ADF Archives - Page 10 of 10

Capability development—still a work in progress (2)

4 December 2013

In last week’s post we presented a potted summary of two of the four main areas of difficulty within the Defence capability development process identified by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO). Today we’ll finish with the other two, and offer a few thoughts of our own.

We should caution that the perspectives here are necessarily in the context of the audit office report. In fairness, we’re going to talk to our friends in Defence as well, and we’ll report later on what we find. As we mentioned last week, the ANAO’s focus is very much on compliance, and is inherently rearwards looking, and we might see a different picture when we look through a different lens. But for now, on with the overview. Read more

Defence and climate change

28 October 2013

The headline message from the recently released IPCC 5th Assessment Report (Climate change 2013: The Physical Science Basis) is pretty straightforward:

Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased.

Concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere are now at levels not achieved in at least the last 800,000 years, as recorded in ice cores. The oceans, which have absorbed about one third of the human produced carbon dioxide since the industrial revolution, are now becoming more acidic.

There’s a feeling I get when I look to the west

2 September 2013

If Tony Abbott becomes Prime Minister next week, expect Australia to devote greater attention to the Indian Ocean. Shadow Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and Shadow Defence Minister David Johnston are both from Western Australia. They’ve got a keen appreciation of the defence presence in their state and the importance of protecting offshore developments in Western Australia.

The Defence White Paper 2013 identified the Indian Ocean as a vital strategic interest for Australia. There’s been increased international focus on strategic relations between major powers in the Indian Ocean. And coupled with the Asian Century White Paper, the Government has been attaching much greater importance to Australia’s partnership with India. Read more

Beyond damage control: taking the lead on the gender agenda

17 June 2013

Army Chief David Morrison’s robust condemnation of some of his officers’ appalling treatment of women has won him wide praise. Morrison’s YouTube speech (below) was a watershed moment, displaying leadership and clarity that cut through the haze being churned up by the at times fetid national debate on gender issues. The speech was elegant in its simplicity, using direct and uncomplicated language. Morrison defined what appropriate conduct should look like not only for his national institution but perhaps also for a nation. Most importantly from the perspective of achieving real change in the ADF, Morrison merged women’s empowerment with military capability, defining it as more than simply a moral obligation. Instead, he argued that empowerment is essential to what the Army does and will do in the future. Morrison’s speech showed that the Army can do more than simply play catch-up on gender empowerment; it can take the lead on the gender agenda.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=QaqpoeVgr8U

Another opportunity where the ADF can seize the lead on gender empowerment is presented by UN Security Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (PDF). The government produced the National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security (PDF) to outline how it will implement UNSCR1325. Defence has responsibilities relating to 17 of the plan’s 22 actions. Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Air Marshal Mark Binskin’s sponsorship and presentation at the Annual Civil Society Dialogue on Women Peace and Security this year signalled that Defence takes its obligations seriously. But, as audience remarks during the Q&A sessions reflected, the underrepresentation of men and other senior defence officers at the event raised doubts about how much the NAP truly guides Defence policy. Read more

Amphibious ANZACs?

14 June 2013

For a while now defence officials and analysts on both sides of the Tasman have been looking for ways to re-energise the Australia-New Zealand relationship. It’s almost as if the two neighbours were becoming too comfortable with where things between them were at. Finding concrete measures hasn’t proven easy so far but some cause for optimism might be on the horizon; cooperation on amphibious operations could breathe new life into ANZAC links. But to do so, some obstacles will need to be cleared out of the way.

The development of an amphibious capability is one of key themes of Australia’s new Defence White Paper (DWP). With the arrival of the LHDs, the ambition is to maintain ‘an enduring joint amphibious presence in the South Pacific’. For its part, New Zealand is prioritising the development of a Joint Amphibious Task Force by 2015. Wellington’s 2011 Defence Capability Plan tells us that the Task Force will be designed primarily for ‘responding to security tasks and defence tasks in New Zealand and its environs, security challenges to New Zealand’s interests in the South Pacific, and challenges to New Zealand and Australia’s common security concerns’. Read more

The cost of Defence: sixty-nine million, six hundred & eighty-one thousand, nine hundred & eighty dollars & eighty-two cents per day

30 May 2013

What a difference a year can make. Twelve months ago, it looked like the government had all but abandoned the ambitious plans set out for the ADF in the 2009 Defence White Paper. More than $20 billion of promised defence funding had been cut or deferred over the preceding three years. Last year, funding fell in real terms by more than 10% pushing the defence share of GDP to 1.6%—the lowest level since 1938.

This year things look very different. Defence spending is again on the rise, and the government has released a new Defence White Paper essentially recommitting itself to the capability goals of 2009 and then some. On current plans, the defence budget will increase in real terms by 2.3% next year to reach $25.4 billion, and then continue to grow for another three years to $28.6 billion (all measured in today’s dollars) to deliver an average of 3.6% real growth over four years.

But that’s only the start. If the government makes good on the $220 billion of financial guidance for the six years that follow, there’s enough money available to grow the defence budget to $33.2 billion by 2022 at an annual real rate of growth of 2.5% per annum.

But don’t pop the champagne corks just yet. The seemingly impressive growth is coming from a low base. In the 48 months between the release of the 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers, around $20 billion of promised funding was lost in the headlong rush to get the Commonwealth’s books out of the red. As things stand, it will be two more years before defence spending rises out of the hole that was dug in search of a surplus. Read more

Rethinking the Defence White Paper after next

25 March 2013

As Andrew mentioned last week, we were recently invited by RUSI ACT to talk about challenges and prospects of the next Defence White Paper. Actually, it was more about the White Paper after next, as a document released only shortly before an election is likely to be short-lived, particularly if there’s a change in government.

Andrew talked about White Papers then and now. My talk focused on how to readjust the strategy that must underpin any defence policy as it relates to dealing with the two major powers in our region, the US and China, and how we might approach our bigger neighbour to the north, Indonesia. The good news is that we are entering another ‘interwar period’ and we could use the ‘strategic pause’ to make changes to strategy and force structure. We don’t live in a rapidly deteriorating security environment, and there is no imminent major power war or destabilising arms race in Southeast Asia.

Undoubtedly, China will become stronger militarily and flex its muscles in East Asia and parts of the South China Sea. But that doesn’t mean that conflict or war is inevitable, or that we have to choose between China and the United States. Nor need we buy into inflated assessments of the PLA’s rising military capabilities. In fact, China faces major challenges to project significant military power beyond its ‘near seas’. Moreover, Chinese investments in lower-end military capabilities for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and protection of sea-lanes are largely underreported, and are all avenues for cooperation with the PLA. Read more

Andrew Davies and Jim Molan talk strategy: round 2

5 February 2013

Here’s part II of the Andrew Davies–Jim Molan strategy debate, with part I here:

Andrew Davies: Jim, to what extent do you see the force in being as an expansion base as insurance against a future that’s worse than now?

Jim Molan: Well, it’s more than just an expansion base. You can’t put all capability off into the future—you have to have some now. In the past we [Defence advisers to government] assumed preparation times that were outside the possibility of impacting on the current force. In other words, we bet that we wouldn’t need the capability we eventually aspired to in the short term. Time has proven it to be the case, but it’s a risk and it mightn’t be true in future. If you’re going to cut the force, you can measure the risk, for example by wargaming. The problem is that no one outside of Defence has any understanding of that risk, so there’s no downside to government in cutting money to defence. We believed the government in 2009 when they said we need more and we’ll believe them in 2013 when they say we don’t need as much.

Andrew: OK, let’s talk budgets. It seems to me there are three ways you can go if the government sticks to the line of reduced money on defence. The ADF can get smaller, or it can be of lower quality, or it can defer capability until later. While I agree with you about warning times and risk, it’s hard to see a power projection risk against Australia in the next decade that’s worth worrying too much about. No one out there is going to have power projection capabilities that even a moderately competent ADF couldn’t deal with. So let me put a concrete proposal as an example. Let’s say we decide that we don’t need a submarine capability in the near term of the sort that drove the Collins specifications and which seems to be driving the future submarine. Instead, let’s buy the Navy some smaller European boats that aren’t in themselves the strategic submarine capability we think we might need down the track, but which can be used as a stepping off point into a future generation of more capable line of submarines. What’s wrong with that line of reasoning? Read more

Andrew Davies and Jim Molan talk strategy: round 1

4 February 2013

Over the course of several blog posts and tweets, Jim Molan and I decided to get together in person to hash out the issue of Need and strategic planning face to face. What ensued was a spirited discussion, the end of which, to my surprise, we found ourselves in violent agreement. The debate that unfolded will likely be of interest to Strategist readers, so I’ve reproduced parts of the transcript below:

Andrew Davies: Thanks for coming along here Jim—we seemed to be butting virtual heads on the blog, but I sensed we might have been talking past each other.

Jim Molan: Yes, I think so. Our clash has a lot to do with the definition of strategy. I think you use the term differently to me. I see it as following on from the Government coming up with a policy, which might be ‘defence of Australia’ or ‘forward defence’ or ‘minimise spending’. Underneath that there’s a strategy which translates policy into the reality of a force structure. So when I use strategy, it’s in the sense of implementation of policy, not how we fight country A, B or C. Your use of strategy, I think, is different to mine. There’s a missing link in what we’re all doing. The link is between government policy, implementation of that policy through an implementation strategy and eventually capability. I think there’s something missing in the centre, which turns strategy into capability. I think that’s what you are calling strategy, but it’s what I’d call an operational plan. Does that make sense? Read more

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