Tag Archive for: ADF

ASPI’s decades: The contest of contestability

ASPI celebrates its 20th anniversary this year. This series looks at ASPI’s work since its creation in August 2001.

‘Contestability’ is a very Canberra word. It’s about the need to promote arguments. So the best arguments win and the best decisions get made.

What could be more Canberra than that?

From the Department of Defence all the way to the Finance Department (a helluva distance, although only a few kilometres apart), everyone praises the principle of contestability. It’s just the doing of the thing.

The Howard government wanted more arguments about defence—and that was at the heart of the submission that went to cabinet in April 2000 on the creation of ASPI:

The principles of contestability have been central to our Government’s philosophy and practice of public administration, but these principles have not yet been effectively implemented in relation to defence and strategic policy, despite the vital national interests and significant sums of money that are at stake … ASPI will be charged with providing an alternative source of expertise on such issues.

As a deputy secretary in Defence and then ASPI’s first director, Hugh White said the government’s act of creation reflected a commitment to ‘policy contestability’ and also ministers’ experiences of dealing with Defence:

For reasons that would be hard to pin down, and although relations between ministers, individual officers, and officials were professional, respectful, and even at times warm, it might be said that the Howard Government never established an easy relationship with the defence organisation. A few specific issues, especially on questions of defence material [sic] and acquisition, and most particularly the troubles of the Collins-class submarine, led ministers to be impatient and even suspicious of defence advice, and thus increasingly eager to find alternative ideas and arguments to test that advice against.

After some argument about how this argumentative beast should be structured, ASPI was born with contestability as a core part of its DNA.

In that spirit, ASPI’s Andrew Davies in 2010 gave the thumbs-down to Defence because of the lack of contestability inside the department. Defence’s job was to produce military capabilities for the government to use, to match military means with strategic ends. Yet the results more often reflected the preferred structures of the three services.

Alternative or transformational options had no champions, Davies wrote, and the professional military judgement prevailed: ‘The previous balance between the military world view on one hand and the analysts who could provide different perspectives, and who do not share the service ethos brought to the table by their military counterparts, has been lost.’

Defence needed to revive something like the old Force Development and Analysis Division (FDA), which was wound down in the 1990s as part of the Defence reform program. Davies had worked for FDA and its descendants and had ‘the scars to prove it’, because inside Defence the acronym had come to mean Forces of Darkness and Acrimony.

The 2015 First principles review made 46 references to contestability in phrases such as ‘arms length contestability’, ‘internal contestability’, ‘strategic, financial and technical contestability’, ‘a robust and disciplined contestability function’, and the need to ‘introduce greater transparency, contestability and professionalism’. The review stated:

A number of stakeholders raised concerns regarding the quality of policy advice in Defence. Several former Ministers stated that policy advice was diffuse, inconsistent and fragmented with one former Minister stating that his lack of confidence in Defence’s policy advice led to engagement of third parties to ‘second guess’ it. It is crucial that the Secretary and the Chief of Defence Force, as the primary policy advisers to Government on Defence issues, are provided with high quality strategic policy advice from within Defence …

Defence also requires a mechanism for providing internal contestability, at arm’s-length from owners and sponsors, up to the point of decision. This will ensure strategy, plans and resource allocations are tightly aligned and appropriately prioritised. It will also foster increased transparency and credibility with central agencies.

One of the outcomes of the review was the creation of a Contestability Division providing independent assessment and advice to the vice chief of the Australian Defence Force. The Contestability Division was described as an effort to rebuild the trust of ministers and central agencies (primarily the prime minister’s and finance departments) in Defence’s ability to deliver budget outcomes.

The first head of the Contestability Division, Michael Shoebridge, would follow Davies as director of ASPI’s defence, strategy and national security program.

Writing for The Strategist in 2016, Gary Hogan, a former director-general of scientific and technical analysis at the Defence Intelligence Organisation, said getting contestability in intelligence judgements was ‘easier said than done’:

The challenge of contestability is compounded by the very nature of the intelligence community workforce. While aspiring analysts may enter the recruitment funnel from diverse backgrounds, offering a wide range of knowledge and experiences, the excruciatingly involved security vetting process sees many fall by the wayside, with a disturbingly like-minded cohort dripping from the tube’s end. Under such circumstances, groupthink becomes a very real issue.

Hogan said analysts in think tanks outside the government bubble would assume added significance as Pentagon-style ‘murder boards’ that asked the toughest of questions: ‘Organisations like the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and the Lowy Institute could perform such a function for most strategic analysis, complemented by academics and commentators with unique expertise in arcane areas of growing importance to Australia.’

As Davies noted, such contestability—civilians testing what the services desired—could turn to acrimony and bickering. A process for dispassionate debate could often be decidedly passionate.

Standing outside Defence, ASPI tries for precision without the passion in its contestation, deeply interested in the many issues that confront Defence as a huge and complex department.

Where’s the combined joint headquarters in northern Australia?

Have you ever heard of Combined Joint Headquarters (CJHQ) Top End? Before you go racing to Google, it doesn’t exist! Yet Australia and its partners need such an arrangement. It’s time to leverage our strategic geography and make a bold commitment to maritime security and multilateral military cooperation by establishing just this kind of headquarters. At the very least, a CJHQ in northern Australia could help to coordinate humanitarian assistance and disaster responses in a region facing more frequent and intense weather events.

In the 2020 defence strategic update, the government committed to invest ‘approximately $270 billion over the coming decade in new and upgraded Defence capabilities’ in order to ‘project military power and deter actions against us’. Unfortunately, there’s little mention of how the Australian Defence Force will command and control all these new capabilities.

The strategic update also says that ‘defence planning will focus on our immediate region: ranging from the north-eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland South East Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South-West Pacific’.

As one would expect, there’s scant detail in the update on the command-and-control structures to coordinate and synchronise these defence planning activities with our non–Five Eyes partners. Hard-won experience reveals that this sort of cooperation doesn’t just occur and is a perishable commodity requiring continuous long-term commitments.

Technology permits command and control to be done remotely, so some will argue there’s no need to create a new headquarters in the Top End—be it the Northern Territory or northern Queensland. This perspective does have a ring of truth, but strategic geography and proximity still matter, and so does people-to-people cooperation.

Establishing a combined headquarters with joint capabilities across the armed services would afford Australia an all-new opportunity to help meet one of the strategic update’s primary aims: shaping our strategic environment by being an ‘assertive advocate for stability, security and sovereignty in our immediate region’.

Placing a coalition headquarters in the north would be a firm step towards ‘strengthening international engagement, particularly with the United States, Japan, India, ASEAN and other allies and partners in our region’.

A northern CJHQ would lend itself to the disaster-response operations that Australia and its partners have routinely found themselves conducting in the past eight years: Super Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in November 2013; the loss of Malaysia Airlines flight 370 in March 2014; the Nepal earthquake in April 2015; and the Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia in September 2018. These operations were civil–military, involving whole-of-government efforts by the nations engaged. Still, the combined defence components provided the planning and command-and-control expertise that led to their success.

A CJHQ in the north could become the focal point, not just for Australia, but for our coalition partners, for combined and joint operations that would support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, as well as the planning and execution of operations in support of police and coastguard forces to counter human and drug trafficking.

It would allow Australia to host this combined effort with India, Indonesia, Japan and other partners in an area of interest common to all. In doing so, those involved would develop and practise the kind of planning and communications protocols that support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

A CJHQ would also relieve some of the burden on the ADF’s Joint Operations Command, whose primary focus is defence and combat operations.

There can be no doubt that establishing this kind of arrangement will be a monumental undertaking involving several countries, from our near neighbour Indonesia to our ANZUS and Quad partners.

One of the first challenges, though, will be far closer to home.

Getting agreement on this from Defence will be no easy task. The headquarters once responsible for all the planning and conduct of operations in northern Australia during peacetime and wartime, Northern Command, has been in a steady state of decline for years. Most of its functions now sit with Joint Operations Command in Bungendore, near Canberra. So, a commitment to returning at least some command-and-control arrangements to Australia’s north will involve revisiting some planning assumptions.

Interestingly, while the ADF’s command and primary headquarters lie beneath 26° south, the United States’ Indo-Pacific Command maps tend to show only the north of Australia.

Regardless of type and composition, all headquarters are challenged with anticipating and determining viable command-and-control structures that accomplish specific operations while retaining the agility to plan and execute other ongoing or new missions.

A CJHQ in the north would provide Australia and its partners with a responsive, agile and inclusive headquarters that answers an operational need and sends a powerful signal to potential adversaries and criminal groups operating in one of the most contested areas in the world.

As most military leaders, regardless of nationality, know, if you get the command-and-control right, the rest of the mission is straightforward. A combined joint headquarters in the Top End of Australia will not only get us and our allies on the right foot, but will place us on our front foot too.

Pathways to prosecution for Australian soldiers’ crimes in Afghanistan

Yesterday it was confirmed in the Brereton report that there’s ‘credible information’ to substantiate the unlawful killing of 39 people by Australian special forces personnel in Afghanistan. These shocking allegations led Prime Minister Scott Morrison to announce last week that a special investigator’s office will be established to assist the Australian Federal Police to investigate these alleged crimes. The information contained in the Brereton report will now serve as a guide for the special investigator’s office, which will focus on gathering evidence that will be admissible in criminal prosecutions.

If a decision is made to implement the recommendations of the Brereton report and prosecute members of the Australian Defence Force, where can they be tried and under what law?

There are two main options—one involving criminal trial in the civilian court system, and the other court martial via Australia’s military justice system. The Brereton report recommends that any criminal investigation and prosecution of alleged war crimes follow the civilian route, with the involvement of the AFP and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. Given the availability of the military justice system, why has the report recommended this course of action?

The civilian route invokes the CDPP’s jurisdiction to prosecute serious international crimes—including war crimes—under the Commonwealth Criminal Code. The commencement of such proceedings requires the federal attorney-general’s written consent. War crimes are acts of atrocity committed during an armed conflict and are considered violations of the laws of war. Such acts include murder (the killing of persons not taking part in hostilities), torture, cruel treatment and mutilation. Those alleged to have been killed by special forces include prisoners and civilians. In addition to the unlawful killings are two allegations of cruel treatment that could amount to war crimes. The report also raises the possibility of commanders being criminally liable for failing to exercise proper control over their subordinates under the doctrine of command responsibility.

Any trials would likely take place in a state or territory supreme court before a judge and a jury. If ADF members are charged with such offences, it would be the first time that Australian soldiers have been prosecuted for war crimes in a civilian court.

The alternative option for dealing with the allegations is via the military justice system. Under the Defence Force Discipline Act, the independent office of the Director of Military Prosecutions has jurisdiction over ADF members for disciplinary offences, such as negligence in performance of a duty. ADF chief Angus Campbell has indicated that individuals accused of such disciplinary offences will be dealt with through military justice processes.

The DMP also has jurisdiction to prosecute ‘ordinary’ crimes under against Australian law no matter where they were committed. Special forces soldiers alleged to have unlawfully killed prisoners or civilians could, for example, be charged and tried with the crime of murder or manslaughter. And, like the CDPP, the DMP has jurisdiction to prosecute ADF personnel for war crimes. A criminal trial in the military system is via court martial.

Courts martial are heard before a president and panel of ADF members and are generally held in public unless the court is closed for reasons of security or defence. They can impose a range of punishments, including imprisonment for life or dismissal from the defence force.

Trial by court martial has the advantage of alleviating concerns that a civilian court won’t understand battlefield decisions or military culture. However, it may be viewed as failing to account for the very real public concern about special forces’ behaviour and a desire for a civilian court trial that is fully independent of the ADF.

The Brereton report’s recommendation that allegations of war crimes be tried in the civilian justice system reflects several different legal and policy issues. A memorandum of understanding between the CDPP and the DMP acknowledges that in the case of alleged war crimes, the public interest may be ‘best served’ by prosecution in a civilian court. The report’s recommendation also takes into account the fact that some individuals who could be prosecuted are no longer serving ADF members and therefore don’t fall under military jurisdiction. There’s also the perception that civilian investigations and prosecutions for war crimes would be more likely to prevent the International Criminal Court from asserting its jurisdiction in this matter.

The ICC is currently pursuing an investigation into international crimes committed in Afghanistan. While the ICC prosecutor’s investigations into this situation have focused on allegations against Afghan and US forces, it will likely keep an eye on the Brereton report and Australia’s response. The ICC is a ‘court of last resort’, which means that it will only investigate or prosecute if a state with jurisdiction is unwilling or unable to do so. Australia’s robust civilian and military justice systems mean that it is more than capable of investigating and prosecuting war crimes.

The Brereton report and the establishment of a special investigator’s office indicate that Australia is already taking these allegations seriously and that it is ready and willing to prosecute.

Defence must work with all levels of government to improve northern Australia’s bases

The Australian Defence Force and all three levels of government should work together to establish and maintain ‘mounting’ bases in Australia’s north from which overseas operations could be launched.

The ADF has home bases, mounting bases and bare bases, which serve specific purposes. Home bases are used for force generation and maintaining preparedness. Bare bases are there to be activated when needed, and mounting bases are established for specific operations and contingencies.

Mounting base infrastructure required for operations to secure Australia and its interests could be enhanced throughout northern Australia by closer linkages to planners and decision-makers within the three levels of government.

While it seems that there have been some attempts by Defence to consider mounting base requirements, they appear to be based on existing infrastructure, with no plan to integrate ADF requirements into future developments.

By comparison, in each state and local government area, significant effort has gone into the infrastructure developments required to support and develop communities and regions.

Defence improves the home bases of the army, navy and air force, generally without much consultation with local or state and territory authorities. This is to be expected given the permanency and purpose of home bases in training forces.

Mounting bases are different. Real attention is generally only paid to them when their potential operational use is considered. As highlighted in a previous post, mounting bases are employed, given operational security considerations, for their proximity to potential operations, accessibility by road, rail, sea and air, and the suitability of their infrastructure and logistics for the training, deployment and sustainment of the deployed force. Given Australia’s geographic location, these bases are normally situated in the country’s north.

The commander of a joint force with an assigned mission has a different perspective on the infrastructure at a mounting base than the base commander. The base commander seeks infrastructure improvements to support the training function and day to day barracks living, and is focused on preparing for possible future missions. The force commander has eyes on the mission at hand.

There are two good reasons to pay attention to this now—the rising instability in our region and the increasing realisation of the benefits of developing northern Australia.

The recently released defence strategic update and force structure plan address the heightened imperative to meet emerging national security threats. For Defence planners, these documents point to the contingencies that could require mounting bases for ADF operations. If there was ever a time to get this right, it’s now.

There is also an increasing focus on the economic benefits of investing in northern Australia, especially since the 2015 Northern Australia audit, and around $12 billion has been allocated to the national Defence estate and infrastructure program over the next four years.

The Commonwealth guidelines are set out in Our north, our future: White paper on developing northern Australia and managed by the Northern Australia Infrastructure Fund and the Office of Northern Australia. The Queensland government has the North Queensland Regional Plan and the North Queensland regional office that has a dedicated defence hub. The Northern Territory and Western Australia have similar plans.

Local governments naturally pursue infrastructure that enhances economic development and liveability of their areas.

Informed decisions made at local and state government level could strongly support Australia’s national security. Without knowledge of Defence’s needs, however, uninformed state and local government decisions could, at best, fail to optimise the conduct of ADF mobilisation and sustainment missions. At worst, not collaborating effectively now could directly impact on future deployed operations.

Improved knowledge, linkages and coordination among the three levels of government about mounting base operational requirements and infrastructure, would make best use of the taxpayers’ dollar in northern Australia, while enhancing national security and improving prosperity.

All three levels of government invest in infrastructure. Where their interests meet, the costs could be shared to realise a national security effect, provide economic prosperity and jobs, and enhance the liveability of communities. In some cases, making choices that don’t involve additional costs could make the difference in whether infrastructure that better supports ADF mobilisation operations is built or not.

A simple example of effective coordination could be a planned port redevelopment. With a more informed understanding of Defence’s mobilisation requirements, a berth might need to be extended only slightly to maximise Defence’s use, for little cost.

Similarly, knowing the weight load and surface material requirements for armoured vehicle movements in a port, might be easily and cheaply addressed at the development stage rather than at some later date in order to meet an urgent contingency.

Simple inputs by Defence could make a significant difference to ADF mobilisation capability with no material effect on the operations of a port and at minimal cost.

Places in northern Australia where mounting bases for operations offshore are likely to be established are constantly being developed by state and local governments. A keener interest by Defence in this development work would likely find that a few simple contributions to the local development plans could yield significant benefits.

Providing advice to state and local government on mobilisation support adjustments would improve ADF capability now and in the future. Bearing in mind the characteristics required of a mounting base, some engagement and attention paid now, could save time and money when we really need both.

Strategic update shows shift in Australia’s defence outlook in uncertain times

In this interview, ASPI’s executive director Peter Jennings talks to The Strategist’s Brendan Nicholson about Australia’s 2020 defence strategic update and new force structure plan.

They discuss the extent to which the nation’s strategic situation has deteriorated in the four years since the 2016 defence white paper, the acceptance that Australia must abandon its long-held expectation that it will have 10 years to prepare for a major conflict, and the decision to provide the Australian Defence Force with a much more potent strike capability to deter an attacker.

The update warns that Australia must be ready to deal with ‘grey zone’ aggression that falls short of actual warfare.

Preparation and improved intelligence-gathering capabilities will be crucial to providing early warning of threats. The Australian-designed Jindalee over-the-horizon radar network will be extended to look out over the Pacific.

The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the vulnerability of supply chains and there’s a big lesson there for Defence. Crucial to Australia’s ability to defend itself will be ensuring a secure supply of locally produced munitions to avoid relying on equipment coming from abroad. The same applies to vital fuel supplies.

The update and the force structure plan map out a path that will give Australia a much greater ability to defend itself in uncertain times.

Cyberattack announcement shows Australia taking on global security role

Last Friday’s announcement by Prime Minister Scott Morrison that Australia was ‘being targeted by a sophisticated state-based cyber actor’ puzzled some: why not name China, why not be specific about the attacks?

It’s the eternal challenge with intelligence matters. We don’t want our opponents to know how effectively we track them. Equally important though, the public must understand what the threat is and why cybersecurity is so vital.

As Beijing gets more assertive, our government must bring Australians further into its confidence on national security. It’s a time for clarity, not euphemisms about being ‘country agnostic’ when identifying threats.

Indeed, there is a good story to tell. Three important developments happened last Friday that received little attention but point to an emerging security strategy in which Australia will play a globally leading role.

First, Treasurer Josh Frydenberg hosted a call with his counterparts in the other Five Eyes nations— Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States—that mirrors the intelligence relationship at the core of Australian security since World War ll. Aligning policy among these countries on economic security is a substantial development. Foreign investment is a prime case in point. We are stronger if we share information and coordinate our approaches, encouraging investment from within the Five Eyes and including other democracies in our technology research, critical infrastructure and economy.

Second, Defence Minister Linda Reynolds participated in a meeting of NATO defence ministers on the geopolitical challenges presented by the coronavirus pandemic. Again, outside of discussions on Afghanistan, this is a first.

These developments show that the democracies are aligning. The pandemic provides the cover to discuss the biggest challenge to global stability—China under Xi Jinping.

Third, Reynolds announced the creation of a ‘defence intelligence enterprise’ to be led by a senior military chief of defence intelligence.

This is more than a bureaucratic restructure. The need is to strengthen the intelligence-collecting backbone of new multibillion-dollar equipment such as the F-35 fighters, air warfare destroyers, E/A-18 Growler electronic-warfare aircraft, submarines, and piloted and autonomous maritime surveillance aircraft.

In Defence, reorganising intelligence areas brings together a patchwork of dispersed army, navy and air force intelligence units working with the portfolio’s big agencies—the intelligence assessors in the Defence Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation providing satellite imagery, and the Australian Signals Directorate with its cyber skills.

Typically, single service units prioritise their service’s needs. Investment in intelligence systems for these units can be patchy as a result. These arrangements worked well when the intelligence needed by operational military personnel was more neatly divided among air, sea and land. But they are not suitable for the world of high-tech military gear that Defence has and will buy much more of in coming decades.

The gap that needs to be filled is in providing a system that takes advantage of the huge amount of electronic data that Defence is able to collect before and during a conflict. This is about creating a virtuous loop—where the needs of personnel are met by tailored intelligence data and where those personnel collect the raw data that the intelligence analysts need to provide support.

The terabytes of data that new ships, submarines and aircraft can collect requires a back-office enterprise that can handle data coming in at unprecedented volumes and speeds, and make use of it for everything from tactical operations to strategic-level decision-making by government.

A key change gives one person—the new chief of defence intelligence—clear authority over intelligence investments and training and staffing of intelligence functions, both civilian and military.

At the same time, the approach integrates effectively with the broader national intelligence community. Slowly, but at gathering pace, Australia’s intelligence system is moving from agencies working in silos towards a shared, integrated enterprise. This is a welcome development.

Inside the Australian Signals Directorate, it seems the relatively new position of military principal deputy director-general, which was about ensuring the newly independent statutory agency continued to be closely connected to the military and its requirements, now reverts to a more junior role, probably a bit too early into the experiment to know its success. Over time, though, ASD’s technology investments will need to align more and more with the big Defence intelligence enterprise being created. That’s a future tango for power and resources that will be interesting to watch.

The intelligence that Defence collects is not only useful for wartime commanders and operational units. It’s also crucial for decision-makers from the cabinet room down. So, getting the innards of the Defence intelligence machine working is vital to ensuring national security as well as providing information for military operators.

On Tuesday, Reynolds convened what is intended to be a regular virtual meeting of Five Eyes defence ministers. Again, this is new and shows that Australia isn’t just being passively predated upon by China. Nationally and internationally, we are shaping responses that will toughen our capabilities as we face down the biggest strategic challenge to democracy since the fall of the Soviet Union.

The value of diversity in the defence of northern Australia

It isn’t news that diverse workforces are a key to producing high-quality, innovative and competitive results. There’s no shortage of evidence from both the private and public sectors that diverse teams solve problems more effectively, think more creatively and are better for the bottom line than their homogenous counterparts.

In 2019, the chief of the Australian Defence Force, General Angus Campbell, set his sights on increasing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander representation in the ADF. He said that he wanted 5% of the ADF to be Indigenous Australians, ‘bringing heritage, bringing diversity, bringing insights, bringing perspective that we cannot otherwise realise’.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have a long history of employment in the ADF, using their skills, languages, cultures and knowledge of the land in the defence of Australia. Indigenous Australians have participated in the armed forces since before federation—which is remarkable given the brutal and violent history between the white settlers and Aboriginal Australians.

More recently, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have been involved in ADF units such as the North-West Mobile Force (or Norforce, as it’s more commonly known). That model should be replicated across the ADF to increase the number of Indigenous Australians in defence and to expand their impact. This approach could help establish pathways to progress Indigenous Australians’ careers from recruitment to promotion through the ranks, and ultimately to levels as high as defence force chief.

The Northern Territory has a high percentage of Indigenous Australians living in both urban and rural settings. The ADF has an opportunity to fill an increasing skills gap in the territory by recruiting reservists, permanent members of the ADF, Defence officials and employees of defence industry. Darwin and Katherine are two major northern centres in which the ADF could focus its recruitment activity.

The ADF also has the opportunity to involve a new generation of experts in science, technology engineering and maths from under-represented groups. The 2018 NT defence and national security strategy calls for adding high-tech platforms in the region to enable the territory to be nationally competitive, agile and on the forefront of new technological advances for defence. In 2018, the NT government’s cyber awareness program was digitised and expanded to include ‘a focus on improving opportunities for the business community to participate in the Defence supply chain’.

Improving the participation of women in the ADF is likewise crucial to filling its skills gaps. The involvement of women from all cultural backgrounds has been found to increase capability in the ADF. Increasing the number of women in the cyber workforce is crucial.

The 2017–18 report on women in the ADF noted that recruiting more women was crucial to ensuring that the ADF secures the best possible talent. At that time, women made up 17.9% of the total  ADF. Women’s participation has improved considerably in the past decade and they now make up 21.5% of the navy, 14.3% of the army and 22.1% of the air force. Defence is aiming for female participation to reach 25% in the navy, 15% in the army and 25% in the air force by 2023.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples bring diverse skills that are vital to the defence of Australia’s north, including unmatched, specific knowledge in areas that aren’t taught in classrooms.

Communities in this region understand how to work in extreme climatic conditions and have crucial skills in reconnaissance, observation and collection of military geographic intelligence. The 2016 defence white paper and accompanying investment program identified infrastructure investment, in particular for cyber capabilities at defence sites in Darwin and in the Katherine region, as a high priority.

Many Aboriginal people in the NT are expert linguists, sometimes speaking more than eight languages. These skills can be transferred to fields like cybersecurity to help meet the NT’s increasing need for people who are proficient in coding languages.

Since the introduction of the Indigenous procurement policy in 2015, there’s been no shortage of Indigenous businesses that Defence can contract to in the territory.

Drawing on these resources makes good sense, and the timing is perfect. As argued last year, involving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities in Defence’s work in the north will provide economic and security benefits to the region and ensure that Indigenous Australians can participate in the global economy.

There is still a long way to go. Attracting women and people from culturally diverse backgrounds to the ADF is notoriously difficult. It requires a rethink of how the ADF operates, including its approach to flexible working arrangements, to ensure it provides a safe and accepting environment.

That won’t be easy, but it is absolutely in Australia’s interests.

Australia’s navy needs operations research to navigate the future

Australia is at a watershed moment in naval capability with the fleet’s regeneration over the next decade as a consequence of the 2016 defence white paper and the investment decisions flowing from it.

As the 2015 First Principles Review of Defence noted, capability must reflect strategic policy: the Royal Australian Navy needs a fleet that’s integrated into the doctrine and structure of the joint force and is interoperable with the forces of our key allies. In light of the rapid strategic changes in the region and the nation’s likely financial position after the Covid-19 pandemic, this fleet must be sharply focused on identifying, achieving and sustaining critical capabilities as economically as possible.

The new vessels are being designed in the digital age, from concept through build to sustainment, and many components are being procured in parallel. This provides an unprecedented opportunity to integrate capabilities in fleet design; standards for data collection and exchange in fleet operations and support; and a data-driven, analytic approach in decision-making.

Key attributes of the fleet’s capability—its pedigree, status, condition, preparedness and weapon system performance—can then be determined through analysis and management of data. Sound capability decisions can be made that will give the navy greater confidence that the fleet is truly fit for purpose. Seaworthiness can be better assured. Operational commanders can better prepare plans and execute activities. Key doctrine and tactics can be developed in a deliberate and disciplined manner. Future requirements can be better articulated.

Data-driven, analysis-based decision-making is the standard today in most successful businesses. Chief data officers and analytic staff with data scientists or operations analysts are increasingly a part of their structure.

Clearly, what a navy does is different, and its objectives are less easily measured than the profit and shareholder value of a corporation, but there’s both a need and an opportunity here for the navy. Operations research (OR) is the essential tool. It’s not a new idea, but it is better enabled in the digital age.

The US Navy has had a large-scale and disciplined (if still imperfect) approach to OR for decades and has a robust curriculum for educating officers in it at the US Naval Postgraduate School. That’s not necessarily so for the Australian Defence Force and the navy in particular. OR has been patchy, siloed and its significance not well understood.

Does the ADF fully appreciate the need for OR to complement the investment in new capability and properly achieve an integrated force?

A ‘thinking navy’ must have a quantitative dimension to its decision-making, and OR can provide that.

Effective employment of OR in the military context requires more than simply adding a cadre of OR practitioners to an organisation. It begins with a framework setting out the critical missions the force is expected to perform—against what threat or for what operational task, and under what circumstances, must the force be able to achieve what outcome, how rapidly and for how long?

Analysis can, and should, be used to inform what’s possible and how to phrase it specifically. The judgement on what objectives are most strategically important to Australia is critical to this analysis. Analysis in force design must be characterised in measurable terms by leaders who understand analysis. OR techniques can then be used to establish the cost-effectiveness of various options for mixes of forces, and the capabilities of the units and systems making up those forces. These techniques can also enable operational planners to decide how these capabilities could best be employed as part of a joint force, to achieve specific outcomes.

While military judgement based on experience is a fundamental part of all of these decisions, many threats and challenges Australia may face in its future, and the systems needed to respond to them, may be beyond the experience of today’s leaders.

Future systems are often so expensive that compelling evidence of their effectiveness will be needed to persuade the government to invest in them. OR techniques, applied in an operationally sound manner by skilled practitioners, can help navy leadership examine a wide range of possibilities to explain decisions rigorously.

Application of data and OR doesn’t end with the decision to procure a new system. All modern military systems and processes are heavily digitised and produce and consume vast amounts of data in their operations. OR techniques can exploit this data to provide new insights on maintenance requirements, energy efficiency and operational status and offer opportunities to minimise fleet operating costs and maximise availability.

But the data needed to do this, and its format and availability to the RAN, must be identified as a requirement in the acquisition of the system. It must be collected, analysed and applied purposefully once the system is fielded. Again, skilled OR practitioners operating in a culture that values and applies their work are key to creating this future for the fleet.

The US Navy used that process to increase the mission-capable rate of its F/A-18 Super Hornets from 250 aircraft on average up to 340 in just 12 months. The project was driven by senior leadership’s belief in the science of OR.

Vice Admiral DeWolfe Miller, the head of US Naval Air Forces, said simply, ‘I love data’, and demanded that it be applied rigorously to an overhaul of maintenance practices at all levels to produce these results, and to give him day-by-day visibility of progress towards them.

OR is a behaviour as much as a science. The collection and management of verifiable data, and the analytical models to exploit it as a fundamental part of decision-making, must be driven with purpose from the top of the organisation.

This requires education and discipline at the tactical through to the strategic levels. It requires a dedicated workforce that understands the science, and that has the operational experience to understand the context within which the science should be applied. The benefits are numerous, but key is the trust brought to decisions based on analysis that is both operationally sound and analytically rigorous.

The RAN needs a contemporary OR roadmap so that it doesn’t lose the opportunity offered by recapitalisation. Data-collection capabilities should be required and fully exploited in all new ship and system designs.

Data needs should be defined, coordinated and managed with sufficient commonality to allow data to be shared, securely, across the fleet enterprise. A strong body of analytical evidence should be demanded to support acquisition decisions. OR should be re-established and managed as a command function, requiring through-life coordination, potentially within the RAN’s new Maritime Warfare Centre.

Training and education in OR should be strengthened in the navy’s workforce to ensure that those who do it are both mathematically skilled and clearly understand the needs and operations of the service. This will all take time to achieve. In the interim, the RAN may need to continue to rely on contracted analytic support and on advanced OR education provided from overseas. But over the long term, military OR must become a core sovereign competency within our navy and part of its culture.

Australia’s defence industry policy needs a reboot

Agree or disagree with Hugh White’s prognosis of Australia’s strategic situation, options and potential responses, at least he has tabled the subject, and shaken more of the general public out of their comfort zone.

We’ll leave the equipment solutioneering to another place, but whatever the decisions on force structure, size and equipment, a few things are certain: the future is far less predictable than the recent past; we need our allies to remain our allies, but their paramountcy is less pronounced and their reliability less assured; and none of our conflicts over the past century-plus have been short.

Although there are positive signs in some elements of Australian defence policy, we need a major change of direction in our strategy for defence industry.

Any regional or grey-zone war, or a major sanctions issue, is likely to interfere with regional and hemispheric shipping, whether through the Malacca Strait or the South China Sea. That would obviously have severe, even if unintended, consequences on the Australian economy, but it would also have a serious impact on our armed forces if they continue to depend on offshore support. Ironically, the heavy, bulky, lower-tech items would be more affected than air-transportable electronic assemblies, but even the more specialised of those are rarely available on call. Munitions, whether guided or dumb, would be a particular issue, but so would a ship’s propeller shaft, a gearbox or an electric motor.

So the corollary is that Australia has to be mentally, organisationally and physically prepared for a range of scenarios in which it must be more self-reliant (even if only to pay the price of being in an alliance) and visibly able to deploy substantial forces when, where and for the extended period over which they could be required. For Australia to be more self-reliant, and for the defence force to be effective, we need a capable domestic defence industry.

But our defence industrial situation has three problems.

First, too much that could be done here is imported for no good reason other than convenience or vested interests. Quantity and consistency in industrial activity are the only ways to create and maintain a sustainable capability.

Second, the things that are done here in Australia are often at too low a level and doled out in penny-packets. The Commonwealth might buy the intellectual property, but to truly have usable IP here, the defence industry needs to use it—by manufacturing the item the first time and every following time—to develop the know-how and the know-why.

Lastly, great tracts of our defence industry are controlled from overseas, and some prefer to import finished products, perhaps salted with piece-parts from local sources.

The logical outcome of this situation is that Australia’s ability to use its military forces, as, when, where and for the period required, is dependent on others—not on Australians. In an uncertain world, this is an unnecessary risk.

Here’s the punchline: industry is not merely an input to capability—it is a capability. Not because it puts dollars back into the economy, or creates jobs, but because it generates, sustains and regenerates a deployed military force. A force with no industrial depth and excessive offshore dependence has little credibility, and if the US becomes less regionally credible, then so do our armed forces at a proportionally greater rate.

History has demonstrated that nations without an adequate arsenal constitute neither an adequately credible force to deter, nor an effective military force when fielded in the national interest. The fates of the Confederacy, Rhodesia and South Vietnam are apposite. As long ago as 1503, Niccolò Machiavelli warned, ‘One cannot always rely on someone else’s sword. One must be prepared to fight for one’s own cause. And to be ready for this, one must have the means.’ Most of the recognised theorists of war and strategy make similar points.

The issue of fuel dependency, and the recent suggestion that we can overcome a lack of onshore reserves by somehow tapping into a supply on the other side of the Pacific, shows how far from reality we have strayed.

What to do? History is a great teacher. Australia showed with the Collins, Anzac and Minehunter programs that it can successfully be done a better way. The furphy that it will cost more to produce here is just that; it’s not borne out by the facts. Warren King’s Senate testimony on shipbuilding in Australia in 2014 clearly showed that, as have other studies. Those programs combined industrial policy tools with competition to efficiently build ships we still use today, and which cost us less to maintain, mostly by ourselves.

Economies of scale only really exist for aircraft and their systems and for some forms of land equipment because they’re largely commoditised. There are few if any opportunities to benefit from offshore economies of production scale for naval platforms and equipment and some specialised vehicles, and, for good reason, Australia’s operational needs reflect its geography so these systems often need varying levels of adaptation. And we can’t presume there are embedded supply chains overseas to fall back on since, even if they exist, their owners are likely to want to use them for their own ends.

A defence industrial capability cannot be created overnight, and that capability needs to address our operational needs over the long term. The logic that says we only need to plan for a short war is fundamentally flawed. We might as well just put all our money on black.

Now is the time for policymakers to develop the defence industry strategy that will benefit Australia’s military capability as the strategic situation clouds. Now is the time to contract locally at scale and for capability, and to develop the defence industrial skills and expertise that we may need, because a big bag of spares from overseas just won’t cut it when the heat is really on.

To delay until tomorrow may be too late.

Australia’s new armoured vehicles must operate from the north

It’s been 12 months since former major general and senator Jim Molan locked horns with ASPI’s Marcus Hellyer in the Strategist over armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs). Both put some great arguments forward, and the matter has rested there since.

However, recent discussions with Depfence Department officials indicate that the Australian Army 1st Brigade’s LAND 400 phase 3 vehicles are likely to skip Darwin for Adelaide so that they can be used year-round warrant a return to the issue.

In an August 2018 article in The Australian, Hellyer suggested that AFVs might be ‘ill-suited to tasks that feature heavily in modern counterinsurgency operations, such as route clearance and patrolling’, and highlighted their vulnerabilities on the conventional battlefield. He made a strong case that AFVs may be ‘poor value for the likely tasks the ADF will have to perform in the future’.

Later, Molan argued that AFVs have proven their worth, in terms of both winning conflicts and saving soldiers’ lives, through hard-earned experience on the battlefield.

These arguments are particularly relevant now as two contenders will soon be shortlisted for the army’s new infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).

In 2011, the army released Plan Beersheeba, which sought to create three combined-arms multi-role combat brigades. Each brigade was to comprise two infantry battalions and an armoured cavalry regiment, ‘with organic armoured, cavalry and mounted combat lift capabilities along with the usual supporting element of artillery, signals, combat engineers and combat service support units’.

The army is more cognisant than ever that even in low-threat environments, non-state actors like insurgent groups and terrorists have the technology to seriously threaten Australia’s current armoured capabilities.

The LAND 400 program will provide the Australian Army with the means to reshape and reorganise its combat formation. The army is acquiring new IFVs to improve safety and minimise casualties across all conflict scenarios, while simultaneously providing increased firepower to operate in concert with tanks in offensive operations.

Former defence minister Marise Payne opened a request for tender for phase 3 of the LAND 400 program in August last year. The $10–15 billion project aims to replace the army’s ageing M113 armoured personnel carriers with a fleet of up to 450 state-of-the-art IFVs and 17 manoeuvre support vehicles.

The tender sought vehicles with high levels of protection, mobility and lethality. It also required the vehicle to be tracked, have the capability to carry a section of eight soldiers, and be able to engage in combined arms manoeuvres with Australia’s M1 Abrams tanks.

Three brigades will be equipped with vehicles from phases 2 and 3 of LAND 400. But rumour has it that 1st Brigade’s IFVs will likely be based in South Australia, where they can avoid Darwin’s wet season and train all year.

Professor Paul Dibb’s 1986 review of defence capabilities highlighted that when it came to Australia’s north, the army needed forces that could move quickly and effectively, with minimum logistical support and some fire support. It’s little wonder, then, that the first capability to be moved north after Dibb’s review was the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, which was soon followed by the mechanised 1st Brigade.

It’s surprising that, three decades later, the unchanged environmental challenge of ‘the wet’ has become a justification for moving whole units and capabilities—such as the tanks of the 1st Armoured Regiment—south to Adelaide.

If wet season factors are driving any plans to divert 1st Brigade’s IFVs to Adelaide from Darwin, it must be asked whether the vehicles themselves are fit for purpose.

As a former soldier, Molan argues convincingly that ‘there can be no sound defence policy or strategy without sound tactics’. At the same time, however, tactics should not be the sole driver of policy and strategy decisions. In this case, it seems that the tactical and administrative challenges of raising, training and maintaining capabilities in northern Australia are driving decisions that run counter to good national strategy.

In today’s increasingly unpredictable strategic environment, we are more likely to find ourselves operating throughout our region than defending our nation from within our own borders. That means the possibility of having to operate our armoured vehicles in the tropics is high. At the very least, the IFVs need to be able to operate across the length and breadth of Australia regardless of the season and the weather. Without that ability they’ll be of neither tactical nor strategic value.

If the army is saying that its IFVs wouldn’t be able to operate in our region for large parts of the year if they were in Darwin, or that they will only be able to be deployed on sealed roads, it’s hard to justify the project’s price tag.