Australia’s ties with Taiwan have strengthened. They should strengthen more

It’s often hard work. It’s often in the face of ingrained habits of anxiety and suspicion. But Australia is steadily building closer links with that place that is in some ways its most natural partner in east Asia: Taiwan.

Rather than ‘place’, I feel tempted to write ‘country’. A few years ago, the embassy of the People’s Republic of China sent a polite and, in the end, slightly puzzled diplomat to explain to me mistakes in articles I’d written.

Foremost was that I’d referred to Taiwan as a country. I explained that readers might be perplexed as to what else to call a place that had its own constitution, elected its own leaders, printed its own money and defended its own borders.

Australians feel comfortable in Taiwan, however it’s described. It has a similarly sized population. It has an effective universal healthcare system. Visitors fly there without needing visas. Its indigenous population is about the same, proportionally—though with closer links culturally to Pacific islanders, who mostly derived from Asia via Taiwan. It was the first place in Asia to legalise same-sex marriage. It’s a comparatively egalitarian, middle-class place and generally the most socially progressive in the region. Its physical beauty mirrors that of New Zealand’s South Island, which it resembles a little topographically.

Of course, there’s a huge economic difference. Australia’s only world-leading industry is to discover, extract and export resources, which we do brilliantly. Taiwan’s is to innovate, develop and market the high-end semi-conductors used in almost every form of advanced activity and product in the world.

But that also means there’s big scope for joint endeavour, including in services, in which trade soared 50 percent in 2023. Overall, Taiwan became Australia’s sixth-biggest goods-and-services export market in 2023, while Australia became Taiwan’s fifth-largest import source. The prospects for further increases are high, with Taiwan’s GDP growth expected to reach about 4 percent for 2024. Mutual investment rose 24 percent in 2023 to $41 billion, split fairly evenly between the two, and with nine Taiwanese banks now operating in Australia, to which they have brought funds of $65 billion.

In early November, 11 Taiwanese biotech companies formed the biggest international delegation to participate in Australia’s largest life sciences conference this year, AusBiotech 2024, in Melbourne. Five of them are located at the Southern Taiwan Science Park, which coordinated the delegation.

In August, the 37th Australia-Taiwan Business Conference was held on Queensland’s Gold Coast, with more than 180 participants, almost a third from Taiwan. The theme of this year’s conference was ‘smart partnerships for a smart future’. It was organised by the Australia Taiwan Business Council, alongside its counterpart the Republic of China Australia Business Council, whose name reflects archaic pieties that Taiwan must retain to avoid being lambasted for seeking independence.

The conference featured major speakers and panels on critical minerals, energy transition, biotech, advanced manufacturing including defence and space, and cyber security. The speakers included Senator Tim Ayres, the assistant minister for trade and for a Future Made in Australia; Cameron Dick, the then deputy premier and treasurer of Queensland; and Donna Gates, the acting mayor of the Gold Coast. Three Queensland state and federal members of parliament participated, as did three parliamentarians from Taiwan.

Emerging business leaders made presentations, and plans are underway for an enhanced four-year program to build on this important network connecting young entrepreneurs and executives of Australia and Taiwan.

Next year’s conference is likely to be held in Taiwan’s lively second city, Kaohsiung, providing further opportunities for Australian businesspeople to deepen and broaden their Taiwan networks and commercial opportunities. The positive trend in the relationship would be enhanced considerably by the participation of Australia’s trade minister; it has been 12 years since a trade minister, then Craig Emerson, went to Taiwan.

Such a visit—especially if the minister is accompanied by a business delegation—would do much to further galvanise economic opportunities. Taiwan’s minister for economic affairs should also visit Australia with a business delegation.

In 2025, Australia will take the chair of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. There is therefore a strong case for Australia to encourage Taiwan to negotiate membership, and separately to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement.  However, Canberra’s overriding regional priority of stabilisation of the relationship with China makes such moves unlikely. But federally sponsored trade and investment missions—perhaps focused on areas such as biotech or green energy—would be a helpful alternative step.

In addition, a Future Made in Australia program might promisingly feature an agreement to foster the involvement of Taiwan tech companies in the development of critical minerals and rare earths processing in Australia.

Building such policy architecture would provide a helpful framework for the already promising commercial and cultural trends boosting connections between two natural regional partners.

Pro-Palau v Pro-Palau: the Pacific state’s election was essentially domestic

Actually, there were two presidential elections with geostrategic implications on 5 November. While the US elected Donald Trump again, the Western Pacific island state of Palau handed a second successive term to President Surangel Whipps Jr. 

The geostrategically interested will mostly notice that Whipps was the most pro-US candidate. The other candidate, former president Tommy E Remengesau, was also pro-US, just less so. So, actually, not a lot was immediately at stake geostrategically. 

Palau, independent but closely associated with the United States, is 1700km from the South China Sea. US military presence there is therefore growing, and China is trying hard to gain influence over the country. A tilt away from the United States that Beijing might eventually engineer would have strong security implications. 

But the concerns of outsiders were not the concerns of Palauans as they voted. For them, the choice of president was based on local issues—as shown by what the candidates campaigned on. And both candidates are better understood as having been, first and foremost, pro-Palau. 

With nearly all locally cast votes counted, Whipps leads Remengesau, who is also his brother-in-law, with 58.1 percent of the vote. Absentee ballots won’ t be counted until 12 November, but Whipps cannot now lose. In a statement on broadcaster Palau Wave Productions, Remengesau congratulated him on victory. 

As with most elections anywhere, the outcome in Palau was driven by issues affecting Palau, such as taxation, inflation, environmental conservation, crime and drug use. Another was emigration, since locals worry that too many of them are leaving their country of 18,000 people. 

Palauans were aware of their country’s international importance and of foreign views of the election. Chinese influence is not hidden, but it was not a campaign issue.  

Over the years, Whipps has often discussed the pressure China has put on Palau to cease recognising Taiwan. (Palau is one of only 12 countries that do so.) But he did not make the issue part of his campaign.

In conversations with Palauans during the campaign, I usually heard them say that the biggest issue was the high cost of living. Remengesau told voters it was caused by the 10 percent goods and services tax that Whipps introduced last year.  

Whipps pointed to international oil-price rises that followed Russia’s attack on Ukraine. He tried to explain the structure and effects of the tax. 

Whipps has proposed increasing the minimum wage to stem emigration. He wants to reduce the national marine sanctuary from 80 percent of its exclusive economic zone to 50 percent. That would address high fish costs, he says. 

Transnational crime and drug trafficking have been an especially prominent domestic issue, following two drug-related deaths in the past year, one of them a murder. 

Many of these issues have a foreign component: rising prices from Russia, foreign fishing in Palau’s waters, transnational drug trafficking, and emigration to affluent countries. However, that is not how Palauans look at these issues. They see prices they can’t afford, decreasing fish stocks, people leaving their homes and family members addicted to drugs.  

This domestic perspective is evident in Whipps’s longtime campaign slogan: ‘a kot a rechad er Belau,’ meaning ‘Palauans First.’  

This contrasts with most international media coverage of the election, which focused on its possible international consequences, such as the US losing one of its footholds in the Western Pacific. 

Still, the US and China do come up as political issues in Palau. Whipps is sometimes asked about increasing US military presence. His frequent response has been, ‘Presence is deterrence’—meaning that US forces being in Palau does not increase the likelihood of an attack by China but, rather, decreases it. 

In Palau, China is associated with domestic problems. Increasing tourism from China may again threaten Palau’s pristine environment. Malign actors from China have been intermingled with tourists, worsening Palau’s drug crisis and engaging in other criminal pursuits. Chinese investors have bought 50- or 99-year leases on much of Palau’s prime real estate, locking out commercial development. 

‘Presence is deterrence’ is equally relevant domestically. The US is helping with fighting crime and influence operations emanating from China. It has increased its diplomatic, national security, cybersecurity and law enforcement presence in Palau, with some success against those domestic threats. 

That’s very good for the US’s standing among Palauans. In the future, as in their presidential election, they’ll be thinking of Palau. 

It’s not just inflation. Contracting practices are also stifling construction

Inflation is ganging up with long-standing problems in our contracting and procurement systems to stifle construction, innovation and ultimately our economic future. 

While the Reserve Bank fights inflation, the government must lead reform in procurement practices, with the aim of ensuring that more potential contractors can bid for major projects. Indeed, this period of exceptional difficulty for project contracting should be the motivation for addressing inefficiencies in contracting that have damped construction activity for too long. 

High inflation is not merely making life uncomfortable for people generally. It is also shifting investment dynamics, potentially damaging economic performance and competitiveness. The 40 percent surge in construction costs since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic has dire implications for public and private sector investment. It threatens our infrastructure projects and thereby robs us of productivity gains and economic growth. 

The problem is acute in northern Australia, where construction costs have always been high and in the past few years have risen even faster than in the rest of the country. 

Inflation that outstrips growth in public finances diminishes the government’s ability to fund crucial infrastructure projects. Meanwhile, private industry, wary of somewhat unpredictable cost rises, must set higher elevated return thresholds, leading it to shy away from investment. 

This not only slows or prevents construction of facilities but also stifles economic growth. If infrastructure isn’t built, industries that need it won’t expand. 

This relatively recent inflation problem is overlayed on the stifling effect of long-standing contracting practices and procurement systems. 

Consider the example of government contracts. Often, governments engage architects and engineers to create detailed project designs then, in the tender phase, require contractors to warrant the buildability of the designs. This unreasonably gives bidders only a few weeks to evaluate a year’s worth of design work.  

The result? Many bidders inflate their prices to account for the uncertain risks; other companies simply choose not to bid. The result is less competition, which, in turn, drives prices higher, adding to inflation. 

Prerequisites imposed on contractors can also diminish competition. For instance, mandating unusually high levels of professional indemnity insurance may deter smaller subcontractors from participating in a project, again leading to fewer bids and higher costs. Punitive liquidated damages clauses further add to the financial burden and, again, compels bidders either to raise their pricing or withdraw from the tender process. 

The loss of competition has another effect: firms under less market pressure are less likely to innovate. And absence of small firms from projects is particularly damaging, because they are the greatest source of innovation. 

The complexities of the US Department of Defense’s contracting approach add yet another layer to this challenge. By favouring US firms and imposing compliance requirements that align with American requirements for lodging bonds to guarantee work they effectively shut many Australian companies out of lucrative opportunities. This not only limits the competitive field but also constricts the available talent pool, ultimately compromising the quality and efficiency of public works. 

Yet there is an opportunity here. The extraordinary additional stress on the major-projects sector created by high inflation should create the motivation for us to now reassess and refine contracting practices. A strong effort from the federal government to understand and mitigate the hidden costs associated with specific contractual clauses could revitalise competition, help mitigate immediate inflation and create permanent efficiencies. 

Moreover, by fostering an environment where a diverse range of contractors can compete, we may very well stimulate innovation. 

We need decisive leadership from policymakers. The Australian government must actively engage industry stakeholders in a dialogue about these issues, prioritising transparency and flexibility in contracting practices. This means re-evaluating the criteria that determine bidder’s eligibility for projects and making necessary adjustments to ensure that more companies—especially smaller, innovative firms—can be involved. 

Moreover, procurement processes should be streamlined to reduce the burdensome requirements that deter participation. By creating a more inclusive framework, we can not only enhance competition but also better position Australia for long-term economic growth. 

Australia should lead efforts to address online gender-based violence

Since the UN Security Council adopted the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda in 2000, the world has started to facilitate women’s participation in peace and security processes while protecting them from gender-based violence. But technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) is undermining these advancements. An October report by UN Women focussing on TFBGV highlighted an intensification of online misogyny and hate speech targeting women.

Australia should address this global phenomenon with a new bill and lead international efforts to improve transparency and accountability on major digital platforms. Proposed legislation to fight disinformation presents an opportunity to do this. The country should also be looking at further measures, such as promotion of digital literacy and participation of women in policy that pertains to TFGBV.

AI-enabled TFGBV, including doctored image-sharing, disinformation, trolling and slander campaigns affected 88 percent of women surveyed in UN Women’s report, with those in public-facing jobs systematically targeted. If no steps are taken, women may be deterred from meaningfully participating in public discussions and decision-making processes, known as the ‘chilling effect’. This is especially true for female politicians, journalists and human rights defenders who often face politically motivated or coordinated attacks.

Domestically, Australia has seen a positive trend in female representation in politics, with participation in state and territory parliaments increasing from 22 percent in 2001 to 39 percent in 2022. However, in a global ranking comparing the percentage of women in national parliaments, Australia has fallen from 27th place to 57th over the last 25 years.

TFGBV poses a direct threat to women’s participation in Australian politics. A 2022 study by Gender Equity Victoria revealed the prevalence of violent rhetoric and material mostly directed at women and gender diverse people. Prominent female politicians such as Julia Gillard, Penny Wong, Sarah Hanson-Young and Mehreen Faruqi have faced relentless online abuse, often involving implied threats of offline physical harm.

The impact of such abuse is often compounded for women who are religious or culturally and linguistically diverse. This discourages marginalised communities with intersectional backgrounds from participating in democratic processes.

Such harassment is not only deeply personal but widely damaging for Australian democracy. When women face a greater risk of gendered online harassment, fewer will pursue public office or meaningfully engage in political discourse. TFGBV is effectively forcing women out of key decision-making spaces and processes, risking the regression of women’s rights and freedom of speech.

The Albanese government’s recently tabled Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation Bill would grant the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) new powers to regulate digital platforms, with the aim of addressing harmful content while safeguarding freedom of speech. This aligns with the WPS pillars of protecting the rights of women and girls.

The bill presents an opportunity to tackle TFGBV as part of a broader approach to digital safety, especially as the growth of female representation in government may be at stake. By empowering ACMA to clamp down on disinformation campaigns that disproportionately target women, the bill could provide a crucial pathway for women to engage in public life without fear of TFGBV.

Additionally, the government must build resilience against TFGBV by establishing digital literacy programs that address online safety. These programs should educate the public on identifying digital threats, navigating online harassment and reporting abuse. Integrating TFGBV prevention into educational curricula and workplace policies could equip women to protect themselves online and encourage safer, more secure digital environments.

To address TFGBV proactively, the government also needs to increase female representation in cybersecurity, policymaking and technology governance. It should invest in initiatives that offer scholarships, mentorship programs and career development for women in STEM, with a focus on digital security. This would empower more women to participate in developing cyber policies and gender mainstreaming strategies and ensure that the gendered dimensions of digital security are fully considered.

Since TFGBV also stems from AI algorithm bias on social media platforms, Australia should lead international efforts to establish transparency and accountability standards for AI applications, including through UN Secretary-General Advisory Body on AI where currently Australia does not have any representation. It should require digital platforms to disclose AI applications, detect harmful content and protect users’ data. Additionally, Australia should advocate for measures that ensure algorithms do not inadvertently target women with harmful content or amplify misogynistic narratives.

In leading these initiatives, Australia can build on its WPS National Action Plan 2021-2031, which serves as a framework for efforts to enhance women’s participation in peace and security processes.

Given the borderless nature of digital spaces, Australia needs to collaborate with other like-minded partners to address TFGBV. Regional partnerships could involve information-sharing agreements, joint training on addressing TFGBV, and collaborative research on the trends of AI-driven gendered-harms and how to counter them. A united stance by Australia and its partners would bolster digital security for women, fostering a safer environment for women in public roles.

Northern deterrence demands full use of civilian infrastructure

Australia’s National Defence Strategy presents a central challenge to the ADF: deterring adversaries from projecting power through our northern approaches. To do this effectively, the ADF must maximise use of civilian infrastructure, particularly in northern Australia, where the local economy cannot always sustain necessary facilities alone.

A strong example of what needs to be done is making the most of Horn Island, in the Torres Strait.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the ADF mapped and assessed infrastructure across northern Australia. This initiative included extensive aerial surveys, satellite imagery and ground assessments, producing detailed maps of roads, bridges, ports, fuel storage, communication networks and more. Collaboration with government agencies and local stakeholders was key to ensuring accurate and valuable data, bolstering military readiness and community development.

However, by the late 1990s, shifting defence priorities and a focus on joint operations reduced these critical assessments, leaving gaps in our understanding of the infrastructure landscape that must now be addressed.

This landscape is rapidly changing with government and private infrastructure investment in northern Australia. And some old facilities—like those in Weipa, where dredging of the port will cease—are being decommissioned as commercial operations shut down, while others are nearing the end of their operational life.

Historically, Horn Island was a key military outpost, with two runways, ammunition storage and defensive installations. Today, it mainly supports regional commercial flights under the management of the Torres Shire Council. Its proximity to Papua New Guinea—makes it an ideal location for a forward military base.

Horn Island already has Jet A-1 fuel, commonly used by the RAAF, and a bulk fuel storage capacity of 600,000 litres at its pier. This infrastructure could be expanded to ensure the island remains self-sufficient during prolonged military operations, reducing logistical dependency that could hinder operational effectiveness and enhancing local resilience.

One of Horn Island’s most significant advantages is its ability to improve the capabilities of Cairns and Townsville within a unified northern defence posture. While Cairns serves as a naval hub for patrol boat operations, Horn Island could act as a forward support base, extending these vessels’ operational range and endurance. Using Horn Island for resupply and maintenance, patrol boats from Cairns could sustain longer missions in the Torres Strait and other northern waters. Its airfield could also extend the ranges of both crewed and uncrewed aircraft.

Maintaining Horn Island’s civilian airfield is commercially justified, but enhancing it may not be. The types of infrastructure that Defence could use for military purposes would no doubt also bolster community resilience across the Torres Strait Islands. But who would pay for such improvements?

The issue applies to much of northern Australia’s infrastructure. The ADF cannot reasonably be expected to alone pay for infrastructure development throughout northern Australia.

As a first step, the ADF must recommence systematic data collection on the region’s infrastructure. A comprehensive understanding of the infrastructure landscape is essential for ensuring operational readiness and resilience. By mapping existing facilities and assessing their capabilities, Defence can identify gaps and determine how best to enhance the strategic use of these assets.

Regular use of such infrastructure will not only enhance the ADF’s readiness but will also contribute to the viability of essential services in northern Australia. These benefits reinforce the argument for investing in upgrades, ensuring that Defence commitments align with local community needs.

The Australian government must adopt a holistic approach to the ADF’s requirements, prioritising ongoing maintenance of critical infrastructure that can support both military and civilian demands, especially in areas where commercial viability is limited. Such foresight is not merely a matter of defence strategy; it is an investment in the social and economic fabric of northern Australia.

By leveraging civilian infrastructure, Australia can significantly enhance its military capabilities and deterrence. The time for action is now, and a collaborative effort among Defence, government and local communities is required.

Houthis’ lesson for the US Army: how a land force can fight a maritime war

The US Army should consider borrowing a page from the playbook of Yemen’s Houthi militants.

The character of war is always changing, and the Houthis’ ongoing attacks against shipping in the Red Sea may prove to be one of the more significant inflection points in military history.

The change involves sea control and sea denial through the application of long-range precision missile fire and autonomous drone employment from the shore. The Houthis effectively blend a mix of anti-ship ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and one-way attack drones to contest control over maritime lines of communication in the Red Sea littoral. They have so far damaged at least 30 merchant ships, sunk two and killed or detained several merchant sailors.

The US Army should aim for much the same capability in a contested littoral environment against an adversary such as China. Technically and tactically, the service is moving in this direction, but it needs to fully embrace the strategy to avoid becoming largely irrelevant in the major war in which the US is most likely to become involved. Army heavy formations almost certainly won’t be available in the initial fighting in a Western Pacific war.

The army can draw on efforts that are already underway in the US military. It can, for example, take inspiration from the US Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept, in which ships are widely separated but act in unison. Army units might operate similarly in the Western Pacific.

The navy is developing DMO for forces that find themselves in combat against an adversary, such as China, that can detect, track and attack US and allied assets at great distances with a variety of different weapon systems.

The army’s own Typhon or Strategic Mid-Range Fires (SMRF) program, in which it is fielding its Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs) and navy SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles for strike missions, should contribute, as should research into drone technology by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

In a maritime war in the Western Pacific, the army would likely have to operate on distant island bases and attack shipping in much the same way the Houthis are doing from the interior of Yemen. Geographic dispersal will be a vital aspect of survivability in the next war.

The SMRF program is already well adapted for shore-based sea control operations. So is the army’s new Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), in which units are tailored to specific theatres for long-range precision effects, including cyber, electromagnetic warfare and precision strike using weapons systems like PrSM and SM-6.

The army should apply the DMO concept to SMRF-equipped MDTFs and deploy them on bases outside the First Island Chain, the string of islands from Japan to Indonesia that hems in China.

This forward presence would contribute to integrated deterrence by forcing the Chinese military to cope with multiple operational dilemmas. It would, for example, have to track multiple distant targets simultaneously and defend against firing batteries distributed across the Western Pacific. Those batteries would demand attention because they’d have the range and lethality to strike and destroy high-value targets throughout the region.

A key aspect of Houthi operations has been the use of one-way attack drones—in effect propellor-driven cruise missiles that are extremely cheap and numerous, presenting unsustainable economic challenge, given the cost of defensive interceptors like SM-2s and SM-6s. Here too, the US Army can learn from the Houthis and adapt to use similar tactics. DARPA’s work, for instance, on offensive swarming drones will be a vital advance in how US thinks about and executes offensive maritime operations and sea control or denial.

To Houthi tactics, add strategic mobility. Here, the utility of the US Air Force’s heavy airlifters comes into play. They can deploy ground units almost anywhere that has even a rough airfield, greatly reinforcing the army’s ability to participate in an island-based maritime war. US and allied exercises should routinely practice rapid loading and unloading of systems such as HIMARS missile launchers on and off C-130 Hercules cargo aircraft.

A valuable effect of such exercises would be honing interoperability between US services and between them and allied militaries. Indeed, highly capable US allies, such as Australia, should play a major role in how the US Army and broader joint forces think about fighting in the Western Pacific.

The US Army and allied forces can achieve a war-altering advantage if they learn from and apply the Houthi tactic of controlling the sea from the shore with inexpensive drones and long-range precision strike weapons and if they blend this technique with air mobility.

The Houthis are unlikely teachers but teachers nonetheless. Houthi operations have demonstrated that shore-based sea control and sea denial can be highly effective. They have shown how the US Army and US partners and allies should incorporate new tactics and weapons systems into their forces before the next war comes.

We did well last time. Here’s how Australia should work with Trump again

Australia managed the first presidential term of Donald Trump as well as any nation. Now it can also manage the second term well.

In doing so, we must work with friends in our region to ensure that the Indo-Pacific remains the main US strategic focus. That also means stressing to Trump and his team that Ukraine’s survival is an Indo-Pacific priority.

Trump will demand more of allies, and we should revel in doing more to attend to our own security and that of others.

In 2017, Australia quickly understood that invoking its long friendship with the United States was not enough in dealing with the then newly elected Trump. He expected to see ongoing efforts in helping the US with its burdens. And we could show that: we had begun, in the national interest, taking stronger security measures against China and were paying an economic price for them.

It helped, too, that we were increasing our defence budget. Altogether, our relationship with the United States actually strengthened during Trump’s first administration.

In his first term, Trump turned US strategic attention decisively towards China. This was deeply in Australia’s interest. The US focus on the Indo-Pacific has continued through the administration of President Joe Biden, and we want it to continue in the coming Trump term.

It was also in the interests of such friends as India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, and still is. So, we should together send the reminder to Trump and his team that the Indo-Pacific is the main game, particularly because China is the captain of the totalitarian Axis.

In the face of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea working together, we should heed Edmund Burke’s clarion call of ‘when bad men combine, the good must associate else they will fail one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle’.

Vitally, Australia and its friends, including other Five Eyes members, should ensure Trump’s team knows that what happens to Ukraine matters for all of us. Trump and his future vice president, JD Vance, have campaigned on quickly stopping the war in Ukraine.

Australia cannot be silent on how damaging a victory for Vladimir Putin would be for Indo-Pacific countries, which would lose trust in the US and its allies and fall into fatalistic acceptance that China will dominate the region.

North Korea’s entry into the fight may have been the turning point needed to ensure the Trump team knows that Ukraine cannot be isolated from Indo-Pacific interests and that a victory for Putin would be a victory for his no-limits partner, Xi Jinping. This victory would be a setback for Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, Australia and the US itself.

Trump’s decision in his first term to compete with China included economic action, setting the West on a path away from policies that misjudged trade and financial links with China as proof of stability.

There can be no stability when the Axis regimes’ routine is destabilisation. They sometimes pause their campaigns, not in good faith but to seek compromises from us while they reload for their next phase of attacks on global rules.

So, we should work with the new Trump administration to further reduce economic dependence on China. For that, Trump has the right instincts.

He has the right instincts on China’s exploitation of the information domain, too. Australia should encourage him to continue what he started in applying sanctions and tariffs on the Chinese tech sector.

Australia and the US must strive together to counteract China’s abuse of the information domain to divide our nations, turn them against each other, undermine our democratic institutions and shift the global order. The tech sector and digital world should be high on the Australian list for engagement with the Trump team.

Both AUKUS and NATO are vital and must be strengthened. The US’s partners within those groupings will need to show Trump they are pulling their weight.

AUKUS should thrive, since Britain and especially Australia are already spending on it and will spend more, deepening their cooperation with the US. NATO members will likely start with a lesser goal of just keeping their alliance together. Most will have to prove they will not fall back into military slumber, leaving the US to do everyone’s job.

For them, Australia and other US friends in the Western Pacific, Trump’s expectations will mean, above all, that they must spend more on defence. They should do so willingly.

Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru’s foreign policy adviser, Takashi Kawakami, said recently that an America that demands more from allies could be an opportunity for Japan to become a ‘truly independent country … and create an environment that allows Japan to defend its sovereignty with its own strategy against foreign forces.’

It’s an argument that Australia should consider. It doesn’t mean isolation and terminating alliances with the US but, rather, strengthening ourselves to strengthen those alliances. We become stronger individually and collectively.

How Europe should woo Trump

Donald Trump’s re-election as US president is a shock to Europe, which is woefully unprepared. His promised protectionism threatens the European Union’s struggling export-led economies, and his transactional attitude toward NATO endangers Europe’s already feeble security. Ukraine could soon be sacrificed to Russia, and by emboldening nationalist fellow-travelers such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Trump may cause EU unity to be further undermined from within.

Shell-shocked Europeans will be tempted to hunker down and hope that Trump does not make good on his most extreme policies: slapping blanket tariffs on European exports, abandoning Ukraine and quitting NATO. But this would be a catastrophic mistake. Europeans must swallow their pride and try to win Trump over.

There is some hope in Trump being unpredictable, inconsistent and susceptible to flattery. He often stakes out aggressive positions as a negotiating strategy, the goal of which is to clinch a deal that he can trumpet as a victory. He craves admiration and respect, and he hates looking weak. Europe’s strategy should capitalise on these features of his personality.

Three points stand out. First, personal diplomacy is paramount. The worst way to engage with Trump is to rely on bureaucratic, policy-oriented, rules-focused EU institutions. Instead, European leaders need to establish positive personal relations with him—just as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did just after Trump won the 2016 presidential election.

The ideal person for this task is Italy’s right-wing nationalist prime minister, Giorgia Meloni. She shares Trump’s hostility to illegal immigration and his professed conservatism on social issues. Already a star in the eyes of American conservatives, she has also been lionised by Elon Musk, who has aligned himself fully with Trump.

But Meloni has also acted pragmatically as prime minister, advancing Italian interests through cooperation within EU circles, rather than in opposition to them. She has also been hostile to Russian President Vladimir Putin and supportive of Ukraine. And with her party enjoying strong backing from small businesses, she is vocal in defending Italian export interests. Meloni’s mission should be to build a rapport with Trump and emphasise the common ground they share.

Second, the EU should give Trump immediate policy wins on trade and defense. Meloni should come bearing gifts, not least a plan to boost US exports to the EU. Trump views the EU’s large trade surplus with the US as unfair, and his proposed solution is to impose sweeping (10 percent or even 20 percent) tariffs on EU exports.

Since the US is the EU’s largest export market—goods exports to the US reached €500 billion in 2023, one-fifth of the bloc’s total—the sluggish European economy is vulnerable to US protectionism. Moreover, since US goods exports to the EU are only €350 billion, and since Trump does not need to worry about re-election, EU retaliation is unlikely to be effective. The best option, therefore, is to try to forestall Trump’s tariffs by unilaterally opening EU markets to US exports.

The other big policy win that Europeans should hand Trump is a commitment by European members of NATO to raise defense spending to 2.5 percent of GDP next year, and to 3 percent by the end of Trump’s four-year term. Doing so is desirable in any case. Europe is vulnerable to Russian aggression because it cannot defend itself. That is why far-sighted countries, notably Poland, have already hiked up defense spending since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Boosting European defense spending would be a hedge against Trump’s suggestion that he will not help defend European countries that don’t spend enough on defense, or that he would withdraw the US from NATO altogether. With luck, a big move by European countries would avoid such a calamity.

Given how little Italy spends on defense, Meloni may not be the ideal person to deliver such a message. The better spokesperson on this issue is NATO’s new secretary-general, Mark Rutte, who maintained good relations with Trump during his first term, when Rutte was the centre-right prime minister of the Netherlands.

Finally, Europeans must appeal to Trump’s vanity to try to save Ukraine. President Joe Biden’s administration and its European allies have sought to fast-track aid to Ukraine to mitigate the threat of a Trump victory, and European countries ought to continue supporting Ukraine in any case. But Ukraine’s faltering war effort will obviously suffer without US aid. Trump’s re-election will have set off alarm bells across Ukraine. He has talked of cutting off US support and ending the war within 24 hours, implying that he will force Ukraine to abandon the territory it has lost and remain vulnerable to future Russian aggression.

But Trump is obsessed with looking strong, not least in the eyes of other strongmen such as Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. So, Meloni should make the case that abandoning Ukraine would make him look weak. It would be better for him to stand up to Putin and bring the war to an end in a fairer way, thus solidifying his status as the dealmaker-in-chief. Useful allies here could include Mike Pompeo, Trump’s former secretary of state and potentially his new defense secretary, who also advocates a tough line in support of Ukraine.

It is easy to find reasons why this strategy might fail. Trump is mercurial, Meloni might change her tune with respect to the EU and Ukraine now that he is in power, and European governments are divided and generally quite timid. EU institutions are weak but also protective of their negotiating privileges. Orban may urge Trump to pursue a different strategy. Even so, Europe needs to try, because the alternatives are terrifying.

Trump vs China, round two

In August 2019, amid an escalating trade war with China, then-US president Donald Trump fired off a series of tweets directing US companies to ‘immediately start looking for … alternative[s] to China’ and shift their manufacturing back to the United States. The demand sent stock markets into a tailspin and alarmed US businesses with exposure to China.

While Trump ultimately softened his stance, the threat underscored a disturbing reality that the world must face now that he is returning to the White House: the president has the power to sever ties with the world’s second-largest economy and can do so on a whim.

With Trump’s resounding victory over Kamala Harris, the spectre of his impulsive, heavy-handed approach to diplomacy looms large. If his past actions are any indication, corporate America might soon be bracing for another round of erratic, high-stakes manoeuvres—or worse—against China.

The US constitution delegates authority over foreign relations to both the president and congress, a structure designed to temper executive discretion with legislative oversight. But this balance has shifted dramatically in recent decades. Foreign policy is now overwhelmingly concentrated in the executive branch and goes largely unchecked, a trend that political scientists attribute to a rise in partisanship and a decline in congressional expertise. With both parties favouring a hardline approach toward China, Trump will have even more freedom to lash out at the country.

Meanwhile, national security has proven to be remarkably pliable, extending far beyond traditional concerns such as homeland defense and cybersecurity. It now covers everything from cross-border data flows and supply chain vulnerabilities to protecting industries deemed too critical to be dominated by foreign competitors.

This broadened definition has enabled presidential actions that would have been unimaginable only a decade ago. Consider some of the measures taken by Trump and his successor, Joe Biden: sanctioning Huawei and ZTE; banning TikTok; blocking Chinese investment in a dating app; launching the controversial China Initiative, which disproportionately targeted Chinese scientists working in the US; imposing a semiconductor embargo on China; restricting US investment in Chinese artificial intelligence and quantum computers; and, most recently, slapping 100 percent tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and batteries.

Many of these aggressive policies should be implemented only in emergencies. But what constitutes an emergency has also expanded considerably and now includes curbing China’s rise. And when Trump takes office in 2025, the executive branch’s capacity and willingness to declare an emergency and impose extraordinary measures under the banner of national security could increase substantially.

While US courts have the authority to check presidential powers—as they did in blocking Trump’s attempts to ban TikTok and WeChat—they have limited oversight of foreign policy. On matters of national security in particular, federal courts have historically been very deferential—even more so when congress and the president are aligned. The recent passage of the TikTok legislation illustrates how congress can quickly restore executive power after a judicial ruling constrains it. As a result, TikTok and other Chinese companies are constantly contending with renewed hostility from the executive, like an endless game of whac-a-mole.

Ironically, this concentration of power in the US presidency mirrors the Chinese governance model that US leaders criticise so sharply. As I show in my book, High Wire: How China regulates Big Tech and governs its economy, the consolidation of political power in China over the past decade has often led to dramatic policy swings that undermine investor confidence and dampen entrepreneurship. The Chinese government’s recent missteps—from mismanaging the Covid-19 pandemic to crackdowns on the tech and property sectors and now a sluggish response to mounting deflation risks—should serve as a cautionary tale.

The US is likewise beginning to feel the unintended consequences of its own hostile approach toward China. The China Initiative has led to an exodus of talented Chinese scientists, many of whom have returned home. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of tough US sanctions and export controls is waning. Huawei, which initially struggled under these measures, has grown stronger of late, invigorated by state support and a firm resolve to achieve self-sufficiency. In its efforts to contain China, the US risks creating a more resilient rival—one strengthened by the very pressures meant to suppress it.

But instead of reassessing the efficacy of its hardline tactics, US agencies are doubling down on sanctions and restrictions. Even the notorious China Initiative, despite being ‘discontinued’, persists in a barely concealed form.

So far, much of the discussion about the Sino-American rivalry has framed China’s rise as the primary catalyst for US policy shifts. But this misses a crucial point: the conflict can also be traced back to a democratic deficit in US foreign policymaking. If the US takes increasingly extreme measures to contain China, as it likely will during Trump’s second administration, it risks widening that deficit—and becoming defined by what it opposes.

America under Donald Trump: views from ASPI analysts

Foreign policy

Greg Brown, senior analyst, ASPI DC—If personnel is policy, we have a fair idea of the Trump foreign policy. The voices competing for the president’s ear all emphasise peace through strength and agree that China is the first order of concern. The debate to watch is between advisers arguing that confronting China is an imperative for maintaining US global primacy and others calling for a narrower strategy that prioritises US attention in the Indo-Pacific.

Nishank Motwani, senior analyst, ASPI DC—As president, Trump will likely reinforce foreign policy unpredictability. This could undermine US commitments to NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, including Australia. This in turn could embolden Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea to act aggressively. Trump views alliances transactionally, favouring financial returns over strategic interests. This could prompt him to scrutinise AUKUS, perceiving missed financial gains and seeking to renegotiate for greater Australian contributions—a move in line with his art-of-the-deal approach.

Raji Pillai Rajagopalan, resident senior fellow—Trump’s presidency brings uncertainty, as he is unlikely to have a steady policy. It is more likely that each issue will be taken in isolation rather than as part of a strategic whole. Such unpredictability will likely scare adversaries such as China and Iran, as it did in Trump’s first term. But US partners will also be concerned by Trump’s shotgun approach, particularly on issues such as trade and economic security partnerships, if he does not distinguish between friends and foes. For this reason, minilateral groups, especially the Quad, may need to play more of a leading role than bilateral relationships, with Australia, Japan and India working together to ensure Indo-Pacific principles and interests are met.

 

China

Bethany Allen, head of China investigations and analysis—Trump is a wild card on foreign policy, including towards China. On the campaign trail he promised increased tariffs on China but criticised Taiwan. Anti-China sentiment runs deep in the Republican Party, but so does its opposition to US support for Ukraine. A Russian win in Ukraine would be a major foreign policy victory for Xi Jinping, Putin’s top supporter, and would make the world safer for revisionist authoritarians such as Xi.

 

Defence

Alex Bristow, senior analyst—Although Trump will probably abandon the term ‘integrated deterrence’, because of its association with Biden, he could retain and more forcibly assert the expectation that allies must step up and share risk if they want US nuclear protection. Elbridge Colby, who is tipped for a senior national security role in the new Trump administration, has said ‘all options are on the table’ for shoring up the nuclear umbrella in the Indo-Pacific. That may hint at stationing or sharing US nuclear weapons on allied territory, which would test legal barriers in Australia. Trump’s dismissive approach to multilateral non-proliferation regimes could fuel disinformation about AUKUS, but Trump may also help pressure Australia’s Labor government to disavow the counterproductive Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The prospects for nuclear arms control look bleak as long as Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang keep seeking leverage by expanding their nuclear forces.

 

Southeast Asia

Fitriani, senior analyst—Trump’s re-election may diminish US engagement with Southeast Asia, given his transactional engagement with the region during his first term. One point to focus on is whether the US will uphold its commitment under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and stand by with the Philippines when tensions with China over the South China Sea flare. As Southeast Asian countries are small to medium in power and size, Trump will care about them only when he can use them to counter a bigger bully: China.

 

Climate

Mike Copage, head of the Climate and Security Policy Centre—Trump will weaken climate policy and international engagement, with deeper and longer-lasting effect than in his first term. If his administration follows the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 recommendations, US national security institutions will be prevented from addressing climate resilience, and world-leading US agencies may see their climate science programs disrupted. This would damage climate resilience and momentum among key allies and weaken important relationships with Pacific island countries.

However, Trump’s close circle includes major private sector proponents of clean energy technology, such as Elon Musk. Their influence may moderate his effect on climate policy.

 

Space

Malcolm Davis, senior analyst—Trump is likely to take a much bolder approach to space, in part driven by a need for personal prestige. This could see him try to get US astronauts back to the lunar surface before the end of his four-year term. He will also confront the growing risks presented by Chinese and Russian counterspace capabilities by promoting the role of the US Space Force. He’s likely to shrug aside notions of international cooperation on space and de-emphasise international diplomatic efforts to maintain norms of responsible behaviour.

Trump’s relationship with Elon Musk, CEO of SpaceX, will also prioritise space policy. The administration is likely to demand a greater effort by allies such as Australia to step up and share the burden of military space capability, including space control. It may also encourage Australia to more rapidly open its launch sites for US space launches and returns, potentially including SpaceX’s fully reusable Starship rocket.