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For Australian policymakers, the security advantages of the Antarctic Treaty would seem to be hiding in plain sight. The luxury of a secure, demilitarised southern neighbourhood saves us a great deal of money and kit. But it has also spared Australian governments from giving Antarctica much thought.

So, as China increased its Antarctic activities over the past decade, there’s been a lack of steady, substantial funding for Australian engagement in the treaty system, which is run by consensus by scientifically active states. Although a new vessel, year-round runway and Antarctic aviation have been approved, Australian governments still need to stump up the bulk of the funding.

Perhaps to catch the attention of policymakers, Australian strategists have mostly worried about whether China might challenge the sovereignty of the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT). That’s despite the AAT having a very odd, limited sovereignty, which is recognised by only a handful of other claimants. Australia can’t apply its laws to other nationalities in the AAT or deny access to other states for legitimate scientific activities.

China may think its research stations and greater logistical access in the AAT would help its position in law if the issue of mining ever comes up again, but Beijing has reiterated its support for the Madrid Protocol, which sets a very high bar for mining even after 2048, when the issue could be brought up again. Practical considerations also push any prospect of mining on the continent into the far future.

Antarctica is also sometimes seen as having special value for military space capabilities, given that many satellites cross over it. The accuracy of China’s Beidou and Russia’s GLONASS GPS-like systems, which have few ground stations in the southern hemisphere, would improve with the use of ground stations in Antarctica.

But Beidou’s accuracy has already been improved by international testing, including from a GPS- and Beidou-capable international ground station in Perth. As Beidou installs more ground stations around the world—in Pakistan, Thailand and likely Brazil—the station in the AAT is likely to make very little difference. More broadly, Beidou is a legitimate dual-use system under the Antarctic Treaty, just like Norway’s Trollsat (part of the EU’s Galileo).

Beidou’s military applications have removed the risk that China ran in relying on GPS in the event of hostilities in the South China Sea. However, that shift occurred when Beidou achieved regional coverage in 2012, before the ground station in the AAT was constructed in 2014. And if major hostilities broke out between the US and China, GPS and Beidou would be attacked in space and cyberspace long before anyone worried about ground stations in Antarctica.

Concerns over Beidou aside, China’s apparently non-strategic, prosaic interests in Antarctica, which could harm Australia’s security, are reason enough to fund our Antarctic presence, science and diplomacy.

President Xi Jinping’s idea of China as a maritime great power encompasses commercial opportunities; the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy depends, in part, on growing the economy. So near-term economic opportunities in Antarctica—such as fisheries, tourism, exploitation of the genetic and chemical properties of Antarctic flora and fauna (bioprospecting), and contracts for equipment and stations—appear to be given the same forethought and state backing as more conventional strategic objectives.

China is therefore willing to strain the operation of the Antarctic Treaty system to defend what it dubs the ‘utilisation’ of Antarctica.

In the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, China has pressed for reduced environmental safeguards. China’s less precautionary approach could end up harming Australia’s valuable toothfish resources around Heard and McDonald Islands, as well as international fisheries.

And we’ve already seen (pages 8–16) China hit back in the commission against Australia after mild and legitimate criticism, in line with broader Chinese sensitivity over its treatment in international forums. In that case, China was supported by South Africa, perhaps presaging an emerging economies bloc in the treaty system.

And Antarctica is a place where Beijing could easily cause us diplomatic difficulties if our relationship is strained for other reasons. Any country that, for example, made spurious environmental objections could significantly delay our proposed year-round runway.

Growing Chinese-owned tourism in Antarctica could increase our search and rescue obligations in the Southern Ocean, or eventually in the AAT, where we currently have no policy on tourism. We’d also have to devote more resources to the surveillance of Chinese vessels if hostilities increased elsewhere in Asia.

But the potentially most worrying intersection of Antarctic utilisation and Australia’s security is the constant reference to the development of a Chinese networked polar observation system.

In its 13th five-year plan (Part IX), Beijing listed ‘the development of real-time online monitoring systems and overseas observation (monitoring) stations for the marine environment’ as one of its major aims, not just for the Antarctic but for the ocean as a whole. It would build on ‘a service platform for the provision and application of information regarding the polar environments and potential polar resources’.

Remote sensing is a legitimate scientific activity in Antarctica as it’s safer and easier than taking measurements directly. But we wouldn’t want to one day find that no vessel could move in the Southern Ocean without Beijing knowing about it.

So Australian policymakers need to advise Antarctic scientists on whether the remote observation systems they’re using in collaboration with the Chinese are sharing technology we’d rather keep to ourselves. Australia should also be more involved in developing practices under the treaty system on the use of drones and other observation equipment, and insist on openness about what systems are deployed and networked.

Under its current leadership, China is unlikely to be swayed from its aims in Antarctica. But we can seek to moderate or delay unsustainable levels of ‘utilisation’ or the establishment of surveillance systems that could hamper other countries’ access. Most importantly, we should put in the diplomatic and scientific effort to support the treaty system, especially its inspection provisions.

Accusations that China and others are contravening the treaty for grand strategic purposes may be good for attracting attention. But they’re hard to prove and make it harder to negotiate on Antarctic practices that could quietly undermine Australia’s security day by day.

Welcome back, comrades.

A fresh batch of new research has been served up in the past week. In time for Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration in Taipei, the Center for a New American Security has released a report on the future of US–Taiwan relations; the Lowy Institute launched Euan Graham’s latest research effort on the strategic partnership between Australia and Singapore (PDF); and the US Department of Defense set free its 2016 report on China’s military power (PDF). (CSIS last week hosted a power panel with Bonnie Glaser, Joseph S. Nye and David Shambaugh, who considered ‘the rise of Chinese power, its strengths and weaknesses, with a particular focus on China’s soft power.’)

Head on over to War on the Rocks for a cracking read on how the work being done by next-gen spaceracer Elon Musk (through his company SpaceX) could and should be applied to help the US meet its military challenges. Here’s a sneak peek of ‘Militarizing Musk’:

‘SpaceX and Elon Musk are thinking big about the solutions to the big problem of accessing outer space cheaply. Moreover, they are on the cusp of succeeding in revolutionizing the way that the U.S. accesses outer space. This capability can be an important part of winning a guided munitions salvo competition – a key aspect of the third offset strategy. The U.S. military should consider the potential advantages of this promising technology to solve several of its most pressing emerging military problems and work with the most innovative parts of the emerging private space launch industry.’

For a longer read over the weekend, be sure to check out these two beautiful manifestos on time spent in Antarctica. The first, by Maciej Ceglowski, reflects on a visit to the McMurdo Station and the enduring military presence in the frozen continent. Somewhat more glamorously, the second piece—spun by Jonathan Franzen for The New Yorker—recounts a birding expedition and cruise to the South Pole and Franzen’s ponderings on climate change and human nature after sighting an Emperor penguin. Run, don’t walk.

‘Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.’ At least, that’s what Lord Acton thought in 1887. 1843 Magazine, pulled together by The Economist, interrogates his claim in a piece on how entitlement and privilege play out in decision-making. Those who drive a black Mercedes, beware.

Now for two yarns on Daesh recruitment and radicalisation. The first, from Foreign Policy, deconstructs two prominent theories about what western women want when they join Daesh—are they aggressively fangirling ‘jihotties’, or are they being groomed? The verdict of the Caliphettes is scornful. The second, over at the Eurasia Review, discusses rising Daesh recruitment in Southeast Asia, and the challenges ASEAN states will need to overcome to address radicalisation in their region.

In honour of the man who needs no introduction (but gets four, anyway), the Australian National University has released a series of essays on the exceptional career of Paul Dibb. Written by a veritable who’s who in defence policy and strategy, the essays review Paul’s work in both government and academia. An essential read for any aspiring strategist. Download the PDF here.

Podcasts

By now, The CSIS Podcast is well-known to Strategist readers for being insightful and quick off the mark. The myth continues to build with their latest effort on the election of Rodrigo Duterte and what it might mean for the Philippines and the Asia–Pacific. ‘The Strongman Cometh’ is available here.

For those in need of a little high culture boost this week, check out this podcast from The Diplomat (23 mins), where Australian playwright Ross Mueller discusses his latest work, I Can’t Even, which offers a glimpse into both the mind of Malcolm Turnbull and Australian attitudes toward Asia.

Videos

It was reported earlier in the month that Aung San Suu Kyi requested the US not use the term ‘Rohingya’ in reference to the generations-old Muslim population that lives under siege in Myanmar. Landing all but a week later was this VICE News piece on the discrimination and violence faced by the country’s heavily persecuted minority (40 mins).

In the lead up to November, Vox has shredded the utility of the classic map of the US that comes out every election season and made us all think that Romney had trumped Obama back in 2012. The short video (2 mins) argues that through ‘prioritising geographic accuracy over electoral importance’, the map fails to shed any light on how Americans actually vote. Check out this more accurate alternative at The New York Times, which gives states a size commensurate with their number of electoral votes.

Event

Canberra: Next Wednesday, the AIIA’s national branch will be host a poignant panel event on the tragic extent of Europe’s refugee crisis. The speakers—Raihan Ismail, Stephan Fruehling, Mohammed Qassar and Michael Wilson—will discuss how Europe is responding to the crisis and how it’s projected to affect the region’s security. Register for this free event here.

In a recent opinion piece with Tony Press, I mentioned that last November, an RAAF C-17A Globemaster delivering heavy lift cargo flew from Hobart to Australia’s Wilkins runway near Casey Station in Antarctica.

The flight marked a new era of logistics co-operation between the Australian Antarctic Division and Defence, although the RAAF have long been involved down south.

As documented in David Wilson’s book on the history of the RAAF and Antarctica, when Sir Douglas Mawson led a scientific expedition to the cold continent in 1929–30, and again in 1930–31, he took with him a Moth floatplane and two RAAF pilots to assist in exploration.

In December 1935, another air force party was shipped south, this time with two RAAF aircraft on board, on an eight-week mission to locate an American explorer and his pilot who had gone missing while attempting to fly across the icy continent.

In 1955, the RAAF formed a special Antarctic Flight, consisting of two Auster Mk 6 aircraft and personnel, to meet the Australian National Antarctic Research Expedition’s (ANARE) needs for dedicated air support at the major research station established at Mawson.

Initially the flight was maintained full-time on the ice, with the men staying until replacement crews arrived on annual ANARE resupply vessels. This practice ceased in 1960 after a Dakota was lost to cyclonic winds. During 1962 and 1963, the ANARE resupply vessels brought with them two RAAF Beaver floatplanes for short-term operations.

Protecting our sovereign interests, exercising jurisdiction and being able to engage in search and rescue and other international efforts are particularly demanding tasks for Australia in the Southern Ocean in view of the distances involved, sea conditions and limited permanent presence.

The tasks require both surveillance of ocean areas and the ability to respond to any incident that might arise.

Response requires a surface vessel, and that’s where we’re seriously lacking at present: neither the Customs’ Cape-class nor Navy’s likely Armidale-class replacement vessels are suited for operations in the Southern Ocean.

As a Senate report on Antarctica conveyed in October 2014:

‘The Southern Ocean should not be the poor cousin in Australian defence and border protection. Consideration of the needs to our south should factor into decisions about the most practicable acquisition of defence patrol resources. The ADF’s present project to update its offshore patrol fleet appears to present one timely opportunity to do so, and is worthy of further examination.’

This year’s Defence White Paper should set out the priority accorded to Antarctica and Southern Ocean interests and how Defence can support our national interests in maritime enforcement, scientific research, emergency response, search and rescue, logistic support, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

Those are areas where there’s likely to be increased calls for ADF services, even though Defence won’t normally be the lead agency.

Relevant Defence capabilities would include Navy’s hydrographic assets (eastern Antarctica’s waters aren’t well charted), HMAS Choules (the RAN’s only ice-strengthened vessel, albeit with a limited ability to operate in light ice conditions), C17 aircraft operation into Antarctic airstrips (Hobart’s runway extension over the next two years will allow extra payloads), AP-3C for search support, future UAVs—like Triton—for ISR, and Army personnel for surveying operations.

There should be greater provision for the ADF to be involved in our Antarctic programs, as was the case several years ago when an Army officer headed up Casey Station.

The Australian government has recently announced a new icebreaker due for delivery in the 2019–2020 season. It’ll be able to conduct Southern Ocean research, act as a rescue platform and deliver fuel and cargo to Australian stations. There’s no reason why RAN personnel couldn’t be seconded to play an operational role on re-supply and scientific voyages.

Defence has a range of capabilities relevant to Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. It’s to be hoped that this year’s White Paper will set out where the government sees Defence’s possible contributions in advancing our polar interests.

Anthony Press, as head inquirer of the recently released 20 Year Australian Antarctic Strategic Plan, provides a useful snapshot of, and context behind, this important document in his contribution to The Strategist.

At its core, the 20 Year Australian Antarctic Strategic Plan emphasises the need to ‘maintain Australian leadership in Antarctica’. It provides clear directions that, in addition to suggesting a reorientation of Australia’s Antarctic program, concentrate on supporting, complementing and extending existing initiatives. The report is cogent yet comprehensive, making 35 recommendations across the scope of Antarctic policy, management, program development, science, logistics and international relations and diplomacy.

Australia needs to act now to ensure that this leadership—achieved after decades of diplomatic efforts and scientific research—doesn’t diminish. In addition to refocusing and reaffirming Australia’s Antarctic interests—and suggesting that those interests be linked to specific government agencies—the report suggests new administrative arrangements to strengthen administration of the Australian Antarctic Territory including vesting the Director of the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) with the position of Territory Administrator. Anthony Bergin notes the potential for role conflict here, but the current system vests the Director of the AAD with a number of responsibilities under Australian law. Read more

Earlier this year, I cited the case of the tourist expedition ship Akademik Shokalskiy, which became entrapped near Commonwealth Bay in the waters of Australia’s Antarctic Territory, as showing up serious limitations of Australia’s weakening search-and-rescue capabilities down south: our one polar vessel couldn’t reach the Shokalskiy. Nor was it carrying helicopters that could.

In the recent federal budget, the government announced that it will request tenders for a new icebreaker to replace the ageing Aurora Australis. It’s a welcome move: Aurora Australis is approaching the end of its serviceable life. A decision was needed to commit to a replacement to ensure our ability to conduct marine research anywhere in the Southern Ocean at any time of year, and to provide a heavy-lift capability for efficient delivery of station cargo and refuelling.

Environment Minister Greg Hunt said two Europe-based firms had been shortlisted to build the vessel, to be delivered by 2019. Hunt told reporters that it will cost ‘hundreds and hundreds of millions’, but he wouldn’t comment further due to an ongoing tender process. The new ship will be a significant capability enhancement over the Aurora Australis, in terms of its icebreaking and cargo capacities. Read more