Tag Archive for: Antarctica

Ice panda: navigating China’s hybrid Antarctic agenda

Antarctica is often overlooked in strategic discussions, but its role in geopolitical competition deserves attention.

This report assesses the continents importance to Australian security, China’s hybrid Antarctic activity, and the need for Australia to develop a balancing strategy capable of bolstering the Antarctic Treaty and ‘pushing back’ against growing Chinese power in Antarctica.

Antarctica offers significant strategic advantages for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Although Beijing’s actions in Antarctica may not overtly violate the Antarctic Treaty (AT), they effectively undermine its principles and, by extension, Australia’s strategic interests. Currently, the PRC is adeptly navigating the AT System to challenge the status quo without explicitly breaching the treaty.

China’s domestic policies, which merge civil and military sectors, appear to contravene the spirit of the AT’s military prohibitions, even if they have not yet resulted in direct military activity on the continent. This evolving dynamic underscores the pressing need for Australia to safeguard the existing Antarctic status quo.

With robust Australian foreign and security prioritization, the AT can counter Beijing’s growing ambitions, which may directly impact Australian interests. We must protect and uphold the principles of the AT.

With diverse domestic and international priorities, Australia must not neglect Antarctica, as Beijing continues to exploit the strategic gap left by our limited focus. Australia, with its rich history and commitment to Antarctica, must assert its role as an Antarctic claimant and clarify that China’s presence is contingent on Australian and other claimants’ cooperation. It’s time for Australia to lead in Antarctica and protect our strategic interests.

Gamechanger: Australian leadership for all-season air access to Antarctica

Next year, the Australian Government will decide on whether to commit funding for a proposed year-round, paved aerodrome near the Australian Davis research station in East Antarctica. An all-weather, year-round, paved runway near Davis would have huge positive impacts on Antarctic science and logistics in East Antarctica, where there are no equivalent facilities. It would be the only paved runway in Antarctica.

As with any major piece of infrastructure development, there’ll be inevitable environmental impacts from the construction and operation of the Davis aerodrome. However, we believe that with care, it should be possible to design, construct and operate a facility that satisfies both operational requirements and environmental obligations under the Madrid Protocol and relevant Australian legislation.

If Australia doesn’t proceed with the aerodrome, another country may step into our shoes and take a similar proposal forward. It might be a country with lower standards of environmental assessment and a lesser track record of environmental protection in Antarctica. The Davis aerodrome project requires long-term funding and political commitment.

Failing to proceed with the proposal would weaken our influence in Antarctica: it would allow other states to take advantage of the opportunity for logistical and scientific leadership in East Antarctica. The proposed Davis aerodrome will increase Australia’s strategic weight in Antarctica, where we claim 42% of the continent.

Strategic Insights 66 – Cold calculations: Australia’s Antarctic challenges

This Strategic Insights looks at the range of Australian objectives in Antarctica, the assumptions that underpin those goals, and the options open for us to best achieve our aims. It’s hoped that this report will inform those responsible for formulating and implementing our Antarctic policies. 

The paper looks at a range of strategic policy interests we have in Antarctica and whether we need to trade off any of these goals: 

  • preserving our sovereignty over our Antarctic territory 
  • maintaining the continent free from confrontation and militarisation 
  • protecting the Antarctic environment 
  • taking advantage of the special opportunities Antarctica offers for science 
  • deriving economic benefits from Antarctica 
  • insuring against unpredictable developments down south.

How we weigh and set both complementary and competing priorities among our Antarctic objectives (even if it’s somewhat imprecise) will be a key challenge, as will judging how other Antarctic players react to our policy objectives and our pursuit of them. Some of our policies mightn’t be complementary with those of other Antarctic players.

Tag Archive for: Antarctica

Australia needs a year-round runway on Antarctica

Australia requires persistent access to Antarctica and needs to reconsider its 2021 decision to abandon plans for a year-round runway near Davis Station. 

Unimpeded access to Antarctica is necessary as to solidify Australia’s status as a major stakeholder. In doing so, it will help deter the malign actions of China and Russia on the continent. These countries, who are already investing in dual-use facilities, risk becoming a threat to Australia’s southern flank for centuries to come. 

Often seen as a frozen wilderness dedicated to peace and science, Antarctica is emerging as a geopolitical hotspot. China and Russia have been increasing their presence on the continent, nominally for scientific research purposes. Both have opened new state-of-the-art research stations this year. These activities, while ostensibly peaceful, have dual-use potential, with stations potentially hosting future military applications. Such manoeuvring within the 1959 Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) framework highlights the need for Australia to reassess its previous decision to abandon plans for a year-round runway. 

Australia’s current Antarctic strategy is heavily focused on science and environmental conservation, aligned with ATS principles. The treaty currently prohibits resource exploitation via the 1991 Madrid Protocol. Yet it is known that the area is rich in natural resources, particularly coal, copper, gold and iron. From 2048, however, the treaty’s stakeholders can review the restrictions and begin mining if so agreed. 

Although Australia does not plan to extract resources from Antarctica in the future, other actors may consider the temptation too great to resist. Future technological advancements in resource exploitation and the effects of climate change will likely increase Antarctica’s value and ease of access. Should these actors attempt to move in on Australian treaty land, a broader approach than what currently defines relations in the Antarctic will be necessary. 

Currently, Australia’s access to Antarctica remains reliant on traversing the Southern Ocean. With habitats largely located in East Antarctica, it can take up to a week to get there from Australia as the region has no year-round runway facility. This hampers our existing Antarctic operations and emergency evacuation capabilities. If tensions rise in the future, this will become a greater problem over time. 

Prior to 2021, Australia was planning to build a year-round runway near Davis Station, Australia’s research base, but the proposal was abandoned. The Morrison government cited environmental and cost pressures as the reason for doing so. The proposed runway was 2700m long and would be built on a region of rock that sees little-to-no ice coverage, making it more reliable and accessible than other places on the continent. 

The present benefits of this runway would be that year-round aviation access would provide the Australian Antarctic Division with more flexibility to operate across the continent. Scientists and others would no longer require ships to get to Antarctica. A research trip via air would take only eight hours, saving time and resources. Most especially, the vital evacuation of expeditioners can occur in quick order. By providing a permanent logistical link between Antarctica and mainland Australia, the project would radically reduce operating costs. It would also allow Australia’s icebreaker capability can be freed up for more important work, with RSV Nuyina no longer the sole asset tasked with science, resupply and inspection missions. 

Maintaining Australia’s leadership in Antarctic scientific and environmental efforts is essential. Canberra must adopt a forward-leaning strategy, investing in infrastructure and capabilities to keep up with rising competition. Together with the runway, Australia must improve communications infrastructure and further enhance land-based travel across Antarctica. This would open the aperture for Australia to lead more facility inspections, resulting in greater transparency and allowing us to shine a light on the malign actions of others. 

Engagements elsewhere consistently underscore the fact that maintaining the status quo through Cold War-era agreements is no longer something to take for granted. The cost of inaction might far outweigh the expense of strategic investments today. By guaranteeing Antarctic access via the all-weather runway, it will enable Australia to lead the complexities of Antarctic geopolitics effectively, securing its stake in this critical region for generations to come. 

Ice panda: not all is quiet on Australia’s southern front

Picture a globe turned upside down so you see Antarctica at the top of the world. The continent’s immense strategic value is striking. Global resource pressures, coupled with advances in technology, continue to generate a deep strategic interest in Antarctica, and that interest will only continue to escalate.

Antarctica is enticing, especially for powers seeking to future-proof their resources, participate in global governance and enhance their scientific prestige.

Antarctica ticks all those boxes for China. The Antarctic Treaty (AT) prohibits military activity and establishes Antarctica as a zone of international cooperation for scientific research. But the AT alone, without being an Australian foreign and security priority, is not holding Beijing’s ambitions at bay, including those against Australia’s interests.

Antarctica is too often forgotten or not included in the strategic debate. It should be included—to determine whether Beijing’s behaviour is merely assertive or crossing into aggressive, as it is elsewhere. The answer, and simultaneously the problem, is that, when it comes to Antarctica, Beijing is not technically breaking the agreed rules by which the continent is managed, but it is undermining them and, therefore, Australia’s interests.

Indeed, according to the rulebooks (the AT System) facilitating activity in Antarctica, China is not overtly in breach of AT agreements. Rather, Beijing can work the AT System effectively to undermine the status quo and, with it, a vital strategic interest for Australia. It’s doing that in multiple ways, including through its domestic industrial policy, which has fused its civil and military sectors and is, at the very least, against the spirit of the AT’s prohibition of military activity, if not wholly inconsistent with it. Just because Beijing is not yet undertaking military activity in Antarctica doesn’t mean it’s not using the access Australia and others are giving it for military purposes. Regardless of whether it’s inconsistent with the AT System or merely a breach of the system’s spirit, it’s no longer business as usual in Antarctica. Australia must act to prevent further changes to the status quo.

As a start, Australia needs to act like the Antarctica claimant we are and ensure that it’s better understood that China has no claim and is only on the continent because of our—and other claimants’—cooperation. With so many different domestic, regional and global priorities, it’s understandable that Antarctica isn’t considered a top priority, but the strategic Antarctic vacuum being left by Australia is being filled by Beijing, which continues to show that it can handle multiple strategic priorities at once. A reluctance to incorporate Antarctica into our strategic discourse means a lack of understanding of the continent’s geostrategic importance.

Australia and like-minded partners should develop a toolkit to adequately counter and mitigate China’s erosive efforts to rewrite Antarctica’s future. Capabilities are a critical component of any toolkit, as they ensure the ability to monitor Beijing’s Antarctic activity adequately. Investment in polar capabilities and the sustainment of physical presence through revitalised Antarctic research bases and a competitive scientific research agenda are priority areas of action.

Diplomacy is a vital requirement of our Antarctic toolkit. Simply put, the continuance of the status quo in Antarctica is a shared interest for all parties. Without checks and balances, Beijing will continue to use the existing rules and a lack of interest from nations such as Australia to change it. Australia must work to remind Beijing (both privately in detail and in public to ensure the Australian public is aware of the issue and priority) of the Antarctic spirit and obligations of the AT. A delicate balancing strategy is needed to bolster the status quo facilitated by the treaty and to establish a robust ability to push back against growing Chinese power in Antarctica. While there’s unlikely to be (armed) conflict in Antarctica, make no mistake: Australia’s Antarctic interests and the Antarctic status quo are squarely under threat.

Both Australia and China have legitimate vested national interests in Antarctica. While Canberra has a sovereign territorial claim to protect and a close geostrategic flank to manage, Beijing’s designs aren’t difficult to grasp when it comes to Antarctica. Besides what China tells us it seeks to do with Antarctica, its long-term ambitions relate to the future development of Antarctic resources (living and non-living).

A new ASPI report provides actionable policy recommendations for the Australian government. Most pressing is the need for the prime minister and cabinet to undertake a net-assessment stocktake of existing Australia–China Antarctic funding and research by 2025. That stocktake should cover the number of Antarctic and Southern Ocean postgraduate scholarships or PhD research projects over the past decade that Australian taxpayers have funded. It should also underline where the intellectual property and expertise remains in Australia and consider the long-term implications of those research partnerships by cross-referencing Chinese partners with the US sanctioned entities list.

Only then will we truly grasp how much Australia is continuing to fund and support Beijing’s Antarctic strategic edge.

The Moon’s Artemis Accords are no blueprint for mining Antarctica

Can the recently concluded Artemis Accords that pave the way for exploring, extracting and using resources of the Moon, Mars and other stellar bodies become a blueprint for the mining of Antarctica? No, they can’t, even though questions of dividing rights on the Moon and in Antarctica look superficially similar.

Launched in 2020, the Artemis Accords broke new ground in tackling the question of resource exploitation because they were conceived as agreements between national space agencies rather than governments. They were also established outside the umbrella of the United Nations, even though they claim to be grounded in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. By June 2024, the accords had 43 signatories.

The accords are not a blueprint for the mining of Antarctica for several reasons.

First, no one has staked a territorial claim on the Moon or any other celestial body, making it simpler to negotiate exploitation rights than in Antarctica. In Antarctica, seven territorial claims were tabled by Chile, Argentina, Britain, Norway, Australia, France and New Zealand between 1904 and 1940, but these were frozen under Article IV of the 1961 Antarctic Treaty, which dedicated the continent to peace and science. To resolve this complex web of territorial claims and decide on the ownership of Antarctica, governments will have to remain central to Antarctic affairs.

Second, it would be impossible for a select few nations to pursue the mining of Antarctica, as that idea was rejected by the UN in the 1980s when the Question of Antarctica was deliberated. In the early 1980s, parties to the Antarctic Treaty began negotiating a mining regime for the continent—the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)—only to see it torpedoed by the UN.

In 1986, General Assembly Resolution A/Res/41/88 called ‘upon the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties to impose a moratorium on the negotiations … until such time as all members of the international community can participate fully’.  CRAMRA collapsed soon after and was replaced by an Environmental Protocol whose Article 7 bans mining on the continent. If parties to the Antarctic Treaty could not get away with mining the continent in the 1980s without an inclusive agreement, there is little chance they could do so now.

Excluding players not considered useful was an explicit strategy in the negotiation of the  Artemis Accords. When the Accords were being crafted by the United States, a senior US official told Reuters that the agreements were part of ‘the Trump administration’s plan to forgo the treaty process at the United Nations and instead reach agreement with “like-minded nations,” partly because a treaty process would take too long and working with non-spacefaring states would be unproductive.’

In other words, the administration did not want to negotiate with countries which did not have the technological capacity to reach outer space (similar to the strategy behind CRAMRA) and which would simply insist on inserting the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) principle into the new agreement, as well as the concept of benefit-sharing that normally goes with it. In fact, the CHM principle referenced in the 1984 Moon Treaty resulted in the agreement being ratified by very few spacefaring nations, setting a poor precedent.

While the founding members of the Artemis Accords, including the US, Australia and Canada, are now seeking to expand membership to include developing nations, they are doing so based on pre-agreed rights and obligations. Negotiations on Antarctica cannot be controlled by a select few in the same way, as the UN’s rejection of CRAMRA led to the expansion of the Antarctic Treaty to include countries such as India and China. These countries enjoy full decision-making powers and cannot be handed a done deal.

While the Artemis Accords share some commonalities with the Antarctic Treaty—calling for peaceful activities, the sharing of scientific data and transparency—they differ in that they directly tackle the question of ‘space resources’. Indeed, critics of the Accords contend that since the Outer Space Treaty expressly forbids nations from staking claim to a planetary body, the agreements violate space law by allowing signatories to lay claim to any resources extracted from celestial bodies. They argue that unilateral approval of commercial exploitation violates the treaty and that only an international regime could provide legitimacy.

In fact, both Russia and China have refused to join the Accords, calling them US-centric and proceeding to create their own alternative. Roscosmos and the China National Space Administration are currently planning an International Lunar Research Station, to which they are  trying to lure participation by other nations. In contrast, in Antarctica both Russia and China have full decision-making powers under the Antarctic Treaty and cannot be sidelined.

While the ban on mining in Antarctica does not expire, parties to the Environmental Protocol can revisit any aspect of the Protocol in 2048. It is hard to imagine Antarctica’s equivalent of national space programs, in other words, the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs and its members, ever being given the lead in deciding whether and how to mine Antarctica.

The seventh continent will need its own blueprint.

China is serious about Antarctica. Australia should be too

 

Our domestic discourse on the geopolitics of Antarctica is shamefully shallow. Our attitude continues to be one of ‘there’s nothing to see here’. Our vital interests, including the defence of Australian sovereign territory, are at stake, but everyone appears happy to pass the problem on to the next government.

Canberra has a national interest in Antarctica—a claim to 42 per cent of the frozen continent. Yet successive Australian governments have overlooked Antarctica. We’ve even launched a National Defence Strategy that makes no reference to our sovereign Antarctic territory.

Real-time testing of the rules-based order is under way in Antarctica. Earlier this month, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting quietly wrapped in India. No consensus was achieved for new environmental protection zones, or the addition of new voting parties. For the first time since 2022, no reference was made to the Russia-Ukraine war in the meeting communique.

The Antarctic Treaty System is in limbo. It fails to reach consensus on practically everything it was crafted to do. Yet the system shows no indication of imminent collapse. The treaty remains intact because it facilitates strategic competition.

The fact the Antarctic Treaty System has not fallen apart is not indicative of its success. The maintenance of this treaty system speaks more to its agility to deliver on a vast array of national interests—for a vast array of actors. States such as Australia, the US, Russia, Ukraine and China are all seated at the same table as equals in Antarctica.

Australia continues to approach Antarctica in a haphazard manner. Canberra takes for granted the enduring treaty system and government maintains an optimistic view of international law in contemporary politics. International law is about interpretation. States have creatively interpreted Antarctica’s treaty protocols, just look to the proliferation of dual-use capabilities on the continent.

China has five research stations there, three of which are in Australian Antarctic Territory. These feature satellite ground stations and technology Beijing insists is deployed in support of its scientific activities in Antarctica. Such capabilities fall under China’s civil-military fusion law, which mandates that all research platforms have military-strategic relevance. China’s interpretation of what is deemed ‘scientific research’ on the continent falls well within the treaty bounds.

Instead of bolstering our capacity to monitor or engage with China on our neighbouring continent, Canberra remains missing in action. We lack both strategy and capability to adequately defend a vital national interest. The recent parliamentary review into the adequacy of funding for the Australian Antarctic Division exposes the dismal state of our commitment. Numerous scientific programs have been cut due to budget pressures.

Resupply of critical food and medicines to our expeditioners in isolated stations is no longer ensured. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is boasting a meagre Antarctic capability with a team of four people, some of whom are working part-time, representing the international diplomatic and legal interests tied to a claim equating to about the size of Australia.

So, what can government do? Start by mirroring competitive behaviours: reinvest in our research stations and get serious about strategic science by funding it appropriately. Cultivate a national Antarctic interest and identity—make the Australian Antarctic Territory worth fighting for.

Australian governments must acknowledge that strategic intent can change overnight—but capability cannot. Our navy’s future fleet features no ice-hardened vessels. Our sole icebreaker—Nuyina—is overburdened with duties. And in trouble. Due to access restrictions on passing under the Tasman Bridge in Hobart Nuyina is unable to refuel at her home port.

Ongoing industrial action further undercuts Nuyina’s ability to reliably operate, with her crew often on strike due to pay conditions. We have no redundancy when it comes to icebreaker capability. The global icebreaker rental market is grim—with our go-to ‘backup’ option, Aiviq, recently secured for the foreseeable future by the US Coast Guard.

Our Antarctic absence has been cultivated by a narrow-minded characterisation of strategic competition. Antarctica is apparently ‘sorted’ because the treaty holds. This could not be further from reality. While boots on the ground may not be needed any time soon, some states are actively undermining and changing the status quo in Antarctica.

Our national strategic discourse continues to regurgitate negligent assumptions of past governments when it comes to Antarctic geopolitics. Perhaps this is not a bad thing. After all, it’s not as if we have the capabilities required to really promote or secure our vital national interests in Antarctica anyway.

Might the politics of the South China Sea weaken the high seas treaty?

On March 4, after more than a decade of negotiations, states at the United Nations in New York agreed on a wide-ranging treaty focusing on high seas conservation. While this instrument is still to be approved by the General Assembly and will likely take years to come into force, it’s the most consequential development in the law of the sea in many years. The 54-page text creates new rules for establishing marine protected areas, conducting environmental impact assessments, and managing rights related to marine genetic resources.

A last-minute addition pushed by China—seemingly to protect its interests in the South China Sea—has important implications for the instrument’s application to the Southern Ocean.

The draft agreement on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (the ‘BBNJ Treaty’) is designed to be compatible with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but covers in detail many topics either not included or barely covered in UNCLOS. It responds to current concerns related to overfishing and other human impacts on the ocean by providing mechanisms to create new marine protected areas (MPAs) where existing regional mechanisms either don’t exist or aren’t up to the task. In this sense, the agreement acts as a major spur to achieving the widely supported 30×30 target set at the 2022 UN biodiversity conference to protect 30% of land and marine areas by 2030.

The treaty applies only to the high seas, and thus not to areas within the jurisdiction of any nation. Hence any marine area where a coastal state has an exclusive economic zone would not be covered.

To achieve 30×30, the Southern Ocean plays a key role. These waters surrounding Antarctica are some of the best candidates for high seas MPAs, and currently include the world’s largest MPA, created by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in the Ross Sea in 2016. Despite overwhelming support in recent years for additional Antarctic MPAs, CCAMLR, which operates by consensus, has been deadlocked due to opposition by China and Russia. The advent of a UN treaty that would include a conference of the parties (COP) that could push for establishment of MPAs anywhere on the high seas where local bodies with jurisdiction for whatever reason were not able to act was one of the major objectives of environmental campaigners.

The BBNJ Treaty will indeed create a conference of the parties with significant authority. Although the COP procedures under which protected areas are established are relatively complex, the COP can recommend establishing MPAs (in the vernacular of the agreement ‘area-based management tools’) on the high seas that are compatible with those adopted by organisations like CCAMLR. In doing so, they must respect the competences of such bodies and not undermine them. Exactly what steps would ‘undermine’ a body like CCAMLR could be a matter of significant debate, and the lack of definition in the treaty for this crucial concept may result in considerable discussion and even confusion. But at least it’s possible for the COP to act where to do so doesn’t undermine an existing organisation. The COP takes a decision as a general rule by consensus, but ultimately can vote by three-quarters majority to establish an MPA.

A decision that seeks to influence an existing body like CCAMLR which has proven unable to make progress on MPAs follows a long hard road involving development of a proposal, scientific review, coordination with the regional body, overcoming a relatively undefined principle of ‘not undermining’ and ultimately achieving a vote of three-quarters of the member states of the instrument represented in the COP.

But action in the Southern Ocean may have an additional barrier to overcome. The final text contains provisions, purportedly insisted on by China, that may be interpreted as rendering the treaty inoperable when it is applied to the South China Sea. The provisions at issue concern claims to sovereignty and related disputes, ensuring that COP decisions or establishment of protected areas ‘shall not be relied upon as a basis for asserting or denying any claims to sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction including in respect of any disputes relating thereto’. The language is particularly opaque, but given the importance reportedly placed by China in securing these words in the final hours of the negotiations, it seems reasonable to conclude that China (and possibly other states) believe that the treaty cannot create MPAs or cover marine genetic resources in areas such as the South China Sea that are subject to marine disputes.

States may argue over what these provisions mean and how to implement them. However, if China decides to become a party to this treaty, it might press for wide recognition of an interpretation that requires exclusion of disputed areas from the treaty’s coverage. In that event many countries which would wish to see China join the treaty—which could include many developing countries for a variety of reasons—might be willing to support that interpretation.

Which gets us to the Southern Ocean. Large parts of the marine spaces in the Southern Ocean—namely areas extending 200 nautical miles from the continent—are subject to disputes over sovereignty. Seven countries, Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand Norway, and the UK, claim territory in Antarctica. The claims of Argentina, Chile and the UK substantially overlap in the Antarctic Peninsula. The Australian Antarctic maritime claim covers large areas surrounding the continent. Under the law of the sea, maritime claims depend on land territory and coastal state rights extend from baselines on shore. Most countries, including the US and Russia, and presumably China, do not recognise the Antarctic territorial claims and likely wouldn’t accept the maritime claims either. These disagreements over sovereignty do not matter in the context of CCAMLR, as Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and its CAMLR Convention counterpart allow the CCAMLR parties to cooperate while maintaining their legal positions.

Given the vibrant biodiversity close to land and ice shelves in the Antarctic, the most important parts of many MPA proposals will be found within waters subject to sovereignty disputes. Thus, the additional BBNJ Treaty clauses insisted on by China could create a formidable barrier to applying the treaty to those areas in Antarctica, including to areas already under consideration in existing MPA proposals in East Antarctica, the Weddell Sea, and the Antarctic Peninsula.

The Chinese initiative to carve out the South China Sea may have the effect—perhaps unintended by Beijing—of heading off a debate between Antarctic territorial claimants and non-claimants about what parts of the Southern Ocean are subject to the BBNJ Treaty. That debate could lead to difficult discussions between a small group of states influential in Antarctica and a wide variety of other states including developing countries that would want to see the treaty apply to the full breadth of the Southern Ocean.

It appears that the BBNJ Treaty has been drafted in a way that will leave the matter of Antarctic MPAs largely to CCAMLR. Nevertheless, this new, large-scale multilateral agreement still has political heft that may prove important in persuading CCAMLR to move forward. The successful completion of the treaty shows that the international community wants progress on MPAs and towards 30×30. Members of the CAMLR Commission, including China and Russia, will find it hard to ignore that reality.

 

 

 

Priorities for Australian and US responses to Antarctic diplomatic challenges

Antarctica faces a series of urgent security and environmental policy challenges requiring active engagement. At a time when Australia and the United States are deepening their strategic and geopolitical cooperation, notably through the recently announced AUKUS trilateral security partnership, these two leading and influential states in Antarctica are well situated to work together to address common concerns in Antarctica, through diplomatic channels and through the mechanisms of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).

The US has the largest presence of any country in Antarctica, as well as long-term interests in the region’s political stability, despite its being far from American shores. Australia maintains a claim to 42% of Antarctica and has a large Antarctic science program. Both countries pay considerable attention to Antarctic diplomacy and are deeply committed to the ATS. Despite their differences over the issue of territorial claims (Australia is a claimant and the US doesn’t support any existing claims), they have maintained strong diplomatic and scientific contacts and tend to agree on fundamental policies. There’s more they can do together to foster long-term peace and security in the region.

Australia and the US need to address actions by strategic competitors, take steps to help ensure that Antarctica remains unmilitarised (including preventing use of otherwise peaceful technologies for military purposes—so-called dual use), promote Antarctic science and marine conservation, and work towards establishing new marine protected areas (MPAs). Both countries (as well as others) need to make a clear-eyed assessment of current and future fault lines and move more quickly to address political and environmental challenges that have implications well beyond Antarctica. In particular, this involves determining when it’s necessary to counter the ambitions of strategic competitors, such as China and Russia, in the Antarctic context, and when cooperation may be the more appropriate objective.

ASPI’s new special report, Meeting Antarctica’s diplomatic challenges: joint approaches for Australia and the United States, describes the key issues in play in Antarctic diplomatic forums, namely the annual Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). The efforts in both bodies are equally important and both need to be taken into account in addressing issues related to Antarctic governance.

Of particular moment are differences with Russia and China over establishment of MPAs and fisheries management in the Southern Ocean. China, consistent with its rise in economic and political power, has a growing footprint in Antarctica, even if its size and operational capabilities don’t match those of the US. Russia has also made a major commitment to Antarctic operations, with many research stations placed strategically throughout the continent.

Location of Australian, US, Chinese and Russian research stations in Antarctica

Source: ASPI.

Both China and Russia have been forceful in pressing their positions at ATCMs and at CCAMLR, heedless at times of calls to compromise. Under a governance regime that requires consensus for decisions to be taken, this means that China and Russia are a continual focus of diplomatic attention.

Australia and the US can work together more actively on a number of key Antarctic issues.

The current Antarctic governance regime, while far from perfect and a difficult diplomatic environment in which to operate because of the need for consensus, achieves a great deal that’s in the long-term national interests of Australia and the US. Both countries can use their influence to insist on the implementation by all countries of ATS rules and can invoke those rules to fight for environmental protection and policies that support scientists. It’s unlikely that a more effective set of treaties could be negotiated today. Australia and the US should spend more time at both senior and working levels to coordinate positions and on outreach to other governments on Antarctic issues.

Both the US and Australia, individually and jointly, can use their leading position in Antarctic science to promote scientific cooperation with other countries as the foundation for Antarctic collaboration. That should, where appropriate, include cooperation with countries such as China and Russia. In part that’s because this is consistent with the ideals of the Antarctic Treaty, but also because the US and Australia originally joined in the establishment of the treaty with the idea of having scientific cooperation at its core. Science in the context of Antarctica aids the promotion of the ‘rules-based order’ that the Biden administration speaks in favour of, and has the advantage of increasing the confidence of all countries (including China) in the merits of the ATS.

Australia and the US should increase their efforts to ensure that conservation and ecosystem-based fisheries-management principles remain at the forefront of CCAMLR’s policies; they can do this by building coalitions to push against attempts to weaken the commission. Essential to this objective is supporting CCAMLR’s scientists and their deliberations so that science-based decision-making remains paramount. Both countries must also continue to push all members to support compliance with the commission’s rules, and to pursue anti-illegal-fishing efforts.

Both countries are fully in line with the need to establish an effective network of Antarctic MPAs, including on the basis of the three major proposals now before the commission. They can work even more actively together, and with the EU and countries such as Argentina, Chile, the UK and New Zealand, to remove obstacles to new MPAs and to implement existing ones.

Australia and the US need to remain vigilant to guard against violations of the Antarctic Treaty, the Environmental Protocol and the CAMLR Convention, and to watch for indications that major players might at some point be looking for an exit or a fundamental reorganisation. As a general matter, they need to use their resources to monitor any possible military measures in Antarctica that might affect their interests either within or outside Antarctica, including the possible dual use of research equipment. The two countries have the capacity to undertake an even more vigorous program of official inspections, and to share information regularly in appropriate diplomatic and other channels.

Australia’s scrapping of Antarctic aerodrome could pave the runway for China

While environmentalists have welcomed the Australian government’s decision to abandon the Davis aerodrome project in Antarctica, China is likely now drafting its own year-round aviation plans for the site.

Canberra had already completed much of the required environmental impact work and articulated its ambition to build the continent’s first paved runway to facilitate unfettered aviation access to Antarctica. As a self-appointed Antarctic Treaty System environmental ‘leader’, Australia has now shown that it’s entirely permissible to plan, plot and develop a concrete runway to bolster Antarctic logistical capabilities and access. While Australia ultimately abandoned the plan, a precedent has been set. Any future unease stemming from Chinese action along the same lines, let alone on the same ground, could be painted as a double standard, and Beijing knows it.

The Davis aerodrome project was unveiled in 2018 as the tabled solution to delivering on the Australian Antarctic strategy and 20-year action plan’s intent to secure year-round aviation access between Australia and Antarctica. By December 2019, the government had earmarked more funding to advance the project to the design and environmental assessment stage. Environmental impact studies were completed, draft comprehensive environmental evaluations were shared with Antarctic Treaty consultative parties (who by and large had no major concerns), and by November 2021, the final decision hinged on Environment Minister Sussan Ley.

The aerodrome has been binned (at least publicly) for a range of reasons. The sheer scale of the project, which would have required approximately 11,500 prefabricated concrete pavers, each weighing about 10 tonnes, compounded with cost considerations (both financial and environmental) ultimately killed the project. But if cost was an impediment, why did Australia not engage collaboratively in the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty with the other states operating bases in the Australian Antarctic Territory? That could have seen cost-sharing, co-running and collaborative use of the new infrastructure.

Political considerations, including the potential of triggering an ‘aviation arms race’ in Antarctica, likely played a supporting role in this decision. Yet such fears are misplaced: aviation activities are already proliferating on the continent and they’re largely driven not by geopolitics or strategic competition, but by the commercial tourism sector. Just last week, a private tourism operator facilitated the landing of an Airbus A340 on an ice runway, underscoring plans to ramp up flights to shuttle back and forth those cashed-up baby boomers jostling to ‘glamp’ in Antarctica.

The Davis aerodrome ought to have been green-lit on its strategic business case alone. The site, in the Vestfold Hills of east Antarctica, had been earmarked since the 1970s when the Australian Army pinpointed the unique features of the region (generally ice-free all year, an elevated rocky foundation and optimal wind conditions) and noted its viability for runway infrastructure. Such geographical features are found nowhere else in east Antarctica.

With the Davis project now off the table, the government must put forward alternative strategies for delivering on year-round aviation capability in east Antarctica. Ley’s announcement assured Australians that our ‘strategic presence across the continent’ would be delivered by new icebreaker RSV Nuyina’s ability to ‘support medium-lift helicopters’. But that doesn’t deliver year-round (let alone agile) capability for Australian Antarctic interests—not only to ensure the safety of the Australian men and women who operate in Antarctica if they need medical evacuation or to facilitate rapid access to critical climate datasets essential to understanding global warming, but also to enable enhanced inspections of Chinese and Russian bases in east Antarctica.

Ley further noted that the decision to dump the Davis aerodrome project was reflective of the need for ‘all nations … to respect the Treaty system’. The sheer maintenance of the Antarctic Treaty for 60 years doesn’t necessarily reflect its health or efficiency; states want to uphold it because it delivers on their various national interests. While Canberra might be patting itself on the back for taking the environmentally respectful decision to not build the aerodrome, the idea that Australia’s inability to fund the project (let alone build it efficiently) will somehow set a standard or put off other Antarctic nations from scoping similar infrastructure projects is perplexing. In a treaty system devoid of enforcement mechanisms that relies on goodwill and consensus, an enhanced presence and inspection capability is going to be required—and in turn would strengthen our enduring claim to the Australian Antarctic Territory.

The decision to scrap plans for year-round aviation access to Antarctica is an inflection point which generations of Australians will look back at and ask: Where was the strategy? Environmental concerns are valid, of course, but surely they were just as valid five years ago when the project was announced? Cost blowouts could have been mitigated through international partnerships.

The idea that broader national security interests played a role in the decision is best captured by the notion that the runway presented a ‘chicken or egg’ nightmare for Canberra. Australia could build the runway, but could it control it? In the spirit of the treaty, international access ought to be facilitated and, indeed, welcomed. Does Australia have the airpower or capability to maintain an upper hand in east Antarctica? Perhaps the government didn’t want to test those waters just yet.

The scrapping of the aerodrome at least leaves us with a lesson. The Australian Antarctic Division is part of the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment. The intersection of security threats and challenges presented by Antarctica to Australia’s national interests are such that the government must make the division a statutory body. Australia’s ‘broader national security interests’ in Antarctica require strategic foresight.

It remains to be seen if the gamble pays off for Australia. In 2021, China tabled a five-year plan which highlighted the role of the ‘polar silk road’ and included ambitions to enhance Beijing’s Antarctic ‘utilisation’. Of course, any utilisation slapped with ‘science’ or ‘research’ labels is largely permissible. Will the cancellation of the Davis aerodrome ultimately trigger Australia’s biggest (east Antarctic) geopolitical challenge of the 21st century? Let’s hope Beijing starts answering our phone calls.

Australia’s Antarctic program up in the air after runway project axed

The Australian government announced yesterday that it will not proceed with the construction of a 2,700-metre-long paved runway in Antarctica. The announcement by the environment minister, Sussan Ley, was framed as a significant decision to protect the Antarctic environment, but there are also other factors at play.

The runway proposal was announced in 2018, and since then the project has been subject to technical feasibility studies, research on and assessments of environmental impacts, and cost–benefit analyses. The runway was to be located in the Vestfold Hills, 4.5 kilometres from Australia’s Davis Station. The area is an ice-free region of the Antarctic continent, close to the coast. The runway would have been 45 metres wide with a total length of 2.7 kilometres, constructed of large prefabricated concrete pavers. Extensive earthworks and ancillary engineering works would have been needed to provide a stable surface for the paving. It would have been possibly the biggest engineering project ever undertaken in Antarctica.

The Davis runway was to service intercontinental flights from Australia (principally Hobart) regularly throughout the year. The current blue-ice runway at Wilkins aerodrome, inland from Casey Station, operates only in summer. The new runway would have also supported year-round access for heavy-lift aircraft such as Australian Defence Force’s C-17 Globemasters and served as the hub for Antarctic intracontinental air services.

Ley’s media release clearly places the decision not to proceed in the realm of environmental protection, saying it ‘will protect Antarctica’s pristine wilderness’. Environmental concerns have been raised about the proposal since its inception, and the Australian Antarctic Division has been engaged in a comprehensive environmental evaluation under the requirements of the Antarctic Treaty System and Australia’s own environmental legislation.

The announcement also points to a ‘detailed … economic assessment’ of the proposal. It’s no surprise that cost was a major consideration in the decision to drop the project. The runway was to be built to the highest standards for use by passenger and freight jet aircraft and to the size required to meet the international standard. The combined cost of earthworks, construction materials, logistics, freight, personnel and associated infrastructure would have exceeded the construction costs of many large regional airports in Australia.

That’s also leaving aside the great difficulties of building a runway of this standard, on untried ground, in the extremely harsh Antarctic environment. Construction time would also have been a major consideration. The project would have taken many years to complete.

The project might also have restricted the logistics and accommodation infrastructure available to researchers in the Australian Antarctic program as resources became tied up with the personnel and freight requirements for construction. These opportunity costs could have been considerable.

Ley’s announcement says, ‘The detailed environmental and economic assessment will help inform future investment in new scientific, environmental and strategic capabilities that better serve Australia’s national interest and protect the environmental values that underpin the Antarctic Treaty System.’

In 2014, I recommended that Australia investigate ‘the viability of flying ski-equipped aircraft directly from Australia to Antarctica or other direct flight options; and the options of regular heavy lift aircraft directly from Hobart Airport to Wilkins Aerodrome or elsewhere in Antarctica’. While there won’t be a large paved runway at Davis Station, there are still many other options to deliver enhanced scientific, environmental and strategic outcomes for Australia’s Antarctic interests.

These options include an alternative ice runway or ski-way, ship-based long-range heavy-lift helicopter operations, enhanced shipping logistics to supplement Australia’s investment in the world-class new icebreaker Nuyina, and investment in new scientific capabilities.

To underline Australia’s Antarctic interests, enhanced commitments to science and international collaboration, environmental stewardship, and leadership in Antarctic affairs should be foremost in the assessment of Australia’s future Antarctic investments.

In response to a recent review of its science capabilities, the Australian Antarctic Division has stated: ‘Science is the central driver of all its activities.’ It has adopted as its unifying narrative that its purpose is ‘Building comprehensive knowledge of East Antarctica and its ecosystems to inform our Antarctic stewardship and enhance our understanding of climate change.’

Priorities should be reinvesting in the Australian Antarctic Division’s capabilities to undertake national priority science in Antarctica, enhancing Australia’s domestic and international Antarctic science investments and collaborations, and developing and deploying new technologies in science and science logistics.

It’s not only science and the environment, though. Australia can, and should, use this decision to underline its environmental leadership in Antarctic affairs, and to use its foreshadowed enhanced Antarctic investments to strengthen international leadership in Antarctic science, logistics and international collaboration.

The ‘options for expanding our wider Antarctic Program capability’ need to include not just the obvious and much needed investments in personnel, logistics and capabilities, but also investments in strategic thinking and diplomacy.

The Antarctic Treaty System is on thin ice—and it’s not all about climate change

The Antarctic Treaty System, which has governed affairs in Antarctica since 1961, is struggling under the weight of great-power competition. Through gaps in governance frameworks, states are exploiting the treaty and its subordinate protocols to pursue their national interests. This article examines the nature and extent of great-power competition in Antarctica and considers how Australia, as a claimant to 42% of the continental landmass, can seek to protect Antarctica and its own interests.

Antarctica offers great treasure in natural resources, scientific opportunity and national prestige. Antarctica’s ‘prizes’ include fishing stocks, bioprospecting opportunities, climate science analysis and hydrocarbons (with potential reserves of between 300 and 500 billion tonnes of natural gas on the continent and potentially 135 billion tonnes of oil in the Southern Ocean).

Article 1 of the Antarctic Treaty declares that use of Antarctica is for scientific observation and investigation—for peaceful purposes only. Despite the treaty suspending the claims of the seven original claimants (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the UK), the US and Soviet Union (as additional, non-claimant, original signatories) exercised the right under the treaty to stake a claim at a later stage. In effect, the treaty froze the issue of territorial sovereignty.

Now, however, the great powers are refocusing their attention on achieving their strategic objectives by alternate means as the treaty’s protocols come up for renewal in 2048. What could change between now and then? As stakeholders with voting rights on continental governance, the consultative parties to the treaty might decide to keep its environmental protocol and continue to prohibit mining and militarisation. But they might not.

Australia’s 2017 foreign policy white paper emphasises Indo-Pacific competition, a focus accentuated with the announcement of the AUKUS pact in September. But the white paper omitted any mention of challenges in Antarctica. Yet, China’s disregard of the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling on its South China Sea claims, coupled with its intense competition for resource access and assertive actions in international governance forums, suggests that a watch-and-wait approach in Antarctica is a high-risk one. Existing legal frameworks don’t deter major states from acting to secure their own strategic interests and Australia can’t afford to be naive about its geopolitical context.

Since the establishment of its first Antarctic research station, the Great Wall, in 1985, China has expanded its presence on the continent. Three of the country’s four research stations are based within the Australian Antarctic Territory, and a fifth is under construction on Inexpressible Island in the Ross Sea. China’s emergence as a polar power includes substantial investment in icebreakers and continental airstrips to provide year-round access.

The Chinese government’s strategic approach to Antarctica is at the level of national security policy. Official documentation incorporates Antarctica and the Southern Ocean into the state’s expanded conception of domains for influence and dominance, beyond the Indo-Pacific. Beijing recognises no existing claims to the continent and pursues a strategy that maximises its own national interests there.

China’s polar affairs are governed through the State Oceanic Administration, which sits directly under the Ministry of Natural Resources. The Polar Research Institute of China nominally administers scientific activity on behalf of the State Oceanic Administration, yet its reach covers ‘polar politics, economy, science and security’. Since 2011, Antarctic priorities have been set at the national level through the Chinese Communist Party’s five-year plans, which explicitly characterise the polar regions as a ‘new strategic frontier’.

The CCP seeks to affirm China’s international legitimacy on the continent on the one hand and maximise domestic support for Chinese Antarctic activities on the other. China thus has ‘two voices’ targeting separate audiences. Externally, China portrays itself as conforming to the treaty system’s institutions with a primary interest in science. Beijing has accused Antarctic forums of being a ‘rich man’s club’ dominated by the US, claiming that others are portrayed as ‘second-class citizens’. This ignores the fact that China has equal voting rights as a consultative party. The CCP narrative is that China has been denied its rightful place in the international order.

Domestically, President Xi Jinping’s November 2014 speech, given aboard the Xuelong icebreaker then docked in Hobart, declared that China wanted ‘to become a polar great power’. China then asserted its ‘right’ to polar leadership in 2015 through its national security law, emphasising the state’s interests in ‘new frontiers’, including Antarctica and the Arctic, among others. By listing these domains in a security context, China laid a domestic legal foundation to protect its potential future rights in them.

Following Xi’s ‘polar great power’ comment, senior Chinese military leaders have used Antarctica’s ‘global commons’ status to assert China’s entitlement to Antarctic interests. This domestic narrative stresses the successful advocacy of China’s polar scientists for educational programs and Chinese people’s rights to opportunities in polar regions.

‘Science’ is deployed as a narrative tool to legitimise China’s expanding presence on the continent. A vital part of this claim is, of course, stressing the importance of climate change research and the need for cooperation from all powers on this front. The polar regions are fundamental to this effort. At the same time, however, Chinese scientific and academic institutions participating in Antarctic science are essentially controlled by the CCP and integrated with China’s civil–military complex.

Xi has explicitly stated that China’s scientists should have the ‘correct political inclination’ and be ‘imbued with patriotic feelings’. Chinese influence in Antarctic forums reinforces the broader Chinese narrative of its natural right to leadership in international governance. On top of this, the People’s Liberation Army has for some time highlighted the likelihood of polar regions being spaces for ‘new geopolitical conflict’.

New Zealand China expert Anne-Marie Brady’s research highlights China’s Antarctic ‘bathymetry activities’ mapping the Southern Ocean seabed for future shipping and/or submarine movement. China has linked the polar regions to the Belt and Road Initiative in building a ‘blue economic passage’ to secure national interests and to ‘build China into a maritime powerhouse’. Antarctica and the Southern Ocean represent a natural extension of Beijing’s maritime economics objectives and its drive to access resources and secure associated trade routes and to set the conditions for ‘dual-use’ capabilities to effectively control the region.

China’s failure to comply with Antarctic inspection requirements serves to further weaken the treaty’s original intent. Poor compliance potentially encourages further militarisation below the detection threshold. The implications for Australia would be stark if competition with the US and/or Australia were to escalate, and China ramped up its military presence in Antarctica.

Competition on the continent has always involved other players. The US was pivotal in the initial development of the Antarctic Treaty. In brokering the treaty, the US was able to deny sovereignty to other states. US policy reinforces the commitment to use Antarctica only for peaceful purposes and free access for science; however, the US ‘recognizes no foreign territorial claims’ and ‘reserves the right to participate in any future uses of the region’.

With priorities in other theatres, the US approach to Antarctica has suffered a period of neglect. Funding constraints on US Antarctic science contributions have created space for other countries to assert more dominant roles. The US is now taking an enhanced physical presence, with a 2020 presidential memorandum focusing on new ‘polar security’ icebreakers. The Biden administration has not reversed this direction and how the US contributes to environmental protection in Antarctica in future will be vital.

Despite the historical relationship and close alliance between Washington and Canberra, the US has consistently refuted Australia’s territorial claim in Antarctica and reserved its right to make a future claim. More recently, though, the US has demonstrated actions that may preference collective over unilateral interests, supporting the treaty and pledging reaffirmed commitments to prohibitions on mineral resource exploitation. As both competition and cooperation (on climate change, for example) with China continue, the US may see merit in ensuring Antarctica’s hydrocarbons and minerals remain off limits for exploitation.

Australia has an opportunity to partner with the US and other countries in a collaborative approach to Antarctic governance. To avoid the territorial and resource competition that would accompany dissolution of, or great power withdrawal from, the treaty, its enhancement is the best means of preserving its peaceful and scientific-research intent. Australia is well positioned to pursue cooperative ventures reinforcing its historic Antarctic position. At the same time, Australia should work closely with treaty members to establish firm mechanisms and compliance measures within the treaty system to address gaps that leave Antarctica open to exploitation.

Antarctica: a cold, hard reality check

The Antarctic Treaty System is a consensus arrangement that has been in place for more than 50 years. It worked well in the 1960s, when nuclear weapons were seen as the key to global security. But this Cold War peace agreement is inadequate to respond to the security challenges of the 2020s.

Most Australians rarely think about Antarctica, and what discussion does arise is often confused, particularly on the contention that Australia holds 42% of the continent. This is not an accepted claim nor is it recognised by even our closest ally, the United States. Chinese and Russian movements in the Australian Antarctic Territory are worrying, but the real threat is our own failure to craft a security strategy for the region.

There’s a broad assumption that the Antarctic Treaty settled the continent’s future, but the issue is far from resolved. International-law specialist Don Rothwell notes that it’s in a ‘complex holding pattern’. But how long it can hold? The treaty wasn’t intended to be a long-term fix; it’s a stop-gap solution to the issue of who owns the continent. The 1950s Western fear of a ‘red’ continent has materialised, however, and while the Russians are active it appears that China is the emerging heavyweight there.

A second problematic assumption is that the treaty grants sovereignty to the seven claimant states (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom). It doesn’t. Discussion of sovereignty is suspended as long as the treaty is in effect. Signatories are not permitted to bolster existing claims, modify or challenge claims, or make new claims. The US and Russia, which don’t recognise any of the territorial claims frozen by the treaty, are afforded the opportunity to make a territorial claim at a later stage.

Areas of ambiguity are a further challenge. There’s the question of dual-use infrastructure, particularly in terms of satellite and space-development programs. The US GPS, Russian GLONASS and Chinese BeiDou systems are at various stages of operation on the continent. Scientific applications are evident, as are military uses.

The broader issue of militarisation is another ambiguous area. The treaty prohibits acts of a military nature, including military base development, military manoeuvres and weapons testing, but it allows military personnel and equipment in support of scientific research or ‘any other peaceful purpose’. This vague language is ripe for exploitation, and it’s probably already occurring. What constituted peaceful purposes in the Cold War is far different in today’s reality. Advances in military technology, particularly in the cyber sphere, make grey-zone activities the new normal.

Ambiguity is also apparent when it comes to oil and gas exploration. Despite the 1991 Madrid Protocol banning exploitation of mineral resources, states are surveying for deposits—which is allowed as long as it’s done for scientific research. It’s well documented that China conducts mineral exploration on the continent, and Beijing has tested the same underwater exploratory methods in Antarctica that it employs in its quest for resources in the South China Sea. Mapping of resource wealth often precedes a territorial challenge.

The basis for the treaty system—environmental protection—is often used to mask strategic ambitions. Framing the discussion about Antarctica in terms of it being ground-zero for climate change is misleading. The system predates global-warming concerns and doesn’t deal with the issue. Nor do environmental protocols (like the Paris Agreement) mention the polar regions.

Russia’s activities on the continent have raised some concerns, particularly for Australia. In 2016, the Russian navy resumed its Antarctic expeditions after 30 years. Russia focuses on hydrographic surveying of minerals, and its Vostok base, the biggest in the Australian Antarctic Territory, is close to the continent’s largest deposit of fresh water.

The treaty allows inspections, and parties must provide open access to all their installations and activities. In 2018, a team from Norway inspected Russia’s Antarctic endeavours, with some alarming findings for Australia. The inspection was to include the first examination of Russia’s new Antarctic runway, dubbed ‘Perseus’, but the inspection team could find ‘no contracts nor coordinates’ for the installation. When the team contacted the neighbouring Russian airstrip, ‘Novo’, they were advised that landing at Perseus would be problematic because an Ilyushin transport aircraft was due to arrive there. They opted to conduct an aerial observation of the Perseus development, but found that the Ilyushin was parked in the middle of the airstrip, blocking access. The team noted considerable activity at the Russian bases, with many aircraft. Russia had advised that it needed Perseus as a back-up runway for Novo activities, but there may be a longer-term strategy at play.

The fragile treaty system is further threatened by the increasingly complex international strategic environment. As I see it, there are three possible futures for the system.

It might limp on and provide enough of a framework to keep cooperation and consensus alive in the region. Review mechanisms might be activated and international law and norms might find a way to continue operating.

Or it might fold up, with the question of sovereignty reverting to the original claims and the US and Russia agreeing to split the remaining sliver of the continent between them. That would leave China and the other international players to pack up and go, which seems very unlikely given how much they’ve invested there.

The third, and most likely, possibility is that the treaty system collapses as great-power competition shapes the continent’s trajectory—and while Australian government departments shuffle the blame and scramble for a strategy. So, what should we be focusing on now to avoid this scenario?

Canberra should try to head off China’s ‘Dome A’ challenge. Beijing has put in a proposal to make Dome A a specially managed area within the Australian Antarctic Territory. Strategically, it’s the highest point on the Antarctic Plateau and unrivalled globally in terms of space signals and observation. Australia should consider submitting its own proposal for Dome A, which could argue that Chinese activity would overlap with scientific research and increase the chance of accidents. Dome A could then be managed by Australia, cutting Chinese access to the site and giving Australia’s space industry an edge.

The Department of Defence should be given responsibility for shaping and delivering Australia’s Antarctic strategy (it currently sits in the environment portfolio). That’s not unusual; the 2018–19 Chilean and Argentinian inspection teams included officials from their defence departments. Australia doesn’t send defence representatives to keep tabs on our Antarctic territory. Since 1963, we have undertaken a mere nine inspections, some of which weren’t in our territory because we don’t have the capacity to reach the most isolated stations. With the defence department safeguarding our Antarctic interests, we might be better placed to conduct more inspections.

We also need to pay closer attention to the hybrid strategies of states like China that may be exploiting Australia’s stake. What might look like cooperation is often driven by competition and can quickly reveal conflicting motives. Of particular concern are the lines of funding for our Antarctic activities coming from Beijing.

The Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre, a government-funded initiative and Australia’s leading Antarctic research body, prides itself on international cooperation. In 2017–18, China’s First Institute of Oceanography provided the centre with $3.25 million, out-financing the Australian Antarctic Division. In the previous year, China provided more funding for the centre’s activities than both the Antarctic Division and the CSIRO. Complications with finance from foreign agencies led to the creation of the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme in 2018. Given the centre’s funding sources, it’s of concern that it’s not listed in the scheme.

Finally, Australia must deal with the inescapable challenge of sovereignty. That means coming to terms with the fact that we received what we call the Australian Antarctic Territory in the 1933 transfer from Great Britain. In assuming this title of sovereignty, we must question to what extent the territory is even ours to begin with. While I’ll leave the complexities of that issue to legal titans Rothwell and Gillian Triggs, it’s apparent that Canberra must be able to prove that between 1933 and 1961, Australian Antarctic activity was enough to consolidate sovereignty.

Antarctica is a global commons that’s rich in resources and strategically significant as a base from which the entire southern hemisphere can be accessed or targeted. Its future is in legal limbo. After 60 years, the treaty system appears to be intact. However, tensions simmer and unilateral strategies are at odds with the continent’s future.

It may be too soon to call time on the treaty system, but we need to seriously question the assumption that the Antarctic challenge will be determined by legal right and not by military might. Is Australia up to the challenge? If not, how do we get there?