ASPI AUKUS update 2: September 2022—the one-year anniversary

Introduction

Consistent with a partnership that’s focused on the development of defence and technological capability rather than diplomatic grandstanding,¹ there have been few public announcements about the progress of AUKUS. That’s an observation we made in our first AUKUS update in May,² and one we make again in this latest update, one year on from the joint unveiling of the partnership in mid-September 2021.

Periodic press releases note meetings of the three-country joint steering groups—one of which looks at submarines and the other at advanced capabilities—but provide little hint about what was discussed.³ On Submarines, we shouldn’t expect to hear anything concrete until the 18-month consultation phase concludes in March 2022.

What’s changed, however, is that the strategic environment that gave birth to AUKUS has worsened markedly, most notably in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s escalating pressure on Taiwan and other parts of the Indo-Pacific. Those developments are making the advanced technologies AUKUS aims to foster even more relevant.

Image: iStockphoto/sameer chogade

While the political landscape across the three AUKUS partners has also changed (of the three leaders that announced AUKUS just one year ago, only one, US President Biden, remains in office), bipartisan support for AUKUS appears to be undiminished in all three capitals.

In Australia, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s Labor government has made clear its commitment to AUKUS alongside the announcement of an ambitious Defence Strategic Review (DSR). Albanese has simultaneously worked to restore good relations with France, which temporarily withdrew its ambassador and some forms of cooperation because of the loss of the Attack-class submarine contract and what it said was a lack of Australian sincerity about AUKUS.

Britain’s new Prime Minister, Liz Truss, was a staunch advocate for AUKUS as Foreign Secretary, and all the signs are that she’ll continue in that vein as Prime Minister. Truss has kept Ben Wallace, a strong supporter of AUKUS, as Defence Secretary. Truss’s government has also moved former National Security Adviser Stephen Lovegrove into a new role focused on nuclear defence industry partnerships. If that becomes a permanent position, it could add capacity to deliver AUKUS over the long term.⁴

This update begins by reviewing the worsening strategic context one year on from the AUKUS announcement. Next, it summarises what more we have learned about progress in the nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) program, which is at the heart of AUKUS. It then assesses how think tanks across a selection of key countries are covering AUKUS to gauge trends in the public debate. The final section of the update assesses the importance of advanced technological cooperation through AUKUS to develop capability and reinforce deterrence rapidly in the face of the strategic challenges we face. The update makes some recommendations for the best way forward.

1. Michael Shoebridge, What is AUKUS and what is it not?, ASPI, Canberra, 8 December 2021. ↩︎
2. Marcus Hellyer, Ben Stevens, ASPI AUKUS update 1: May 2022, ASPI, Canberra, 5 May 2022. ↩︎
3. ‘Readout of AUKUS Joint Steering Group meetings’, The White House, 31 July 2022. ↩︎
4. ‘Sir Tim Barrow appointed as National Security Adviser’, media release, UK Government, 7 September 2022. ↩︎