Deciding the future: the Australian Army and the infantry fighting vehicle

Introduction

The aim of this report is to inform government decision-makers and the public on the ability of Project LAND 400 Phase 3—the infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) acquisition—to meet the needs of Australia. I examine a number of factors that provide context for the government’s upcoming decision, whenever that may take place. Those include how IFVs fit into the Australian strategic environment, the ease with which the ADF can deploy them, their vulnerability to threats, and the ongoing utility of armour in the light of lessons unfolding from the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian War.

To set the information into a useful context, this report explains the nature of contemporary land warfare and speculates how the Australian Army is likely to fight in a future conflict. To further assist those making the IFV decision, this report offers a number of scenarios that outline potential operations that the government may direct the ADF to undertake. It also identifies current gaps in ADF capability that will need remediation if the IFV is to achieve its potential, as well as the other opportunities that might not be taken up because of the focus on this investment.

The report’s analysis results in some key questions for decision-makers to consider as they decide on the infantry fighting vehicle acquisition:

1. Does the government believe that its IFV investment will deliver an appropriate balance of protection, lethality and mobility (both tactical and operational)?
2. Does the government agree with the requirement for an infantry vehicle with STANAG 4569 Level 6 force protection and equipped with an active protection system?
3. Is the government confident that the number of the IFVs obtained will generate a deployable and sustainable force that represents a sufficient return on the investment?
4. Does the government accept that the IFV options under consideration will enable the ADF to offset existing gaps in capability and allow it to conduct operations in a contested maritime environment, including sea and airlift, long-range fires and logistics?
5. Is the government confident that the Army’s combined arms system is deployable in contested environments, particularly in a maritime scenario?
6. Does the government believe that the IFV will provide utility in the range of contingencies that the government envisages the ADF will need to meet?
7. Does the government agree that the IFV will contribute to the requirement that the ADF be able to shape, deter and respond to threats as mandated in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU)?