Tag Archive for: Africa

Understanding the BRI in Africa and the Middle East

This Strategic Insight aims to expand on Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith’s powerful, provocative paper, Australia’s management of strategic risk in the new era. Dibb and Brabin-Smith, two of Australia’s leading strategic thinkers, examined China’s growing assertiveness in our region. Here, I look beyond our region and beyond China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative (BRI) to highlight how China is expanding its influence in Africa and the Middle East. I examine some selected cases, such as Zimbabwe, Israel, Turkey and Iran. I also try to situate the BRI in President Xi Jinping’s grand strategy.

Preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa: mining and Australia’s interests

Australia has commercial and strategic interests in helping to prevent and counter violent extremism in Africa. Australian mining companies are engaged across the continent in Mali, Burkina Faso, Kenya and many other countries where there have been high-profile terrorist attacks and kidnappings of foreign nationals, including Australians. Those threats already affect the way Australian mining companies approach their operations on the continent. With rising risks to Australian nationals, businesses and foreign investment through the mining industry, violent extremism in Africa is a direct threat to Australian national interests.

Drawing on the findings of a newly published in-depth report, Preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa: The role of the mining sector, this paper examines how the Australian mining sector should step up efforts aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) in Africa. While the report notes that mining projects present risks that can exacerbate some of the drivers of violent extremism, it also highlights the potential to leverage the work of mining projects as a bulwark against violent extremism.

This paper shows that there’s scope for further cooperation and engagement with the Australian Government in the mining sector. The potential of the private sector in P/CVE remains underexplored. Consequently, the mining sector has an opportunity to lead by example in this field.

Preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa: the role of the mining sector

Terrorism and violent extremism remain significant threats to international peace and security. Although few countries have been immune, Africa has been particularly susceptible. Weak institutions, porous borders, inadequately trained or ill-equipped security forces, historical grievances and a lack of economic opportunities have created conditions for extremist ideologies to grow and persist in parts of the continent.

“The global effort to prevent violent extremism can’t succeed without the private sector. This report explains why, and how to incorporate this essential partner.”

Dr Khalid Koser MBE
Executive Direct
Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF)

To date, most counterterrorism efforts have been security and intelligence led, with an emphasis on military and kinetic strategies to ‘defeat’ terrorism. Over the past decade in particular, global efforts have also focused on strategies for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), particularly on the role of international institutions, governments, regional organisations and communities. While several international frameworks for counterterrorism, for example the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, have recognised the important role of the private sector in prevention measures, there’s been little research and analysis exploring the specificity and mechanisms of private sector involvement. This report by ASPI, in cooperation with Hedayah, uses a case study of the mining sector in Africa to examine how the private sector does and can engage in P/CVE efforts.

This report explores the correlation between the drivers of violent extremism and the different activities undertaken throughout a mining project’s life cycle in order to identify potential risks and opportunities. It examines the role of the mining sector in actions to address violent extremism, identifying preliminary lessons and best practices from the research. Finally, it provides recommendations for mining companies, the industry, governments and communities on approaches to engage mining companies in P/CVE efforts.

The report is accompanied by a second paper that draws on the findings and examines how the Australian mining sector should step up efforts aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa. See Preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa: Mining and Australia’s interests.

Tag Archive for: Africa

China is exporting its model of political authoritarianism to Africa

To expand its influence in Africa, China has stepped up its elite capture programs from hosting delegations and training to exporting its authoritarian model of governance. 

Graduates are now emerging from a school for politicians and officials in Tanzania, the first of its kind that China has set up in Africa. More may follow.  

By providing training, China ingratiates itself, creating interpersonal links with future leaders. As the school has started training those leaders in the Chinese Communist Party’s ways of maintaining political and social control, it raises the prospect of greater oppression on the continent. 

In the last decade, China has adopted several novel foreign policy tools and doctrines of influence, such as its signature Belt and Road Initiative, largely known for building mega infrastructure projects. In recent years, it has gradually transitioned into an influence operation, encouraging, for example, people-to-people exchange. 

Chinese influence in Africa has been constantly deepening through both economic diplomacy and security cooperation. This has fostered a favourable image of China among African people. Now, as China is reorienting its Africa policy away from geoeconomics towards geopolitics, it must win the political class. 

China has strongly emphasised on elite capture strategies, upgrading its model of domestically run governance training schools to political party training schools in a target country. The Tanzanian political party training school, set up in 2022, is an example.  

Located only 40 kilometres from Tanzania’s commercial capital, Dar es Salaam, the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School was established as a collaboration between the CCP and the Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa—an informal coalition of liberation parties from six southern African countries. They are Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 

The campus has more than 10 hectares of land and boasts a modern and technically well-equipped building for classrooms. Additionally, the school has a dormitory, canteen, service building and facility building and can accommodate 200 people. It’s offering year-round short leadership training courses, which include CCP-arranged tours in China. Run by the CCP, the school is designed to teach Chinese ways of maintaining political and social control, thereby promoting authoritarianism. 

In 2023, China refurbished the Herbert Chitepo School of Ideology in Zimbabwe, a similar school meant to train ruling party cadres. A greater CCP involvement in the curriculum of the school can be expected. China may establish more such schools in other African nations including in Burundi, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco and Uganda. 

Over the years, China has trumpeted non-interference as a key tenet of its foreign policy. Political training schools arguably show China moving away from the principle of non-interference. Perhaps China would argue that, since the investment of approximately US$40 million came from the CCP, not the state government directly, so it does not constitute state interference. 

By teaching the virtues of party-state fusion to local political leaders, China aims to activate personal and professional bonds. This should help it to build a more expansive network of ties in the long run. Moreover, for some African countries with political oppositions, the school in Tanzania accepts students from both sides—so China will benefit regardless of who wins future elections.  

China’s engagement in African politics is not a new development. Beijing has historically supported African independence movements, military endeavours and governance structures. 

Over the years, it has invested in several influence operations in Africa through its media and generous scholarships, with the objective of telling China’s story better. China expects to reap significant geoeconomic and political payoffs from these investments, allowing China to entrench its network among African political elites. 

However, as the school trains present and future leaders of Africa, it risks greater oppression on the continent. The Chinese model of governance threatens African societies because it challenges the inherent multiethnic compacts of post-colonial African states. 

Already, conflict across the continent often reflects ethnic tensions, including the Rwandan genocide, 2007 post-election violence in Kenya, and crises in northern Nigeria, in Ethiopia and in Darfur in Sudan.  

Because support for political parties in Africa tend to be based on particular ethnicities, rather than ideologies, entrenching any of them in power with the CCP’s methods would also mean suppression of rival ethnicities. This will be dangerous, creating ethnically based unrest in many of these already fragmented societies. 

However, for China, policies that promoted the interests of local leaders with such destructive tactics would still count as successes. They would consolidate its friends in power.

A new energy pact for Africa

Many people associate technologies like solar and wind power with efforts to tackle climate change. But for the world’s most vulnerable populations, they are much more than a clean-energy solution. By creating jobs, improving health and increasing social mobility and gender equality, they build a path to a more prosperous future.

This is especially true for Africa. In terms of energy sources, the continent has immense potential that has gone largely untapped. Despite being home to 60% of the best solar resources globally, for example, Africa has roughly the same installed solar PV capacity as Belgium, a small country not known for its sunshine. There’s also great potential for hydro, wind and geothermal power in many African countries, and these energy sources can play an important role in diversifying and securing electricity supply. Leveraging the continent’s natural endowments responsibly will be essential to its development.

The economic and social benefits of renewable energy could be huge. Throughout Africa, hundreds of millions of people still lack access to electricity—a major impediment to gaining an education, finding regular employment and contributing to a productive economy. The global energy crisis has only exacerbated the situation, as mounting debt problems and rapid price increases have made it even harder to reach the United Nations’ goal of universal energy access by 2030. Renewables are vital to address this, with solar, in particular, set to become the cheapest source of electricity nearly everywhere in Africa by 2030.

Electricity isn’t the only energy concern on the continent. Four out of five people in sub-Saharan Africa still cook with wood and biomass, which, when burned, produces harmful smoke. In fact, nearly half a million premature deaths per year in sub-Saharan Africa are linked to household air pollution resulting from the lack of access to clean cooking facilities. This disproportionately affects women and children, not only in terms of health but also in lost time and lack of opportunity. Clean cooking solutions could mean more children in the classroom rather than out collecting firewood, and more women with the time to find work or start a business, which could provide a route to financial independence. The use of clean cooking fuels also reduces greenhouse-gas emissions.

Addressing Africa’s energy challenges requires meaningful investment from both the public and private sectors. Currently, only about 3% of energy investments worldwide are made in Africa, even though the continent is home to 17% of the world’s population (over 1.2 billion people)—a figure that is expected to double in the next 30 years. International financial institutions should step up to mobilise private capital, acting as first movers to absorb risk and protect investments. Doing so would help promote projects that support vulnerable populations, lay the groundwork for sustainable economic growth, and ensure that Africa becomes an attractive destination for investment.

Investments in resilient and efficient power grids will be critical to meeting the growing energy needs of densely populated urban centres and growing industries. At the same time, off-grid systems powered by solar and batteries have already revolutionised the way remote towns gain access to electricity. Both centralised and decentralised power systems will be important for expanding electricity access to all Africans.

Building reliable, modern energy systems can also help Africa develop its industrial base and manufacturing capacity, including for clean-energy technologies, whose market is set to grow rapidly this decade. The continent is already a major player in producing the raw materials needed for clean-energy technologies and is home to more than 40% of global reserves of cobalt, manganese and platinum—key minerals for batteries and hydrogen fuel cells. These resources must be extracted and used in a way that benefits local populations and respects environmental and social standards. Beyond mining, African economies must focus on strengthening their refining and manufacturing capacity, as well as on constructing their export infrastructure. This will require a well-equipped labour force of trained engineers, technicians and scientists.

As is well known, Africa has contributed the least to global greenhouse-gas emissions and yet suffers some of the worst effects of climate change. To help ensure that it has an opportunity to play a central role in the emerging clean-energy economy, we are calling for a new energy pact at the African Climate Action Summit in Nairobi this September and ahead of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai later this year.

The pact aims to foster deeper collaboration between African countries and their international partners to accelerate the continent’s unacceptably slow progress towards universal energy access; to increase investments in renewables and energy-efficiency improvements in Africa; and to lay the groundwork for African countries to contribute to emerging clean-energy supply chains. Success would require African governments to work with international partners to develop more ambitious plans to finance and realise energy projects in Africa while addressing governance, environmental and labour issues.

Done right, a new energy pact can generate lasting benefits for Africa, such as greater energy security and improved living standards, and help the world reach its climate goals. If Africa is left out of the clean-energy future, the entire planet stands to suffer.

Policy, Guns and Money: Africa Day

In this episode, ASPI Executive Director Peter Jennings speaks with Kenya’s high commissioner to Australia, Isaiya Kabira, about the significance of Africa Day (coming up on 25 May) and the continent’s progress since the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963. They talk about the impact of Covid-19 in Africa as well as the state of Australia’s ties with Kenya and Africa more broadly.

The Strategist’s Brendan Nicholson then talks to Australia’s high commissioner to Nigeria, Claire Ireland, about the two countries’ bilateral interests and the evolution of Australia’s relationship with Africa.

And to round out this special episode, ASPI’s Lisa Sharland interviews journalist and filmmaker Santilla Chingaipe about the African diaspora in Australia and how different communities have been affected by Covid-19.

Policy, Guns and Money: Fuel security, India, Africa and more

In this huge episode, Michael Shoebridge and Paul Barnes discuss Australia’s fuel security, US missiles in the Indo-Pacific and revoking the Port of Darwin lease.

Aakriti Bachhawat chats with Professor Harsh Pant about India’s perceptions on the Indo-Pacific and the Quad as well as the foreign policy priorities under Narendra Modi’s new government.

Brendan Nicholson interviewed Brian Adeba from the Enough Project on efforts to prevent atrocities and corruption in Eastern and Central Africa.

And Renee Jones caught up with Greg Moriarty, secretary of defence, and Gai Brodtmann, former shadow minister for cybersecurity and defence, at ASPI’s recent speed mentoring event.

South Africa in crisis (part 2): corruption and the rotting substructure of the state

The bad news for South Africa just keeps getting worse. The latest macroeconomic figures show that GDP shrank for the second quarter in a row, meaning the country has technically entered a recession for the first time since 2008–09. At least there was an excuse last time in the form of the global financial crisis, but in 2018 the world economy is pumping ahead. ‘There is no way to sugar-coat the numbers’, as one senior economist put it, ‘the growth picture in the first half of 2018 is ugly’.

And it gets uglier the further down you drill. The rand crashed in August, its worst month in five years—and it may plumb yet greater depths as markets react to government plans to radicalise land reform. Agricultural production has gone through the floor, contracting nearly 34% in the first quarter and 29% in the second—a collapse officially blamed on drought, but one that some analysts attribute in part to the land reform debate. Unemployment is at a 15-year high and manufacturing activity is at its lowest level in 13 months. There’s international pressure on fuel prices—which the government has plugged with an unsustainable subsidy—and an upcoming credit rating in October by Moody’s, which may result in rand-denominated debt being rated ‘junk’. If that happens, South African bonds will be jettisoned from global indices and a sell-off will result.

And all that’s just the superficial bad news. The systemic issues facing South Africa are gigantic, and will not be moved by the stimulus package and other band-aid measures that the government is spinning ahead of the 2019 elections. Leaving aside what is arguably the biggest problem of all—the evisceration of an inclusive nation-building vision at the hands of race-based, punitive collectivism—it is corruption that stands as the greatest challenge. That’s because graft destroys both the desire and capacity to seriously engage with the other epic conundrums—among them, population growth, burgeoning long-term youth unemployment, and world-beating levels of crime and inequality.

It’s not difficult to justify South Africa’s reputation for corruption, with the ruling African National Congress (ANC) leading from the front. Recently axed president Jacob Zuma had 783 charges of corruption laid against him—and that was before he ascended to the top job. In his nine years at the helm, he progressively transferred the institutions of state to a cabal controlled by his private business partners and political cronies. With the ANC haemorrhaging support, Zuma was—by a narrow margin—removed as party head in December 2017 and later fired as state president. An official inquiry has now been launched into what became known as ‘state capture’.

Yet the new era of clean government declared by his replacement, Cyril Ramaphosa, is little more than bombast. The ANC has become, to its core, a patronage machine for the post-apartheid political elite. It may be that some of Zuma’s allies in the factionalised party structures are targeted—‘for my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law’—but a thoroughgoing attack on corruption would be an assault on the ANC’s latter-day raison d’être.

The rot extends from the top of the party to the bottom—and horizontally through the bureaucracy and into the private sector. In South Africa, the main game is access to state resources and the crooked processes by which they are allocated. It is, in local parlance, a land of ‘tenderpreneurs’—those who score lucrative government tenders through political influence, nepotism, backhanders and other related arts. Much of the country’s nouveau riche is built on such activity—a rent-seeking, parasitic class that leeches off a narrowing tax base and adds little in the way of genuine economic growth.

Nothing is off limits. The ANC has not baulked at fleecing the poorest of the poor. For example, South Africa’s state-owned pension fund for public employees, the Public Investment Corporation—Africa’s largest asset manager—has been used to capitalise crony consortiums and, allegedly, to fund the ANC itself through fake investments. Likewise, social welfare recipients were deliberately locked into a cycle of debt through a scam between ANC functionaries and a finance company that accessed beneficiaries’ private data, using it to sell them paperless loans and insurance. It was quite a service: push-button impulse buying and automatic dole-debiting for those who can least afford it. A couple of taps of your mobile and the food budget for the kids evaporates.

If there was a sharp distinction between the highest and lowest echelons of government, there might be more hope, but there isn’t. The soliciting of bribes by police officers, teachers, licensing officials, health professionals and others is rife, as reported by anti-corruption NGOs—and as any South African can testify. South Africa’s ranking on Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index slumped from 21st in 1996 to 71st in 2017.

Is there any hope, then? The sanguine invest much in Ramaphosa as an individual, and add that South Africa’s institutions are robust. The press played a central role in exposing Zuma’s shenanigans, and the judiciary has remained troublesome and independent. That’s only half the story, however. Those analyses fail to recognise the overwhelming dominance of the executive and overstate the pinpricks it receives. The ANC and its government departments routinely ignore court orders. The press is—in the normal course of events—as shrill as it is ineffective. Its influence was magnified by the recent struggle within the ANC and won’t be sustained. And the fact that Ramaphosa’s name is the first on the lips of optimists shows just how far the balance of power has shifted from where it should be. When politics becomes messianic, it’s a sure sign that you’re already in real trouble.

Between the 1960s and 1990s, the notion of South African exceptionalism grew to mythic proportions in the soils of increasing world attention. But there has been scant evidence in the 2000s that these vast expectations can be met. To the contrary, the trajectory of the country is such that it will be fortunate to avoid the kind of catastrophes that have marked its northern neighbours. And that’s a sobering thought. The history of sub-Saharan ‘unexceptionalism’ is that things can get a whole lot worse—much worse than most imagine—before they get better.

Australia and Africa: cooperation to counter violent extremism and terrorism

Different countries and regions across the African continent have been subject to a range of brutal terrorist activities in recent years. They have included hostage-taking incidents and deadly attacks on the Tigantourine gas facility in Algeria in January 2013, the Westgate shopping Mall in Nairobi in September 2013, and Garissa University College in Kenya in April this year. Terrorist organisations such a Boko Haram (aligned with Islamic State) and al-Shabaab utilise indiscriminate means and asymmetric tactics to target civilians across the continent. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a regular feature of conflicts in places such as Somalia and Mali. The evolving security threats on the African continent present a risk not only to regional security, but global security.

Australia’s security and economic interests are affected by these developments. Our trade in Africa is valued at $10 billion, and dominated by the mining industry. More than 200 ASX listed companies are engaged in projects across 35 African countries. Australia has an interest in ensuring those companies are able to operate without risk of attack. More broadly, Australia has a strategic interest in ensuring that terrorist organisations aren’t able to destabilise fragile political processes or operate in failed states to further build their presence and influence in the region and beyond. As a supporter of the international rules-based order, we have an interest in ensuring that Africa supports efforts to implement international counter-terrorism frameworks.

Discussions during the recent Aus-Africa Dialogue in Zambia noted that both continents have capabilities and lessons to share when it comes to countering terrorism and violent extremism, particularly in the security sector (also previously discussed here). The Department of Defence and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) have developed cooperation programs with some African countries, but our approaches to date have been largely ad-hoc and reactive.

Ensuring Australia has a comprehensive understanding of the security situation in Africa remains an ongoing challenge. We’ve only got one Defence Attaché posted on the continent (in Ethiopia) and one AFP liaison officer (in South Africa). Consideration could be given to further Australian Defence Force (ADF) and AFP personnel to support targeted assistance to African countries, as well as regional and sub-regional organisations. In terms of policing engagement, that could include seconding an officer to the African Police Cooperation Organisation (once established), as well as providing training on forensics, intelligence gathering and social media exploitation.

Peace operations are one mechanism lending support to efforts to prevent terrorist groups from proliferating in ungoverned spaces. African countries deploying personnel to UN and African Union (AU) peace operations are operating in an asymmetric threat environment in places such as Somalia and Mali. Australia has lessons to share from its extensive experience operating in such environments from over a decade of high-tempo operations in Afghanistan.

Foreign Minister Bishop pledged that Australia would provide more counter-IED support to UN peacekeeping at a high-level peacekeeping summit hosted by US President Obama in September. But this commitment only referred to better preparing ‘our neighbours’. That’s despite African countries providing close to 50% of the more than 105,000 military and police personnel deployed to UN peacekeeping operations, and even more when you factor in AU peace operations. Australia also pledged further training support for UN peacekeeping at the summit, but again, this was limited to ‘soldiers and police in our region’. The ADF could build on our existing modest peacekeeping training programs in Africa, such as those delivered to the East Africa Standby Force, to provide counter-IED support and training.

While strengthening military and police capacity on the continent will improve the ability of countries to respond to terrorist events, efforts also need to be invested in addressing threats at their source. Recent UN Security Council resolutions on terrorism require states to prevent and suppress recruiting and equipping of foreign terrorist fighters, as well as the financing of foreign terrorist fighters and activities, both through law as well as cooperation and information sharing. Several UNSC mandated international sanctions regimes apply to individuals and organisations in Africa, making regional implementation even more critical. Drawing on our domestic and regional experience, Australia could share lessons on efforts to implement these international obligations.

Our interests are also served by tackling terrorist groups at the source by building local capacity. That could include a special program on counter-terrorism working with the appropriate NGOs or pilot aid projects on countering violent extremism. Australia could support educational institutions that compete with radical messages coming from foreign-funded educational institutions.

Communication via social media is also important in developing counter-narratives. But we have no public diplomacy activities in Africa to promote norms or values in any organised way. Australia could partner here with countries that are ‘like-minded’ on these approaches, such as the UK, US, Germany, and the Nordic states.

The capacity of Australian government to engage comprehensively in Africa is limited. As such, priority should be attached to identifying multilateral and regional programs that support counter-terrorism activities. These might include funding programs through the UNODC, providing support to peacekeeping missions and efforts to train regional standby forces, or engaging with INTERPOL and regional police chief organisations in Africa.

The private sector is also a critical partner in efforts to leverage Australian engagement on counter-terrorism efforts. The government should engage regularly with Australian companies operating in Africa on the security concerns they face, including threats to infrastructure, investment and personnel. This could form part of a whole-of-government engagement strategy which identifies Australia’s strategic interests, as well as regional and geographic priorities. The recently established Advisory Group on Australia-Africa Relations has the potential to provide a platform for engagement on these issues.

ASPI suggests

Students with Infantry Training Battalion practice basic marksmanship techniques at Camp Geiger, N.C., Sept. 26, 2013. The students are part of the first ITB company to include female Marines as part of ongoing research into opening combat-related job fields to women. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler L. Main/Released)

Headlining today is Mullah Omar’s death in 2013—what does it mean? Mullah Akhtar Mansour, Omar’s deputy, has now ascended to the top job but Pakistan, host to negotiations between the Afghan government and Taliban representatives, confirms talks are on hold. For in-depth analysis, Thomas Joscelyn argues that ‘ISIS’s supporters will have a field day’—the death is a blow for al Qaeda but a win for ISIS. Terrorism scholars Aaron Zelin and J.M. Berger discuss what one-eyed leader’s demise means for the broader ISIS–al Qaeda war (podcast, 20mins), while Daveed Gartenstein-Ross noted:

Turning to our region, RSIS has a stack of new papers on security and political developments. First, former independence fighters in Aceh are showing support for ISIS in Iraq and Syria; Jasminder Singh discusses the growing threat of jihadists in Southeast Asia. Second, with Malaysia’s scandal that US$700m was allegedly transferred from state funds to the PM’s personal bank accounts and the sacking of the country’s deputy leader ‘on health grounds’, Yang Razali Kassim looks at the future of Malaysian politics. Meanwhile Stephanie Kam explores why Thailand shipped 100 illegal Uighur refugees back to China and how this could affect Southeast Asian security.

Last week, prominent US think tankers including CSIS’ Dr Mira Rapp Hooper testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on the US role in the South China Sea. You can watch the testimonies or access full transcripts here. Of particular interest are the suggestions our American colleagues made on multilateral efforts like a ‘maritime coalition of the willing’ that would include Japan, Australia and India (see Patrick Cronin’s presentation).

Before there was Google Maps, there was the Soviet Union. Described as one of the most ambitious cartographic enterprises ever, Soviet military mapmakers captured the entire Cold War globe in secret maps of incredible detail, including individual buildings, road widths and factories of cities like Berlin, London and San Francisco. Wired features an in-depth look at the cartographic goldmine and the scholars that study them (h/t Iain Henry), including John Davies whose website features many of the maps.

Speaking of the Cold War, if you’re interested in the history of espionage, check out Stephen Grey’s new book, The New Spymasters: inside the modern world of espionage from the Cold War to global terror. From the CIA to spooks inside ISIS, Grey traces the shift from utilising humans in gathering secrets to technology, arguing ultimately that this over-reliance has manifested in spectacular failures include the 9/11 attacks. For an in-depth look, Malcolm Forbes reviews New Spymasters over on The Journal of International Security Affairs.

Meanwhile, The Economist looks at how democracies could regulate espionage better.

In today’s tech pick, DARPA is paying people to watch Alfred Hitchcock films in the name of conflict resolution and counterterrorism. According to researchers, observing how humans response neurally to narratives helps unlock what influences human behaviour and what impact that has on communication. Along with Hitchcock films, other movies included in the study were Alien (great choice, DARPA), Misery and Munich. Read more here.

When did it become an insult to run like a girl? This is a question explored by US Marine Corps officer Lieutenant Colonel Kate Germano in a draft article arguing that the Corps’ tolerance for lower female physical standards and segregated training were entrenching bias throughout women’s military careers. Tougher standards, she says, would encourage ‘radical change’ and greater respect between the sexes. She was controversially relieved of command last month, yet it remains unclear whether that was for issues relating to her leadership or her strident views on standards. Meanwhile, US SOCOM commanders, past and present, are still split on lifting combat exclusion policies for women.

Podcast

Today’s podcast pick is an entire series! The China in Africa Podcast produces a number of interesting discussions on topics including China, Africa and the Indian Ocean (25mins); China’s expanding military presence in Africa (30mins); and China’s new development bank and Africa (20mins).

Video

Indonesia’s capital Jakarta is a sprawling, crowded yet eclectic megacity. Forty-five years ago, things were more tranquil in the ‘big durian’ (the city’s nickname), as depicted in this short documentary—an atmosphere that regular visitors to the capital would never imagine (8mins).

Events

Canberra: Drs James Curran and John Blaxland discuss the 1970s and Australian foreign policy, including the impact of key figures like Whitlam and Nixon, Sir Roland Wilson Building at ANU on Thursday 6 August at 5.30pm. Register here.

Melbourne: the Australia–China Relations Institute is hosting a panel discussion on Malcolm Fraser and China, featuring Dr John Fitzgerald, Dr James Curran and ACRI director Bob Carr at Corrs Chambers Westgarth on Monday 17 August at 5.30pm. Register here.

The Beat and CT Scan

General Muhammadu Buhari

This week in The Beat – more problems in Australia’s ‘ice’ epidemic, big money in European organised crime and news for Serial fans. And this week in Counterterrorism Scan, Australian foreign fighters, counterterror in the Asia-Pacific and mapping jihadi groups.

The Beat

Australia’s ‘ice’ epidemic

We’ve referred to an Australian Crime Commission report describing methamphetamine, or ‘ice’, as the biggest illicit drug problem facing law enforcement. In a new op-ed, David Connery and Hayley Channer describe some of the recent changes to the Australian illicit drug landscape. Notably, the internationalisation of the drug trade presents new challenges for law enforcement and international cooperation.

Problems with dealing with ice aren’t just overseas. Justice Minister Michael Keenan has expressed concerns that criminals are exploiting differences in the way Australian states and territories monitor the legal substances used in ice manufacturing. He has called for national consistency on chemicals ahead of Law Crime and Community Safety Committee of the Council of Australian Governments meeting in Canberra in May.

Organised crime in Europe is big business

The Organised Crime Portfolio, an EU-based research consortium, has written a new report, ‘From illegitimate markers to legitimate businesses: the portfolio of organised crime in europe’. The report puts costs of organised crime in Europe at €110 billion per year.

According to the report, there is a move by organised crime gangs from high risk areas like drugs into areas like tax fraud. The report also stressed the need for greater private and public sector cooperation—for instance, in data exchange and best practices—to close loopholes that organised criminal groups can exploit.

Serial spinoff: Undisclosed

Finally, if you’re anything like us you’ll be eagerly waiting for the second season of Serial, the podcast series that investigated the prosecution of Adnan Syed for the murder of Hae Min Lee. You can listen to Undisclosed: The State v. Adnan Syed, a new series that picks up where Serial left off. This isn’t the last we’re likely to hear of this case; Syed’s appeal is set for June 2015.

CT Scan

Terrorism researcher Andrew Zammit has a new Lowy Institute report out today that argues that Australians fighting in Iraq and Syria pose a threat to Australia’s security. Andrew examines non-coercive means a part of a range of options to address that threat, and suggests that countering violent extremism measures adopted from other jurisdictions must be calibrated for the Australian context.

CT measures beefed up in the Asia Pacific

In the region, the Indonesian military plans to teach villagers about a ‘moderate’ interpretation of Islam. Malaysia’s army also attracted attention, but for the wrong reasons; 70 army personnel were found to be involved with Islamic State and will be counselled by police and army personnel. The Diplomat offers some context. Over to China, with a number of attacks in public areas the nation announced that it will bolster its security measures on public transport. These measures are part of a broader strategy to build a ‘security network’ that increases monitoring of potential terrorism offenders.

African governments take on terrorism

In Africa, VICE News has released its last instalment of its three-part series, documenting a journalist’s rare experiences on the front line of Nigeria’s battle against Boko Haram (13 mins). However, with the election of the new president Muhammadu Buhari—a former military chief of state and retired general—Nigeria might have finally found a leader to weaken Boko Haram. As for al-Shabaab, Paul Hidalgo at Foreign Affairs makes the case that the biggest cause of Kenya’s terrorism problem is not al-Shabaab; it’s the nation’s own government. This week’s visual is the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s map of fractures in jihadi groups around the world, comparing today’s situation with that of last year. It appears that Islamic State has ballooned at al-Qaeda’s expense, and that Islamic State has splintered other jihadi organisations while revamping the plight of peripheral groups.

Terrorism research

Finally, Abdul Basit at the Express Tribune explains that ‘politically-correct and tactically-convenient’ research that ‘works on the simple binaries of extreme-moderation, oppressor-emancipator, progressive-regressive and “us versus them”’ has produced flawed policies. Instead, Basit suggests a multi-disciplinary approach that aims to understand the operations of terrorism.

Australia and UN peacekeeping: comfortable complacency?

Australian Defence Force members receive a brief prior to flying on mission into South Sudan.Last weekend, Australia commemorated 67 years since it deployed its first peacekeepers under UN auspices to the Dutch East Indies. Since then, over 30,000 Australian military and police personnel have participated in UN peace operations. It’s a history Australians can be proud of. But there’s a risk we’re becoming complacent about peacekeeping.

Our commitment of personnel and capabilities to UN peacekeeping has declined over the last decade. At present, there are approximately 44 Australian military and police personnel deployed to peacekeeping missions in Cyprus, the Middle East and South Sudan. We’re considered a small contributor for a country of our size and global reach, ranked 83rd out of a total of 123 countries contributing approximately 100,000 military and police personnel. Read more

Sacré bleu! L’alliance essentielle?

Paratroopers from France's 17th Parachute Engineer Regiment land at Timbuktu Airport, Mali to conduct an evaluation of the facility which was damaged by retreating insurgents. France's operations in Africa provide potential learning opportunities for Australia.

At the end of January, ASPI hosted a 1.5 track defence and industry dialogue between Australian and French defence officials and think-tank and industry representatives. Why France and why now? Only the most one-eyed of Australia’s ‘Asia only’ foreign policy Red Guard could have failed to notice France’s remarkable re-emergence as a global strategic player. On Syria, France’s socialist President François Hollande out-muscled wobbly Washington and would have been prepared to launch strikes after Assad’s chemical weapons atrocities. France was a leading force in NATO’s action in Libya; intervened decisively in Mali (with a little help from Entente Frugale ally Britain); has resisted cutting defence capabilities too deeply, and is looking to build closer strategic ties with a slew of countries, from India and Japan to China.

In the Pacific, France’s position has gone full circle from the unhappy nuclear-testing, insurgency fighting 1980s to a point where the French territories are now the model of stability and the envy of the region. France is a net contributor to Pacific Island security and one of very few countries prepared to do more to support more regional cooperation. Read more