Kiwis are renowned for being flightless, but they may soon be equally well known for their agility in the water, based on the plethora of documents released by the New Zealand government on both the composition and tasks expected of the New Zealand Defence Force.

The expansion and enhancement of the NZDF’s amphibious capability will be vital for New Zealand, but the benefits will be felt in the wider Pacific region and beyond. The value of an amphibious capability had been identified earlier, but the NZDF lacked the capacity to meet all of the potential requirements. The growing need for amphibious operations has prompted plans to redress the shortfalls. These changes will be essential to fulfil the expected demands on the NZDF.

In 2013, the NZDF stated:

By 2020, with the JATF [Joint Amphibious Task Force] at its core, the Defence Force will be capable of conducting amphibious military operations and responding to emergencies at home and abroad, and projecting and sustaining land or maritime forces with increased combat utility, either on its own or as part of a wider coalition.

Despite progress towards that aim over the next few years, it was decisions outlined in the Defence capability plan 2019 that suggested true ‘amphibiosity’ might be feasible. As a first step, upgrades to the communications systems on HMNZS Canterbury, the navy’s sealift and amphibious support vessel, will enable the ship to serve as ‘a base for deployed amphibious operations’ and ‘provide sufficient capacity to simultaneously communicate with maritime, air and land forces’ by 2022. The systems upgrade project underway in Canada for New Zealand’s two Anzac-class frigates is also intended, in part, to provide ‘improved support to amphibious forces’.

Substantive progress will, however, result from future acquisition plans. The purchase of an additional sealift vessel in the mid- to late 2020s will enable the conduct of concurrent operations and lead to the introduction of a more capable ship. A landing platform dock or similar has been mooted. It’s been suggested that it will have greater lift capacity than the Canterbury, plus a well dock, hospital facilities, planning spaces and self-defence capabilities. The ship will be capable of operating in more challenging sea and weather conditions and will support the deployment of helicopters, remotely piloted aircraft and special forces.

The planned increase to the army will also buttress the ability to transport a large number of troops for amphibious operations. In addition, following its withdrawal from service after 2030, the Canterbury will be replaced by another, more capable vessel to ensure continuity.

These advancements are significant and come at an opportune time. The concurrent development of Australia’s more advanced amphibious capabilities provides an obvious avenue for cooperation and fostering interoperability. New Zealand’s characterisation of its ‘evolving strategic environment’ emphasises the significance of increasing the NZDF’s amphibious capabilities.

Climate change is a particular concern for the New Zealand government given the potential flow-on effects, including the requirement for ‘more humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, stability operations, and search and rescue missions’. The government has also noted that the NZDF may confront ‘more frequent and concurrent operational commitments, which will stretch resources and may reduce readiness for other requirements’.

Wellington’s ‘Pacific reset’ has placed greater emphasis on engagement, and a more robust amphibious capability will be crucial for enabling that. The Australian National University’s John Blaxland described Australia’s acquisition of two landing helicopter dock ships as a ‘game-changer’ in the Pacific. While not as obvious as the potential effects of the Australian LHDs, the enhancement of the NZDF’s amphibious capability will be pivotal for New Zealand and could be hugely beneficial for the South Pacific, given the increased capacity to transport materiel and personnel for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and stability operations. Recent documents stress the importance of working with ‘like-minded’ partners, and an enhanced sealift and amphibious capability could underpin a significant element of that cooperation.

There’s a strong justification for the focus on increasing the NZDF’s amphibious capability, but the concept of ‘amphibiosity’ needs to be embraced wholeheartedly to maximise its effectiveness. Amphibious mindsets need to be cultivated and retained. In the United Kingdom, for example, it was noted during discussions about the future of the Royal Marines that the experience of amphibious operations in World War II emphasised the requirement for ‘specialist doctrine, training and equipment’, which has not diminished since. The transition to a fully fledged amphibious mentality will be an important and necessary step.

The biennial Southern Katipo exercises and the Joint Waka exercises that commenced in 2016 have helped to transform mindsets, but the expansion of the force will mean that the process needs to be continually broadened and enriched.

In his latest contribution to The Strategist, Nic Stuart continues to act as something of a catalyst for discussion on this blog. Following an eloquent reply on the benefits of regional amphibious capabilities from Peter Dean, Nic’s post partially departs the operational level and attempts to address the complexities of fiscal inputs, operational outputs, and public understanding of large government expenditures.

I believe there are several weaknesses in Nic’s post. But the most alarming comes with his rhetorical question: ‘Why should my tax dollars be spent on something unless I’m persuaded of the need’?

The answer is simple. The public elects candidates to represent their views, and in doing so cedes authority on such issues to Parliamentarians. Nic seems to channel John Locke, praising the virtues of the Law of Opinion and Reputation, while negating the Civil Law authority granted to elected officials. If his point is that we need greater public influence on government decisions, what Nic is seeking is not simply dialogue, but constitutional change. Read more

In the last post I concentrated on the ADF’s tasks. For this post I will add a few points about the new Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships. The small ships and catamarans that some have advocated don’t have sophisticated command and control capabilities of the LHDs, and have either limited or no helicopter capacity. They do not have large hospital facilities on-board, nor can they provide the same extensive support, accommodation space, or maintenance facilitates as the LHDs. Most of the smaller vessels have no ‘D’—that is dock facilities to carry and land vehicles (including mine resistant vehicles, tanks, and APC’s), they cannot carry the same volume of bulk supplies, nor have the ability to land these vehicles, personnel, or supplies over a beach.

Why is this important for the South Pacific and many parts of Southeast Asia? These areas often have low-grade infrastructure, especially in terms of ports, wharves and cranes, let alone airports. Without these facilities catamarans are useless; they’re high speed ferries not amphibious ships (although not all the systems which support maritime mobility need be high-end amphibious units). And even within the class of amphibious ships there are degrees of usability. Many of the smaller amphibious ships, such as the now retired RAN LPA’s HMAS Manoora and Kanimbla, cannot land vehicles, armoured or otherwise (the LPA’s bow doors, derrick, and tank ramps were removed).

Read more

Much of the concern about amphibious operations in Australian commentary has focused on the vulnerability of the associated task group and ships to attack, rather than the difficulty of the amphibious problem itself. It is good that recent debate (some in The Strategist) has begun to display a more sophisticated understanding of the spectrum of amphibious operations, particularly in the relationship between their utility and the significant demands that even activities in a benign environment place upon the personnel and equipment involved.

The employment of an amphibious group in a contested situation against sophisticated opposition remains not only one of the most risky activities that the ADF could undertake, but also one of the least likely. And, even in such high intensity conflicts, a landing would seek to be where the adversary is not, rather than where he is—the opening scene of Saving Private Ryan is not the way ahead for the Australian amphibious capability. The key vulnerability issues are thus ones of wider maritime concern and should be answered separately.

On the other hand, given opponents or potential opponents in lower intensity conflicts, the capacity of the ADF to rapidly achieve over-match in an amphibious entry will be vital. This will demand mastery by all involved of high intensity and closely coordinated operational amphibious techniques. It is this land-sea interface and the integration of the amphibious ships with their embarked forces that will require the management of a steep learning curve and which needs the ADF’s close and continuing attention. The ships and their embarked forces should be capable of much even in the very short term, but there will be a long haul from achieving the basics to being able to exploit the full potential of the amphibious group. There are also matters of sustainment and readiness to be resolved, only some of which have been answered by the 2013 White Paper decision to retain the Choules in service. The ship can lift large numbers of heavy vehicles, as well as substantial amounts of stores and munitions. Without her, the LHDs Canberra and Adelaide will have the capacity to put very capable battalion groups ashore, but limited ability to provide the resources that such forces consume in their operations. One key question that remains is what follows, when—and how—in terms of an offshore deployment, particularly for its logistic requirements? Read more