In September 2014, a RAAF E-7A Wedgetail early warning and control aircraft arrived in the Middle East to join the war against the Islamic State terror group. Soon after its crew set off on a familiarisation flight, they were told a US E-3 Sentry aircraft that was to direct operations over Iraq was unserviceable and were asked to take over the operation.

Number 2 Squadron commander Warren Haynes says the crew had been extensively prepared for the mission in simulators and on exercises and it was quickly assessed that their workup training made this complex operation safe for them.

The crew transitioned seamlessly from a ‘famil’ exercise to an operation, Wing Commander Haynes tells The Strategist.

RAAF chief Robert Chipman says the Wedgetail joined Australia’s Air Task Group as a battlespace manager with tasks including directing fighter aircraft and linking them up with tankers—’orchestrating the fight, bringing it all together’.

Air Marshal Chipman says the aircraft surprised many by performing seamlessly with how the E-3s operated, using the same tactics, techniques and procedures, with a radar able to see a long way and to build a very good picture, and with a strong communication suite. Suddenly there was an E-7 on the block with half as many crew as an E-3 and a much smaller airframe. ‘It was a lot more reliable than the E-3s and was doing at least as good a job.’

It wasn’t always so. The Wedgetail was an early addition to the public version of the Defence Department’s list of projects of concern in January 2008 and it remained there until December 2012.

Now a RAAF Wedgetail has been sent to Europe to help safeguard Ukraine’s vital supply lines. The Wedgetail is operating from Germany and will not enter the airspace of Ukraine, Russia or Belarus. Its highly effective radar systems will scan for any possible missile launches from hundreds of kilometres inside Russia, Belarus and Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.

Chipman says the Wedgetail, built into a Boeing 737 airframe, was an Australian idea, built to Australian specifications to meet an Australian requirement. Boeing and Northrop Grumman in the US fitted the radar and the UK’s BAE Systems the electronic-warfare system.

He says the project was for a long time very troubled and benefited from the additional oversight as a project of concern. ‘An element of pragmatism crept in once we realised that some of the capability requirements we set were aspirational, that this was leading-edge technology. We needed to work with the manufacturer and evolve it iteratively.

‘We were able to bring it into service at a time when the operators could still influence the capability. That’s been the secret sauce—you have people who know the system well, to operate it to its top potential and work closely with the manufacturers to deliver that.’

The Wedgetail was highly developmental and the phased-array radar, the heart of the surveillance capability, had never been integrated into an airborne system at that scale.

The Australian National Audit Office warned that delays in some projects, including the Wedgetail, resulted from their technical difficulty leading to ‘underestimation by industry and/or Defence of the complexity of developmental and/or large scale integration projects’.

The ANAO said the Wedgetail achieved final operational capability in May 2015, but noted that it had ‘provided more than 1,220 hours directing air strikes in the coalition operations in the Middle East since October 2014’.

Chris Deeble, who now heads Defence’s Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, joined the project in 2006.

He says the aircraft was conceived as a mobile element of the command-and-control role that had previously been done from the ground. What finally emerged was vastly more than that. ‘It’s a critical aggregator and disseminator of information, taking information in, adding its own sensor and other information and pushing that out to the fighter force. It’s an enabler now for fifth-generation warfighting.’

Deeble says such complex projects are necessary and the Wedgetail experience demonstrates that they can succeed. ‘It’s about being aware, understanding the risks and the benefits, and charting the path that helps avoid significant problems you will inevitably find as you take on complex technology.

‘People didn’t understand what being the lead customer for our first-of-type capability was going to mean for us. The specification was very demanding, as I discovered when I took over the program.’ A very aggressive schedule was never going to be achieved.

An example was the early approach to testing the radar. ‘When we got the radar operating on the aircraft, the temptation was to check its performance at full power, its range, its loading and its maximum performance. That was very important to understanding if we’ll get there.’ But when they went to full power on the immature radar, it failed, he says. ‘It was not stable, so we had to accept that path was not going to work and reverted to a lower power.’

Ultimately, the integrated radar and communications systems fitted within two side arrays and a ‘top hat’ (also known as a ‘surfboard’) on the fuselage could ‘see’ over a vast area.

Deeble says that, from his experience running many projects of concern, a lack of understanding of the risks involved is a common factor. That means dealing with unexpected problems as the project progresses.

‘And people would say that if we told government that it was going to take 10 years versus six years, then government would never approve it. I think that’s not true, and I think sometimes we underestimate governments’ and politicians’ ability to understand it.’

It took much longer than expected to get the Wedgetail project right, and that meant a constant fear that the key stakeholders wouldn’t bear the cost and the project would be cancelled.

‘You have to understand where you may be pushing the bounds of technology,’ Deeble says.

So, what does the Wedgetail’s ultimate success signal about Australia’s ability to develop cutting-edge technology and get it operational?

‘It tells us that it’s not cheap,’ says Chipman. ‘It’s not easy; it doesn’t happen quickly. You need to persist with it, but you also need to get to a point where you’ve got a good enough product to push it out into the operational community and evolve it over time.

‘That combination of working in partnership, having the vision, persistence and determination to see a capability through, but also to evolve it while it’s in service are valuable lessons. That’s our pathway. There are other ways to deliver cutting-edge technology to the warfighter, and we need to be open to all of them.’

Chipman says some original goals may have been over optimistic, but setting them helped develop a significant capability. ‘Had we not set ambitious targets, we would have fallen short of what was eventually achieved. You have to strive for ambitious targets.’

But there is a balance point. ‘We also need to achieve the timely delivery of capability into service. We were close to a point with the Wedgetail where our determination to achieve an ambitious target was delaying its introduction, and that’s dead time for us. If a product is good enough, then we bring it into service and achieve those aspirational objectives over time.’

How difficult is it to evolve a capability once it’s operational?

That’s the new model, says Chipman. The RAAF has a steady drumbeat refreshing the capabilities of platforms such as the F-35A Lightning II, the Growler electronic attack aircraft and the Super Hornet by upgrading software, hardware and firmware. ‘That ensures that we’re on the leading edge of technology. We must do that because our potential adversaries are not standing still. They’re delivering new missiles and other capabilities into inventory, new electronic-warfare systems. You’ve got this cat-and-mouse game where we need to continue to make sure our systems can compete and win.’

The 14 February piece by James Mugg and Andrew Davies was like the curate’s egg: good in parts. Much of what they wrote about the significance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and systems (UAS), especially about Navy’s recently announced contract for 110kg CAMCOPTER S-100 rotary wing UAS and three year logistics support, is non-controversial. They could’ve also mentioned Navy’s current trials with the Boeing Insitu 22kg ScanEagle fixed wing UAV, equipped with Melbourne’s Sentient Vision Systems ViDAR sensor, but more on that later.

Their consideration of a large unmanned helicopter like Northrop Grumman’s 1,430kg, 7.3 metre long MQ-8B/C Fire Scout for Navy was the problem. Probably the only RAN vessels where Fire Scout would be an excellent UAV choice are the two Canberra Class LHDs plus HMAS Choules, a smaller amphibious vessel. Smaller UAVs make much more sense for the air warfare destroyers, future frigates and offshore patrol vessels.

Fire Scout is an outstandingly good UAV, with excellent endurance, serious sensor capabilities, and it can be equipped with offensive missiles. The US Navy’s large platforms, like their littoral combat ships, have deck space and hangar room to deploy Fire Scout very effectively.

So why is this contrary view on the suitability of large unmanned helicopters for the RAN’s ships, apart from those already mentioned, being put forward?

Quite simply, if a ship’s hangar only has space for one helicopter then it must be a manned one. Mugg and Davies probably agree. Many of the tasks assigned to naval helicopters require crew on-board. Consider surface and underwater warfare operations; search and rescue by day and night; vertical and cross-deck replenishment and movement of personnel; casualty evacuation; interception and boarding; counter-terrorism operations; humanitarian aid and disaster relief; support for other government agencies, including Police and Border Force; and many other missions where interaction between aircrew and other people is necessary for successful completion.

Hangar space for two helicopters on board an RAN ship, alas not provided on the Hobart Class AWDs but hopefully on the Future Frigates, is important for anti-submarine warfare because they can share continuous surveillance, underwater detection and attack submarine threats. The OPVs are never going to be big enough to have double helicopter hangar space.

It would seem much more sensible for most Australian warships to carry at least one manned helicopter in its hangar, sharing that with one or more small UAVs which become the eyes of the ship at distances and in conditions beyond the capabilities of human lookouts.

That view is supported by Defence’s 2016 Integrated Investment Plan, which includes this statement (Section 4.32):

‘To improve the situational awareness of ships on operations, we will acquire a new tactical unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft system that will complement other sensors and systems by extending the area able to be held under surveillance. These systems will be progressively introduced over the decade to FY 2025‑26.They will be able to operate from a range of vessels of varying size, including the future frigates and patrol vessels.’

The budgeted project cost range of $500m-$750m suggests that Navy’s planning to acquire quite a large number of small UAVs, which typically cost well under $3m each with extras. The major acquisition program could start as early as 2018 and run until 2030.

At Nowra in November 2015, an RAN ScanEagle tested Sentient Vision Systems’s Visual Detection and Ranging (ViDAR) optical detection system, turning the UAV into a broad area maritime surveillance asset capable of covering up to 80 times more area in a single sortie than is possible with standard cameras. The self-contained ViDAR system consists of high-resolution digital video cameras and software that analyses image feed and autonomously detects, tracks, and photographs each contact with a 180-degree pan. ViDAR is similar to RADAR, but uses visible rather than radio frequency.

In the fourth quarter 2016 a team from Navy’s UAS Unit deployed to Christmas Island to test their ability to conduct long-term UAS operations without support. The deployment and location allowed offshore flights for up to 10 hours at a time. By four weeks into the three month deployment, the team had achieved approximately 82 flight hours, with over 12 hours of specific ViDAR operation.

During the RAN’s 2015 and 2016 trials, which on occasion covered an area greater than 13,000 square nautical miles (45,000 km²) in a 12-hour trial mission, ViDAR successfully detected Navy vessels positioned for the trials, and autonomously found smaller targets like recreational boats and yachts, a submerged whale, and even an airborne helicopter.

The ScanEagle’s data links allow it to send image data from up to 50 nautical miles away. As well, Sentient Vision Systems claim that ViDAR is ideal for real-time small object detection such as people in the water, periscopes at 4 nautical miles, and fast boats out beyond 8 nautical miles. It can be used to detect objects that are too small for existing radars.

The RAN trials with ScanEagle/ViDAR are continuing at sea in 2017. I’d say Navy is well on track in its thinking about uses for UASs.

I’ve recently discussed two trends in military technology. The week before lasts’ post on the 1990s non-revolution in military affairs argued that low-tech adversaries simply make themselves scarce when faced with a technologically superior foe. Before that I discussed the impact on the survivability of expensive top-end platforms of the new generation of long range sensors and weapons.

The former observations apply to the asymmetric campaigns that western forces have fought over the past 15 years in the Middle East. The latter apply in the ‘anti-access/area denial’ world of future major power conflict. It should be worrying for planners of future force structures that exquisitely capable but increasingly expensive high-end platforms don’t look to have a decisive role in either.

But somewhere in between there’s the ‘just right’ campaign, where those platforms are exactly what’s required. That includes the 1991 Gulf War and the NATO contribution to the Kosovo campaign in 1998–99. In both cases western forces avoided exposure to insurgency because they weren’t involved in extended ground campaigns. And Iraq and Serbia’s air defence capabilities didn’t seriously trouble American-led air power.

It was a grand time for advocates of air power. I sat through many a presentation of the virtues of bloodless (for the winners) achievement of strategic aims through precision strike. The trouble is that the 1990s, when that mindset was at its strongest and the worship of airpower reached its zenith, doesn’t look much like today’s world.

The post 2003 insurgency in Iraq was only put down by the many boots on the ground of the 2007 ‘surge’. And, as we know now, it left behind a very fragile environment, creating space for a hideous new hybrid actor in the form of ISIL. Russia is showing that state-backed hard power still plays a role in international affairs and it’s seriously rattling European notions of post Cold War peace. In the Pacific theatre the United States is facing an ever more challenging access environment as China builds its military power, especially numerous missile systems designed to keep American naval power at arm’s length.

Insurgencies and anti-access systems are both asymmetric in the sense that they don’t tackle the strengths of western forces head on. They’re post-RMA strategies that blunt the advantages otherwise conferred by sophisticated weapon systems. Neither are a new idea; the Viet Cong successfully adopted guerilla tactics against a much more powerful United States half a century ago and Egypt’s asymmetric approach to Israeli air power and armour in 1973 achieved their goals.

There are two possible responses to the contemporary versions of these challenges. The first is to push on and develop ever more elaborate platforms to maintain a technological edge. There are numerous downsides to that idea. It will require better defensive suites to allow the platforms to get close enough to do their job, with commensurate cost and weight penalties. The R&D will take ever longer, if the 19 years and counting of the F-35 wasn’t enough. And there’s always the risk that we’d be deep into diminishing returns, as adversaries think up new asymmetric responses (not least of which the ‘swarming’ of major platforms by large numbers of much cheaper systems), steal the technology for themselves, or both.

I think the better answer is summed up in the old saying about the relative merits of not beating them and joining them. If the adversaries are using long-range sensor and weapon systems on one hand and dispersion on the other, it suggests a new approach that takes the best of both worlds. Major platforms of the future mightn’t deliver end effects themselves, but a swarm of smaller sub-systems that by virtue of numbers could provide area coverage for ISR, persistence in the battlespace and, when called together, locally outnumber even sophisticated defences.

The sub-systems could be networked together, and in the future Moore’s Law will probably enable autonomous systems. In short, the future of military power might be R2-D2s rather than Death Stars (PDF):

‘Just as the Death Stars’ vulnerability and inadequacy are perfectly realistic, the superior operational performance of a simple droid corresponds to real-life experience. Time and again, war-winning weapons tend to be simple, inexpensive and small.’

The author of that piece could usefully have added ‘and numerous’ at the end there, but the rest of the sentiment is right. The resultant force mightn’t look as impressive as today’s—perhaps a problem for peacetime ‘presence’ and alliance assurance—but it’ll be more effective when it counts.

Two things will be required to make that future a reality. First, the temptation to make the sub-systems as capable as possible will have to be resisted—that way awaits further R&D, cost and schedule problems. Second—and more difficult to achieve—is the need for military planners to give up on Death Stars. If recent reports on the RAN’s frigate plans are to be believed, there’s a fair way to go yet.