Who is Singapore’s bestie? The answer might surprise

Which country is Singapore’s ‘special and most-trusted partner’, according to Prime Minister Lawrence Wong? For a globally networked city state that excels in ‘multi-alignment’ and spurns formal alliances, the crop of potential candidates is abundant. But the answer may surprise.

The answer matters because Singapore is widely seen as a strategic bellwether, a place from which to assess the direction the geopolitical winds are blowing. It is a significant source of military capability, capital and technology within Southeast Asia, a region that is palpably experiencing geopolitical stresses. The identity of the country that the city state trusts the most should therefore be of interest to more than just its 5.6 million inhabitants.

Could it be China, for example? Singapore prides itself on its close partnership with the People’s Republic, recently highlighted by Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan’s upbeat description of Singapore and China as ‘two forces for stability’, whose relations are a ‘bright spot’ in a volatile world.  Then again, Beijing isn’t always so flattering or obliging. In 2010, China’s then Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi famously told his Singaporean counterpart that, ‘China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.’

As if to prove the point indirectly, in 2016, Hong Kong’s customs authorities impounded some of Singapore’s military vehicles as they transited through the port on the way back from exercises in Taiwan—a coercive move widely attributed to Beijing. There is also former Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew’s timeless advice that Singapore should beware of being taken for a Chinese proxy. It’s a warning that remains pertinent as Beijing increasingly throws its weight around in Southeast Asia, even though the region’s elites appear won over.

Then how about the US? Washington’s deep defence and security bonds with Singapore give it a comparative edge over Beijing. Singapore invests heavily in the US, while corporate America is densely represented, with 6,000 US companies headquartered in the city state. Yet it goes against Singapore’s DNA to side with one major power over another, especially when their competition is hotting up and turning zero sum. Democracy is not necessarily in the US’s favour either, when Singaporeans perceive America’s politics as driving polarisation at home and unpredictability abroad. Diplomatic equidistance therefore remains the name of Singapore’s US-China game.

Australia might think it has a decent shout. The ground-breaking 2016 comprehensive strategic partnership will next year be upgraded to new heights of policy co-operation. Australia has the closest two-way defence relationship with Singapore after the US. Access for Australian forces to Singaporean facilities is underpinned by the Five Power Defence Arrangements, while Singapore trains its armed forces in Australia on an unparalleled and expanding scale, and pays Canberra for the privilege. Singapore sources energy, food and other vital commodities in large volumes from down under, and reciprocates as an exporter of refined fuels and economic gateway for Australian businesses. Australia and Singapore are more interpersonally intertwined than many regional partners. Close but no cigar, mate.

Taiwan and Singapore once enjoyed exceptionally close government-to-government ties. Singapore maintains a discreet military training relationship through the Starlight Program. But Taiwan’s star in Singapore is waning, outshone in international status by a rising China that aims to eclipse Taipei.

What of special friends further afield? Singapore values its British heritage more than many Commonwealth countries, in spite of Britain’s chequered history as the island’s former security guarantor. But only so far. Germany is probably Singapore’s favourite European economic partner and defence supplier. But it is too far away to win the accolade of being the city state’s preferred partner.

Israel could be considered a long-range contender. From independence, in 1965, Singapore studiously modelled its defence strategy on the Israeli experience. Israeli defence advisers flew to Singapore under the guise of being ‘Mexicans’, while Singaporean tank crews trained secretly in the Negev desert. But Wong wasn’t describing Israel either.

Nor was he describing Japan, India, South Korea, or even New Zealand—however popular Kiwis are in the ‘Red Dot’.

Which leaves Singapore’s fellow ASEAN members. It can’t be Malaysia, obviously. The inter-familial bonds there are too close for comfort. Likewise, Indonesia is a stone’s throw away. There’s too much neighbourly baggage and troublesome proximity from both of these countries for real trust to develop. Thailand perhaps, or Vietnam? No dice there.

Singapore’s special and most-trusted partner is in fact the small Southeast Asian sultanate, Brunei.

While Brunei appears starkly different to cosmopolitan Singapore—physically, socially and politically—their congruent interests and strategic outlook heave into view on closer inspection. Brunei is another small state, which shares the island of Borneo with Malaysia and Indonesia. It’s far enough away to pose no threat to Singapore, yet close enough to share the neighbourhood dynamics. Singapore’s networks extend globally, but its threat perceptions are more localised.

Singapore and Brunei co-operate closely in foreign policy and hold similar positions on important issues, including freedom of navigation. Defence and finance links are particularly well developed: Singapore conducts jungle warfare training in Brunei’s eastern district, Temburong, where Wong himself served. Since 1967, Singapore and Brunei have operated a mutually stabilising interchangeable currency agreement, the only arrangement of its kind within ASEAN. Brunei’s stock of hydrocarbon-funded investment in Singapore is considerable. Leadership ties are cultivated assiduously. It has become a tradition that Singapore’s prime ministers and presidents make Brunei their first overseas visit, while the long-reigning Sultan and his heir are regular callers to the city state.

It’s easy to overlook Singapore’s all-weather relationship with Brunei, as one bilateral strand in Southeast Asia’s burgeoning international relations. But its conspicuous endurance and depth is worth reflecting on. As with politics, geopolitics has a strong local dimension too. In designating Brunei as its most-trusted partner, Singapore perceives not simply an echo of its strategic circumstances but a not-too-distant reflection of itself.

The problem for Singapore is that Brunei counts negligibly in the strategic balance. In normal times, this would matter less, but with the Indo-Pacific in a heightened state of tension and Southeast Asia at its epicentre, Singapore’s exquisitely balanced brand of non-alignment appears less tenable as a strategy, as the fence becomes an increasingly uncomfortable place to sit.

The city state’s cozy, low-risk relationship with Brunei has a comparison point in Australia’s strategic debate, where some—like Trade Minister Don Farrell—judge New Zealand to be their closest ally. However, for Singapore and Australia alike, the partner that is most comfortable to deal with is not necessarily their most important international relationship for the challenges ahead.

Improving ADF recruitment by acknowledging its history with the LGBTQ+ community

Amid ADF recruiting and retention woes, outreach and support to current and future LGBTQ+ servicemembers falls short. This error is leading the ADF to miss out on strong candidates who may otherwise stay or enter the service.

In 2023, only 6 percent of the APS-Defence identified as being a member of the LGBTQ+ community. Nationally, some surveys indicate that up to 11 percent of the Australian population identifies as LGBTQ+. While there is no data on the number of LGBTQ+ servicemembers in the ADF, it is reasonable to assume that number is similar or lower than APS figures.

The 2023 Defence Culture Strategy Blueprint mentions the importance of diversity five times within 22 pages. Yet, it does not include concrete plans of how to improve the work environment for LGBTQ+ servicemembers, nor does it mention the terms LGBTQ+, gay, transgender or queer.

As the ADF continues to face these challenges, outreach and support to the LGBTQ+ community in the force should receive higher focus. But to do this, the ADF will need to take into account its history with this community.

Even into the 1990s, the ADF actively found and expelled LGBTQ+ service members from the service. It took another 17 years for LGB servicemembers and their partners to receive the same benefits as their heterosexual counterparts. Since 2010, transgender Australians have been allowed to serve openly. While the ADF has improved its visibility efforts within the LGBTQ+ community, more work must be done.

Prime Minister Paul Keating ended the LGB ban on service in 1992 despite opposition from certain military organisations like the Returned and Services League. Baseless claims motivating this opposition ranged from loss in morale, impacts on combat effectiveness and even mass-resignations from ADF servicemembers. None of this happened. Ironically, it may have improved productivity and the working environment for servicemembers overall.

Yet the situation still needs improvement. The most recent survey of gay Australian Army personnel, conducted in 2013, indicated that approximately 40 percent of respondents were harassed due to their sexuality and 30 percent hid their sexuality from their fellow comrades.

Due to the lack of more recent survey data, it is difficult to define the extent of homophobia faced by LGBTQ+ servicemembers today, or if attitudes have improved. The legacy left behind from decades of harassment and discrimination may still be impacting the success of outreach to the LGBTQ+ community. To understand the depth and magnitude of this fact, it is critical that the ADF performs more research on the effectiveness of the efficacy of outreach programs and address how they can be improved.

The 2023 interim report of the Royal Commission on Veteran Suicide found ‘unacceptable behaviours, again, especially directed towards women, LGBTQ+ community, culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) workers, and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander workers’ was a significant cause of veteran suicide.

Despite these concerns, the Blueprint does not identify mechanisms to address these behaviours but commits to greater action in the report. Broadly, the goals noted are important but they lack any metrics to measure success. This increases the risk of falling short. Furthermore, without a specific plan, these goals will just turn into buzzwords that do not invite the necessary change and represent a missed opportunity to improve the lives for all its servicemembers.

The ADF should perform more in-depth annual surveys around demographics, bullying and harassment for servicemembers and be transparent about the results. The Monitoring and Evaluation section of the Blueprint sets out a great framework to accomplish this. However, it is up to the ADF as an institution to see these objectives achieved.

The Final Report of the Royal Commission on Veterans Suicide notes that there is little data on LGBTQ+ veterans or soldiers collected by Defence. Well-crafted surveys will provide an effective tool to measure how policies in the Blueprint are affecting servicemembers.

Higher-ranking ADF members would also benefit further from engaging with lower-ranked personnel to hear their stories and to identify meaningful goals together. It is particularly important for ADF leadership to meet these personnel where they are with genuine care and intentionality.

The history of the military and LGBTQ+ is complex and is too often filled with pain for those in the sexual minority. The memories of trauma and homophobia do not go away overnight and the ADF must ensure a deliberate approach. This requires first acknowledging the history, discussing what has been done to rectify it, and most importantly, ensuring that those who want to serve and are serving have the capacity to do so in the way that they choose. Creating meaningful and measurable goals will achieve this.

A deliberate approach that meets people where they are and shows genuine care for their future may help change the script.

Quad leaders face pivotal chance to renew relevance beyond a GINO

The Quad grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the United States is turning 20. And like a young person entering their third decade, the Quad’s time has come to start maturing into its proper potential and making its mark on the world, rather than trying to cling onto the safety and comfort of youth.

That means avoiding the major mistake that was made after the Quad’s creation in 2004 when, for fear of angering China, the four members, in particular Australia and India, began to back away. Worrying that the Quad risked creating provocation rather than delivering stability through regional balance, the member nations let it drift into a decade of stasis until it was revived in 2017 in response to collective concern over Beijing’s newly assertive and coercive stances. The first foreign ministers’ meeting in 2019, in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly, signalled that Quad 2.0 had arrived.

An opportunity to shape Quad 3.0 will come this week when, just ahead of this year’s UNGA, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese meets with his three fellow leaders in Delaware, United States. That meeting needs to produce outcomes that demonstrate that the four countries have learnt from the past and are prepared to give the minilateral group a renewed reassertion of relevance for regional stability and security to avoid its becoming just another yearly meeting.

Beijing would love to kill off the Quad a second time but, having calculated that the group is here to stay, its next best strategy is to hollow it out and make it a GINO—a grouping in name only. It’s to that end that Beijing is applying fresh pressure.

Downplaying the Quad’s security role, and thereby continuing a trend that has been creeping into Quad rhetoric for some time, would go a long way to delivering Beijing its aim. This pattern includes the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s explicit description of the Quad as a ‘diplomatic, not security, partnership’ and Japan’s then Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi—also a leading candidate to be the next prime minister—saying last year that the group was ‘not for security issues, nor military issues’.

What these mistaken messages of reassurance achieve is to help confirm China’s propaganda—consumed by ASEAN—that minilateralism, from NATO to the Quad, is the provocateur. True, the Quad is not a military alliance, but that doesn’t mean—and it can’t mean—that it doesn’t collaborate on security.

Language, moreover, must be backed up by specific plans. The announcement of this Quad meeting referenced a number of areas of security, including maritime security. But the group needs to go beyond such generic prose and explain what it means in practical terms.

Ultimately, this week’s joint statement must clarify the ‘practical co-operation’ previously promised by the Quad and provide a roadmap for the ways the four country-members can work together, including to build military capacity and to prevent aggression in the region.

Vigorous assertion of accountability for Beijing’s regular breaches of the rules and norms must also be part of the Quad’s agenda. These include bullying of neighbours in territorial disputes, cyber attacks and economic coercion, which are all too often left to the victims themselves to protest.

Such breaches should be called out by the Quad and not left to other groups like AUSMIN or the Australia-Japan 2+2 forum.

Accordingly, the Quad statement must expressly support the Philippines and condemn China’s illegal and aggressive behaviour in the South and East China Seas, not just express general support for the law of the sea or country-agnostic concern relating to unilateral actions.

China’s recent illegal incursions into Japan’s territorial airspace need to be referenced, flowing on from Australia’s bilateral support during the recent Foreign and Defence Ministers’ meeting with Japan. And while espionage is a universal practice, the protection of our smaller regional partners should be a priority. The recent cyber attack on the Pacific Islands Forum should be called out.

This clarity on the Quad’s agenda, role and principles is vital for its future. After all, there’s a reason minilaterals—from the Quad to AUKUS—are on the rise. Multilateral bodies should serve global interests by mustering a collective weight of countries that want the right thing for all—international common interests such as security, stability, sovereignty and solutions to global problems such as climate change. Instead, they are being co-opted and neutered by self-interested regimes including Beijing and Moscow.

The role of Quad leaders—particularly for both US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida who should aim to leave a legacy from their last Quad meeting—is to ensure such minilateral groups are effective until the multilateral system repairs itself—or regrettably in the event that it doesn’t.

As Quad leaders and foreign ministers head to UNGA after the meeting, they owe a message to the UN and multilateral bodies—do not fear China and Russia to the extent that lets them reshape international institutions to tolerate their own persistent breaches of international rules and norms.

After Quad 2.0 was launched, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi famously referred to the Quad as nothing more than ‘sea foam’, suggesting it would break up and dissipate—one half of its dubious narrative couplet that the Quad was an Asian NATO and hence provocative, yet at the same time ineffectual.

Recognising that total breakup is unlikely, Beijing is this time determined to render it a GINO. Sea foam, of course, can also be light, airy and insubstantial. As Quad leaders gather, they must seize the chance to reinject weight and substance, and give this minilateral grouping the power of a rising tide of co-operation towards a more secure and stable region.

The urgent need for a strategic overhaul in Australia’s Defence approach to fuel resilience

Over the last three decades, the Australian Defence Force (ADF), enjoying an era of peace and strategic stability, shifted from prioritising sovereign fuel resilience to investing heavily in outsourcing. With strategic warning times shrinking and supply chain vulnerabilities surfacing, the ADF must elevate fuel security to a Fundamental Input to Capability status.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was not merely a symbolic end to the Cold War; it heralded a new era of unprecedented globalisation. It accelerated the development of just-in-time supply chains, centralised production, offshoring and privatisation.

Nations and businesses alike redefined their strategies to embrace economic efficiency and streamlined operations. However, this transition came with significant trade-offs for Australia: sovereign capability and national resilience.

The ADF, like many other institutions, has adopted a market-driven model, focusing on leveraging external providers and technological innovations. While this shift was intended to enhance operational flexibility and cost-effectiveness, it has also introduced critical vulnerabilities, particularly in supply chain management. This strategic shift has inadvertently compromised our sovereign capability and national resilience, underscoring the need for a more robust approach.

The lessons learned from the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999 and the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for change.

The ADF’s participation in INTERFET illustrated the critical importance of effective logistical coordination and the need for adaptive strategies in complex operational environments. The mission highlighted the necessity of robust supply chain management and the ability to integrate and synchronise efforts with international partners to ensure operational success.

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed Australia’s logistics resilience vulnerabilities, particularly in the supply chain for essential products like AdBlue, a crucial component for diesel engine emissions control. In this case, both Russia and China decided to restrict the compound necessary to make the product. Without it, Australia’s trucking industry would grind to a halt. This experience highlighted the urgent need for Australia to enhance its domestic liquid fuel production capabilities and build more robust and resilient supply chains to mitigate future disruptions.

Despite these valuable lessons, the ADF has continued to rely on market forces to resolve supply chain issues. Recent geopolitical tensions and a reduction in Australia’s strategic warning time have created a burning platform for immediate change.

For the ADF, liquid fuel resilience presents a challenging supply chain vulnerability. Liquid fuels are not just a logistical component but a strategic asset.

Recognising this, the ADF must elevate fuel security to a Fundamental Input to Capability status. This involves developing a comprehensive fuel strategy integrating robust storage and distribution networks. The focus should be on creating redundancy in supply lines and ensuring backup systems are in place to mitigate local, regional and global disruptions.

A secure and consistent supply of manufactured fuel is vital for sustaining military operations, powering equipment and enabling rapid response in high-stress scenarios. The ADF can reduce dependency on external sources by establishing robust domestic manufacturing capabilities, mitigating supply chain risks and strengthening national security resilience.

Effective logistics management relies on accurate forecasting and proactive planning. The ADF should invest in advanced forecasting tools and modelling techniques to better anticipate and prepare for potential disruptions. This includes implementing scenario-based planning exercises to simulate various crises and evaluate response strategies. These should consider the possibility of continuous, concurrent and cascading risks and shocks. By incorporating these tools, the ADF can improve its ability to respond swiftly and effectively to emerging threats.

The complexities of modern logistics require a collaborative approach. Fuel security and resilience are not solely concerns of the ADF but are pivotal to national stability and economic security. Disruptions in fuel supply can affect critical infrastructure, public services and the broader economy, highlighting the interdependence between military readiness and civilian sectors.

To address this pressing issue comprehensively, the ADF must collaborate with government agencies and stakeholders across various sectors to develop a unified strategy ensuring robust fuel security and resilience for the nation. The ADF must enhance its engagement with state and territory governments and private sector stakeholders. Building strong partnerships across these sectors will facilitate information sharing, resource pooling and coordinated response efforts. This collaborative framework will be instrumental in addressing logistical challenges and ensuring a unified approach to national security.

The current geopolitical landscape, marked by increased risks and reduced warning times, underscores the urgency of these recommendations. The burning platform we face necessitates a strategic overhaul in our logistics and supply chain management approach with a clear focus on liquid fuels. The ADF can build a more resilient and effective logistical framework by prioritising fuel security, enhancing forecasting and planning capabilities and strengthening collaborative efforts. This will support sustained military operations and fortify Australia’s strategic posture in an increasingly uncertain global environment.

It is time to rethink our approach and invest in the resilience and preparedness needed to navigate the complexities of the modern world.

Digital spinach: What Australia can learn from China’s youth screen-time restrictions

As Australia debates the right cut-off age for social media use, let’s not forget there already is a cut off age—13. That’s the age most platforms set in their terms of service in compliance with the United States’ Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA).

But there’s a slight problem—whatever they’re doing to keep younger kids out, it’s not working. Surprisingly, a key part of the solution might be found in a place few would expect—China. While the idea of borrowing tactics from a surveillance state might seem unappealing to Australians, there are valuable lessons we could learn from Beijing when it comes to enforcing age restrictions and protecting young users from the harms of social media.

Research conducted by the Office of the eSafety Commissioner reveals that nearly a quarter of children aged eight to 10 report using social media weekly or more often, and almost half of those aged 11 to 13 are doing so. Which raises the question: what are these companies actually doing to keep underage users off their platforms?

That’s precisely what eSafety Commissioner Julie Inman Grant asked the major social media platforms earlier this month. They have 30 days to respond, but the answer is already clear. With kids getting phones at younger ages, many are downloading apps intended for those 13 and older, and are lying about their age in the process. The safeguards in place are far from robust.

Even the major platforms concede that keeping underage users out is a losing battle. When Instagram paused its ‘Instagram Kids’ project in 2021—a version of the app specifically designed for users under 13—Adam Mosseri, the Head of Instagram, admitted that relying solely on age verification was not enough, advocating instead for a safer, controlled version of the app for younger users.

So, if the current measures are ineffective, what’s the solution? The federal government’s $6.5 million trial of ‘age assurance’ technologies is exploring a range of options to enforce age restrictions more effectively, from a digital ID to AI profiling and biometric analysis.

But in a draft open letter to the government, some Australian tech leaders criticised the trial as a ‘fundamental strategic error’, arguing that tech giants should be responsible for developing and enforcing age verification systems themselves. These companies, they said, should face severe penalties if they fail to comply—penalties that would compel them to figure out a solution.

The crux of the issue is how severe those penalties should be. The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regularly fines major platforms for violating COPPA, but with little impact. For example, TikTok and ByteDance have been accused of flagrantly violating COPPA by collecting data from children under 13 without parental consent. However, the $5.7 million fine imposed—a record at the time—was insignificant for a company with $16 billion in US revenue last year. The risk-reward balance remains skewed towards non-compliance.

Even if fines increase, platforms still face a fundamental challenge: verifying the age of children too young to have an ID. Platforms argue that others are better placed to solve the problem. Snap, for instance, has suggested that device manufacturers should handle age verification since they control the registration process when a new phone is activated. Meanwhile, Meta advocates for legislation requiring app stores to implement age verification tools, allowing parents to block children under 16 from downloading social media apps.

So, the social media platforms blame either the app stores or the device makers, who then point right back at the platforms. Perhaps it’s time for everyone to take responsibility?

China, unexpectedly, provides a model for how this could be done. Last year, Beijing mandated a coordinated effort across app developers, app stores, and device manufacturers to create a unified ‘minor’s mode.’ This framework enforces strict rules like age-specific screen time limits, mandatory breaks, and a curfew banning use between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. These measures are designed to close the loopholes kids have exploited, such as using their grandparents’ accounts to dodge restrictions and indulge in late-night gaming.

Being communist China, the approach extends beyond mere access restrictions. It segments children into age groups, prescribing the type of content they can access. Children under eight are limited to 40 minutes of screen time per day, with content strictly educational. Once they turn eight, their allowance increases to one hour, introducing ‘entertainment content with positive guidance’. It’s a grand piece of social engineering, rooted in a blend of paternalistic, Confucian, and Leninist principles, that appears designed to ensure the next generation grows up patriotic, productive, and in line with the party-state’s vision for the future.

Some Western critics have argued that while Beijing ensures a healthy digital diet for its own youth, it simultaneously exports platforms like TikTok to weaken the youth of other nations. As former Congressman Mike Gallagher starkly put it, ‘ByteDance and the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] have decided that China’s children get spinach, and America’s get digital fentanyl.’

The truth is, TikTok is just a more efficient delivery device for the same content available on any platform, regardless of ownership. While the CCP can influence TikTok’s algorithm, they’re not force-feeding us digital fentanyl; the real issue is our own failure to implement safeguards that ensure a healthier digital experience for our kids.

We don’t need the state to socially engineer or force our children onto a strict ‘spinach’ digital diet, but we can certainly take a page from Beijing’s playbook and force all the stakeholders in our digital ecosystem—from app developers to app stores and device manufacturers—to co-operate, so we can build a digital ecosystem that keeps young children off social media until they’re ready.

The software war: a quieter threat to Australia’s national security

Australia is waging a quiet yet critical battle on a new front—its software supply chains.

Attacks on this battleground infiltrate deep within the software development lifecycle, exploiting vulnerabilities in third-party components or open-source software. But unlike other kinds of attacks, the fallout easily extends beyond businesses to essential systems that can underpin our nation’s economy and security.

Recent high-profile breaches, like the Sisense and Okta attacks, show just how dangerous supply chain vulnerabilities can be. The approach is uncomfortably simple: embedding malware into software updates of trusted vendors that are then distributed across their customer network. Organisations, in effect, deliver the attacks to themselves. Once these updates are deployed, both to private sector companies contracted by government, as well as agencies themselves, they can silently undermine entire systems without any immediate signs of a breach.

What makes these attacks so dangerous is how stealthy they can be, sometimes remaining undetected for months or even years. So, when attackers finally act, they’ve already spread so far and into so many different organisations that no one is immune. What’s more, if we consider the possibility that they’re nation-state backed, there’s every chance that essential services Australians rely on every day can be disrupted. From energy grids to healthcare systems, even our national defences are placed at risk.

Australia’s vulnerability to software supply chain attacks is a growing concern at the highest levels of government. Even more so as technology becomes more ingrained in critical infrastructure. Former Australian Home Affairs minister, Clare O’Neil, even described cyber as ‘the fastest changing national security threat that our country faces’. The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner recent data breach report also highlights growing concerns over supply chain risks and breaches, revealing a significant number of multi-party incidents.

What this means is a breach in one software provider can ripple across multiple industries and government agencies. If a supply chain attack were to compromise software supporting key services, like healthcare or communications, the impact could be catastrophic. The Optus and Medibank incidents show just how vulnerable Australia’s systems are.

Software supply chains are as complex and interconnected as the highways that support our essential services. Just as road networks have multiple entry points, software ecosystems have countless side entrances—third-party components, open-source libraries and external vendors that can introduce vulnerabilities. For governments, securing these entry points is not just an IT challenge; it is a national security imperative. Tackling these daunting challenges demands defence from three distinct directions: education, continuous scanning and establishing trusted frameworks.

Government bodies, like other major organisations, must ensure that those managing the software supply chain, from developers to IT administrators, understand the risks. Clear guidelines are essential for sourcing software components, especially open-source code, and knowing under what conditions they should be used. Following the principle of trust but verify, public sector entities must rigorously vet any third-party code before it is deployed in critical systems, especially those underpinning essential services.

Open-source communities, in particular, benefit from this. Many solutions used in software supply chains come from open-source projects, and raising awareness about supply chain risks within these communities can help in safeguarding critical software infrastructure.

Continuous scanning also plays a huge role in identifying and addressing vulnerabilities across every layer of the software supply chain, from development systems to production environments. Automated tools can scan for known common vulnerabilities and exposures and flag issues before attackers can exploit them. It’s essential to scan not just the software itself but also the infrastructure and libraries that support it, a leave-no-stone-unturned defence posture. For government departments managing sensitive data and critical infrastructure, this level of attention should always be non-negotiable.

Finally, trust. To ensure software integrity, organisations should strongly consider adopting trusted frameworks and certifications that can guarantee a high level of care in the development, maintenance and distribution of software, well-known ones include the Cybersecurity Framework developed by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Supply-chain levels for software artifacts, a Google-developed framework, each setting rigorous security standards.

As the digital economy grows and Australia becomes increasingly dependent on critical infrastructure powered by broad software ecosystems, the stakes will only rise. IDC, a market intelligence firm, found that in 2024, with the frequency of cyberattacks increasing, Australia contributed over 25 percent of security spending, alongside India, across all the Asia Pacific, excluding Japan. But, without a concerted focus on securing software supply chains, even these investments might fall short of protecting our country’s digital assets.

Australia’s national threat response requires inter-governmental coordination

Cooperation between federal and subnational Australian governments on national security must continue to evolve in the face of the complex terrorism, espionage and foreign interference threats. 

The tensions exemplified by Canberra’s unprecedented 2021 decision to revoke Victoria’s Memorandum of Understanding with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2019—culminating in the enactment of the Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act 2020—highlight the misalignments that can occur. Establishing cohesive national security policies necessitates collaboration across all levels of the Australian government, particularly in light of ongoing developments such as AUKUS. 

Australia’s political system, shaped by its unique blend of US federalism and the British Westminster system, allocates sovereignty between the national and state governments. This federal structure has distinct advantages: it allows for policy diversity, accommodates varied regional perspectives, and enables state and territory (S&T) governments to tailor policies to local needs. However, this system also has its pitfalls, particularly regarding national security. The potential for divergence between federal national security and S&T economic priorities can lead to inconsistencies and national security vulnerabilities. 

Despite these challenges, a cooperative approach between federal and S&T governments offers several benefits. A unified strategy enhances national security and reassures public trust in the federation and Australia’s democracy. Collaboration creates a more formidable defence against external threats. It presents a unified stance to authoritarian regimes that would otherwise benefit from the creation of disunity and division. It ensures a proactive approach to addressing national security vulnerabilities and mitigating risks. 

A coordinated response to the AUKUS agreement, which involves substantial investments in South and Western Australia’s defence infrastructure, demonstrates how federal and state cooperation can bolster national security while promoting regional economic benefits. 

Historically, there have been instances in which S&T have pursued international relations that diverge from federal policy, creating friction. For example, Mark McGowan, then premier of Western Australia, visited China in April 2019. During this visit, McGowan focused on strengthening economic ties and promoting trade opportunities between Western Australia and China. This visit was controversial in the context of Australian foreign policy. The Australian federal government, particularly under then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison, was wary of China’s growing influence and activities in the region, particularly its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Some saw McGowan’s visit as challenging the federal government’s stance on China, which was increasingly critical of Chinese influence and involvement in Australian affairs. The federal government was concerned that state-level engagements with China could undermine a unified national approach to managing relations with Beijing and address issues like foreign interference and security. 

This challenge isn’t just about the S&Ts and their diplomatic efforts. The federal government, including the national intelligence community, must understand the drivers behind subnational diplomacy and play a proactive role in managing and guiding these engagements to ensure they align with national security priorities. 

The COVID-19 pandemic empowered S&Ts to make decisions independently of the federal government. While federal policies often address national concerns, they often fail to align with the immediate economic needs of individual states. For instance, the then-Victorian premier Dan Andrews criticised the federal government’s veto of its engagements with China, viewing it as neglectful of local economic interests. Similarly, Mark McGowan criticized federal figures for misjudging China’s importance to WA’s economy. Such tensions reinforce the necessity for a national security strategy that integrates federal and state priorities. 

S&Ts pursuing foreign policies independent of national policies risks creating security vulnerabilities. Authoritarian regimes may exploit federal systems to weaken national unity and erode democratic trust. As observed with Victoria’s MoU, foreign entities may view subnational agreements as opportunities to bypass or undermine federal policies. Such actions can create confusion and weaken the overall effectiveness of national strategies. 

A unified approach is essential for national security policies to succeed. Initiatives such as AUKUS require coordinated efforts from both federal and state governments. Additionally, programs like the US Force Posture Initiative, which includes several states, necessitate cohesive planning and execution. Effective national security strategies hinge on all levels of government working together to address emerging threats and challenges. 

Existing efforts to enhance cooperation, such as the Centre for Counter-Terrorism Coordination and the National Counter-Terrorism Plan, illustrate what can be achieved when federal and S&T governments work together.  

These initiatives provide a platform for sharing intelligence, coordinating responses and developing joint strategies—and they offer lessons for further improving cooperation. For example, increasing state involvement in national intelligence briefings and establishing dedicated channels for subnational diplomacy could improve coordination.  

As ASPI argued in our report last year on subnational diplomacy in the US alliance, the federal government should consider setting up a new branch within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade that focusses on subnational diplomacy and further consider appointing an Ambassador for Subnational Diplomacy. Granted, these measures could face challenges such as resource allocation, coordination with existing diplomatic structures (such as DFAT State Offices), and potential conflicts with federal foreign policy. Still, in spite of the challenges and the effort required, these initiatives could further bridge gaps between federal and state governments. 

A strong and unified approach to national security requires robust cooperation between federal and state governments. By enhancing coordination and communication, Australia can navigate the increasingly complex security challenges it will continue to face in the coming years. The success of national security initiatives depends on the kind of partnership in which S&T are not just recipients but active participants in national security policy. 

Closer defence partnerships can accelerate capability to the front line

Embracing partnership more widely across governments, the military, industry and academia can accelerate capability to the frontline, which enhances a nation’s deterrence posture.

The profound changes underway in the global security environment are clear. And this resurgence of great power competition and the increasing complexity of regional threats should prompt a rethink of defence acquisition and the evolution of capability through its life.

The Australian Government’s response to these threats is clear. The National Defence Strategy, Defence Industry Development Strategy and Integrated Investment Program articulate well the challenges, the Commonwealth’s priorities for addressing them and the indispensable role of industry in supporting the Australian Defence Force.

To navigate these changes effectively, we must move beyond traditional defence capability development and acquisition paradigms. The complexities of modern warfare, and the scale and pace of technological development in the defence industrial enterprise and beyond, require a more collaborative approach – one that leverages the strengths and expertise of multiple stakeholders: in short, greater partnership in capability acquisition and through-life management.

We need to strive for a partnership model in which all parties are focused on achieving outcomes, and work for the common good. From my experience, this can work in defence.

Enhanced partnerships in support of military capability are not merely an option for defence, they are essential to achieve the pace and combat effectiveness we need against today’s and tomorrow’s threats.

By forging partnerships beyond the traditional boundaries of government and military institutions, Defence will benefit from greater diversity of ideas, skills and experience. Partnering helps channel focus and energy on common goals and outcomes, and engenders sharing of knowledge, resources, and capabilities; this in turn results in more operationally effective and efficient capability.

Successful partnering requires an investment of time and effort. It requires participants to lead with the right culture and behaviours, and to focus on ‘the greater good’ and shared objectives. This demands openness and honesty about risks and issues, and being prepared to have uncomfortable conversations if needed.

To illustrate the benefits of partnering to accelerate capability to the frontline, let me highlight a few case studies that demonstrate potential impact on Australian defence capabilities.

First, the AUKUS arrangement of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States is a prime example of how strategic partnerships can enhance defence capabilities. Through AUKUS, Australia is gaining access to cutting-edge technologies, including nuclear-powered submarines that significantly bolster Australia’s defence. This partnership strengthens naval capabilities, reinforces its position within the Indo-Pacific region, and enhances its strategic deterrence and operational reach.

AUKUS will foster greater collaboration and knowledge-sharing. It will help drive continuous improvement and innovation by sharing lessons from national and collective capability development and sustainment. And done well, it will bolster national resilience and industrial sustainability.

As an example, we embarked a number of years ago on a sovereign skills program that brings QinetiQ employees from Australia to the UK for several months to participate in live test and evaluation environments. This knowledge transfer helps our employees learn about our global test and evaluation capability so that they can return to Australia and provide the organic sovereign test and evaluation capability this nation needs.

A second example is high-energy laser systems. QinetiQ is working with Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Group to co-develop a state-of-the-art laser directed energy weapon that can be deployed across a wide range of operational environments.

The program, announced in April 2023, sets a timeline for the completion of a technology demonstrator by the end of the first quarter of 2025—reflecting a commitment to delivering a timely, functional and effective system that meets the needs of the Australian Defence Force.

This partnership is a strategic move to integrate DSTG’s sovereign technology with QinetiQ’s advanced global capabilities, accelerating the development of a future-ready defensive system for Australia.

Finally, QinetiQ announced the formation of ‘Team TECSA’, a collaboration bringing together Australian industry and academia in response to the government’s National Defence Strategy and Defence Industry Development Strategy, which has identified test and evaluation, certification and systems assurance (TECSA) as one of the sovereign defence industrial priorities.

The National Defence Strategy calls for an ‘all of nation’ response. Team TECSA brings together industry and academia to build the workforce and infrastructure necessary to rapidly enhance Australia’s defence test and evaluation enterprise.

Initiatives such as this demonstrate how industry can collaborate to make genuine progress and bring together a prime’s global capability, workforce, infrastructure, and innovation with local industry to combine capabilities, resources, and collective know-how.

This approach to collaboration and integration provides Defence with the opportunity to accelerate its enterprise plans; increasing the pace of delivery, improving capability outcomes, driving efficiencies; and fostering innovation.

Real partnering and meaningful collaboration require a significant change in national and industrial behaviours. Clearly this is easier said than done—but it can be done. Governments, the military and industry must demonstrate a greater willingness to engage more broadly based upon a foundation of trust and a partnering approach for the good of the enterprise.

If we get it right, we have the opportunity to create greater stability and higher collective economic growth.

As a former US Secretary of Defence, once said, ‘You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.’

One can easily substitute ‘capability’ for ‘army’ into this statement.

An improved approach to partnering will accelerate capability to the frontline. Time is of the essence—the threat is real, and we must be ready.

Indonesia’s new cyber force needs to be planned, not rushed

The intent of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) to establish a Cyber Force needs to be supported, but not rushed.

In response to the recent hacking of TNI Strategic Intelligence Agency data in June 2024, the TNI commander, General Agus Subiyanto, declared that he would expand the TNI structure to include a new cyber force. Other government leaders, such as the then-chief of the TNI Information Center Maj. Gen. R. Nugraha Gumilar, claimed that the information obtained by the hacker was outdated, thereby attempting to downplay the event. Subiyanto took the incident as quite a slap in the face for the TNI, reacting almost immediately.

The process to establish this new force began quickly. At a joint session of the House of Representatives and the Regional Representative Council on 16 August 2024, the chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), Bambang Soesatyo, suggested the creation of the service. If created, the cyber force would become the fourth force after the army, navy, and air force.

This decision should be welcomed, as strengthening cybersecurity in Indonesia is a must. Indonesia has experienced a significant increase in cyberattacks since the beginning of 2024. According to the Indonesian-based civil society organisation on digital rights, SAFEnet, the frequency of events has doubled compared to data from the same period last year. Despite this, in Southeast Asia region, Indonesia is placed behind Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in assessments of its cybersecurity capability level by the National Cyber Security Index. Indonesia’s vulnerability is what led to a failure of the TNI to protect itself.

However, before going further, the TNI needs to weigh up a few vital issues. The establishment of this new force must be comprehensively examined through consultation with various parties, especially relevant experts.

Given predictions that it will consume quite a substantial amount of the military budget, the establishment of the cyber force should not hamper the modernisation of the TNI’s main weaponry system, as this equipment will define Indonesia’s deterrence and active combat capabilities far into the future. Furthermore, Indonesia is currently failing to meet the minimum essential force. Without the right amount of personnel, the cyber force will be a hollow shell from the very start.

Next, the TNI needs to establish clear lines of demarcation and communication with existing institutions that deal with cyber security, most especially the civilian agencies. The Ministry of Communication and Informatics and the National Cyber and Crypto Agency must work closely with this new force. It’s crucial that the establishment of the cyber force does not create any overlap of authority between institutions, which would become a cyber vulnerability itself.

To avoid overlapping authorities, new legal and updated frameworks are necessary. The TNI Law, the National Defence Law, the Law on the Management of National Resources for National Defence (PSDN), and the Presidential Regulation on the organisation of the TNI must all be amended. Moreover, the cybersecurity and cyber resilience draft bill, which will fortify protection and security regulations for all data, will require additions based on changes to the other laws.

Finding the right personnel for the force will be an issue as well. While the TNI might find the number of people easily, it will be initially difficult to assess quality. Cyber and military culture are often opposed to one another, meaning the more experienced individuals in the cyber field might initially baulk at the thought of being in uniform. Finally, the TNI will be actively competing with multiple parties in recruiting and retaining qualified cyber personnel. The TNI will need to provide a competitive offer to potential recruits to attract the most qualified personnel and will have to tailor it to the culture it seeks to engage with directly.

It will also be crucial for the government to set clear boundaries on the powers of the force itself in order to uphold human rights and prevent encroachment from the military into civil spaces. There are concerns that the force’s projected offensive ability to control cyberspace will hinder people’s critical voices and freedom of expression. Should threats arise, whether domestically or internationally, this force—like all military forces—can be used against its own people in times of crisis.

In preparing for the establishment of a cyber force, Indonesia can look at Australia, which recently officially established a new cyber command. This command is designed to strengthen the ADF and work across its existing services. The equally-recently signed Defence Cooperation Agreement between Australia and Indonesia provides the perfect platform for Indonesia to explore the process of establishing their cyber force as the ADF sets up its own. In doing so, it can avoid many of the pitfalls before they ever happen.

Is the establishment of a cyber force a pressing need? Yes. Is it ambitious? Yes. Can it fail? Yes—if it is rushed.

NT construction industry report holds lessons for Defence

Last week, the Industry Capability Network in Australia (ICN) released the second edition of its Northern Territory’s Construction Industry Mapping Report. As the Australian Department of Defence prepares to unleash a wave of construction projects on the area, both public and private sectors must understand the region’s construction industry landscape to deliver the major projects desired during this increasingly busy period.

ICN began with the simple goal of connecting buyers and sellers. Over time, it has developed into a network of state and territory-based analysts, managing thousands of transactions and substantial business volumes each year. ICN’s functions now include supporting major procurement programs through in-depth data analysis and capability mapping. This not-for-profit organisation, funded by government and industry, provides critical expertise in pre-qualification, procurement and supply chain analysis, underpinned by direct involvement in significant projects.

The construction industry in the Northern Territory is a cornerstone of the regional economy. Substantial infrastructure requirements and the demands of a globalised export market drive it.

ICN’s Report offers an essential tool for understanding and engaging with the Northern Territory’s construction sector, particularly in defence construction. It provides a detailed analysis of the local industry’s capabilities, capacity and qualifications. Its conclusions highlighted the region’s capacity to meet future project needs and emphasising the importance of tailored procurement strategies to leverage local expertise fully.

What distinguishes this report from others like it is its foundation in first-hand experience and the reassurance it provides through this approach. Unlike mere data aggregation from public sources or artificial intelligence models, ICN’s unique advantage lies in its deep-rooted, hands-on engagement with local industries and its involvement in early-stage procurement discussions. This approach ensures the report’s reliability and relevance to stakeholders.

ICN-NT has had extensive involvement in high-profile projects. The $40 billion Ichthys liquid natural gas project, one of the largest gas projects in the world, as well as the $550 million Larrakeyah/Coonawarra Facilities Upgrade and the $1.6 billion Tindal Air Force Base upgrade for Defence stand out as preeminent examples. This involvement provides it with insights into the Northern Territory’s construction landscape, enabling ICN-NT to map the region’s industry accurately.

Dick Guit, chair of ICN-NT, emphasises that capability mapping is vital for understanding market potential, which is crucial for planning new programs. This approach builds on broader economic analyses, such as the Billion Dollar Partnership Report by Master Builders NT from the previous year, which provides a comprehensive overview of the construction industry’s contribution to the Northern Territory’s economy.

Guit underscores the importance of structuring procurement processes to align with local business capacities. This strategy is crucial for ensuring project success, maintaining social license in 2024 and beyond, and making stakeholders feel included in the planning process. It ensures that the unique capabilities of local businesses are fully utilised, fostering a sense of collaboration and shared success.

ICN’s Report assesses local construction capacity relative to anticipated demand, including major Defence projects and other significant developments on the horizon. Its methodology involved scrutinising procurement structures for prominent projects like the Tindal Air Force Base program, HMAS Coonawarra, and the Charles Darwin University City Campus.

Procurement was segmented into 75 standard work packages across six categories: Building/Tier Contractors; Site Preparation and Early Works; Mechanical, Electrical and Plumbing (MEP); Structural Works; Fit-out and Internal Works; and Specialist Services. When Northern Territory businesses are mapped against these categories, the results are notable:

–68 packages had more than 10 capable businesses.

–Five packages had between six and 10 capable businesses.

–Two packages had one to five capable businesses.

Over 750 local businesses were identified as key players in the construction sector. The report concludes that the Territory possesses robust capabilities across all essential work packages. That robustness could start to falter, however, if procurement structures are not adapted to foster local competition.

It is for this reason that successful procurement depends on a nuanced understanding of the local market. If procurement is designed correctly, Territory contractors are well-equipped to deliver; a point well illustrated by the Territory’s proven track record in executing projects exceeding $500 million.

The Northern Territory’s construction industry is highly capable and ready to address the demands of the forthcoming works program. The ICN report offers Defence and other stakeholders a comprehensive understanding of the sector. Now, they need to utilise its findings to ensure that they enjoy further project successes.