How Russia will reassess its ties with North Korea after Ukraine

An agreement to end the war in Ukraine could transform Russia’s relations with North Korea. Moscow is unlikely to reduce its cooperation with Pyongyang to pre-2022 levels, but it may become more selective about areas of cooperation.

Regardless of how favourable a settlement it can achieve in Ukraine, Russia will want to challenge the US-led security architecture in Asia. Cooperation with North Korea can be a tool for this.

Russia has already made clear that it wants to be more involved in Asia: during meetings with Chinese, North Korean and Vietnamese leaders last year, it called for new security mechanisms in the region.

Military cooperation is a core of the deepened partnership between Russia and North Korea, with Moscow helping Pyongyang to modernise its military capabilities. Reportedly, Russia has sent air-defence systems, provided technologies for intercontinental ballistic missiles and agreed to supply North Korea with fighter aircraft.

Still, Moscow may be wary of sharing too much, as North Korea could become a competitor on the arms market by making cheaper copies of Russian weapons. So the pace of transfers from Russia to North Korea may decline.

Arms trade between Moscow and Pyongyang has weakened the nonproliferation regime and undermined international sanctions. This collective resistance highlights a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms: Russia simply ignores the threat of punishment, as the US ability to coerce North Korea and Russia to adhere to sanctions is limited. North Korea is notorious for its sophisticated schemes to evade sanctions and can easily work around new restrictions. Furthermore, North Korea can cooperate with Russian entities to diversify its own illegal supply chains.

North Korea has exported military equipment to Russia during the war, but Russia’s demand for it will diminish when the fighting stops. A step-up in supplies of civilian goods from North Korea is unlikely to replace this trade, because of the limitations of its economy.

North Korea can offer few goods that would be competitive in the Russian market. Its primary exports—natural resources—are abundant in Russia. Moreover, North Korea is not a useful conduit for Russia to import Western goods, because it has limited trade with Europe, unlike China, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. As sanctions are partially lifted, Moscow will prioritise restoring economic ties with the West to boost its economy.

Russia will also want South Korea to lift sanctions and normalise economic relations with it. South Korea is one of Russia’s major trading partners, and the two economies have complementary structures. To approach Seoul, Moscow will need to scale down its military and technology cooperation with Pyongyang.

Still, Russia will want to keep a friendly North Korea as a backup option in case the West and its friends decide to reinstate sanctions.

When the fighting ends, the future of North Korean troops in Russia will become a controversial issue. While a peace deal would reduce the need for them militarily, they will probably be used as labourers in Russian-occupied territories.

Since the start of the war, Russia’s labour market has shrunk due to high enlistment numbers and a decline in foreign workers. In 2022, Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin proposed to invite around 50,000 North Korean workers to supplement the Russian workforce. In 2024, the number of North Korean workers sent to Russia skyrocketed.  If Russia continues to struggle with labour shortages, it may persist with this policy.

Moscow and Pyongyang can also continue cooperation in non-sanctioned areas, such as tourism. Their diplomats have discussed ways to simplify travel regulations to encourage Russian tourists to visit North Korean resorts. Still, North Korea remains a niche destination for Russians. In 2024, only 1500 of them visited North Korea, compared with 200,000 who travelled to South Korea, despite a lack of direct flights.

Academic collaboration is another avenue for cooperation. North Korean agreements with Russian universities include access to advanced technologies and training for specialists. North Korean delegations have visited Russia’s Moscow State University, Novosibirsk State University, Far Eastern Federal University and others, where they focused on joint projects in chemistry, medicine and information technology. As well as sending more students to Russia, North Korea will have opportunities to send illegal workers posing as students.