’s national-security interests. This presents a risk that the CCP could use persuasive technologies commercially developed in China to pursue illiberal and authoritarian ends, both domestically and abroad, through such means as online influence campaigns, targeted psychological operations, transnational repression, cyber operations and enhanced military capabilities.

ASPI has identified several prominent Chinese companies that already have their persuasive technologies at work for China’s propaganda, military and public-security agencies. They include:

  • Midu—a language intelligence technology company that provides generative AI tools used by Chinese Government and CCP bureaus to enhance the party-state’s control of public opinion. Those capabilities could also be used for foreign interference (see page 4).
  • Suishi—a pioneer in neurotechnology that’s developing an online emotion detection and evaluation system to interpret and respond to human emotions in real time. The company is an important partner of Tianjin University’s Haihe Lab (see page 16), which has been highly acclaimed for its research with national-security applications (see page 17).
  • Goertek—an electronics manufacturer that has achieved global prominence for smart wearables and virtual-reality (VR) devices. This company collaborates on military–civil integration projects with the CCP’s military and security organs and has developed a range of products with dual-use applications, such as drone-piloting training devices (see page 20).

ASPI has further identified case studies of Chinese technology companies, including Silicon Intelligence, OneSight and Mobvoi, that are leading in the development of persuasive technologies spanning generative AI, neurotechnologies and emerging ambient systems. We find that those companies have used such solutions in support of the CCP in diverse ways—including overt and attributable propaganda campaigns, disinformation campaigns targeting foreign audiences, and military–civil fusion projects.

Introduction

Persuasive technologies—or technologies with persuasive characteristics—are tools and systems designed to shape users’ decision-making, attitudes or behaviours by exploiting people’s physiological and cognitive reactions or vulnerabilities.1 Compared to technologies we presently use, persuasive technologies collect more data, analyse more deeply and generate more insights that are more intimately tailored to us as individuals.

With current consumer technologies, influence is achieved through content recommendations that reflect algorithms learning from the choices we consciously make (at least initially). At a certain point, a person’s capacity to choose then becomes constrained because of a restricted information environment that reflects and reinforces their opinions—the so-called echo-chamber effect. With persuasive technologies, influence is achieved through a more direct connection with intimate physiological and emotional reactions. That risks removing human choice from the process entirely and steering choices without an individual’s full awareness. Such technologies won’t just shape what we do: they have the potential to influence who we are.

Many countries and companies are working to harness the power of emerging technologies with persuasive characteristics, such as generative artificial intelligence (AI), wearable devices and brain–computer interfaces, but the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its technology companies pose a unique challenge. The Chinese party-state combines a rapidly advancing tech industry with a political system and ideology that mandate companies to align with CCP objectives, driving the creation and use of persuasive technologies for political purposes (see ‘How the CCP is using persuasive technologies’, page 21). That synergy enables China to develop cutting-edge innovations while directing their application towards maintaining regime stability domestically, reshaping the international order, challenging democratic values and undermining global human-rights norms.

There’s already extensive research on how the CCP and its military are adopting technology in cognitive warfare to ‘win without fighting’—a strategy to acquire the means to shape adversaries’ psychological states and behaviours (see Appendix 2: Persuasive technologies in China’s ‘cognitive warfare’, page 29).2 Separately, academics have considered the manipulative methods of surveillance capitalism, especially on issues of addiction, child safety and privacy .3 However, there’s limited research on the intersection of those two topics; that is, attempts by the Chinese party-state to exploit commercially available emerging technologies to advance its political objectives. This report is one of the first to explore that intersection.

Chinese technology, advertising and public-relations companies have made substantial advances in harnessing such tools, from mobile push notifications and social-media algorithms to AI-generated content. Many of those companies have achieved global success. Access to the personal data of foreign users is at an all-time high, and Chinese companies are now a fixed staple on the world’s most downloaded mobile apps lists, unlike just five years ago.44 While many persuasive technologies have clear commercial purposes, their potential for political and national-security exploitation—both inside and outside China—is also profound.

This report seeks to break through the ‘Collingridge dilemma’, in which control and understanding of emerging technologies come too late to mitigate the consequences of those technologies.55 The report analyses generative AI, neurotechnologies and immersive technologies and focuses on key advances being made by PRC companies in particular. It examines the national-security implications of persuasive technologies designed and developed in China, and what that means for policymakers and regulators outside China as those technologies continue to roll out globally.

Persuasive-technology capabilities are evolving rapidly, and concepts of and approaches to regulation are struggling to keep pace. The national-security implications of technologies that are designed to drive users towards certain behaviours are becoming apparent. Democratic governments have acted slowly and reactively to those challenges over the past decade. There’s an urgent need for more fit-for-purpose, proactive and adaptive approaches to regulating persuasive technologies. Protecting user autonomy and privacy must sit at the core of those efforts. Looking forward, persuasive technologies are set to become even more sophisticated and pervasive, and the consequences of their use are increasingly difficult to detect. Accordingly, the policy recommendations set out here focus on preparing for and countering the potential malicious use of the next generation of those technologies.

Full Report

For the full report, please download here.

References

  1. First defined by Brian J Fogg in Persuasive technology: using computers to change what we think and do, Morgan Kaufmann, 2003. ↩︎
  2. See, for example, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Chinese next-generation psychological warfare, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 1 June 2023, online; Elsa B Kania, ‘Minds at war: China’s pursuit of military advantage through cognitive science and biotechnology’, PRISM, 2019, 8(3):82–101, online; Department of Defense, Annual report to Congress; Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, US Government, 19 October 2023, online. ↩︎
  3. Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: the fight for a human future at the new frontier of power, Ingram Publisher Services, 2017. ↩︎
  4. Examples of Chinese-owned apps that are among the most downloaded globally include Tiktok, CapCut (a ByteDance-owned video editor) and the e-commerce platforms Temu and Shein. See David Curry, ‘Most popular apps (2024)’, Business of Apps, 30 January 2024, online. ↩︎
  5. Richard Worthington, ‘The social control of technology by David Collingridge’, American Political Science Review, 1982, 76(1):134–135; David Collingridge,
    The social control of technology, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1980. ↩︎

Stepping up military support to humanitarian assistance in the Pacific

On October 3 the South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting (SPDMM) endorsed the establishment of the Pacific Response Group (PRG), a novel multinational military cooperation initiative that will seek to address the need for more efficient and effective cooperation between Pacific militaries to deliver military support to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR).

In the coming years, the PRG will have to address challenges surrounding the potential expansion of the group and its mission, including into areas like stability operations, and Australia will need to commit greater resources to ensuring that it successfully adapts to the region’s needs. It is important that the thinking, consultation and some of the planning for that starts now.

Any decisions regarding the PRG will be made by SPDMM members as a collective, but each member state will have its own perspectives on the group’s development. This report provides 12 recommendations focused on areas including resourcing, encouraging a whole-of-government support, and expansion of the group in size and in scope. The report is intended to inform policymakers in Australia as a contributing member of the PRG, but many of the recommendations could also be valuable for, and hence adopted by, other members of the group.

A summary of the recommendations contained in the report are as follows:

Recommendation 1: PRG members states should consider the need for an expansion of the PRG beginning as soon as the 2025/2026 high risk weather season and must be able to deal with concurrent disasters.

Recommendation 2: The end goal of the HADR component of the PRG should be dedicated forces from each military able to be readily deployed in immediate response to natural disasters in the region.

Recommendation 3: PRG member states should consider ways it can guarantee capabilities for PRG use in the high-risk season from Australia, New Zealand and France for much needed transport, including maritime and air assets.

Recommendation 4: The Australian government should acknowledge that the PRG is not designed to address all of Australia’s domestic HADR demands so should consider other solutions to bolster its domestic disaster response.

Recommendation 5: The Australian government should consider how a whole-of-government approach can actively coordinate across departmental initiatives so that the PRG, and other initiatives, can make the best contribution to regional environmental security concerns.

Recommendation 6: SPDMM member states participating in the PRG should address the potential for the inclusion of police units or paramilitary from countries such as Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in the future.

Recommendation 7: The PRG should think ahead and consider outlining a role for SPDMM observers such as Japan, the UK and the US in supporting the group without changing its core makeup. This could include financial support for transport, maintenance or infrastructure and supplies.

Recommendation 8: Australia should be willing and ready to support the expansion the PRG mission as desired by its member states to address instability through a coordinated multilateral response, provided this is desired by other members of SPDMM.

Recommendation 9: If there is an expansion of the mission to include stability operations, Australia should lead the way in the development of a multilateral security agreement that formalises the PRG’s approach to stability operations in any SPDMM member state.

Recommendation 10: Together, PRG members should publicly push-back against any narratives that suggest this initiative is competition driven and remind other states that successful security initiatives inevitably lead to a reduced need for other external support. Australia should also be more transparent about its concerns with a greater Chinese security presence in the region.

Recommendation 11: Australia should encourage some of the region’s key partners to support the PRG with supplies, funding and – if needed – additional vessels and aircraft for transport.

Recommendation 12: If, in the future, the PRG is requested to support alongside Chinese security forces, Australia must combat potential narratives pushed by China of welcome cooperation and partnership between Australia as a PRG-member and China in the region that legitimise a Chinese security presence while respecting the sovereign decision making of recipient countries.

Connecting the Indo-Pacific: The future of subsea cables and opportunities for Australia

This report examines the role of hyperscalers as drivers of the subcable market and the geostrategic context of subcable systems; it highlights the significance of these developments for Australia, exploring both the potential benefits and challenges.

Submarine cable networks are critical infrastructure; they carry nearly all public internet and private network data traffic, facilitating global economic and financial activity as well as government and military communications and operations.

The submarine cable landscape has entered a new era and is now shaped by the rising participation of hyperscalers—hyperscale cloud and content providers— as well as the strategic actions of major powers and minilateral groups. The report examines the significance of this for Australia and explores how Australia can capitalise on these evolving dynamics to solidify its position as a regional digital hub in the Indo-Pacific by improving regional subcable resilience and digital connectivity, including its own.

This report makes five key recommendations, including that the Australian Government supports and strengthens regional repair and maintenance capabilities, ensuring that the management and protection of cables remains best practice, while continuing to work with regional partners to shape the regulatory norms and standards of the region. Additionally, to manage risks to Australia’s data security and digital economy ambitions, this report recommends that the Australian Government engages more closely with industry, makes potential regulatory adjustments, and maintains strategic oversight and vigilance to digital supply-chain dependency risks and anticompetitive behaviour.

Not only will those measures build connectivity and resilience domestically and regionally, but they align with Australia’s foreign-policy, development, security and cyber objectives, and will also support Australia’s growth and attractiveness as a subcables hub.

Lessons in leadership: Interviews with 11 of Australia’s former Defence Ministers

In a time of growing strategic uncertainty, 11 of Australia’s former defence ministers have shared valuable lessons they learned over decades running one of the toughest portfolios in government.

In this compendium, the former ministers from both sides of politics give their views on topics ranging from the complexity of dealing with a massive department, to the grief they shared with families at the funerals of slain soldiers.

The pieces are drawn from interviews with former ASPI executive director Peter Jennings and links to the original video interviews are available in the posts on The Strategist site.

ASPI’s two-decade Critical Technology Tracker: The rewards of long-term research investment

The Critical Technology Tracker is a large data-driven project that now covers 64 critical technologies spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas. It provides a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology capability.

It first launched 1 March 2023 and underwent a major expansion on 28 August 2024 which took the dataset from five years (previously, 2018–2022) to 21 years (2003–2023). Explore the website and the broader project here.

Governments and organisations interested in supporting this ongoing program of work, including further expansions and the addition of new technologies, can contact: criticaltech@aspi.org.au.

Executive Summary

This report accompanies a major update of ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker website,1 which reveals the countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—leading scientific and research innovation in critical technologies. It does that by focusing on high-impact research—the top 10% of the most highly cited papers—as a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology (S&T) capability.

Now covering 64 critical technologies and crucial fields spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas, the Tech Tracker’s dataset has been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022)2 to 21 years of data (2003–2023).3

These new results reveal the stunning shift in research leadership over the past two decades towards large economies in the Indo-Pacific, led by China’s exceptional gains. The US led in 60 of 64 technologies in the five years from 2003 to 2007, but in the most recent five years (2019–2023) is leading in seven. China led in just three of 64 technologies in 2003–20074 but is now the lead country in 57 of 64 technologies in 2019–2023, increasing its lead from our rankings last year (2018–2022), where it was leading in 52 technologies.

India is also emerging as a key centre of global research innovation and excellence, establishing its position as an S&T power. That said, the US, the UK and a range of countries from Europe, Northeast Asia and the Middle East have maintained hard-won strengths in high-impact research in some key technology areas, despite the accelerated efforts of emerging S&T powers.

This report examines short- and long-term trends, to generate unique insights. We have updated the recent five-year results (2019–2023) to show current research performance rankings (top 5 country results are in Appendix 1). We have also analysed our new historical dataset to understand the country and institutional trends in research performance over the full 21-year period. In select technologies we have also made projections, based on current trends, for China and the US to 2030.

The results show the points in time at which countries have gained, lost or are at risk of losing their global edge in scientific research and innovation. The historical data provides a new layer of depth and context, revealing the performance trajectory different countries have taken, where the momentum lies and also where longer term dominance over the full two decades might reflect foundational expertise and capabilities that carry forward even when that leader has been edged out more recently by other countries. The results also help to shed light on the countries, and many of the institutions, from which we’re likely to see future innovations and breakthroughs emerge.

China’s new gains have occurred in quantum sensors, high-performance computing, gravitational sensors, space launch and advanced integrated circuit design and fabrication (semiconductor chip making). The US leads in quantum computing, vaccines and medical countermeasures, nuclear medicine and radiotherapy, small satellites, atomic clocks, genetic engineering and natural language processing.

India now ranks in the top 5 countries for 45 of 64 technologies (an increase from 37 last year) and has displaced the US as the second-ranked country in two new technologies (biological manufacturing and distributed ledgers) to rank second in seven of 64 technologies. Another notable change involves the UK, which has dropped out of the top 5 country rankings in eight technologies, declining from 44 last year to 36 now.

Besides India and the UK, the performance of most secondary S&T research powers (those countries ranked behind China and the US) in the top 5 rankings is largely unchanged: Germany (27), South Korea (24), Italy (15), Iran (8), Japan (8) and Australia (7).

We have continued to measure the risk of countries holding a monopoly in research for some critical technologies, based on the share of high-impact research output and the number of leading institutions the dominant country has. The number of technologies classified as ‘high risk’ has jumped from 14 technologies last year to 24 now. China is the lead country in every one of the technologies newly classified as high risk—putting a total of 24 of 64 technologies at high risk of a Chinese monopoly. Worryingly, the technologies newly classified as high risk includes many with defence applications, such as radar, advanced aircraft engines, drones, swarming and collaborative robots and satellite positioning and navigation.

In terms of institutions, US technology companies, including Google, IBM, Microsoft and Meta, have leading or strong positions in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum and computing technologies. Key government agencies and national labs also perform well, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which excels in space and satellite technologies. The results also show that the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)—thought to be the world’s largest S&T institution5—is by far the world’s highest performing institution in the Critical Tech Tracker, with a global lead in 31 of 64 technologies (an increase from 29 last year, see more on CAS in the breakout box on page 19).

The results in this report should serve as a reminder to governments around the world that gaining and maintaining scientific and research excellence isn’t a tap that can be turned on and off. Too often, countries have slowed or stopped investing in, for example, research and development (R&D) and manufacturing capability, in areas in which they had a long-term competitive advantage (5G technologies are an example6). In a range of essential sectors, democratic nations risk losing hard-won, long-term advantages in cutting-edge science and research—the crucial ingredient that underpins much of the development and advancement of the world’s most important technologies. There’s also a risk that retreats in some areas could mean that democratic nations aren’t well positioned to take advantage of new and emerging technologies, including those that don’t exist yet.

Meanwhile, the longitudinal results in the Critical Tech Tracker enable us to see how China’s enormous investments and decades of strategic planning are now paying off.7

Building technological capability requires a sustained investment in, and an accumulation of, scientific knowledge, talent and high-performing institutions that can’t be acquired through only short-term or ad hoc investments.8 Reactive policies by new governments and the sugar hit of immediate budget savings must be balanced against the cost of losing the advantage gained from decades of investment and strategic planning. While China continues to extend its lead, it’s important for other states to take stock of their historical, combined and complementary strengths in all key critical technology areas.

This report is made up of several sections. Below you’ll find a summary of the key country and institutional findings followed by an explanation of why tracking historical research performance matters. We then further analyse the nuances of China’s lead and briefly explain our methodology (see Appendix 2 for a detailed methodology). We also look more closely at 10 critical technology areas, including those relevant to AI, semiconductors, defence, energy, biotechnology and communications. Appendix 1 contains visual snapshots of top 5 country rankings in the 64 critical technologies.

We encourage you to visit ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker website (https://techtracker.aspi.org.au) and explore the new data.

What is ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker?

ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker is a unique dataset that allows users to track 64 technologies that are foundational for our economies, societies, national security, defence, energy production, health and climate security. It focuses on the top 10% of the most highly cited research publications from the past 21 years (2003–2023).9 The new dataset is analysed to generate insights into which countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—are publishing the greatest share of innovative and high-impact research. We use the top 10% because those publications have a higher impact on the full technology life cycle and are more likely to lead to patents, drive future research innovation and underpin technological breakthroughs.10

Critical technologies are current or emerging technologies that have the potential to enhance or threaten our societies, economies and national security. Most are dual- or multi-use and have applications in a wide range of sectors. By focusing early in the science and technology (S&T) life cycle, rather than examining technologies already in existence and fielded, the Critical Technology Tracker doesn’t just provide insights into a country’s research performance, but also its strategic intent and potential future S&T capability. It’s only one piece of the puzzle, of course: it must be acknowledged that actualising and commercialising research performance into major technological gains, no matter how impressive a breakthrough is, can be a difficult, expensive and complicated process. A range of other inputs are needed, such as an efficient manufacturing base and ambitious policy implementation.

The Tech Tracker’s dataset has now been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022)11 to 21 years of data (2003–2023). This follows previous attempts to benchmark research output across nations by focusing on quality over quantity, key technology areas and individual institutions, as well as short-term, long-term and potential future trends. This update continues ASPI’s investment in creating the highest quality dataset of its kind.12

Both the website and two associated reports (this one included) provide decision-makers with an empirical methodology to inform policy and investment decisions, including decisions on which countries and institutions they partner with and in what technology areas. A list of the 64 technologies, including definitions, is on our website.13 Other parts of this project include:

  • the Tech Tracker website: ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker14 contains an enormous amount of original data analysis. We encourage you to explore these datasets online as you engage with this report. Users can compare countries, regions or groupings (the EU, the Quad, China–Russia etc.) and explore the global flow of research talent for each technology.
  • the 2023 report: We encourage readers to explore the original report, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power.15 In addition to analysing last year’s key findings, it outlined why research is vital for S&T advances and it examined China’s S&T vision. The report also made 23 policy recommendations, which remain relevant today.16
  • visual snapshots: Readers looking for a summary of the top 5 countries ranked by their past five years of performance in all 64 technologies (see example below) can jump to Appendix 1.
Example of the visual snapshots depicted further in the report.

Data source: ASPI Critical Technology Tracker.

Full Report

For the full report, please download here.

  1. Critical Technology Tracker, ASPI, Canberra. ↩︎
  2. Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power, ASPI, Canberra, 1 March 2023. ↩︎
  3. 21-year dataset with improved search terms and institution cleaning, see Methodology for more details. ↩︎
  4. In the early years, such as 2003–2007, some of the 64 technologies have not yet emerged and the credits assigned to top countries or institutions are too low to be statistically significant. Where this is the case we have avoided pulling key insights from the rankings of countries and institutions in these technologies. ↩︎
  5. Bec Crew, ‘Nature Index 2024 Research Leaders: Chinese institutions dominate the top spots’, Nature, 18 June 2024. ↩︎
  6. Elsa B Kania, ‘Opinion: Why doesn’t the US have its own Huawei?’, Politico, 25 February 2020. ↩︎
  7. See, for example, Zachary Arnold, ‘China has become a scientific superpower’, The Economist, 12 June 2024.
    ‘China’, Nature, 9 August 2023, https://www.nature.com/collections/efchdhgeci ;
    ‘China’s science and technology vision’ and ‘China’s breakout research capabilities in defence, security and intelligence technologies’ in Gaida et al.
    ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, 14–20; Tarun Chhabra et al., ‘Global China: Technology’, Brookings Institution, April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/global-china-technology/ ;
    Jason Douglas and Clarence Leong. “The U.S. Has Been Spending Billions to Revive Manufacturing. But China Is in Another League”, The Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/the-u-s-has-been-spending-billions-to-revive-manufacturing-but-china-is-in-another-league-75ed6309 . ↩︎
  8. Eva Harris, ‘Building scientific capacity in developing countries’, EMBO Reports, 1 January 2004, 5, 7–11. ↩︎
  9. These technologies were selected through a review process in 2022–23 that combined our own research with elements from the Australian Government’s 2022 list of critical technologies, and lists compiled by other governments. An archived version of the Australian Government’s list is available: Department of Industry, Science and Resources, ‘List of critical technologies in the national interest’, Australian Government, 28 November 2022.
    In May 2023, the Australian Government revised their list: Department of Industry, Science and Resources, ‘List of critical technologies in the national interest’, Australian Government, 19 May 2023, https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/list-critical-technologies-national-interest .
    A US list is available from National Science and Technology Council, ‘Critical and emerging technologies list update’, US Government, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf .
    On our selection of AUKUS Pillar 2 technologies, see Alexandra Caples et al., ‘AUKUS: three partners, two pillars, one problem’, TheStrategist, 6 June 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukus-three-partners-two-pillars-one-problem/ . ↩︎
  10. Felix Poege et al., ‘Science quality and the value of inventions’, Science Advances, 11 December 2019, 5(12):eaay7323;
    Cherng Ding, et al., ‘Exploring paper characteristics that facilitate the knowledge flow from science to technology’, Journal of Informetrics, February 2017, 11(1):244–256, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joi.2016.12.004 ;
    Gaida et al., ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, 9. ↩︎
  11. Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power. ↩︎
  12. See more details in the full methodology in Appendix 2. ↩︎
  13. ‘List of technologies’, Critical Technology Tracker. ↩︎
  14. Critical Technology Tracker ↩︎
  15. See Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power. ↩︎
  16. Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power, 44. ↩︎

Tag Archive for: Asia & the Pacific

ASPI and STEPI sign MoU for future cooperation on technology policy

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ASPI co-hosts Australia-ROK Critical Tech Track 1.5 in Seoul

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Manila Conference

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Private Investment in Pacific Island Countries

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Chief of Army Roundtable

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In Conversation with Dr Arzan Tarapore – Deterring an attack on Taiwan: policy options for India and other non-belligerent states

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Senior Analyst Dr. Greg Brown presented to active duty and reserve US Air Force and Air National Guard officers

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2023 Indo-Pacific Strategy Forum (ISPF)

On 5 December 2023, Senior Analyst Dr. Greg Brown, provided a Keynote Address at the 2023 Indo-Pacific Strategy Forum (ISPF) in Ottawa—the largest and most comprehensive Indo-Pacific conference in Canada on defence and trade engagement in the region.

The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy (IPD) and the Canada West Foundation (CWF) co-hosted two-days of ISPF panels and presentations featuring nearly 40 expert speakers from Canada and the Indo-Pacific region.

Occurring a year after the Government of Canada launched its Indo-Pacific Strategy, the 2023 conference was a timely platform for evaluating the progress of the strategy’s implementation, exploring Canada’s broader engagement with the region, and understanding how this engagement is perceived within the Indo-Pacific.

Dr. Brown’s address: A Perspective from Australia: Navigating Relations with China and the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific, outlined Australia’s forefoot foreign policy and its possible lessons for strengthening Ottawa’s relations and influence in Washington.

Tag Archive for: Asia & the Pacific

Stop the World: TSD Summit Sessions: ASEAN, regional stability and disruptive tech with Dato’ Astanah Abdul Aziz

In the latest video edition of The Sydney Dialogue Summit Sessions, Bethany Allen, Head of China Investigations and Analysis at ASPI, speaks with Her Excellency Dato’ Astanah Abdul Aziz, Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN for Political-Security Community.

They discuss Dato’s career path and how her time as a diplomat within Malaysia’s foreign ministry led to her current role with ASEAN. They also explore the role of ASEAN and the value that it brings to the region – not just economic value but also in building relationships.

With growing tensions in the South China Sea, Bethany and Dato’ discuss how ASEAN can contribute to greater stability in the Indo-Pacific. They also talk about how ASEAN nations are working to address the rise of disruptive technologies, particularly artificial intelligence.

Dato and Bethany were both panellists at The Sydney Dialogue, ASPI’s premier policy summit for critical, emerging and cyber technologies, held on September 2 and 3. This special episode is the fourth in a series of podcasts filmed on the sidelines of the conference, which will be released in the coming weeks. 

Speakers: 
Her Excellency Dato’ Astanah Abdul Aziz 
Bethany Allen

Stop the World: Japan’s security, partnerships and regional strategic outlook with Narushige Michishita

In this episode of Stop the World, we bring you the penultimate episode in our special series recorded from the sidelines of the ASPI Defence Conference ‘JoiningFORCES’.

This interview is all about Japan and regional security. Dr Euan Graham, Senior ASPI Analyst speaks with Narushige Michishita, professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo and Japan Scholar with the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program. The conversation covers Japan’s perspective on the strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific, the role of the US-Japan alliance and the evolution of the Australia-Japan relationship. Euan and Michishita also discuss Japan’s major investments in defence, including a promise to increase defence funding by 60 percent, and opportunities to increase regional cooperation on security, including through AUKUS.

Note: This episode was recorded on the sidelines of the conference, so please forgive the less than perfect audio quality.

Guests:

⁠Euan Graham⁠

⁠Narushige Michishita

Stop the World: EU security and strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific

This week on Stop the World, ASPI Senior Analyst Alex Bristow speaks to Niclas Kvarnström, Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific at the European ExternalAction Service, to discuss the European Union’s engagement in and relationship with the Indo-Pacific.

With war in Europe and conflict in the Middle East, they discuss how much capacity the European Union (EU) has to focus on the Indo-Pacific, how Russia’s war on Ukraine has forced a rethink of the EU’s future security, as well as its relationship with China.

And in the episode’s second segment, Alex is joined by William Leben, Expert Associate at the Australian National University’s National Security College, to unpack his recent ASPI report ‘Escalation risks in the Indo-Pacific: a review for practitioners’. They discuss the main threats to strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific, how a potential crisis in the region might develop, and whether or not AUKUS will contribute to a balance of power in the region.

Mentioned in this episode:

⁠https://www.aspi.org.au/report/escalation-risks-indo-pacific-review-practitioners#:~:text=The%20outbreak%20of%20war%20in,potential%20miscalculations%20heighten%20the%20risk⁠.

Guests:

⁠Alex Bristow⁠

Niclas Kvarnström

⁠William Leben

Mapping China’s data harvesting and global propaganda efforts

ASPI has released a groundbreaking report that finds the Chinese Communist Party seeks to harvest user data from globally popular Chinese apps, games and online platforms in a likely effort to improve its global propaganda.

The research maps the CCP’s propaganda system, highlighting the links between the Central Propaganda Department, state-owned or controlled propaganda entities and data-collection activities, and technology investments in Chinese companies.

In this special short episode of Stop the World, David Wroe speaks with ASPI analyst Daria Impiombato about the key takeaways from this major piece of research.

Mentioned in this episode:
Truth and reality with Chinese characteristics

Guests:
David Wroe
Daria Impiombato