Tag Archive for: Antarctic Treaty

Quad maritime security initiative holds promise for the Indo-Pacific’s southern flank 

At the recent Quad leaders’ summit in Tokyo, Australia, India, Japan and the US launched the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, an initiative aimed at strengthening maritime security in the region. Apart from one very useful explainer and David Brewster’s excellent recent analysis, the announcement has been largely overlooked.

The objective is for regional countries to buy commercially available satellite tracking data of ships and combine it with data gathered from sources such as automatic identification systems, which broadcast a ship’s name, location, course, speed and other data.

‘This initiative will transform the ability of partners in the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region to fully monitor the waters on their shores and, in turn, to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific,’ a White House fact sheet noted.

However, ‘fully’ is somewhat of an overstatement; it would be more realistic to say that it would provide another means for countries to monitor their waters. It would provide unclassified data, and its principal customers would be civil maritime law enforcement agencies, especially coastguards and maritime police.

As Brewster explained, one of the biggest challenges for small countries in the region is tracking suspected illegal fishing vessels that ‘go dark’ by switching off their automatic identification systems. That’s not possible with vessel monitoring systems: if they’re installed as a term of licence, they can’t be tampered with in the same way, and if they’re turned off they send a notice. Automatic identification systems have no such functionality, since they’re designed for safety of navigation and not for monitoring. The Quad initiative would therefore be another very useful data source for agencies cracking down on illegal fishing and a valuable feed for more efficient enforcement activities using surveillance aircraft and surface vessels.

In building the system, much can be learned from the Pacific, where the island states face a pressing need to understand more about what’s happening in the waters that surround them. The small island nations have developed sophisticated platforms like the fisheries information management system, which houses all industry, observer, registry, licence, compliance, catch documentation, certification, vessel monitoring and other data and manages it on a single secure platform. From this base, the fishery can be sustainably managed and (where agreed) data fields are forwarded in near real time back to sovereign nations; fishing and market states; and industry, science, surveillance, compliance and regional fisheries bodies such as the Forum Fisheries Agency surveillance centre in Solomon Islands. It holds a common operating picture based on data provided through member states’ vessel monitoring systems, some high-seas data from the Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, and data from ships’ automatic identification systems and long-range tracking and identification systems.

One area in which the Quad partners should consider applications for the new system is the Indo-Pacific’s southern flank: the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. The Quad countries are all active Antarctic players. But the southern Indo-Pacific boundary often gets neglected in discussions.

The ship-tracking data from the plethora of satellites in low-earth orbit (particularly polar orbits) is just as applicable to the Southern Ocean as it is to the high latitudes of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. There’s no significant technical reason why this data wouldn’t be available to go into the shared analysis and distribution network that’s envisaged through the Quad.

It would be worth the Quad partners thinking about three potential zones of the Southern Ocean where the system might operate: the temperate region, north of the polar front and up to the continental margins of Australia, South Africa and South America; the sub-Antarctic region, north of 60°S and south of the polar front; and the Antarctic Treaty Area, south of 60°S.

For the first zone, leveraging the system into that area makes good sense. It would be of obvious military, fisheries and search-and-rescue benefit to all states bordering the Southern Ocean.

For the second zone, there may be some concerns about extending it into the area protected under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, albeit above 60°S. At the moment, the convention doesn’t expressly provide for aerial inspections (although the Antarctic Treaty does under Article VII), so there’s some argument among members about whether data collected in this way (or further data collected by satellite) can be used to support inspections under the convention.

That was the issue with the Russian vessel FV Palmer, which was spotted by a New Zealand military aircraft while apparently fishing in an area closed to fishing, some 800 nautical miles from where the vessel was officially reported to be. Both Russia and China disputed that data collected from aerial patrols was allowable under the convention’s inspection system. Information collected from the Quad system would likely face similar resistance from these states if someone attempted to use it as evidence of an inspection under the convention. But at the very least, the data could be used as intelligence to support the well-established practice of vessel-based inspection under the convention.

For the third zone, there’s the possibility of negative perceptions in some states arising from the non-militarisation provisions in Article 1 of the Antarctic Treaty. Extending the system into the Antarctic Treaty Area could generate concerns that the Quad was somehow ‘securitising’ the region and acting against the spirit of the treaty’s demilitarisation provisions.

But the counterpoint to those concerns is that maritime domain awareness for civilian purposes is a ‘peaceful use’. The Antarctic Treaty inspection regime expressly allows for ‘aerial inspection’ of stations and ships in the treaty area. That might arguably include satellite inspection from space.

It’s not clear yet who will put the system together and provide intelligence to regional information centres and national law maritime enforcement authorities. Presumably Maritime Border Command—a multi-agency taskforce in the Australian Border Force that coordinates surveillance of and responses to civil maritime threats, such as illegal fishing—will play a role.

It may turn out that there are just too many cooks in the kitchen. But in theory, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness is a promising idea to bolster the maritime security of the region, including the Southern Ocean, by creating a networked real-time picture that allows for a shared understanding of threats and developments in the maritime domain.

While not a complete solution in its own right, the data from the system, correlated appropriately and delivered in a timely manner, will be another valuable input to the many other initiatives seeking to provide more effective maritime domain awareness in the region.

Antarctic environmental anniversary a reminder that diplomacy is key to regional security

Monday 4 October marks the 30th anniversary of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. The signing of the protocol by 26 countries marked the end of a tumultuous few years of diplomatic shock and international wrangling. It also signified a major achievement for international diplomacy, led by Australia.

The 1959 Antarctic Treaty had, among other things, prohibited military activities in the entire region below 60° South—a provision of significant importance for Australian security.

From 1982 until 1988, the Antarctic Treaty parties had been negotiating an international convention that would regulate mining activities in Antarctica. The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources was a pre-emptive move to ensure that the impacts of any potential mining would be thoroughly assessed and, if judged acceptable, ensure that it was properly regulated.

During the negotiation of the minerals convention, a number of countries joined the Antarctic Treaty, including China, India and the Republic of Korea. The Antarctic Minerals Convention was agreed in New Zealand’s capital, Wellington, in June 1988.

While the minerals convention was being negotiated, environmental organisations were engaged and, when it became clear that a ‘world park’ option for Antarctica wouldn’t succeed, they focused on strengthening the convention’s environmental protections.

However, after the minerals convention’s adoption, opposition to even the possibility of mining in Antarctica grew loud and strong. France was the first to express doubts about the wisdom of proceeding. Environmentalists were also active and well organised in Australia and put a great deal of political pressure on the Labor government, which took political pride in its environmental achievements. Pressure on Prime Minister Bob Hawke escalated in the wake of the Exxon Valdez calamity, which spurred opposition leader John Howard to oppose Australia’s signature of the convention.

Australia, with the support of France, went on to do the unthinkable. Less than a year after agreeing to the minerals convention, Australia announced in May 1989 that it wouldn’t sign it—ensuring that it couldn’t come into force. This sent shockwaves through the Antarctic Treaty System. How could a leading Antarctic country walk away from an international agreement that took many years to negotiate and which it had supported? Reneging consensus on such a vexed issue was probably the biggest destabilising event for the Antarctic Treaty since it came into force in 1961.

Australia and France, with a small but growing band of supporters, set about on a huge diplomatic effort to negotiate an agreement that would prohibit mining in Antarctica and establish a comprehensive regime for environmental protection and management. The quiet, steady, behind-closed-doors discussions and negotiation by senior officials that were the standard fare of the Antarctic Treaty now involved heads of state, prime ministers, ministers and teams of senior diplomatic negotiators.

Remarkably, it took only two years to re-establish consensus on an environmental protocol that put in place legally binding environmental rules. The protocol indefinitely prohibits mineral resource activities in Antarctica and sets Antarctica aside ‘as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science’. It required the participation of all Antarctic Treaty consultative parties and entered into force in 1998.

In the light of growing geopolitical tensions, this remarkable achievement offers several lessons relevant to diplomacy and international relations today.

It shows that concerted diplomatic efforts, coordinated by like-minded countries and visibly championed by government leaders, can change the course of history. Even though the Antarctic Treaty is effectively a regional agreement, its states parties are global—the world’s then-superpowers were parties to the treaty.

The success of the negotiations for the environmental protocol demonstrates that middle powers such as Australia can play a significant and independent role in the international diplomatic landscape. Australia had a unique opportunity to use its privileges as an Antarctic claimant state to change the course of Antarctic politics.

Australia’s closest allies, the UK and the US, wouldn’t have expected Australia and France to unravel the minerals convention. New Zealand was appalled; Australia’s actions denied it a diplomatic victory on its initiative to establish a minerals regime. Nonetheless, all parties to the Antarctic Treaty still signed on to the environmental protocol in 1991, accepting that the global public interest was better served by an environmental regime.

It also shows that ‘hard’ diplomacy is required to shift the status quo. Australia and many other countries sent high-level, experienced diplomatic negotiators to the negotiations for the environmental protocol. This showed also that a focused effort and considerable resourcing are required to rapidly shift international sentiment.

The most popular myth circulating in the media, and through some think tanks and academic circles, is that the Antarctic Treaty, or the environmental protocol’s ban on mining, will expire in 2048. It does not. Any push to overturn the mining ban would be very difficult because all states that signed the protocol in 1991 would need to ratify any changes.

There’s also a narrative that predicts overt conflict over resources, and the imminent and ultimate failure of the Antarctic Treaty System. And another one that sees all national efforts in Antarctica as direct positioning for a future in which the Antarctic Treaty collapses under the weight of strategic competition.

Such pessimistic views on Antarctica and the Antarctic Treaty System may be alarmist, but it doesn’t mean that geopolitical tensions are absent or that Australia, as claimant to 42% of the Antarctic continent, should be complacent about defence of the treaty and protecting its national interests.

In recent years Russia and China, for example, have attempted to reinterpret some of the fundamental rules, norms and principles of the Antarctic Treaty System and to impose their national positions on treaty parties by withholding consensus on important decisions such as the establishment of marine protected areas. This is worrying to those, like Australia, that are seeking to improve the treaty system’s environmental provisions.

But Australia has to be mindful of how consensus operates. Thirty years ago, Australia itself imposed its will on other parties by refusing consensus on the minerals convention, which had been designed, at Australia’s insistence, to embody strong environmental protections. This points to the critical role for careful diplomacy in advancing Antarctic governance while pursuing the national interest.

Countering the erosion of the rules, norms and principles of the Antarctic Treaty System requires strong, concerted diplomatic effort. Repeated obstruction to the conduct of proper business should be countered with direct and high-level diplomatic action by Australia and like-minded states—something that was a feature of the treaty system at the turn of the century.

The Antarctic Treaty ensures this vast region in the south is free of military conflict. As we reflect on one of its great successes, the negotiation of the environmental protocol, we should also reflect on the importance of leadership and diplomacy in Antarctic affairs.

Policy, Guns and Money: Covid-19 in Southeast Asia, geopolitics of Antarctica and the future of Darwin Port

Recently, Covid-19 cases in Southeast Asia have hit new highs, making it the global epicentre of the coronavirus. As countries across the region try to curb the spread of the Delta variant, ASPI’s Huong Le Thu and Richard Maude, executive director of policy at the Asia Society Australia and senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, detail how Australia can support its neighbours and the region’s potential path to recovery.

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty, which governs international use of the southern continent. ASPI research intern Matthew Page speaks to polar geopolitics expert Elizabeth Buchanan, lecturer in strategic studies with Deakin University for the defence and strategic studies course at the Australian War College Canberra and a fellow of the Modern War Institute at West Point Military Academy; all views are her own. They discuss the geopolitics of the region, the usefulness of the treaty system 60 years on and what Australia should be focusing on in its Antarctic policy.

The Port of Darwin, currently under a 99-year lease to Chinese company Landbridge, is of strategic importance to Australia and its allies. Co-author of the latest report from ASPI’s Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre, Lead me to the harbour! Plotting Darwin Harbour’s future course, John Coyne joins Michael Shoebridge to discuss how Australia can maximise the strategic value of Darwin Port through a unified direction that accounts for contrasting interests and stakeholders.

Working in the cold: Australia and China in the Antarctic

In 2013, the Tasmanian government signed a memorandum of understanding with China’s State Oceanic Administration to provide support services for Chinese Antarctic expeditions. Under the agreement, Chinese vessels were given access to Hobart’s port and provided with technical and regulatory assistance support. The Australian government and China signed a memorandum of understanding on Antarctic collaboration in 2014.

China has committed to regular visits to Hobart by its Antarctic icebreakers. The Xue Long and Xue Long 2 visited in November 2019, and the Xue Long 2 returned in March when Australia helped the Chinese team that was repairing a research vessel stranded in Antarctica.

Hobart may host China’s first nuclear-powered icebreaker, which is now being constructed. Australia transports Chinese expeditioners on intercontinental flights from Hobart to Antarctica and within Antarctica. China reciprocates with logistics and science support to Australia in Antarctica.

The logistics arrangements directly benefit the Tasmanian economy and support the Antarctic efforts of both nations.

But if China’s long-term ambitions in Antarctica aren’t congruent with ours, should we also be asking how we might adjust this relationship and our commitments to ensure Beijing supports our Antarctic interests? Antarctica is strategically important to Australia. As a claimant state to 42% of the Antarctic continent, we have vital national interests in the region and critical relationships with other countries that are active there.

In our new ASPI report, Eyes wide open: managing the Australia–China Antarctic relationship, released today, we take stock of Australia’s long relationship with China in the Antarctic in the context of its status as a rising power in Antarctic affairs. Some analysts see our cultivation of a closer relationship with China on Antarctic affairs as laudable, even when we differ sharply over other important issues.

That’s because a well-constructed relationship can improve the chances that Australia and China will  cooperate in a part of the world that has remained free from military conflict, and that Australia can influence China’s evolving interests in the Antarctic Treaty System.

Others are concerned that the expansion of ties with China may cost us our traditional role as a leader in Antarctic affairs.

Given the broader tensions in the China–Australia relationship, China’s global ambitions, the lack of progress on key Antarctic policy initiatives and the potential for significant geopolitical consequences for the future of Antarctica and for Australia’s strategic interests, it’s important that Australian policymakers reconsider our long-term Antarctic policy settings.

China has already demnonstrated its ability to disrupt the established decision-making systems of the Antarctic Treaty System. Responses to those disruptions require early intervention, coherent strategies, disciplined implementation and strong partnerships with like-minded countries.

We found no clear evidence that China is violating the Antarctic Treaty, and we’re not arguing for a confrontational approach with Beijing. Indeed, Australia should continue scientific and logistic cooperation with China in Antarctica. But there’s reason to apply a more sharply focused assessment of the costs and benefits of cooperation, given China’s more assertive international posture and increasing interests in Antarctica.

Future cooperation should proceed only after a careful assessment of Australia’s interests and the impact on our wider multilateral aims. We should bring broad policy and intelligence perspectives to our Antarctic activities and relationships and assess with allies and friends China’s activities, interests, goals and intentions.

Recommendations designed to maximise the value and mitigate the risks of our Antarctic relationship with China include:

  • establishing a ministerial Antarctic council to assess, measure and review our Antarctic engagements, most importantly our engagement with China
  • demonstrating Australia’s commitment to Antarctica through visits there by the prime minister and senior ministers
  • regularly engaging with Australian Antarctic scientists and logisticians through policy departments and other agencies
  • conducting ongoing discussions on how China might be affecting Antarctic norms and governance, on any risks in research collaboration, and on areas in which our engagement might be more focused
  • providing regular briefings by Australia’s intelligence community for scientists and other Australian Antarctic officials about China’s aims and what scientific cooperation might indicate about China’s intentions
  • placing Antarctica back on the agenda for the Australia-China High-Level Dialogue, from which it was dropped
  • objecting strongly when China’s views run counter to the values and norms of the Antarctic Treaty System and speaking out early on any Chinese attempt at norm-shifting
  • adopting a more tailored and transactional approach in our Antarctic engagement with China, making clear what we expect from China
  • establishing a dialogue with friends and allies to develop a shared understanding of China’s interests and ambitions for Antarctica and to ensure that differences on China’s Antarctic policies or actions aren’t treated only as bilateral issues
  • increasing our cooperation with the US on Antarctic affairs; for example, Antarctica could be a topic for consideration at the next AUSMIN meeting
  • increasing our Antarctic engagement with Asia to avoid problems arising from over-reliance on bilateral cooperation with China. Australia has strong scientific collaboration with South Korea and Japan, and India is keen to strengthen its Antarctic connections with Australia
  • promoting Hobart’s role as a science and logistics gateway to Antarctica to South Korea, Japan and India. That diversification will reduce Tasmania’s economic reliance on Chin
  • examining how technology such as civilian satellites could enhance inspection and transparency; for example, experts from the Defence Science and Technology Group, in civilian roles, should be more involved in an enhanced inspections regime
  • conducting regular inspections of Chinese facilities in the Australian Antarctic Territory.

Stagnant and, in some areas, diminishing funding for science (as opposed to logistics and infrastructure) has opened the way for China to invest in Antarctic research by Australian institutions. We run the risk of being mendicants living on Chinese research funds. Modest Australian reinvestment will diminish that risk and increase our leverage as we engage with China on Antarctic research.

As a guiding principle, applying the Hippocratic oath, ‘First, do no harm’, to our Antarctic and overall national interests would help manage Australia–China Antarctic relations.

For example, we should not help China to use Antarctic research for resource exploitation, to gather information on advanced technology with clear potential for military purposes, or to damage the environment.

Given Beijing’s tendency to move quickly on a broad front, as it has done in the South China Sea, we need to be prepared to respond to a rapid increase in the speed and scale of China’s activity in Antarctica.

To ensure that our engagement with China on Antarctic affairs proceeds in line with our national interests, we should pursue an approach that’s clear, cogently communicated, credible, comprehensive and consistent. This must be informed by a broad appreciation of the cumulative effect of China’s actions, policy and presence on the continent.

Readers’ response: China on ice

China is a relative new player down south. It joined the Antarctic Treaty in 1983 and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources in 2007. A recent ASPI Special Report, China’s expanding Antarctic interests, sets out in forensic detail the intensification of Chinese activity in eastern Antarctica, including in Australia’s Antarctic Territory (AAT). Professor Anne-Marie Brady’s study is a welcome addition to the scant analysis of China’s expanding programs on the cold continent.

We agree with her suggestion that Australia should be investing strategically in Antarctic science, logistics and diplomacy. But the claim that China now has a greater presence and greater capacity in the east Antarctic sector of the AAT than Australia is misleading.

Our program is larger than China’s, whether we look at people on the ground, logistics, scientific infrastructure, programmed scientific research, or seasonal and year-round presence.

Australia has three permanent year-round stations (Davis, Casey and Mawson); one large seasonal base at Wilkins Aerodrome to support intercontinental air transport; three seasonal skiways to support intracontinental air transport; and a number of other field camps. China has one permanent year-round station near Davis (Zhongshan); a seasonal field station on the traverse to Dome A (Taishan); and a seasonal field station (not used every season) at Dome A (Kunlun). The total capacity of Australia’s research facilities, and their regular use by personnel, far exceeds that of other nations in East Antarctica.

Australia transports around 500 personnel to and from Antarctica each year. Around half of them travel on Australia’s intercontinental air transport system (as do teams from other nations, including China); the other half travel by ship. Australia’s (usually) two intracontinental aircraft support these personnel. Australia has a regular schedule of C17 heavy-lift aircraft assisting the Antarctic program. Australian air logistics are used by other nations, including flights to McMurdo, Concordia and, recently, Troll Station in Queen Maud Land.

Australia’s Aurora Australis supplies or visits all three permanent stations at least once a year, as well as carrying out scheduled research in the Southern Ocean. Australia and China are currently constructing new icebreakers for Antarctic logistics and science.

As a matter of Antarctic law, we’d question Professor Brady’s view that China’s Antarctic program is a stalking horse for a Chinese sovereignty claim. The Antarctic Treaty came into force for China on 8 June 1983. At that point, and from then on, the treaty’s Article IV, which relates to sovereignty in Antarctica, applies to all activities by China in the treaty area. Specifically, it states that ‘no acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute the basis for asserting … a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica, or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica’.

Professor Brady says that China reserves the right to make a claim. But there’s nothing that China does in Antarctica that could be used, within the bounds of international law, for it to assert sovereignty in Antarctica. As she herself notes, ‘China’s activities in Antarctica can’t be used as a basis of claim so long as China remains a party to the treaty.’ Even if the treaty were to end at some hypothetical point, China’s past actions, as a basis for sovereignty, would have no merit because of the operation of Article IV.

China, the report suggests, is engaging in Antarctic minerals exploration. That would be a serious breach of Article VII of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. It establishes an indefinite ban on any activity ‘relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research’. The protocol provides no definition of what is or isn’t ‘scientific research’ with respect to minerals. But if there is clear evidence of breaches of the Antarctic treaty system, the offending party should be directly challenged by Australia (and other Antarctic Treaty members).

At various points, the report talks about China’s ‘military activities’ in Antarctica that, it’s claimed, leverage the use of space. All scientific research carried out in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean relies heavily on satellite telecommunications and the acquisition of remotely sensed data. The presence of Antarctic satellite receiving stations isn’t of itself a breach of the Antarctic Treaty. If, however, they were used in Antarctica to engage in military activities, that would breach the treaty.

What’s required to stop militarisation of Antarctica is transparent and full reporting under Article VII—the requirement to disclose the use of military personnel and equipment. The Antarctic Treaty’s right of inspection should be more regularly exercised.

Professor Brady’s picture of the intensification of Chinese activity in eastern Antarctica, including in our polar real estate, means she’s spot on in suggesting that we need to better manage our economic and political relationship with China.

We’ve in fact been doing that. Officials from both sides met in February last year at the Joint Committee on Antarctic and Southern Ocean Collaboration, established under the China–Australia Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Antarctic and Southern Ocean Affairs. We’ve got a China–Australia Antarctic MOU for environmental, policy, scientific and operational collaboration. The Tasmanian government and the State Oceanic Administration of China have an MOU providing support for Chinese logistics.

All of this gives us useful insights into China’s Antarctic program. Those insights are welcomed by our other collaborators down south, such as the US, Japan, India, France and New Zealand.

In May this year China hosted, for the first time, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, the annual decision-making mechanism established under the treaty.

A good point of our continued engagement should be to positively acknowledge China’s recent Antarctic position paper issued in May this year that repeatedly notes China’s commitment to the Antarctic treaty system.

Want to advance Australia’s interests in the Antarctic? Team up with Canada!

Advocates for a greater commitment by Australia to its Antarctic territory have welcomed the announcements of an Australian Antarctic Strategy and 20 Year Action Plan, as well as the signing of a contract for the construction of a new icebreaker.

The strategy talks about Australia being a logistics collaborator of choice in east Antarctica. But what if collaboration extended to the polar regions in general, not just part of Antarctica?

When it comes to the Antarctic, Australia has more in common with Canada than would be initially expected. While the Australian continent doesn’t contain any polar zones, it claims a large section of Antarctica in an area known as the Australian Antarctic Territory. As shifting geopolitics shine a spotlight on the growing long-term security challenges to both nations’ polar regions, Australia should look toward closer collaboration with Canada to advance shared interests on the frozen continent.

Like a great deal of existing Australia–Canada collaboration, it’s already beginning to occur informally. During the recent expansion of the resources sector, the links between Perth and Calgary thickened at a rapid pace as competition for skilled workers increased and energy and related service companies’ developed footprints in both energy capitals. Political links have also been strengthened in recent years. Connections on a personal level are growing, with a number of Australians and Canadians quietly working together. These flows are largely unstructured and relatively common because of the similar experience in dealing with harsh, remote locations and the tyranny of distance.

Like Australia, Canada shares a British legal and cultural heritage within a federal parliamentary system. The two countries’ military history has long been characterised as operating within what were initially UK and now US-led military coalitions. As major commodity exporters with small, unevenly distributed populations across large landmasses, both countries have remarkably similar international outlooks and policy challenges. For these reasons, collaboration between Australia and Canada has already been mooted in terms of energy and climate policy.

For decades, the approach by each country to their own polar region has been through multilateral agreements and gatherings of diplomats and scientists. For Australia, it has been the Antarctic Treaty; for Canada, it’s the Arctic Council. With an emphasis on science, the environment and consensus, both regimes have proved remarkably successful during their tenure. However, the security environment is changing.

Both countries are confronting major challenges to their respective longstanding claims and influence over the Arctic and Antarctic. The shift to a more multipolar world is leading to greater levels of resource competition in both regions. The first decade of the 21st century has already seen the divergence between a camp of largely Western nations who viewed polar regions as a site of scientific and environmental collaboration and an alternate group—including China, Russia, India and Brazil—that are seeking more influence and access to the regions’ resources.

For Australia, maintaining its pre-eminent position in Antarctica will become more difficult in the coming years, as will ensuring that the continent doesn’t become a contested southern flank. For Canada, the possibility of resource riches and an opening of the fabled Northwest Passage sea route between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans offers both an opportunity for future prosperity and a challenge. While they are advanced, capitalist democracies, both Canberra and Ottawa are limited in the resources they can commit to advancing their own interests in each polar region.

Building upon a foundation of commonalities, we recommend that the two countries leverage each other’s military and diplomatic capabilities in three areas: personnel exchanges, joint procurement, and the mutual recognition of territorial claims.

With formalised personnel exchanges, Australia can benefit from Canada’s decade-plus experiences in regular naval and coast guard operations in the Arctic. If Canberra is to create and maintain the capabilities necessary to perform search and rescue operations in the Antarctic—because of a cruise ship accident or a research station emergency—and to say nothing of resource challenges, Australia needs a reservoir of knowledgeable and experience polar personnel. As such, Australia should start sending RAN and RAAF personnel on rotations with Canadian Armed Forces units performing regular operations in the Arctic. Opportunities also exist to share expertise in strategic planning at the bureaucratic level, between Canada’s Department of National Defence and Australia’s Department of Defence.

With procurement, the different hemispheric calendar cycle allows for Canada to possibly rent out Australia’s soon-to-be built icebreaker while Ottawa awaits the building of the CCGS Diefenbaker. Such a scenario is within the realm of possibility considering the Canadians are already in temporary rental agreements with Chile and Spain for auxiliary oil replenishment ships.  

Finally, both countries stand to benefit in mutually recognising each other’s territorial claims in the Antarctic and Arctic, respectively. Considering the limited number of countries recognising Canberra’s claims and the fact that no nation recognises Ottawa’s polar claims, a small but nevertheless significant diplomatic victory could be achieved, paving the way for possible additional international recognition by other states.

While none of these recommendations is a fail-safe from great power contestation in the Arctic and Antarctic, both countries need to maximise their limited resources to ensure their interests are sustained at both poles.