Tag Archive for: Anthony Albanese

Putting economics before security leaves us exposed to Trump’s tariffs

World leaders convening at the APEC and G20 multilateral summits this week seemed to be nervously shadow boxing Donald Trump, who was relaxing ringside at the Ultimate Fighting Championship in New York.

Anthony Albanese recited talking points on ‘free and fair trade’—not to influence any counterparts present but as a message to Trump that Australia was well placed to be exempted from any broad tariffs that the incoming administration might impose. In doing so, he cited the healthy trade surplus that the United States enjoys with Australia, which will indeed be an important starting point.

But the Albanese government needs to reflect a little more deeply on the direction it has taken on economics and security before it assumes its credentials speak for themselves as befitting a reliable global player and partner.

In 2024, it’s not enough just to say we seek maximum economic engagement with all partners, minimising trade restrictions in pursuit of the frictionless flow of money, goods and services. That might have worked as a Platonic ideal of free trade back in the early 2000s but, as an approach to both free and fair trade in the 2020s, it ignores half the picture.

Australia stood its ground on its own security and sovereignty for a number of years and, as a consequence, incurred the wrath of Beijing in the form of several waves of economic coercion and diplomatic unapproachability. We did this not under pressure from Trump during his first administration—nor any other US government—but because it was in our own interests and adhered to our values.

Yet despite Albanese’s insistence that we ‘have not changed our position’ on anything, Australia has steadily become silent and acquiescent on key issues that would risk upsetting Beijing. In return, we have been rewarded with diplomatic charm and trade assurances. We have, in short, chosen domestic economics over our national security and our standing as a stout defender of an international system based on rules. We have all too quickly forgotten that economics and security are inseparable.

How so? We’ve failed to stand up for our neighbours, including the Philippines, as they are bullied by China in the South China Sea. We withdrew from World Trade Organization cases that would have held Beijing to account for its coercive measures and set an example to the rest of the world. We’ve gone completely silent on China’s appalling human rights record. We have stopped referring to the case of Australian Yang Hengjun as arbitrary detention. We say nothing about China’s support for Russia’s war on Ukraine. We are dawdling on defence investment when we should be readying ourselves to make a steadfast contribution to regional security as Beijing flexes its muscle across the Indo-Pacific. We’ve all but lost interest in the diversification that we agreed was vital for our resilience in the wake of the double hit of China’s coercion and the global shockwaves of the Covid pandemic.

We should do all of these first and foremost because they are the right things to do. But they would also mean we could say with real conviction that Australia is not one of those countries that is relying on the US to singlehandedly make the world a fair place for everyone—even those unwilling to carry some of the load themselves by, for instance, investing in their own defence and security.

To be sure, Trump’s global tariffs threats are a blunt instrument, articulated with his characteristic flair for appealing to the sections of US society—a clear majority, as it turns out—who feel that the world is taking advantage of them. We can hope that Trump will distinguish between allies—even if he is right to grumble that some have free-ridden on US security and leadership—and adversaries such as China, which was welcomed onto a level economic playing field only to cheat remorselessly at every turn of the game.

But we shouldn’t easily assume we’d be exempted as we were from Trump’s steel and aluminium tariffs in 2017. The fact is, our exemption back then was won by proving we were investing in our own security and were a true partner to the US rather than a hanger-on.

AUKUS provides us with a good starting point this time, demonstrating real investment in our own security and in the alliance. But the partnership is not enough on its own, when we are cutting other defence programs, including in space security, while also criticising countries that can’t harm us economically—whether friends such as  Israel or foes such as North Korea—while excusing China’s malign behaviour as just what ‘great powers do’.

Albanese only ever answers China questions with the same trope that Australia is ‘cooperating where we can and disagreeing where we must’. This is not good enough when we don’t actually know where we disagree anymore, nor indeed if the ‘must have’ disagreements would arise only if China used military force.

For Albanese to be able to prove his statement in Peru that Australia is a free and fair trading nation, we need to show we are willing not just to reap the benefits of selling goods to China but to share the burden of security requirements.

Instead we are pursuing our economic interests with China while deprioritising security threats to ensure diplomatic meetings, as well as lobster and wine sales. That’s trade, yes. But it’s neither free nor fair.

Relying on the US, as well as other friends such as Japan, to do the heavy lifting on security is not equitable. It is actually an ‘Australia first’ policy—even while we fret about Trump’s putting America first.

Australia’s opportunity to help China be mindful of the society of states

At their press conference last week, US President Joe Biden recounted to Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese a conversation he’d had with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Xi asked him why the US was ‘working so hard’ with Australia, to which Biden replied, ‘We’re a Pacific nation, the US. We are, and we’re going to stay that way.’

During many trips to China, we’ve had similar conversations with interlocutors who have questioned the Australia–US relationship, asking why Australia doesn’t ‘choose China’. Often, they’re unaware of Australia’s long security relationship with the US, particularly its role in Australia’s defence during World War II. Moreover, mutual respect and communication often count more than economics and geographic proximity. Beijing attributes this type of misinterpretation to an ‘information deficit’.

In other instances, the probing is an attempt to deploy wedge politics—potentially what Xi was trying to do with Biden. In 2019, Beijing sent Chinese academics to Australia to criticise the governments of Malcolm Turnbull and Scott Morrison, entice Australians to ‘choose China’ and denigrate the Australia–US relationship. Their trip was wedge politics in action.

One of those academics, Chen Hong, blamed Australia for the freezing of Australia–China relations, chastising Turnbull’s decision in 2018 to ban Huawei and ZTE from Australia’s 5G network. However, Turnbull’s decision supported Julia Gillard’s of 2012 to ban Huawei from bidding on Australia’s National Broadband Network. Ignoring bipartisanship and overlooking Beijing’s retaliatory actions to what were domestic matters, Chen argued that the poor state of Australia–China relations was ‘totally on the Australian side; China always promotes friendship’.

Another, Wang Yiwei, went further, warning Australia: ‘If there is a war, whether a hot or cold war, you are the first sacrifice for this war.’ He called Australia ‘naive’ for trusting its alliance with the US.

They also accused Australia of ‘China bashing’ and ‘pioneering’ condemnation of China at the UN over its treatment of the Uyghur population—despite evidence of an unfolding crisis in Xinjiang—and signalled that to make amends with China, and have a ‘solid deal’ with Beijing, Canberra needed to sign on to the Belt and Road Initiative.

While Beijing may have seen their trip as a masterstroke, it wasn’t—their efforts to entice Australia to the ‘Chinese side’ and denigration of the US reeked of desperation. Soon afterwards, Beijing attempted to punish Canberra with economic sanctions and a further freezing of relations.

Covid-19 gave Australia time to reflect on the challenges it and other regional states were facing due to an increasingly belligerent Beijing and escalating US–China competition. Numerous countries have experienced Beijing’s economic coercion, with Lithuania the newest member of the club. However, economic coercion is not working for Beijing. Instead, these campaigns further tarnish Beijing’s already damaged international reputation.

Post-Covid, Xi is facing a more difficult international environment. The war in Ukraine reflects the problematic nature of China’s ‘no limits’ friendship with Russia and misunderstandings over the limits of Russian power—Xi is in the difficult position of trying to help Vladimir Putin while at the same time acknowledging Ukrainian territorial sovereignty. Meanwhile, China’s lines of credit to Iran provided it with an economic lifeline in the face of ongoing sanctions. Given that Tehran is a critical backer of Hamas and Hezbollah, following the brutal 7 October Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, it appears that Beijing’s ‘information deficits’ on the intricacies of terrorist organisations may have contributed to this outcome.

So, in his upcoming discussions with Xi, Albanese should prepare for the usual attempts at wedge politics, and the likely torrent of accusations and airing of the various grievances China has with Australia and the US. The Albanese team should prepare for struggle-session tactics designed to rattle them: unexpected program delays, errors in the use of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as if they don’t apply to the great power, discussions that incorrectly start from the premise that Australia is to blame, and attempts to force a confession that former Australian Liberal Party leaders were responsible for Beijing’s recent behaviour and that the Labor Party may take penance to be rewarded.

Strategically, in response, the Albanese team should have at the ready a list of issues concerning the international political and social order—or what international-relations theorist Hedley Bull called the society of states—to constrain Xi’s temptation to belittle and isolate its visitors. The list could be substantial: transparency and accountability for global health, hostage diplomacy, economic coercion, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the recent treatment of the Philippines, and China’s relations with Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands are all valid topics to be held in reserve as possible issues that Beijing could help Australia understand.

Xi knows that China and Australia need each other to develop and prosper and that when treated with respect Australia is a good friend. Speaking to the Australian Parliament in 2014, Xi said: ‘A harmonious and a stable domestic environment and a peaceful international environment are what China needs most … Dear friends, China has always viewed Australia as an important partner.’ Hence Albanese has the responsibility to help China respect the society of states and not use wedge politics, fill in the information deficit, avoid blame politics and continue bipartisanship, and he must hold steadfast to the terms set, over recent years, for a healthy, mutually respectful and sustainable Australia–China relationship. He’d also be well advised to follow Biden’s advice of ‘trust, but verify’ if any offers are made by Beijing.

An Albanese–Ardern alliance in the Pacific: a step forward?

The election of a Labor government led by Anthony Albanese in Australia heralds the potential for even closer relations with its neighbouring Labour government, led by Jacinda Ardern in New Zealand.

Ardern was among the first foreign leaders to call and congratulate Albanese. Ardern emphasised Australia’s importance to New Zealand, stating that ‘Australia is our most important partner, our only official ally and single economic market relationship, and I believe our countries will work even more closely together in these tumultuous times.’

The Pacific islands is a region in which Australia and New Zealand have long worked together. And the increasingly crowded and complex geopolitics of the region gives the two neighbours even greater impetus to look for ways to cooperate more closely.

Our ongoing research on how Australia and New Zealand work together in the Pacific has found that, alongside key areas of policy convergence like shared commitment to the international rules-based order, crisis management, Pacific regionalism and regional trade liberalisation, there have been critical divergences in Australia’s and New Zealand’s policies and practices, most notably on regional diplomacy, New Zealand’s Pacific identity as a domestic driver of foreign policy, climate change and nuclear disarmament.

Having Labor/Labour governments on both sides of the Tasman should help narrow some of these critical policy divergences. The Australian Labor Party’s plan to build a stronger Pacific family signals a commitment to climate leadership. This aligns with New Zealand’s Pacific resilience framework, which recognises the importance of climate action.

The ALP has also pledged to reform and expand Australia’s Pacific labour mobility programs and offer additional pathways for Pacific migration to Australia. This also aligns with New Zealand’s extensive Pacific labour mobility schemes and its policy of reserving a quota of spaces for Pacific people to permanently migrate to New Zealand each year.

The ALP also plans to expand Australia’s investments under its Pacific maritime security program, including increased support for aerial surveillance. New Zealand has long been a supporter of maritime domain awareness activities in the Pacific.

The ALP’s plan to increase development assistance to the Pacific by $525 million from 2022–23 to 2025–26 will also be welcomed by New Zealand, which has said it will focus on building economic security through economic integration and long-term resilience. The key will be ensuring that the allies’ economic development and integration policies complement each other.

It’s likely that New Zealand will also welcome the ALP’s proposed Australia Pacific defence school to provide training programs for Pacific defence and security forces, albeit with caution given the increasingly crowded security sector in the region.

There is also likely to be some convergence on nuclear disarmament, as the ALP has committed to sign and ratify the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. But this convergence won’t be a merger; the ALP has committed to continue the planned purchase of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS arrangement, which has caused tensions with New Zealand and several Pacific Island states.

The Solomon Islands–China security agreement and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s pending tour through the Pacific islands mean the region is going to be at the top of the new Australian government’s foreign policy agenda.

Australia’s other ally, the US, is also increasing its focus on the Pacific islands. And the upcoming announcement of the ‘partners for the Pacific’ initiative comprising the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the UK and France, as well as other Quad plans, including on maritime surveillance, means that the region is becoming increasingly crowded—and that Australia has a lot of partners to balance.

While there is much alignment between the Australian and New Zealand government’s policies, New Zealand is going to have to actively position itself as a key partner for Australia in the region.

As we have argued, New Zealand needs to demonstrate to Australia—and, through Australia, to the US and other partners—that it can carry its share of the alliance burden. New Zealand should emphasise that in the Pacific islands, where development, non-traditional security challenges and personal relationships are critical, it contributes to its alliance with Australia in a range of ways in addition to traditional military capabilities. New Zealand has considerable soft power that allows it to exercise influence.

But the Solomon Islands–China security deal suggests there is still work for New Zealand to do to. Senior New Zealand diplomat Andrew Needs met with Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare in Honiara only 10 days before the draft security agreement circulated on social media. Yet New Zealand was, according to Defence Minister Peeni Henare, caught by surprise by the agreement. This has led to serious reflection in Wellington about the true depth of its partnership with Solomon Islands.

The news of the security agreement also triggered some soul-searching in Canberra. But the change of government offers a vital opportunity for a reset in how Australia conducts itself in the region. Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s statement to the Pacific, recorded on her first day on the job, signalled change, as she emphasised listening to the Pacific and taking real action on climate change.

The change of government also opens space to pursue new opportunities for cooperation with New Zealand.

First, Australia and New Zealand should work together to provide more space for Pacific voices to participate in robust and nuanced public and private debate on geopolitical and other challenges. There’s a real risk that Pacific priorities and agendas will become increasingly overlooked and undermined in the noise and sound of the increasing focus of partners such as the US on the region.

Second, Australia and New Zealand need to facilitate better coordination between the greater number of partners now active in the Pacific islands. The large number of states that responded to the Tongan tsunami earlier this year illustrated the need to do this in relation to humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Greater coordination across a range of security initiatives is needed, as is coordination across the growing number of aid and development initiatives that partners are embarking upon.

Third, Australia and New Zealand could seek to expand existing coordination mechanisms to include Pacific island states, with opportunities to open the membership of the Pacific Quad (the Quadrilateral Defence Coordinating Group under which Australia, New Zealand, the US and France provide maritime surveillance support to the Pacific) and the FRANZ arrangement. This would elevate Pacific states to equal status with the partner countries involved in these initiatives, recognise that Pacific states are often best placed to take the lead (demonstrated by the localisation of disaster response after Cyclone Harold hit Vanuatu in 2020), and build capacity and strengthen collective security responses.

Fourth, Australia and New Zealand could work together to advance indigenous foreign policy approaches in the Pacific; this is at the heart of NZ Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta’s foreign policy and the ALP has committed to implementing a First Nations foreign policy.

Next year is the 80th anniversary of the opening of Australian and New Zealand diplomatic missions in each other’s countries and the 40th anniversary of the Closer Economic Relations agreement. It is an opportunity to demonstrate the value of the alliance to each other and to the Pacific.

Albanese’s chance to make the right first impression at the Quad

Life is tough at the top. As Australia’s new prime minister, Anthony Albanese will have barely recuperated from election night celebrations as he boards the plane to Tokyo for his first Quad summit, accompanied by Foreign Minister Penny Wong. And the stakes couldn’t be much higher: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has strained Quad solidarity while China expands its influence in the Indo-Pacific.

As the newcomer, Albanese must build rapport. This should be easiest with US President Joe Biden as they’ve met before and Albanese has reaffirmed that the US alliance will remain the primary pillar of Australian foreign policy under Labor. Leaving aside historical debate about Labor’s past engagement, Japanese PM Fumio Kishida and Indian PM Narendra Modi will welcome assurances that Albanese is fully committed to the Quad and will not sacrifice it to improve relations with China.

Albanese must also consider his counterparts’ priorities. The host, Kishida, has objectives closest to Australian interests. Kishida has signalled that regional economic security and resilient supply chains, notably in energy and digital infrastructure, will be on the agenda—dubbed a ‘new form of capitalism’. This overlaps with Canberra’s longstanding agenda, including a bilateral hydrogen partnership, and Australia and Japan are like-minded on other priorities like regional trade architecture.

For Biden, his delayed first presidential trip to Asia must reassure allies that the US can still walk and chew gum as tensions rise simultaneously in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Thankfully, he remembered his chequebook. But launching the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) alongside Kishida cannot veil US absence from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the sums involved will never rival China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Albanese should encourage Biden to make IPEF the foundation for a larger US economic offer to the region.

Modi requires Quad partners to respect India’s complex relationship with Russia. Albanese should strike a positive tone, building on momentum in the Australia–India relationship. India is primarily invested in the Quad because of China, which threatens its border and encroaches in its neighbourhood. Delhi shares Western alarm at the ‘no limits’ friendship announced by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on 4 February. But India relies on Russia in critical sectors, including defence.

Rather than harangue him over Ukraine, Albanese should tap Modi’s insights into Putin’s and Xi’s thinking. At the press pulpit, Albanese can highlight India’s regional contribution, including manufacturing Quad vaccines. He should oppose split-wording on Russian aggression in the communique. Privately, Albanese needs to express understanding of India’s unique circumstances, explore ways to lessen India’s dependence on Russia and offer help with regional challenges like the ongoing crisis in Sri Lanka.

Forearmed with a grasp of his counterparts’ views, Albanese should keep an unwavering focus on a handful of Australian aims from this summit. He has already revealed that one priority will be climate change. That’s fine as far as it goes: Biden in particular will appreciate Australia shrugging off the cognitive dissonance that constrained engagement under former PM Scott Morrison. But the organising principle of the Quad is China. Albanese must address how to bind the world’s largest polluter into climate solutions without horse-trading core interests.

Australia’s real skin in the Quad game is countering Chinese expansion by building sovereign resilience, amongst partners and across the Indo-Pacific. Albanese can point to Labor’s early commitment of resources to Southeast Asia. But he shouldn’t labour the point—it will take much more than a modest, election-inflected funding commitment to challenge China’s tightening grip in Southeast Asia.

Instead, a comprehensive program that includes massive infrastructure investment is essential. A profusion of grand ideas and acronyms—IPEF, BBW, BDN, SEAGIF—must start translating to tangible ports and digital connectivity soon, because China is already reforming the physical and regulatory landscape. And wider partnerships matter: the Quad’s infrastructure partnership needs a clearer mechanism for coordinating with the G7 as it engages ASEAN.

His Quad counterparts will expect Albanese to lead on the South Pacific. Beyond Solomon Islands, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s upcoming Pacific odyssey will likely include further nasty surprises, perhaps including a new pact with Kiribati, another recent convert from Taiwan. If that happens, Labor will face the same accusations of failure that it levelled at Morrison’s Coalition—an early wake-up, if one were needed, that the new Chinese ambassador’s olive branch is barbed.

But however high the domestic stakes over the Pacific, Albanese should retain some perspective—Japan and India both face direct Chinese challenges to their territorial integrity, and the great game in the South Pacific should be addressed in the context of a Chinese expansionary playbook across the region. That means genning up on thorny hotspots, including Taiwan, the South China Sea and North Korea. The Quad is not a military alliance, but it cannot dodge discrete planning for increasingly real regional contingencies. And fumbling the detail on these in front of the media has consequences.

Lastly, don’t forget those not at the table. The customary genuflecting to ASEAN centrality in public remarks is necessary but insufficient to calm regional anxiety about being sidelined. While the Quad membership is fixed, it makes sense to collaborate with a wider circle in niche areas, like critical technology, as Biden agreed with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol. Think tanks can play a scoping role, as shown by New Zealand and UK participation in ASPI’s Sydney Dialogue.

However hard this crash course in global summitry feels, Albanese and Wong will find that it’s the easy part. What happens when Beijing rediscovers Canberra in the phonebook?