Nothing Found

The security challenges across the globe are numerous and complex, and the post-Cold War peace dividend is an increasingly distant memory. I see two main security trends at play. The first is ungoverned spaces and fragile states. Instead of the hoped for end to the 9/11 decade, extremist groups continue to take advantage of ungoverned spaces and weak states to establish safe-havens from which they export violence.

That’s most obvious in the Middle East, but it is occurring across the globe, including in Africa and Asia. Radicalised non-state actors are a new normal—and, as a result, Australia has once again committed significant numbers of military personnel to the Middle East.

Labor has provided bipartisan support for Australia’s assistance to Iraq and, more recently, air operations across Iraq’s border with Syria. We believe it’s in the national interest to contribute to the campaign against Daesh, although we’ve been upfront about our concerns with the coherence of the strategy guiding the international effort.

Labor isn’t alone in its concerns—and there has been much criticism in recent months of the international strategy in Iraq and Syria. Some of this criticism, frankly, appears to be motived more by a desire to achieve political change in Washington than in Damascus.

Yet it’s true that, to date, the international effort hasn’t achieved all that we might hope. But we shouldn’t overlook some of the successes. The briefings I’ve received indicate that Daesh’s aggressive advance in Iraq has been largely halted, and in some instances, reversed. Our training efforts—which will ultimately help Iraq protect itself—are making progress. But our role is a supporting role.

The key to success will be a demonstrable commitment by Iraq’s leaders to overcoming sectarian divides and to unite for a common goal. I believe success is Iraq is achievable—but only Iraq’s people and their leaders can provide the fundamental ingredient for success.

Meanwhile, the situation in Syria is a humanitarian catastrophe and a threat to global security. We must acknowledge that a durable solution will demand more than just military intervention—it will require diplomatic effort and a political solution. There won’t be a lasting solution absent an agreed way forward between the major players involved in the conflict.

If an agreed solution ultimately calls for additional international contributions, then that’s something Australia should consider—and Labor will be a constructive partner in those discussions.

But, as a starting point, the international community should be encouraging the Arab states with the means to do so to secure a post‑conflict Syria.

Ungoverned spaces and weak states are one of two key security trends—the other is shifting power relations. It’s in our region, to our north, where the greatest shifts are occurring—a generational transformation is underway as decades of stability lead to enormous economic growth.

In a post-GFC world in which developed economies have struggled to grow, Asia has become the world’s economic engine. But as economic weight has shifted to our region, so too has strategic competition increased. Asia’s economic rise has led to a period of intense military build-up and modernisation.

 

Of themselves, those trends are neither surprising nor a cause for alarm. It’s understandable that countries with healthy economies will want to modernise their militaries—and having more capable militaries in the region that can contribute to common security goals is desirable.

But coupled with a lack of transparency and historical grievances, those trends could have unforeseen consequences. In a period of flux, it would be comforting to assume that the multilateral system that has served us well to date will be a stabilising force.

But as DFAT Secretary Peter Varghese has noted, multilateralism is under intense pressure and isn’t delivering on our expectations. In Mr Varghese’s words: ‘emerging powers are no longer willing to accept rules they did not write or outcomes which they perceive do not take their interests into account.’

As a result, the future of global leadership could be described as contested. For a middle power like Australia, for whom the international system provides a means to project our interests beyond our relative strategic weight, that’s a concerning prospect.

Notwithstanding the shifts underway, for the foreseeable future, the US will remain the preeminent global and regional power. Labor strongly believes that this special relationship remains firmly in our national interest—and that an engaged and active US is a common good for our region.

Our alliance is an art, not a science—it’s a relationship that isn’t defined by a precise formula or quid pro quo—and it’s more than the sum of its parts. It’s also, in my view, a relationship that requires constant investment, innovation and reinvention to meet new challenges.

Labor has been at the forefront of evolving the alliance to respond to new challenges. This includes extending the ANZUS treaty to cover cyber threats, and increased bilateral cooperation on space.

China’s rise is at the centre of changes occurring in our region. It isn’t the only factor, but it is the most prominent. And its relationship with the US will be the defining feature of this century.

Labor strongly supports the peaceful rise of China. As our relationship with China matures and deepens over time, so too should we expand the links between our defence forces and personnel.

While others have argued that China’s rise will lead to an inevitable ‘choice’ for Australia between our alliance with the US and our growing relationship with China—I disagree. I reject the notion that there must be a binary, zero sum ‘choice’. We are, in the words of Defence Secretary Dennis Richardson, ‘friends with both, allies with one’.

I believe that we can continue to invest in our alliance with the US while we simultaneously seek to build cooperation with China.

It’s important to acknowledge that our relationships with both differ. Our relationship with the US is long and deep. Our relationship with modern China is only just developing. It’s a relationship centred on trade that, I hope, will develop over time into a rounded and mature relationship as trust and confidence builds.

We can expect China to want a greater say in existing global and regional arrangements and institutions—and to promote new arrangements and institutions which reflect its interests.

But trust and confidence will also require China to demonstrate a commitment to supporting the international system of laws and norms from which both our countries have directly benefited.

Nowhere is it more apparent that the international system is under pressure and in need of support than in our region—particularly in the South China Sea. As a maritime trading nation, we have a direct interest in freedom of navigation and are the beneficiaries of an international system of laws and norms.

We don’t take a position on the competing claims—whether they be the claims of China, the Philippines, Vietnam—or any other claimant.  Our interest—Australia’s interest—is in supporting the international system.

For this reason, Labor welcomes the recent activities by the United States in the South China Sea as an important affirmation of international law and norms.  I believe that other likeminded countries, including Australia, also have an obligation to act in support of international law and norms in the South China Sea.

Those actions mustn’t be directed at any single claimant.  And I would encourage all nations to become parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including the United States, as a confidence building measure and further step towards a normative rules based approach to resolving disputes.

I recently spoke at the third ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) workshop on cybersecurity held in Beijing. In the following two posts I’ll look at the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure in the Asia­–Pacific, and examine some of my personal takeaway themes from the two-day meeting.

The starting point for any discussion about the ASEAN region is that of technological, economic, or social diversity, reflected in the variation between ASEAN states’ critical national infrastructures.

One of the nightmare ‘cyber scenarios’ that we are frequently presented with at these gatherings is the take down of critical infrastructure delivery services, such as energy, water and communications which would leave a nation crippled. This has led to much debate internationally about how to lower the potential use of this attack vector in any future scenario. Yet for many nations in the region, simply understanding what their critical assets and services are would be a good starting point. For some nations such as China, infrastructure is still largely state-owned and run, whereas in Australia approximately 90% of all infrastructure is private sector-owned. This makes assigning common roles and responsibilities for critical infrastructure protection a complex task. Additionally the definitions of critical infrastructure used also vary across the region, meaning that the playing field is far from even. Australia works with the following definition:

those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact the social or economic wellbeing of the nation or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security.

Increasingly large parts of our critical infrastructure are connected to the internet, enabling threat actors to target aspects of our critical infrastructure making any government uncomfortable as impacts on one nation can have implications for another thousands of kilometres away. Yet as much as the region has a variable critical infrastructure picture, there are a range of shared risks.

A recent report by Lloyd’s of London and Cambridge University estimated that a sophisticated cyberattack on the US power grid could cause nearly $250 billion in economic losses and, under the most severe circumstances, cost more than $1 trillion to the US economy. A recent poll by the Organisation of American States found that hacking attacks that destroy rather than steal data or that manipulate equipment within critical infrastructure are far more prevalent than widely believed within that region. The poll found that 40% of respondents had battled attempts to shut down their computer networks, 44% had dealt with bids to delete files and 54% had encountered ‘attempts to manipulate’ their equipment through a control system.

Destruction of data presents little technical challenge to carry out compared with penetrating a network, so the infrequency of publicised incidents has often been ascribed to a lack of motive for attackers. However, now that hacking tools are being spread more widely particularly through the Darknet, more criminals, activists, spies and business rivals are experimenting with such methods.

Additionally there’s the very real threat posed to increasingly internet-connected supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems which communicate with industrial control systems to provide operators with the capacity to control the physical parts of the system, like fans, pumps and valves. Those that are linked online, create backdoors for malicious actors who can gain control of critical infrastructure facilities.

There’s little regional reporting as to what the key threats are, and research is urgently needed to get a better grasp on the threat environment, especially as the region is expected to see rapid expansion in infrastructure delivery. That infrastructure is going to be highly inter-connected nationally and internationally, meaning that the systems and networks to deliver them need to be cyber secure. It’s expected that by 2020 critical infrastructure security spending in the region will reach US$22 billion. This also means that government cyber policies will need to keep pace with the rate of development and spending, as will the regional discussion of these issues.

Asia–Pacific nations have a shared interest in ensuring that delivery of their critical goods and services is continuous, especially with the increasingly cross-border nature of management and ownership of critical national infrastructures. We’re more interconnected than we sometimes like to admit and this means as situation of shared risk.

So what are the practical measures that ASEAN can take? Well the region isn’t starting from the ground floor in this area; there’s already agreement (PDF) that critical national information infrastructure needs to be protected across the region. Malaysia, China, America, Russia, and Japan were all present at the latest ASEAN ARF and were also members of the UN Group of Government Experts that recently agreed to the norm that critical infrastructure shouldn’t be intentionally damaged by another state. So it’s obvious that this norm should be reinforced amongst ASEAN nations. A clear statement in the resulting ARF report reiterating this norm and advocating the advancement of critical infrastructure cyber resilience for all states would be powerful.

Second, I proposed the baselining of minimum cybersecurity standards for ASEAN critical infrastructure in order that a clearer picture emerges for those nations developing their infrastructures. Obviously there would need to be discussion about how exactly this could be monitored and measured, but additional work is sorely needed, and regional level standards could assist in both building capacity and building confidence.

Finally, ASEAN could lead critical infrastructure specific workshops for those who are responsible for delivering policies and the goods and services in order that they share best practice and approaches to cybersecurity in this area.

The ARF was highly focused on the practical measures that ASEAN nations could adopt to enhance cyber capacity and build confidence amongst its member state, and it was fascinating to see how this was interpreted differently by those who were in attendance. The second post in this series will look at the overall themes and messages from the meeting.

At the centre of Australian strategic policy lies a puzzle: how do we grow a responsibility-sharing order in an Asia of rapidly shifting power relativities? The traditional answer has been to nurture new forms of regional security architecture that would embrace the full range of key players, strengthen the concept of a regional community, and articulate ‘rules of the road’ to codify regional strategic behaviour.

We’ve pursued that strategy over a number of years as a complement to other strands of our policy, including maintaining our alliance with the US (hoping thereby to ensure continued US regional primacy), strengthening the self-reliant capabilities of the ADF, and attempting to grow what might be called ‘critical mass’ in Southeast Asia. We were ASEAN’s first dialogue partner, we played a role in the design of APEC, we were a keen supporter of the emergence of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and we campaigned for an expansion of the East Asia Summit and its prioritisation within the range of regional architectures. Read more

The ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre was fortunate enough to be part of the team that put together the second ASEAN Regional Forum workshop on cyber security (the first was held late last year in Beijing). The Kuala Lumpur based workshop drew together key individuals from government, think thanks, the private sector and academia across the region. Co-chaired by Australian and Malaysian government representatives, the meeting set out to be a practically orientated discussion rather than one trapped in the diplomatic quagmire of the internet governance debate. The sessions explored specific proposals for practical cyber confidence building measures (CBMs) within the Asia-Pacific. This type of discussion is vital to lowering the risks of miscalculation and misinterpretation in cyberspace, especially in a region that has become the focus of cyber-competition. Read more