Sovereign data: Australia’s AI shield against disinformation

Any attempt to regulate artificial intelligence is likely to be ineffective without first ensuring the availability of trusted large-scale sovereign data sets.

For the Australian government, AI presents transformative potential, promising to revolutionise the way in which government departments and agencies operate. The allure of AI-driven efficiency, precision and insight is irresistible. Yet, amid the chorus of AI evangelists, a discordant note rings true: establishment of robust AI policy guardrails now would be premature and potentially counterproductive without first addressing the fundamental issue of sovereign trusted data.

This contentious stance is rooted in the understanding that trustworthy AI hinges on the availability of trusted large-scale data sets. Without this bedrock, current attempts to regulate AI could end up being built on quicksand and become ineffective in mitigating the menace of misinformation and disinformation. Proposed Australian regulations are focusing on privacy requirements, labelling of AI-generated work, the legal consequences of AI choices and understanding how the software makes decisions.

AI, in its essence, is a data-driven phenomenon. The algorithms that power AI systems are not imbued with inherent intelligence; rather, they learn and evolve through ingestion and analysis of vast quantities of information. The quality, accuracy and representativeness of this data directly influence the performance and trustworthiness of the resulting AI models. In the absence of robust, verifiable data, AI can purvey misinformation, amplifying biases, perpetuating stereotypes and undermining public trust. Such risks are particularly acute for government agencies, for which stakes are high and the impact of erroneous decisions can be far-reaching.

Regulations that are not grounded in the realities of data quality and provenance risk being toothless and easily circumvented by those seeking to exploit AI for nefarious purposes.

Australian sovereign data is data that is owned, controlled and governed within Australia’s borders. It is subject to Australian laws and regulations, ensuring its collection, storage and use adhere to the highest standards of privacy, security and ethics. This control is crucial in mitigating the risks of foreign interference, data manipulation and the spread of misinformation. By maintaining sovereignty over the source data, the Australian government can ensure that the AI systems it deploys are built on a foundation of trust and transparency.

Sovereign data empowers Australian government agencies to build AI models that are tailored to the unique needs and context of the nation. By training AI systems on data that accurately reflects the diversity and complexity of Australian society, we can ensure that these models are not only effective but also equitable and just. Furthermore, sovereign data fosters transparency and accountability, allowing for independent scrutiny of the data and algorithms that underpin AI decision making. This transparency is essential for building public trust in AI and ensuring its responsible use in government.

Establishing trusted large-scale sovereign data sets is undeniably complex. It requires overcoming four challenges:

—Data Collection and Integration. Gathering comprehensive, high-quality data from disparate sources across government agencies is a logistical and technical challenge. Data must be standardised, cleaned and de-identified to ensure its usability and protect privacy.

—Data Governance. Robust data governance frameworks must be established to ensure data quality, security and ethical use. This includes defining clear roles and responsibilities for data management, implementing access controls and establishing mechanisms for addressing data breaches and misuse.

—Expertise and Resources. Building and maintaining sovereign data capabilities will require significant investment in infrastructure, technology and skilled people. Data scientists, analysts and governance experts are essential for ensuring effective management and utilisation of sovereign data.

—Cultural Shift. A cultural shift towards data-sharing and collaboration is needed across government agencies. Breaking down silos and fostering a culture of open data can accelerate the creation of comprehensive, multi-dimensional data sets that reflect the complexity of real-world challenges.

Despite these complexities, several countries have made significant strides in establishing sovereign data capabilities. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a prime example, setting a global standard for data privacy and control. India’s push for data localisation and its efforts to build a national digital infrastructure also highlight the growing recognition of the strategic importance of sovereign data.

The concept of sovereign data linkages with trusted nations also presents an opportunity for Australia. By establishing secure and mutually beneficial data-sharing agreements with like-minded and aligned countries, Australia could expand its access to high-quality data while maintaining control and ensuring ethical use. Such linkages would require careful negotiation and robust governance frameworks to ensure data privacy, security and alignment with shared values.

The Chinese government’s unfettered access to vast amounts of citizen data, coupled with its willingness to deploy AI for surveillance and social control, raises serious concerns about the future of AI ethics and governance. Australian collaboration with like-minded nations can counterbalance China’s AI ambitions.

Responsible and effective deployment of AI in Australian government is not merely a technical challenge but a strategic imperative. Sophisticated sovereign data sets can provide the bedrock for trustworthy AI, mitigating the risks of misinformation and disinformation while unlocking the full potential of AI for public good.

How giant China looms over tiny Palau’s economy

Palau is finding itself increasingly entangled in China’s economic web—in many cases, it seems, because Beijing is controlling investment and business links with the strategically critical Pacific nation of 18,000 people.

Beijing is using tactics such as creating dominance in tourism, making empty investments in real estate, bribing local politicians and sending Chinese organised crime to Palau. Its economic influence becomes political influence as local leaders consider local jobs, incomes and infrastructures when making decisions.

It’s no exaggeration to say that the scale of China’s involvement in the Palauan economy poses a challenge to the sovereignty of this US-aligned country.

Tourism dominance

Over the past two decades, Palau grew increasingly dependent on Chinese tourism, only to suffer heavy repercussions when Beijing withdrew that business.

In 2008, Palau received 634 Chinese tourists, less than 1 percent of all visitors. By 2015, the number had skyrocketed to 91,000, or 54 percent.

But, in response to Palau’s continued recognition of Taiwan, China banned state-backed package tours to the country in 2017, and the COVID-19 pandemic further upended the tourism industry. Because 40 percent of Palau’s gross domestic product comes from tourism, the disruptions seriously affected the economy. To compensate for lost business, Palau has had to campaign for direct flights and visitors from elsewhere.

Most recently, China issued a travel warning for Palau, citing concerns over ‘frequent safety cases’. The action looks like retaliation for Palauan accusations of China being behind a March cyberattack on the country’s financial systems.

Since China issued the warning, the number of Chinese tourists coming to Palau has plummeted to barely 25 percent of all visitors. While it is still too early to predict how this will affect Palau’s economy in the long run, China is likely sending a strong signal that acting against its interests will be neither unnoticed nor without consequence.

Buying up land

Investment in Palauan real estate from China has increased since the early 2000s. An increasing number of Chinese nationals or businesses have bought leases for buildings and land of 50 to 99 years. They include businesspeople linked to the Chinese Communist Party. In many cases, no land development has followed the purchase of these leases, with many properties having been abandoned entirely. Lessees’ intentions remain unclear, but by locking up valuable land in long leases, these individuals hold substantial control over economic development on the island. If Chinese investment continues to grow at an unchecked rate, then businesspeople and officials from China will likely have leverage over Palauan economic decision making.

Some investors appear to be advertising in China to sell Palauan land. In 2017, a Chinese website advertised available housing in Palau, promising returns up to 20 percent.

A Chinese law reportedly allows any land owned or leased by a Chinese national to be used for intelligence purposes, so Chinese nationals’ ownership of properties presents special opportunities for Beijing. That would challenge US military goals in the region.

Monetary inducements

Bribery is also part of China’s efforts at gaining sway in Palau. China appears to be using criminals to gain influence over Palauan officials and politicians.

In a well-publicised letter to an undisclosed US senator in February, President Surangel Whipps personally expressed concern over China’s inducements aimed at Palau generally. He described how China had promised economic benefits to Palau in exchange for severing ties with Taiwan, including hotel investments, increased tourist numbers and provision of US$20 million per year for a call center in Palau.

Crime by Chinese nationals

Since 2019, Palau has experienced a large increase in Chinese organised crime and drug trafficking, with illegal gambling surging in popularity.

On New Year’s Eve in 2019, 165 people, mostly Chinese nationals, were arrested in as such activities were shut down. By June 2020, four more illegal gambling operations were shut down. There are still several suspected illegal gambling operations in the country, most staffed by Chinese nationals. Authorities have determined the organisations’ leaders to most likely be tied to Chinese crime syndicates, such as the 14K triad based in Macau.

Similarly, methamphetamine trafficking from China and the Philippines to Palau has increased exponentially over the past two decades. Contributing factors include the extreme smallness of Palau’s Narcotics Enforcement Agency, made up of merely eight people. Also, corruption among law enforcement officials allows for intercepted meth packages to go uninvestigated while drugs that aren’t linked to syndicates, such as cannabis, get busted.

As Palau grapples with the economic fallout from reduced Chinese tourism, rising corruption and escalating Chinese national linked organised crime, its sovereignty hangs in the balance. Especially as it nears its November 2024 presidential elections, the US must recognize and address these vulnerabilities to reinforce its commitment to Palau, as failure to do so could result in a significant shift in the region’s geopolitical alignment.

Broadening strategic reliance to signal Australia’s resolve against China

To signal resolve to China, Australia must develop and clearly communicate a broadened strategic reliance on Indo-Pacific partners.

One of the most challenging aspects of Australia’s relationship with China is finding new ways to signal our interest in keeping the region open and free. Central to that is our willingness to develop meaningful strategic partnerships with other regional countries.

This task is complicated by Beijing’s habit of seeing Australian interests as aspects of alliance relationships, particularly the Australia-US alliance.

While automatic alignment of Australian and US interests in China’s strategic thinking has long been annoying, it has not until recently become something we need to actively change.

Through words and actions, Canberra needs to more clearly show China that Australia is willing to strengthen our alliances and forge new strategic partnerships outside of them, and that must include open acknowledgement that few of the problems China poses can be solved without a broader collective.

Our ability to deal with Beijing’s bilateral pressure-and-release tactics is not in question. Australia has withstood long-term economic coercion from China. At the same time, it has strengthened defence and security cooperation with the US through agreements such as the United States Force Posture Initiatives. This, alongside the advent of AUKUS and its promise of a more impactful regional security role, speaks volumes about the resilience of Australia and its alliances.

This does not mean, however, that China’s leaders understand the resolve and longevity of Australia’s regional partnerships.

At the 2024 Pacific Island Forum meeting, leaders agreed to remove an accurate reference to Taiwan as a ‘development partner’ from its communique. This followed coercive and intimidatory behaviour from China’s ambassador to the Pacific, despite China being only a dialogue partner rather than a forum member.

While countries such as Australia likely viewed fighting the concession as not being worth the battle, Beijing will now see it as a precedent for all minilateral and multilateral groupings; the collective backdown will reinforce China’s belief in its ability to dictate who cares about what and with what degree of commitment.

Once such a view is formed institutionally in Beijing, it is very difficult to change.

Another such view is China’s characterisation of Australia as a subordinate partner within the Australia-US alliance. Premier Li Qiang’s June meeting with Prime Minister Anthony Albanese showed that China’s leaders believe that Australia’s blind allegiance to the alliance is leading us to do things we don’t really want to do. If only we were savvy enough to think this through for ourselves and brave enough to say ‘no’ to Washington more often, our future would be much brighter—so their assumption goes.

Even if China’s leaders don’t genuinely believe this to be the case, it is problematic, if only because it feeds the deputy sheriff characterisation that we need to move past.

Canberra’s public framing of its regional security cooperation strategy matters. Considered communication around our broader strategic reliance will not only help to shift domestic narratives; it will also signal our resolve to China and reaffirm our regional presence.

Take Australia’s enhanced defence and security cooperation with Tokyo. It is and should be framed as the product of a trusted partnership—one that is evolving in response to China’s destabilising behaviour and the associated risks to our shared values and mutual strategic interests.

Australia doesn’t need a formal alliance with Japan to have shared interests and values, or to develop critical capabilities and maintain a strong desire to keep the region from being dominated by a single actor. Similarly, Indonesia’s non-aligned status does not (and should not) stop us from wanting to strengthen defence and security ties, as the recent signing of a new bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement shows.

It is telling that such a significant step could be taken against the backdrop of Jakarta’s initial reservations about AUKUS and Canberra’s uneasiness with president-elect Probowo’s stated intention to work with Russia on civil nuclear energy and conduct bilateral military exercises with China.

But this is a sign of the times. Unlike the old days where a single irritant—such as whaling in the Japanese case—would colour the entire relationship and set back defence and security cooperation for years, all countries in the region are looking at what is happening around them and see a need to work together in ways that serve larger interests. There is a kind of strategic lightness of touch in the way that most regional actors are now thinking that is allowing cross-cutting and unlikely partnerships to form quickly.

Consistently expressed comfort with the concept of broader strategic reliance will position Canberra to make the most of these opportunities while subverting China’s firmly held expectations.  That works for Australia.

Somaliland is where India can counter China in east Africa

India should develop closer relations with Somaliland, especially by using its port. This could provide India a valuable tool for countering China’s influence along the eastern coast of Africa.

In looking for access to the Red Sea, India should avoid overcrowded Djibouti and opt for Somaliland’s port of Berbera. Berbera handles 1/10 as much traffic as Djibouti’s port, but it is growing, thanks to investment by Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which are new members of the BRICS grouping and key partners for India.

India has frequently deployed anti-piracy patrol boats and warships to the Gulf of Aden, north of Somaliland, to maintain stability in the region. As India strives to gain more influence, Somaliland itself could become India’s strategic lynchpin.

Somaliland’s location and history hold key advantages for India. A breakaway region of Somalia, it controls an 850km coastline along the Red Sea, and Berbera is one of Africa’s busiest ports. Before a civil war destroyed Berbera, the British used the port to connect Ethiopia with India. And earlier this year, Ethiopia signed a historic deal with Somaliland to gain commercial and military access to the port.

In developing closer relations, India would be joining Somaliland’s growing network of partnerships. In striking contrast to Somalia and many other African countries, Somaliland is relatively stable and has been a democracy for more than 30 years. Despite being broadly unrecognised as a sovereign state, it has begun partnering with many countries. Its capital, Hargeisa, hosts consulates of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Turkey, as well as liaison offices of Britain, Denmark, the UAE, Egypt and Kenya.

India and Somaliland already share strong trade relations. Somaliland imports various goods from India: food, petroleum, gas, machinery, building materials, apparel, tobacco, pharmaceuticals and cars. India is one of Somaliland’s major trading partners by container volume, along with the UAE, China, Turkey, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.

Berbera port’s impressive operations and location within Africa make it a strategic asset for India. Last year, Berbera ranked even above Kenya’s port of Mombasa in the World Bank’s Container Port Performance Index.

It is also well placed for India to establish a naval base. From it, India could counter Pakistan’s attempt to spread Islamist extremism in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the regional influence of the Chinese army, which has a base in Djibouti.

Closer ties with Somaliland could also strengthen India’s relationship with the UAE, which has invested US$300 million in expanding Berbera port and the nearby free trade zone. Among other extensive investment and aid to Somaliland, the UAE is co-developing the Berbera Corridor with Ethiopia to connect that landlocked country to the port. In return for such help, Somaliland will allow the UAE to establish an air and naval base in Berbera.

The UAE has already docked ships at Berbera, about 250km south of Yemen, where the Saudi-led coalition that includes UAE troops was recently fighting Houthi rebels.

Because Ethiopia and the UAE became members of the BRICS in 2023, closer collaboration with them could enhance India’s status within grouping and provide opportunities for accessing Berbera port. Ethiopia is leading the way by shifting all its commerce to Berbera.

Crucially, a stronger bond with Somaliland would help India counter China’s influence in the region. In 2020, Somaliland recognised Taiwan. It continues to support Taiwan diplomatically, despite intense pressure from China and lobbying by members of the opposition Waddani Party. However, given the small size of its economy and lack of broad diplomatic recognition, Somaliland will not be able to resist China’s influence for too long—unless India shows up.

If India established a stronger economic presence in Somaliland, it would benefit Indian businesses and enhance Somaliland’s prosperity. As African countries increasingly seek to extricate themselves from China’s debt-trap diplomacy and look for alternatives, India’s growing engagement in the region could inspire other fence-sitters to eschew finance from China.

India must revisit its Africa strategy and partner with other like-minded countries to counter China’s influence in the region. Closer relations with Somaliland are crucial in developing a pax-India—a zone of influence for India—along the east African coast.

Nitazenes threaten to unleash a new Australian opioid crisis

Nitazenes, a group of potent synthetic opioids, are fuelling a global overdose crisis, with rising fatalities across Europe and North America. In Australia, nitazenes are only just making their mark, from hip inner-city nightclubs to needle exchanges. Australia faces an urgent threat that has the potential to fuel organised crime, increase overdoses, destabilise communities and create a new generation of people with an addiction.

The government must take decisive action to safeguard public health and take harm-reduction measures.

Understanding the nature of opioids is crucial to grasping the potential implications of a rapid take-up of nitazenes in Australia.

Natural opioids, derived from the opium poppy, interact with the brain’s receptors to block pain and elicit euphoria. Opioid abuse affects the brain’s limbic system, leading to a reliance on these drugs for emotional regulation, as well as increased risks of overdose and death.

Developed in the 1950s, nitazenes were never approved or marketed for medical use due to their extreme toxicity. Their reemergence can be traced back to the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan. The Taliban first cracked down on opium production in 2000, implementing a strict ban that drastically reduced poppy cultivation. This ban led to a shift in the global heroin supply chain. Opium production in Myanmar rose in response, and so too did production of synthetic opioids in China. After the Taliban returned to power in 2021, they again cracked down on opium in 2022. This time the gap is being filled almost exclusively by a surge in Chinese production of synthetic opioids production, particularly nitazenes.

Over the past three years, nitazenes have surfaced on the streets of major cities in North America and Europe. In Britain, an estimated two people die each week from nitazenes overdoses, and the crisis is worse still in the US, where thousands of Americans are dying from overdoses each year.

In Australia, the precise scope of nitazenes use remains difficult to determine. Though the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission has yet to find substantial evidence in wastewater analysis, a small number of cases have emerged since 2021. Coronial data reveals at least three overdose deaths linked to nitazenes in Victoria alone. In the same period, the Australian Federal Police and Australian Border Force have intercepted shipments. It is clear that this threat is no longer a distant concern.

Australia’s illicit drug market doesn’t always follow global trends. The North American crack epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s devastated communities, where this cheap and highly addictive form of cocaine fuelled a crime and health crisis. The idiosyncrasies of Australia’s drug markets, law enforcement approaches and geographic isolation helped to limit the spread of crack cocaine. Its relatively strong public health policies and lower demand for cocaine further limited negative effects.

The danger of nitazenes may be due to unintentional consumption. Globally, dealers often mix nitazenes with heroin and counterfeit pills, creating lethal cocktails. They do so because nitazenes, being strong, are imported by organised crime groups in much smaller quantities than other drugs. They’re harder to detect and offer larger profits. Substitution of non-opioid drugs by nitazenes dramatically increases risk of accidental overdose.

At the same time, many dealers may be unaware of what they are selling, and users often don’t know what they’re taking.

The priority for any government response should be harm minimisation. The government should consider expanding access to the life-saving medication naloxone and providing comprehensive training on its use. Naloxone rapidly reverses opioid overdoses by blocking opioid receptors in the brain and thereby preventing fatal respiratory failure. Its wide distribution is crucial to public health because it provides immediate, accessible intervention during overdose emergencies.

Drug testing and screening services are also critical in addressing nitazenes. Such services allow users to identify dangerous substances in their drugs, helping to prevent accidental overdoses. Users can make safer choices, and the public health risks associated with unintentional exposure to highly toxic substances is reduced.

The Australian government should implement broad drug testing and screening services to safeguard public health and effectively mitigate the risks posed by these emerging threats.

Implementing comprehensive education on safer drug use practices, alongside personalised treatment options for those with opioid use disorders, will be essential in mitigating the risks associated with these potent synthetic opioids. Furthermore, fostering improved public communication that is free from stigma can encourage individuals to seek help and raise awareness about the dangers posed by nitazenes.

Without swift and comprehensive action, we risk plunging into a nitazenes-driven overdose epidemic.

Pacific initiatives need transparency and ground rules to reduce harmful competition

It’s time for the Pacific to talk about ground rules in the security sector.

The Pacific Response Group (PRG) is expected to be endorsed at this week’s South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting in New Zealand. For this group, and the recently announced Pacific Policing Initiative (PPI), to succeed, participants must agree on ground rules concerning the training received and the type of equipment used by participating nations.

Australia doesn’t have to lead the way in setting these rules, but it should encourage the conversation. China will probably try to delegitimise these initiatives and turn the conversation into one about competition and paternalism. Australia should push back against such statements.

Ground rules are needed to ensure greater interoperability and effectiveness between the forces. If Pacific countries are to spend time, effort and resources on these regional security initiatives, all participating countries must be willing to have the tough conversations to make them work.

Greater security effectiveness is the primary reason for clear ground rules. There is no need for duplication of effort from multiple partners for training or equipment. Such duplication would only cause confusion between the different approaches in practice. Many Pacific countries have said they can be easily overburdened by offers of assistance that aren’t filling gaps.

Groups participating in the PPI should be receiving the same training, and when they’re in training, they should use the same equipment as they would when deployed in the region under these security initiatives.

These ground rules in question shouldn’t be designed to be extensive, burdensome or restrictive for relationships. They should be practical in creating mutual understanding of where additional external support is not needed. For example, the training that PPI participants receive at the Pinkenba facility in Australia or in any of the future regional centres of excellence shouldn’t be duplicated by other partners through other initiatives. At the same time, militaries participating in PRG operations shouldn’t use communications equipment that is incompatible with the rest of the group.

Nor should these ground rules infringe on the sovereignty of any country or its ability to have a security partnership with other countries. The goal should be to facilitate cooperation on areas that doesn’t impact these larger concerns. However, these mutually agreed upon ground rules should come with understood consequences. Failure to comply with them would hurt the initiatives underway and by extension the security of the rest of the participating Pacific nations. There needs to be regional commitment to the success of these initiatives.

While such discussions are likely already happening behind the scenes, there should be greater public awareness of them. Transparency helps those being supported by these security initiatives to understand how and why they are being developed, which will also combat external efforts to undermine their success. Pacific leaders will need to step up to take ownership of some of these decisions. Equally, Australia, as a member of these initiatives,  should encourage and support these efforts to agree on ground rules for the acceptance of external assistance.

Unfortunately, China will challenge any discussions of this sort. It tries to undermine the advancement of any partnerships between Australia and the Pacific, even when they benefit the region. This has already been demonstrated by China’s attempt to prevent the endorsement of the PPI by Pacific leaders. Chinese narratives seized on statements by Australian ministers that they are in a state of ‘permanent contest’ with Beijing and see ‘no need for Chinese police’ in the region to paint the PPI as a deceptive Australian-led initiative designed to control the region and block China out of the security space. The contest with China cannot be allowed to interfere with the development of these Pacific owned and led initiatives that are designed to provide enormous benefit to the region. If anything, China’s attempts to stymie these initiatives prove the necessity of the ground rules.

Australia’s current strategy appears to be to lay low and try to avoid stirring up trouble or concern in this area. It’s likely the Australian government believes that if it’s not outspoken, it’s less likely to offend other Pacific leaders or have its actions be portrayed as competitive. Instead, Australian leaders presume that these conversations can be handled behind closed doors. But that strategy isn’t working, especially when China doesn’t play by those same rules. There is an information void, at the very least in public communications, and China is seeking to exploit that void to promote its own narrative and agenda. Clear ground rules and public conversation will narrow the information gap.

Ground rules on accepted training and equipment will reduce the kind of competition between external powers that harms regional development, and they will allow region-owned security initiatives to reach their full potential.

The new Gang of Four

The Gang of Four was the name given to four senior Chinese officials closely associated with some of the Cultural Revolution’s most radical features. They lost out in the power struggle that followed Mao Zedong’s death, after which they were arrested, convicted of various crimes and imprisoned.

Fifty years later, a new Gang of Four has emerged: China, Iran, North Korea and Russia. This grouping is not a formal alliance committed to defending one another. But it is an alignment driven by shared antipathy toward the existing US-led world order and features mutual exchanges of military, economic and political support.

This Gang of Four seeks to prevent the spread of Western liberalism domestically, which they see (correctly) as a threat to their hold on power and to the authoritarian political systems they head. They also oppose US leadership abroad, including the norms the United States and its partners embrace, above all the prohibition on acquiring territory by the threat or use of force.

The gang’s mutual support takes several forms. On the eve of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, China signed an agreement with Russia declaring that their mutual friendship had ‘no limits’, while Russia expressed support for China’s position vis-a-vis Taiwan. Since then, China has echoed Russian talking points about the war in Ukraine, blaming NATO for it and amplifying Russian misinformation.

In the economic realm, China has opposed war-related sanctions against Russia, is the world’s largest importer of Iranian oil and has long subsidised North Korea. Militarily, Iran has provided missiles and drones to Russia, North Korea has provided artillery shells and China seems to have provided dual-use technologies and industrial inputs with military applications that the US and its allies have tried to keep out of Russia’s hands. Russia has reportedly reciprocated by assisting these countries in improving their nuclear, missile, or submarine programs, and by sharing intelligence about Western weapons systems gleaned from its war with Ukraine.

Unfortunately, no single or simple policy will suffice to counter this alignment. There is no diplomatic opportunity to exploit divisions between them, in contrast to the early 1970s, when the US leveraged Sino-Soviet tensions to draw China toward the West. Further complicating matters, China is fundamentally different from the other three. It is integrated into the global economy and a major trading partner for many countries in the Western security orbit. Efforts to isolate China economically or to use trade and investment to shape its behaviour will have limited impact.

China also stands alone among the four in seeking not to overturn the existing international order so much as to bend it toward its foreign-policy goals. Iran, North Korea and Russia are far less integrated into the global economy, though they have one another as a source of imports and markets, and Iran and Russia have other trade partners. India remains a major purchaser of Russian energy and arms. Dozens of so-called Global South countries have refused to condemn Russian aggression in Ukraine or support sanctions against Russia.

North Korea is the most isolated of the four, but its vulnerability to sanctions is limited by China’s interest in preventing it from collapsing, fearing instability on its border and a united Korea tied to the West. Russia, given its reliance on North Korean artillery, will also likely provide Kim Jong-un’s regime with greater assistance.

To confront this challenge, the US, in coordination with South Korea, could explore relaxing sanctions in exchange for steps by North Korea to limit the scale of its nuclear and missile programs. Close ties between the US and South Korea should work to discourage North Korean aggression.

Russia, for its part, must not prevail over Ukraine. This requires maintaining long-term military support for Ukraine while extending security assurances and European Union membership, all of which would signal to Vladimir Putin that he is wrong to think that he can outlast the West. This would not bring peace, but it could set the stage for diplomacy that ends the fighting and preserves Ukraine’s independence. Standing up for Ukraine also demonstrates to China that it should not expect a free hand with Taiwan.

In the case of Iran, the long-term priority must be to ensure—through diplomacy or the threat or use of military force—that it does not develop nuclear weapons. The immediate goals should be to rein in Tehran’s support for its havoc-wreaking proxies across the Middle East (admittedly easier said than done) and to prevent the Israel-Hamas war from spiraling into a regional conflict (which Iran may not want, given its domestic challenges).

China presents the most complicated challenge of the four, owing to its strategic ambitions and willingness to use its economic heft and military might to achieve its objectives. Dialogue, deterrence, and, at times, reassurance will be required to influence Chinese behaviour and leverage its interest in maintaining access to technology and markets.

The US and its partners need to assume this new alignment will persist and potentially deepen. That should not preclude diplomatic contacts, which are a tool, not a favour. Diplomacy reinforces the message that the US goal is policy change, not regime change, if only because regime change is beyond reach and could encourage even less restraint among the Gang of Four.

US and Western influence will also reflect US and Western strength. This implies the need to repair defence industrial bases across the US, Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and to enhance and integrate military capabilities to account for the possibility of a multi-region conflict. Moreover, the West must create supply chains for critical goods that do not rely on these four countries.

The US also must modernise its nuclear arsenal in response to China’s massive nuclear buildup (and North Korea’s relentless one) and the possibility that the New START agreement with Russia will expire in 2026. At home, the US ought to reduce its soaring debt (now higher than its GDP) and prevent its political divisions from interfering with its international commitments.

But the principal tool for countering the Gang of Four is an effective counter-alignment. Fortunately, it already exists in the web of alliances and partnerships in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The challenge for the US is to provide the presence and predictability that such relationships require. For America’s partners, the challenge is to contribute more toward common defence and to coordinate policy to meet shared challenges—including those posed by the Gang of Four.

The outlook for Prabowo’s defence and foreign policy—and his choice of ministers

Prabowo Subianto, who will assume Indonesia’s presidency on 20 October, will be much more his own defence and foreign minister than was his predecessor, Joko Widodo (Jokowi). And he’s likely to rebalance policy in favour of national security over economic development.

But the ministers who take those portfolios will also exercise great influence, and Prabowo’s choices for the position are key issues for Australia.

Given his strong interest in foreign affairs and national security, Prabowo has been vocal about his views. He believes in the importance of military strength and that national security is integral to economic prosperity. As Indonesia’s current defence minister, he spearheaded efforts to modernise the military. As president, he aims to continue that focus, working towards boosting the defence budget from 0.7 to 1.5 percent of GDP by 2029, building indigenous defence capabilities, boosting technology transfer and facilitating joint production deals with partners such as France and South Korea.

While he had not expressed a foreign policy vision too distinct from his predecessors’, as defence minister he was also more understanding of Australia’s decision to enter into the AUKUS arrangement. This was in contrast to the concern expressed by the foreign ministry that AUKUS would feed into a regional arms race. In the past, he has also criticised the Jokowi government’s response to Chinese incursions into the Natuna Sea and the use of Chinese labourers in Indonesian infrastructure projects, though he also has demonstrated an ability to look the other way on China.

A president’s interest in foreign affairs and national security will not necessarily shift Indonesia’s foreign policy orientation. But it may help to address a longstanding issue with the absence of a centralised hub on foreign and defence policy under Jokowi. Jokowi’s lack of interest on foreign affairs led to fragmented policy execution, as his own disinterest facilitated bureaucratic competition.

But the ministers under Prabowo will not be passive implementors. While they will take guidance from him, they will be tasked with the tough challenge of managing the expectations of both the president and the ministries and agencies that they lead.

While many ministerial posts are being given to coalition partners, Jokowi is likely to appoint close confidants to the key four offices of the state: minister of home affairs, minister of foreign affairs, minister of defence and minister of finance.

On foreign affairs, the two leading candidates are Sugiono and Meutya Hafid, both of whom accompanied Prabowo during his August trip to Canberra. Sugiono is currently one of the deputy chairs of the First Commission of the House of Representatives, which deals with foreign policy, defence and security issues. The low-profile Sugiono is a longtime Prabowo loyalist and a Gerindra party stalwart.

Meutya Hafid chairs the First Commission. A journalist-turned-politician, she became an Indonesian household name after being kidnapped by Jaish al-Mujahidin in Iraq in 2005. Since 2019, her role as First Commission chair has afforded her the opportunity to lead the commission’s agenda to scrutinise the Jokowi government’s foreign and defence policy. She is also an alumna of the University of New South Wales, so she has a direct link with Australia.

Another candidate who is not a career diplomat is Fadli Zon, a prominent culturalist and parliamentarian who has been a close confidant of Prabowo’s going back to the 1990s. Fadli is known for his fiery and nationalist rhetoric, having raised concerns associated with the Jokowi government’s deepening economic engagement of China and its handling of the South China Sea disputes, particularly during Jokowi’s first term, when Prabowo was in opposition.

Other potential candidates for foreign minister include career diplomats Arif Havas Oegresono and Abdul Kadir Jailani, ambassador to Germany and director general for Asia-Pacific and African Affairs respectively. Indonesia’s permanent representative at the United Nations, Arrmanatha Nasir, is also known to be in the running. Even if these individuals do not become foreign minister, one may become vice-foreign minister, given that their bureaucratic and diplomatic experiences are crucial to support a ministerial appointee from outside the foreign ministry.

Any non-diplomat who became foreign minister would be the first to do so since 2001.

None of these candidates has proposed a distinctive vision of Indonesia’s foreign policy publicly, and it remains unlikely that we will see a strong departure in Indonesia’s approach—unless Prabowo demands it.

He is also likely to appoint a close confidant as minister of defence, who will need to administer and manage Prabowo’s ambitious goals for the armed services during his presidency.

The leading candidate for defence minister is Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, who served as vice-defence minister under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Sjafrie, a close associate and former military academy classmate of Prabowo, has been an adviser to the incoming president during Prabowo’s stint as defence minister. Privately, Sjafrie has already been introduced to some foreign leaders as a prospective defence minister. However, there is also the possibility that Sjafrie may be assigned to other important roles in government, such as minister of the state secretariat or head of national intelligence.

Other potential candidates for defence minister are Lieutenant General Muhammad Herindra and Air Marshal Donny Ermawan, who are deputy minister of defence and secretary-general of the Ministry of Defence, respectively. Both have worked closely with Prabowo and have been instrumental in implementing his vision for defence.

Making predictions is always risky. We are less than a month from Prabowo’s inauguration, and the horse-trading is likely to continue till the day he comes into office.

As important as Ukraine is, a Taiwan war must be Australia’s biggest worry

Other than the Middle East, the world faces the possibility of two major wars escalating in Europe and East Asia, over Ukraine and Taiwan.

Australia must worry about either of those wars, but ultimately it’s the possible loss of Taiwan to China that could be the front-and-centre issue for our national security.

Ukraine and Taiwan each face a military threat from a large neighbouring great power that is nuclear armed. In Ukraine’s case, Russia has already invaded, and the two have been at war for more than two-and-a-half years. In Taiwan’s case, communist China’s President Xi Jinping is making increasing threats that China should integrate Taiwan, and he reserves the right to use force to occupy it.

In Russia’s case, Putin is bogged down in a slow war of attrition, which he did not expect. And he is making increasing threats of the use of nuclear weapons. Ukraine’s recent occupation of Russian territory in the Kursk oblast (region) is the first time that a non-nuclear power has invaded the territory of a nuclear superpower. One of Putin’s self-proclaimed advisors, Sergei Karaganov, has recently said, ‘Any attack on our territory must get a nuclear response.’

There are, however, some obvious differences between Ukraine and Taiwan. First, Ukraine is an internationally recognised independent state, and we should remember that post-communist Russia recognised it as such in the 1994 Minsk Agreement.

In the case of Taiwan, there is no such recognition that it is an independent country. To the contrary, nearly every major power in the world does not recognise Taiwan as a separate independent nation state. Even so, more than 70 percent of Taiwanese identify themselves as being Taiwanese—not Chinese.

This leads us to another significant difference. Ukraine cannot yet be recognised as a full democracy free from corruption and having an independent judiciary. Quite the opposite. After Ukraine became a separate country, it suffered prolonged instability and violence due to the rise of oligarchs and widespread corruption involving criminal gangs. Corruption continues to be a major impediment against it joining the European Union.

By comparison, Taiwan is not only a much longer established democracy, but it does much better in surveys about corruption and has a basically independent judiciary.

Both these countries have a chequered recent history. Ukraine declared its independence from Russia in 1990. Yeltsin was so anxious to be president of a separate Russia that despite being reminded by one of his senior advisers to raise the issue of Crimea with the new Ukrainian president, Leonid Kravchuk, Yeltsin hastily remarked that Crimea could be settled later.

In January 1994, Ukraine agreed to cease being a nuclear power; it transferred 1300 strategic nuclear warheads to Russia in exchange for security reassurances from the US and Russia about Ukrainian sovereignty. Had Ukraine retained some nuclear weapons, it would probably not have faced the humiliation of being invaded by Russia.

In Taiwan’s case, it was effectively under ruthless martial law from 1949 under the dictator Chiang Kai-shek until the demise of the KMT single-party system and the rise of the democracy movement in the 1980s. Martial law was eventually lifted by Chiang’s son, president Chiang Ching-kuo, in 1987, and constitutional democracy was restored.

We have now seen a vibrant democracy in Taiwan with routine, peaceful changes of government over the past 37 years. The success of democracy in Taiwan has contradicted an old assertion that Chinese people, including those in Singapore and Hong Kong, would never be able to make democracy work properly.

This brings us to the crucial issue of all-out military contingencies involving the survival of both countries and their differing strategic implications for Australia. In the case of Ukraine, the big question is what Australia would do if Russia’s war with Ukraine escalated into a full-blown military confrontation between Russia and NATO. From a moral and international legal perspective, there would be pressure on us to make some sort of contribution. But Ukraine is not in our region of broader strategic concern in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, if the war in Europe were to escalate to include Russian attacks on neighbouring NATO members, such as Poland and the Baltic countries, it would involve high intensity land-based military conflict for which the Australian Defence Force is not structured. We could make no more than a limited military contribution.

But such an escalated European war might create an opportunity for China to attack Taiwan. China could perhaps attack Taiwan at the same time as Russia expanded its war to neighbouring NATO countries. Although Taiwan itself is not in Australia’s area of immediate strategic interest (Southeast Asia and the South Pacific) a successful conquest of Taiwan and defeat of America by China would raise potentially first-order strategic threats to Australia, and our own survival as a fully independent state, for the following reasons.

First, if China decisively defeated the United States in such a war, then there might be nothing to stop China from expanding southwards and establishing military bases in our immediate vicinity. And a beaten US might retract into one of its historic phases of isolationism. Australia would then be strategically isolated and without a protector. Southeast Asia and the South Pacific would effectively come into China’s sphere of influence.

Second, such a shock defeat of the US would have grave consequences for Japan and South Korea. It would involve them conceding sea and air control of the East China Sea and the South China Sea to China. A China commanding the island of Taiwan would have military dominance over the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. A new China-centric geopolitical order would then most likely prevail throughout East Asia. Such a crisis might reasonably drive Japan and South Korea into acquiring a reliable retaliatory nuclear strike capability of their own.

Third, Australia would have to consider where its future lied under the jackboot of a dominant Beijing. Without the US alliance and our critical access to American intelligence, surveillance, targeting, weapon systems and world-beating military platforms, we would no longer have credible military capabilities. Would we then retreat into a neutral posture with only the pathetic remains of a credible military force?

Fourth, the truly nightmare scenario would be a conjoining of Russian military successes against contiguous NATO members such as the Baltic countries and Poland with China’s defeat of America over Taiwan and the resulting dominance of Japan and South Korea. This wicked brew then drums up the ultimate contingency of an all-out nuclear war.

Those Australians who carelessly proclaim that the United States is finished, that China will inevitably dominate the entire Asia-Pacific region and that our only survival will be to get out of the ANZUS partnership need to think again. Theirs is a value-free world where we would be on the receiving end of communist China’s dominance.

So, in the event of a US war with China over Taiwan, what could Australia contribute? Our defence force is of a modest size but we have considerable potential to defend ourselves if, instead of just waiting for AUKUS submarines, we rapidly acquire sufficient long-range anti-ship missiles with ranges of more than 2000km.

We would, however, require access to airfields and ports—for example in Okinawa, which is less than 600km from Taiwan. But a more credible military mission for us would be to deny the narrow straits of Southeast Asia (Malacca, Sunda and Lombok) to China’s maritime traffic—including the 80 percent of its oil imports.

The purpose of this analysis has been to demonstrate the dangers of listening to those who focus only on the risks of resisting and deterring China. Instead, my analysis here concentrates on the dangers of not resisting and not deterring China.

Moreover, when strategic push comes to shove, we need to recognise that, unlike Ukraine, Taiwan may become directly important in our defence planning priorities. Even so, we do have a strong national interest in seeing Ukraine liberated from Russia’s illegal invasion and we should do what we can to bring that about.

Exclusive: Inside Beijing’s app collecting information from Belt and Road companies

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs operates a secure digital platform that connects it directly with Chinese companies operating abroad, requiring participating companies to submit regular reports about their activities and local security conditions to the government, internal documents reveal.

The documents obtained and verified by ASPI’s China Investigations and Analysis team show how the platform, called Safe Silk Road (平安丝路), collects information from companies participating in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy initiative. The BRI has facilitated Chinese infrastructure projects and other investment in more than 100 countries, particularly developing regions. The Safe Silk Road platform was initially launched in 2017 and is now used by at least dozens of Chinese companies across several continents.

By tapping into the extensive network of Chinese companies engaged in projects around the world, the platform demonstrates how Beijing is finding new ways of improving its global information and intelligence collection to better assess risks, and ultimately protect its interests and its citizens, even in the most remote corners of the world. The Safe Silk Road platform is one more building block in the growing global infrastructure that seeks to place the Chinese government at the center of the Chinese experience abroad, and that replicates some of the structures of information collection and surveillance that have now become ubiquitous within China.

The MFA’s External Security Affairs Department (涉外安全事务司), which operates the Safe Silk Road, has said the platform is a direct response to the difficulty of obtaining information relevant to Chinese companies abroad. The information the app collects feeds into the department’s assessments. The platform is also part of a trend across Chinese government ministries of creating apps to facilitate some of the work they were already doing.

ASPI is the first organisation to report on the Safe Silk Road platform. It is mentioned on some regional Chinese government websites but has not been covered by Chinese state media. The platform operates through a website and an associated mobile app that can only be accessed with registered accounts.

The platform is not available for download in app stores. The documents state that the platform is only intended for companies’ internal use, and that users are strictly prohibited from circulating information about it online. Companies can apply for an account through the MFA’s External Security Affairs Department or their local consulate and, once approved, designate an official contact person within the company, called a ‘company liaison officer’ (公司联络员), who is authorized to submit reports and use the app’s full functionality. The MFA provides companies with a QR code to download the app and requires companies to use the platform’s bespoke VPN with the app and desktop version.

 

 

Companies are asked to submit quarterly reports through the app. Those reports include basic information such as the name, national ID number and contact information of the owner, the region in which the company operates, its sector or industry, the amount of investment in US dollars, the number of Chinese and local employees, and whether it has registered with a local Chinese embassy or consulate, according to internal company documents viewed by ASPI analysts.

The app has a feature called ‘one-click report’ for ‘sudden incidents’ (突发事件) that allows users to report local security-related incidents directly to the MFA, according to the documents and other materials. The reporting feature includes the following categories: war/unrest, terrorist attack, conflict between Chinese and foreign workers, protest, kidnapping, gun shooting, production safety accident, contagion/epidemic, flood, earthquake, fire, tsunami, and other. The user can then provide more information including date, location and other details about the incident.

The reporting form also asks the company to provide information about its ‘overseas rights protection object’ (海外权益保护对象) and ‘police resources database object’ (警务资源库对象). An ‘overseas rights protection object’ may refer to patents, trademarks, and copyrights held by the company; the Chinese government has made protecting the intellectual property of Chinese companies a key focus in recent years. ‘Police resources database object’ is a vague term that may refer to security contractors, Chinese overseas police activity, or physical assets or company personnel that need protecting.

Users can subscribe to real-time security updates for their region and register to attend online safety training classes. There is even a video-conference feature within the app that allows embassy officials to call the app user directly. It is common for foreign ministries to create digital services that provide information and security alerts for their citizens abroad—such as Australia’s ‘Smartraveller’, the US Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP), and China’s own ‘China Consul’ (中国领事).

The Safe Silk Road platform, however, is different. It is not public-facing, it is tailored specifically for BRI companies and, most importantly, it asks for detailed information from those companies about their own activities and local conditions, rather than just offering helpful information. For some companies, participation may even be compulsory.

ASPI’s analysis of the Safe Silk Road platform underscores Beijing’s determination to safeguard its global infrastructure and investment power play under the BRI. As China’s investment in developing regions has grown, so has Beijing’s emphasis on protecting its citizens, companies, and assets abroad.

As of December 2023, about 150 countries had joined the BRI. According to the official Belt and Road Portal, China has 346,000 workers dispatched overseas. BRI-affiliated companies often run projects in regions with underdeveloped infrastructure, high poverty, poor governance, lack of quality medical care, domestic political instability, violent crime, and terrorist attacks. Private security contracting companies are increasingly offering their services to Chinese companies abroad. The number of Chinese private security contractors has expanded dramatically in recent years as BRI companies have faced growing security challenges.

Several events over the past few years, including the pandemic and a string of attacks in Pakistan in 2021 targeting Chinese nationals supporting BRI projects, have underscored to Beijing the need for better security measures. At the third Belt and Road symposium in 2021, Xi Jinping said China needed ‘an all-weather early warning and comprehensive assessment service platform for overseas project risks’. The External Security Affairs Department said the same year that ‘the difficulty of obtaining security information is one of the major problems faced by companies who “go out”’, referring to Chinese companies that invest overseas. To address this concern, the department ‘launched the Safe Silk Road website and the related mobile app to gather information about security risks in Belt and Road countries to directly serve company personnel engaged in projects overseas’. The department said that in 2021 the app was used to disseminate 13,000 pieces of information, including more than 2,800 early warnings.

More broadly, the platform is illustrative as a digital tool to help Beijing protect its interests abroad. The External Security Affairs Department was established in 2004 in response to a perceived increase in kidnappings and terrorist attacks targeting Chinese nationals abroad, but its role in China’s security policy has expanded since then.

The department’s leading role in ‘protecting China’s interests abroad’ (中国海外利益保护) meets an objective increasingly found in official Chinese Communist Party documents and Chinese law. This objective appears in China’s National Security Strategy 2021–2025, the new Foreign Relations Law 2023, and new regulations on consular protection and assistance passed in 2023. The party’s ability and readiness to protect China’s interests abroad is considered one of the historic achievements of the party, according to a resolution it passed in 2021.

But the exact scope of China’s interests abroad is still a matter of debate in the public commentary among Chinese national security and foreign policy academics and analysts. Are China’s interests just the physical security of Chinese nationals and commercial or strategic assets in foreign countries? Or do they also include ‘intangible interests’ (无形利益), such as protecting China’s national image and reputation, and anything else that should be within China’s national interest as a major global power? How the Chinese government currently defines China’s interests abroad is probably somewhere in the middle, and may broaden.

China has a widely recognised deficiency: gaps in its overseas intelligence collection capabilities. Safe Silk Road is part of the toolbox that the External Security Affairs Department uses to extend the range and effectiveness of Beijing’s information-gathering and to better understand the situation on the ground everywhere that China has interests.