After the federal elections of 2022 and 2025, a certain supposed truth is taking root in Australian political discourse—namely, that discussion of potential conflict involving China is politically disadvantageous, because it is likely to have an adverse impact in electorates with many Chinese Australian voters. Political scientists and psephologists will no doubt further study and test this hypothesis.

At least 1.4 million residents in Australia identify as ‘Chinese Australian’ of whom 536,000 were born in mainland China (as at the 2021 Census). At a time when geopolitical tensions are rising, it should be assumed, even in the absence of research, that sensitivity will increase among Chinese Australians. Many will experience anxiety, uncertainty and even fear as a consequence of discussion of war.  Many would be concerned about the risk of rising anti-Chinese racism, and some may even be concerned about the possibility of collective internment should war break out.

How might we best conduct a rational policy discussion about rising geopolitical tensions and the prospects of conflict without adding unduly to these anxieties, uncertainties and fears?

Silencing discussion of possible war is not an option.  Apart from anything else, were it to become accepted that any open discussion about the prospects of conflict had to be constrained because of the perceived electoral impact, then China would have achieved one of its key political warfare objectives. Discursive restraint in target countries is a central objective of the grand strategy of China. When China urges other countries to engage in ‘responsible discussion’ and to avoid ‘Cold War attitudes’ on issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea, its real objective is to deaden discussion of its intentions, capabilities and increasingly assertive and risky behaviour.

Equally, reckless war talk is unacceptable.  It does not usefully illuminate the real issues.  However, we need to be careful about terms. Rational policy discussion about the contingency of war is not war mongering nor is it the beating of the drums of war.  Such accusations are often deployed in order to stifle discussion of a difficult and often inconvenient topic.

For an example of real war mongering, one might examine the actions of those who have been called the American ‘war lovers’ of 1898, especially Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge and William Randolph Hearst. They agitated for war against imperial Spain, and it came in the form of the Spanish American War. Where is such a war lobby to be found in Australia today? There’s none. Those who speak rationally about the contingency of war are not war lovers. Typically, they are tragic realists who often possess a deep historical consciousness and who view war as a recurring human blight, not an adventure.

To set the conditions for a rational discussion of the question of possible future war, the Australian government should make clear that it will always presume the loyalty of all Australian citizens and that it will also presume the acceptance on the part of residents of the obligations of their residency. The government should explicitly reaffirm that any threats to security in the context of looming or actual war with China would be dealt within the framework of security law. That is to say, threats to security would be dealt with on their merits and with due process, which is focused on the actions of individuals and not of races or cultures. Collective internment, as occurred during the world wars, should be ruled out. If necessary, this should be codified in law.

In acknowledgement of the deep historical roots of ‘yellow peril’ racism, which emerged in the 19th century and was enshrined in the White Australia policy, the government should state that it is sensitive to the risk of Chinese Australians being alienated and victimised by resuscitation of racism, the re-emergence of which will not be tolerated.

To this end, the government should establish a specialised process of dialogue within the multicultural framework that is administered by the Department of Home Affairs. The department would be best placed to manage this issue, having been sensibly reconstituted after the recent election. Such a dialogue process would be dedicated to engagement with Chinese Australian community groups on issues of national security and defence and the concerns they hold regarding racism and especially the risk of racialised discussion about the prospect of conflict with China.

Such a dialogue would be jointly chaired by the ministers for home affairs and multicultural affairs, who would explain policy and seek the views of community representatives on effects of national security and defence developments on the Chinese Australian community. The government should acknowledge that there will always be diverse voices in the Chinese Australia community and that it wishes to hear from all of them. The ministers and their officials could explain what is being done to detect and deal with relevant efforts to amplify discord within the Australian community. This would encompass efforts by way of foreign interference and information campaigns activities by Beijing and efforts by racist groups and actors to vilify those of Chinese ancestry, especially by calling into question their loyalty to Australia.

On the latter, there are real risks in engendering anti-Chinese racism through a thoughtless and reckless discursive framing when sensitive matters of conflict and war are discussed. This is especially so where there is a careless conflation of analysis and discussion of the policies and actions of China as a state with a racialised narrative about the Chinese people and their presumed traits. The government and others need to stringently delineate terms, such that it is clearly understood that references to ‘China’ are not to be taken to as a cultural or racial reference to the Chinese people.

Active measures along these lines will need to be taken to prevent such conflation and racialisation and to open up the space for rational discussion of the question of possible war, a question that will not go away.  Shutting down all such discussion would play into the hands of Beijing—as would an unthinking, undifferentiated and potentially racialised discourse.  Conscious treatment of the risk will be required.

We should be very clear about what we mean by the most charged term of all: ‘the China threat’. The government should make clear that Australia is not threatened by China, at least not in the way that two countries which have a shared history of enmity and prior conflict and which maintain grievances over territory might see each other as a threat.

Ukraine, Israel, India, Japan and others know what it is to have threats at the door.  Australia does not. Australia’s strategic dilemma is different. It does not face a direct China threat. There is no evidence that China would wish or need to attack Australia, outside of a wider war. It is the prospect of a wider war that should concern Australia, which would be threatened by the consequences of a Chinese victory. This would be a strategic catastrophe—not a cultural or racial one.