Tag Archive for: air combat

Australia should talk to Washington about buying B-2 stealth bombers

China’s recent naval circumnavigation of Australia has highlighted a pressing need to defend Australia’s air and sea approaches more effectively. Potent as nuclear submarines are, the first Australian boats under AUKUS are at least seven years away. Air power is well-positioned to fill the gap in Australia’s long-range strike capability: It has clear advantages over submarines and ships in terms of its responsiveness in the maritime strike role.

But the F-35A and F/A-18F lack the necessary range, and Australia has not fielded a bomber since the F-111 was retired in 2010. No new candidate aircraft has been identified as available for purchase, on a timeline that is relevant, or on a budget within Australia’s means.

Solving this problem requires imagination from Australia as well as its key ally, the US. Fortunately, there is a solution at hand but, like the aircraft itself, it is not easy to detect. As unlikely as it sounds, Australia should pursue America’s B-2A Spirit bomber, and has a narrow opportunity to do so.

Australia, to be clear, would be acquiring the B-2A as a fully sovereign capability, to boost its deterrent and war-fighting capabilities, with China’s strategic challenge primarily in mind. America would also gain by further enabling a close ally to make a stabilizing contribution to the regional balance of power, through a significant augmentation to its air power, alongside the development of undersea and other capabilities via AUKUS.

The B-2A is well suited to meet Australia’s capability requirements in terms of range, payload and stand-alone platform survivability. There are indications that the B-2A is already transitioning to a long-range precision strike role — delivering such weapons as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (Extended Range) with which it was integrated in 2022. Maritime strike was a particular focus of the B-2A’s participation in last year’s RIMPAC exercises, when it demonstrated the use of modified JDAM gravity bombs as low-cost ship-sinkers. These are capabilities the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) already fields.

Obviously, Australia would need to clear some major obstacles to acquire the B-2A.

First, the US has never before entertained exporting the Spirit, given its limited numbers (only 18 remain) and proprietary technology. Second, Australia would be concentrating a multibillion-dollar investment into very few platforms, just when the Australian Defence Force arguably needs to pivot away from ”exquisite” capabilities and inject greater mass, depth and risk-worthiness into its order of battle. Third, the B-2A serves the USAF in a nuclear as well as conventional delivery role, which would have to be reconciled with Australia’s prohibition on possessing nuclear weapons. Finally, Australian critics of the Trump administration would pillory such an acquisition as foolhardy, at a time when doubts about Washington’s political reliability as an ally are peaking.

Without dismissing these drawbacks, there is a pathway for Australia to acquire a viable B-2A bomber capability, on a timeline that is relevant to its strategic needs. And the window of opportunity is relatively slim— requiring decisive action by Canberra within the next couple of years.

Why Not Other Aircraft?

What about other options? There are really only three other avenues, all with significant downsides: buying into the US’s future B-21 Raider program, acquiring B-1B Lancer bombers as they are retired from the USAF, or trying to tie into the British-Italian-Japanese GCAP effort.

While it would provide a capability for the long term, the problem with the B-21 option for Australia is that it conflicts with the USAF’s overriding need to recapitalize its own bomber force. It would therefore not be available until well into the 2030s — if at all. Cost is another factor, at an estimated $16-18 billion USD for a squadron of twelve. And while the B-21 remains laudably on track, indeed under-budget in the FY25 appropriations request, the potential for cost overruns and delays remains.

The main advantage of pressing used USAF B-1Bs into Australian service is that the Lancers are flying now and are already configured for anti-ship missions. The major downside is that the RAAF would have to assume the full burden for the B-1B’s sustainment while the USAF pivots resources to the B-21. Designed for an operational lifespan of 8,000-10,000 flying hours, the B-1Bs now average above 12,000 hours because of the aircraft’s extensive use as a loitering close air-support platform in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the USAF has retired them from all but short-duration missions. While statistics on flying hours aren’t publicly available for the B-2A, the USAF has been much more sparing with them than the B-1B. Australia would be investing at the point of sharply diminishing returns.

The GCAP joint venture aircraft, while not a bomber per se, is likely to be large enough to be considered in the long-range strike role. Australian interest in the program is rising and GCAP is likely to be more affordable than the B-21. But it may not be available on a significantly more favorable timeline, and there is a constant concern that the multi-national nature of the program could lead to delays or spiraling costs.

Meanwhile, the Spirit is already on borrowed time in USAF service, as it will be retired (along with the B-1B) in the early 2030s in order to accommodate the transition to the B-21, without expanding the overall size of Global Strike Command. Although a precise date is difficult to identify, provided the B-21 rollout proceeds smoothly, the USAF could potentially start retiring B-2As at the end of this decade without reducing its overall bomber fleet. (While the USAF has previously stated it could keep the B-2As flying into the 2040s, Northrop Grumman’s $7 billion contract for B-2A maintenance and support concludes at the end of 2029.)

Retiring the B-1B and B-2A in parallel (the venerable B-52 will be retained in service) creates an expensive and burdensome disposal problem for the USAF. Framed in this context, an Australian pitch to buy eight or more B-2As could be well received by both the USAF and the Trump administration, which has emphasized the need for stepped-up burden sharing from allies.

How This Could Work

Make no mistake, this would be a costly effort, one that would have to come as part of a significant uplift in defense spending, closer to 3 percent of GDP, up from roughly 2 percent GDP today. But if the government is willing to do that, then there are mutual benefits for both Canberra and Washington.

Australia has upgraded several air bases to support regular deployments of USAF bombers and other combat aircraft, and B-2As have already operated from Australia, albeit on short-term detachments. An Australian base in the Northern Territory was used to support a B-2A strike mission against Houthi targets in Yemen last October, most likely for refueling.

Future B-2A deployments to Australia could be scaled up, to further explore the practical challenges of maintaining and sustaining these aircraft here. Deep maintenance might still have to be done in the US, and Australia would need to support that part of any agreement. But as the USAF transitions towards B-21, Australia could incrementally take on more of the funding for B-2A maintenance, easing the cost on American taxpayers. Assuming some overlap in the sustainment footprint between the B-2A and B-21, the RAAF and USAF could also develop shared support facilities, in Australia, for Spirits transferring into Australian service as sovereign assets, as well as B-21s which the USAF could begin to forward deploy to Australia around the same time. This promises economies of scale, within an alliance framework.

While the B-2A would be a stopgap capability for Australia, a further advantage of operating it is that it would provide the RAAF with a pathway to transitioning to the B-21, if it eventually becomes available in sufficient numbers for the US to consider exporting it to Canberra.

To assuage anti-nuclear concerns in Australia, the systems that allow the B-2A to carry nuclear weapons could be disabled through software changes that conform to RAAF standards. Similarly, adapting the B-2A for anti-ship weapons, like LRASM, could be done without insurmountable delays.

All this would require a major Australian diplomatic effort to persuade Washington that it can be trusted to safeguard such highly prized stealth and other technologies via a foreign military sale. But the precedent created by AUKUS, Australia’s subsequent ITAR carve-outs and the existing, close relationship between the RAAF and USAF would do much to make this transfer practicable.

Yes, it’s wildly ambitious. Yes, the hurdles to making this happen may simply be too many to overcome. But now is the time for Canberra to be contemplating bold moves, and convincing the US to sell the B-2A would transform Australia’s defense posture on a significantly faster timeline — an effort worth pursuing to meet the gathering threats.

Tag Archive for: air combat

Australia must learn defence lessons from Ukraine

Military lessons from the Ukraine war are being absorbed quickly in Asia. The message for democracies arming against the threat from authoritarian regimes is to select weapons that are simple and available rather than small numbers of expensive and complex ships, aircraft and vehicles that may not survive the first hours of conflict.

The Politico news service, well connected in Washington, revealed last week that the US State Department had rebuffed Taiwan’s requests to buy submarine-hunting MH-60R Seahawk helicopters. The Biden administration’s reported view is that ‘these expensive items, while fine for peacetime operations, would not survive an all-out assault from the [Chinese] mainland’.

The US is urging Taiwan to buy low-cost sea mines able to blunt an amphibious assault, along with smaller mobile weapons such as drone swarms, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and Javelin anti-tank missiles.

The US State Department told Politico, ‘Bolstering Taiwan’s self-defenses is an urgent task and the most effective approach to doing so is through investing in asymmetric capabilities that are credible, resilient, mobile, distributed, and cost-effective.’

Ukrainian forces have given the world a masterclass in battlefield asymmetry: you do not need a tank to destroy a tank if you have well-targeted five-kilogram bombs dropped from commercial drones.

Likewise, two Neptune cruise missiles, which Kyiv designed and developed for a reported total cost of US$40 million ($57.7 million), sunk the Russian flagship Moskva, estimated by Forbes to cost US$750 million.

One of the most successful weapons used by Ukraine is the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 armed drone, with costs reported at between US$1 million and US$2 million each.

Contrast that with the six high-altitude MQ-4C Triton unarmed ‘unmanned aircraft’ Australia plans to buy. The total approved budget so far is for $2.5 billion, but that’s only for the first three aircraft and the ground control and support systems and facilities. It’s acceptable to plan for the loss of a $2-million drone in combat, but it’s best not to fly a drone into harm’s way if they each cost several hundred million.

The State Department’s message to Taipei calls for urgent action. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine accelerates the timeframe for a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan because Xi Jinping may choose to strike while a distracted America focuses on Russia, attacking before Taiwan is better armed.

The Australian Defence Force is anything but asymmetric in design. To use the State Department’s words, the ADF is not ‘credible, resilient, mobile, distributed, and cost-effective’.

Take the example of the P-8 Poseidon aircraft, which then defence minister Linda Reynolds in 2020 said would provide ‘one of the most advanced maritime patrol and response capabilities in the world’.

According to ASPI senior analyst Marcus Hellyer, Australia has acquired 14 P-8 aircraft for a total approved budget of $6.575 billion. That includes facilities, but let’s call that $479 million per aircraft.

The P-8s are the core of our maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare capability. They are by no means the only military platforms that can play that role, but they are a central element.

The Ukrainian experience demands that we ask how vulnerable our ships, aircraft and military vehicles are to being destroyed in combat. The answer is that they are significantly at risk to a range of lower-cost missiles and weapons in Chinese military service.

In February this year, an Australian P-8 was ‘lased’—targeted by an on-board laser—when shadowing two Chinese warships transiting the Arafura Sea. Prime Minister Scott Morrison described this as ‘unprofessional and unsafe military conduct’ on the part of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. P-8s were also used last week to monitor the Chinese intelligence-gathering vessel Dongdiao off Australia’s northwest coast. The P-8 is a very high-value asset to use for relatively routine surveillance work.

In real combat, the P-8 could never be that close to a Chinese warship. Many kilometres before being in visual range, the aircraft would be at risk of being shot down.

The only thing more valuable than a combat aircraft is its crew. I understand that when the Russians target a Ukrainian aircraft, they fire two missiles, one to bring down the plane and the second to target the ejector seat if the pilot survived the first hit.

Pilots and aircrew are even harder to replace than complex combat aircraft. Australian officials are appropriately tight-lipped about the numbers of trained and available aircrew, but they are hardly in oversupply.

In effect, the ADF is designed around such expensive platforms and so few operators that we can’t afford to risk deploying them into high-threat areas. It’s as though Defence buys this expensive gear never expecting to fight with it or take losses.

The most capable surface vessels the navy operates are our three air warfare destroyers, which in total cost about $8.5 billion. The sail-away cost of the third AWD was about $2 billion.

How would Australia use these vessels in wartime? The last defence white paper, produced in 2016, said: ‘We cannot effectively protect Australia if we do not have a secure nearer region, encompassing maritime Southeast Asia and South Pacific.’ The policy focused on ‘increasing the capability of the ADF to make contributions to any such operations’.

Having seen how the Moskva was sunk by a truck-launched cruise missile launched from land 160 kilometres away from the target, will our government or the ADF really deploy an AWD into the South China Sea?

In a conflict, no ship would deploy without the backing of submarines and air cover, but China has turned the South China Sea into one of the most potentially dangerous places on the planet with many options available to it for air-, land-, sea-surface- and underwater-launched anti-ship cruise missiles.

China was making that point to Australia in its February naval deployment, comprising a modern guided missile destroyer with a substantial armoury of long-range weapons and an amphibious landing ship. The destination of the flotilla was the Coral Sea near Solomon Islands. Point taken?

Against this backdrop of regional rearmament and the bloody realities of war in Ukraine, we desperately need to rethink Australia’s defence planning priorities. The government, the opposition and Defence itself know the risk of regional war is rapidly rising, but our defence decisions are not catching up with this reality.

The budget decision abandoning a plan to buy the SkyGuardian armed drone is the worst in a series of force-structure blunders. In the past few weeks, the Japanese Coast Guard announced it would operate the SeaGuardian version of this drone from October, with the possibility that the Maritime Self-Defence Force would follow suit.

At the beginning of this month, the US Marine Corps confirmed that it would acquire 18 of these drones, known in their system as the MQ-9A, and has plans to double that number.

Australia could have chosen to be part of a coalition of countries operating a relatively low-cost drone that is available now, with a capacity to remain airborne for 20 hours and the ability to perform a variety of missions, from maritime surveillance to supporting ground troops with missiles.

Defence correctly says that difficult priority judgements always must be made, but here was something that added combat power, supported our closest partners and could be put into harm’s way without risking aircrew this year—not 2032, and not 2042.

The most urgent defence task for the next government is clear: we need a high-priority, full-on emergency effort to redesign the ADF and to work out how it can be equipped with available equipment over the next two to three years.

Governments need to start reading the international signs. Xi’s international belligerence and military build-up, his track record in the South China Sea and Hong Kong, and the strategic agreement with Solomon Islands all show the direction of traffic.

To that we can add the State Department’s urgent direction to Taiwan to arm more quickly with simple but effective weapons. Australia’s strategic geography is different—we need reach, not just homeland defence—but the timeframe is no different.

Finally, Ukraine’s tragic experience shows that a determined smaller country working with the backing of allies can put up a powerful defence against the biggest of bullies.

Australia can turn its defence fortunes around, but it will take lateral thinking of a type not happening in official circles. Our history is that we ignore the obvious international signs and allow ourselves to be surprised when conflict comes calling.

The first and biggest test of the next Australian government will be to see if we can do any better than that today.

The artificial intelligence ‘backseater’ in future air combat

Among the myriad technological developments in airpower—including advanced propulsion, better stealth, directed-energy weapons and hypersonics—perhaps the most important will turn out to be artificial intelligence. AI has the potential to transform air combat operations and the way airpower is conceived and used.

The US Air Force demonstrated the role of AI dramatically in December last year by flying a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, which normally carries a single crew member, with an AI algorithm as a ‘virtual backseater’. As the pilot flew, the AI system—dubbed ‘ARTUµ’ in honour of Star Wars robot R2-D2—controlled the aircraft’s sensors and navigation.

On the test flight, ARTUµ was tasked with finding adversary missile launchers and was ‘solely responsible for sensor employment and tactical navigation’, while the human pilot concentrated on finding enemy aircraft and flying. ARTUµ ‘made final calls on devoting the radar to missile hunting versus self-protection’.

The flight demonstrated human–machine teaming at a new level and points to the potential to integrate AI backseaters into current fighters like the F-35 and future air combat aircraft such as the US Next Generation Air Dominance platform, or NGAD.

The F-35 has room for just one person in the cockpit, but with AI the pilot gets a backseater that can manage the complex process of integrating data from a multitude of onboard and offboard sensors and other information sources, freeing up the pilot to fly and fight. AI can also manage human–machine teaming between the F-35 and autonomous systems, such as the ‘loyal wingman’ autonomous platform being developed in Australia as part of the Boeing airpower teaming system.

So, AI dramatically reduces the aircrew’s workload and can process data and information faster than a human pilot, including rapidly assessing threats. But it also boosts the operational potential of autonomous platforms in crewed–uncrewed teaming because it can ensure greater oversight and control—‘on the loop’ for the autonomous platform—while giving the human pilot the big picture of tactical operations. That eases rules-of-engagement constraints on using autonomous systems, including future lethal autonomous weapons platforms.

For fast jets like the F-35, the benefits of integrating AI are obvious—it opens up new approaches to complex and fast-moving air combat operations.

For slower, heavier aircraft such as the E-7A Wedgetail and the P-8A Poseidon, integrating AI inside the cockpit is likely to enhance the operating efficiency of the planes and their crews, particularly as they begin to exploit offboard sensors based on drones such as the MQ-4C Triton, maritime platforms or space-based capabilities. AI can manage a diverse network of sensors and platforms and take the lead in transforming the flood of data gathered over the future battlespace into a knowledge edge—the key to getting the information advantage that’s critical for success.

The role of AI in the cockpit gives us a glimpse into the future of airpower. The Royal Australian Air Force needs to be thinking about where airpower goes next, even as the F-35 achieved initial operational capability in December and moves to final operational capability in 2023. That future is almost certain to be a mix of crewed and autonomous systems, working together in teams to deliver a range of effects as a system of systems.

We need not wait until the late 2030s for a sixth-generation platform to emerge to replace the fifth-generation F-35 in the 2040s. It would be a mistake to delay consideration of future air combat capability by maintaining a traditional acquisitions mindset. Yet, the 2020 force structure plan pushes back the start of the F-35 replacement process to the mid-2030s. Given the pace of technological change and the rapid deterioration in our strategic environment, that notional timeline needs to be challenged and capability acquisition needs to happen faster. With the US already flying a demonstrator for NGAD and considering a ‘digital century series’ approach to acquisition, it’s time Australia shook off the slow, generational acquisition paradigm. Investment in breakthrough technologies such as AI is part of that transformation.

A complementary next-generation air combat system spread across multiple platforms and technologies—crewed and autonomous—that has AI as a key component needs to be prioritised as an opportunity for common development with our Five Eyes partners, especially the US. The Australian Defence Force could work with its US counterparts, or with allies and partners in Europe and Japan, to develop future air combat capabilities that will complement and, ultimately, replace the F-35 sooner than the 2040s. Boeing’s ‘loyal wingman’ drone is a good first step and may be able to be evolved into a potent future air combat capability.

It’s time for the RAAF to be forward-looking and proactive in accelerating the acquisition of the next generation of air combat capabilities. That effort should incorporate the broad application of AI—inside the cockpit and across the battlespace—to allow our military to think and act at machine speed.

Of course, there are risks in moving fast. AI is still a relatively new technology, and its complexity needs to be mastered. Networking a multitude of offboard sensors that an AI algorithm can use to inform aircrew of the common operating picture will require significant investment in software development, supported by the establishment of research facilities and the training of personnel. It will require a substantial boost in digital high-speed communications bandwidth to work. That’s likely to require investment in other technology areas—notably, satellite-based laser-optical communications and quantum technologies.

Nor will the ADF operate in an uncontested electromagnetic domain. Potential adversaries such as China are already developing sophisticated capabilities in electronic and network warfare, so our tactical command and control, including elements controlled by an AI ‘backseater’, must be robust and resilient.

Meeting all of those challenges will take time, money and skilled personnel. The US Air Force’s U-2 demonstration of ARTUµ is one step down a path towards tomorrow’s airpower, and Australia needs to proceed with determination to achieve success.

Russian military modernisation: everything old is new again

Image courtesy of Flickr user Discovery Times.

In a recent article for The Strategist, I showed how Russia’s economic woes are negatively affecting plans to modernise the country’s military. In order to be thrifty, Moscow has, for the most part, been investing in modernised or upgraded versions of existing platforms, rather than waiting for altogether new platforms like the Armata tank or PAK-FA fighter to enter service. Most of the Russian Armed Forces’ equipment is of Cold War vintage, and their priority appears to be an increase in the volume of modern equipment in service, rather than introducing revolutionary new capabilities.

It’s telling that the 2011–20 State Armaments Program’s major benchmarks emphasised the percentage of modern equipment in service: 30% of total by 2015 and 70% by 2020. Their success in that pursuit has been mixed, and exact numbers are hard to find, but the share of modern equipment in service has clearly been increasing.

Russia’s Deputy Defense Minister said in April 2016 that the military had received some 1,200 ‘new and modernised aircraft’ since 2013—250 new planes, 300 new helicopters and 700 modernised aircraft. Essentially all the new fixed-wing combat aircraft are modern derivatives of 1980s Soviet-era aircraft: the Su-27 ‘Flanker’ (Su-30; Su-35 and Su-33), Su-25 ‘Frogfoot’, MiG-29 ‘Fulcrum’ (including the forthcoming MiG-35) and the MiG-31 ‘Foxhound’. These ‘4th generation’ airframes outfitted with modern, digital avionics and sensors are commonly referred to as 4.5 generation fighters, and lack the intrinsic design features of 5th generation aircraft like the F-35.

Ambitions for a 5th generation Russian fighter, the PAK-FA, have been continually delayed due to high costs and intermittent support from development partner, India. Just eight prototypes of the vaunted aircraft exist today, and the latest plans expect to see just 12 production aircraft acquired by 2020. Production lines for the Su-35 or MiG-35 are likely to benefit from the PAK-FA’s shortcomings, as well as continuing export demand for Russian 4.5 generation fighters.

There’s nothing inherently wrong with that; in fact, it’s a practical and cost-effective plan. The US Navy began transitioning from the 80s-era F/A-18 Hornet to the modern Super Hornet in the early 2000s. Those 4.5 generation fighters are, by all accounts, still very capable and require less development than brand new airframes would. And given that both of the US military’s 5th generation fighter programs have suffered significant setbacks, it’s easy to see why Russia opted for a less risky path, though it’s not without opportunity cost.

Russia’s naval modernisation plans have progressed much more slowly. Of the 108 surface combatants in service today, nearly three-quarters are over 25 years old. Efforts to build modern surface combatants have focused on relatively smaller ships: since 2010, 11 corvettes and two frigates have been commissioned, with another 12 corvettes due to enter service by 2019. But Moscow’s interference in Ukraine’s civil war led the Ukrainians to cease exports of vital naval gas turbines to Russia. Of the six frigates in various stages of completion, only three have the turbines they’ll need to operate, creating headaches for the Russian Navy.

Of 20 large surface combatants (destroyer or larger, including the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier/cruiser), only two were commissioned in the latter half of the 90s, and none have been built since. A further three destroyers are being kept in reserve, but if they return to service, they’d likely replace older warships rather than add to the overall size of the fleet.

Likewise, two of the enormous 80s-era Kirov-class ‘battlecruisers’ have been kept in reserve, one of which—the Admiral Nahkimov—is undergoing modernisation. By 2020, the Nahkimov will replace the Pyotr Veliky as flagship of the Northern Fleet, while the latter undergoes a period of maintenance and modernisation. A new class of Russian large surface combatant, the ‘Leader class’, is reported to begin construction in the early 2020s, but no contracts have yet been signed.

The submarine fleet is in a similar state, with most vessels dating back to the early 90s. Contemporary submarine construction has focused on an improved version of the 80s-era Kilo-class SSK. The Kilo has been a successful export product for Russia, with 16 of 22 improved Kilos in service with foreign navies. Recent emphasis has shifted to the Yasen-class nuclear submarine, with the second vessel of its class due to be launched this year. As well, the fourth ship of the Borei SSBN class will be launched this year. Both nuclear subs are iterative improvements on earlier ships in their class, resulting in the labels Yasen M-class and Borei II-class respectively.

Recent economic hardships appear to have driven the Russians further toward improved or upgraded platforms rather than the pursuit of entirely new platforms. But there’s no halt in the modernisation process, only a course adjustment. If anything, some services may be able to reach their modernisation goals even sooner thanks to dependable production lines. And late Cold War-era designs are still sufficiently deadly to be taken seriously, especially when equipped with modern sensors and weapons.

Air combat – where to from here?

A mass formation of 16 F/A-18F Super Hornets fly's over South East Queensland.

The recent Australian National Audit Office reports on the current and future air combat capability highlighted the risk and potential cost of keeping the 1980s vintage Hornets flying until they are replaced by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. It isn’t the ANAO’s job to look at the policy options for dealing with the risks they identified, but their findings clearly beg the question of what to do.

There are three broad options: stick with the current plan of managing the ageing Hornets until the F-35 is mature and established in service elsewhere; bite the bullet and move to the F-35 sooner to reduce the risk that the Hornets won’t go the distance; or make a further purchase of Super Hornets to add to the existing fleet of 24 Super Hornets acquired in 2006 to de-risk the then planned transition from F-111 to F-35 between 2010 and 2014. For reasons explained below, the logic of the situation is increasingly pointing to a further Super-hornet buy.

Sticking with the current plan has the advantage of not requiring extra resources in the next few years—a real attraction from the point of view of a government with a finely balanced budget. The downside is that the Hornets will become increasingly expensive to maintain towards the end of the decade, while offering a progressively lower return in capability terms. Read more