More than ever, airpower will depend on sharing data. Watch Sweden

A growing consensus holds that the future of airpower, and of defense technology in general, involves the interplay of crewed and uncrewed vehicles.

Such teaming means that more-numerous, less-costly, even expendable uncrewed vehicles can bring more weapons to the fight and force the adversary to deal with more targets. More-expensive and survivable crewed vehicles, meanwhile, can stand back, offering human supervision of the entire formation.

But none of that will work without maintaining real-time common operational pictures. Everyone and everything in a team needs to know what the others know—about each other and about the enemy.

One nation has longer experience in automatic sharing of data among aircraft. Thirty years ago, its interceptors could perform a radar-silent engagement by mind-melding the radars of two fighters tens of kilometres apart. Every pilot in a group of four aircraft knew the position, fuel state and remaining weapons of the other aircraft. For many years, this was one of the least reported stories in military aerospace (which was no accident).

What that nation is doing now is highly relevant to the crewed-and-uncrewed future. It isn’t the United States, Russia, France, Israel or Britain. It’s Sweden.

In a lobby on the Saab campus in Linkoping in southern Sweden, a blue-and-white mural of a spring sky covers one wall and extends across a white-framed door. Behind that door, Peter Nilsson, a former pilot of mighty JA 37 Viggen fighters, heads Saab’s low-profile future combat aircraft program.

Nilsson and his colleagues have been talking with growing confidence about plans for a Sweden-led future combat air system, now supported by contracts from Swedish procurement agency FMV. Saab chief executive Micael Johansson said in a 7 February earnings call that Saab expected to fly several uncrewed aircraft in the coming years.

Nilsson showed concepts in a Swedish TV interview in late 2024 that included a future piloted stealth fighter and a tailless stealth uncrewed aircraft with a striking resemblance to Saab’s J 35 Draken, the fighter that showed in the mid-1950s that Sweden’s aviation expertise was in the top tier.

Sweden’s knowledge of stealth today should likewise not be underrated. Saab has insisted that its current fighter, the JAS 39E/F Gripen, has a balance of reduced signature and countermeasures, though the company keeps details close. Its technology has roots in 1963 when, in a little-known deal, US Air Force stealth guru Bill Bahret traveled to Sweden and advised Saab on reducing the radar cross-section of the Viggen.

The final design for the Swedish system that’s in the works may not have been settled, but it’s leaning towards a combination of uncrewed and expendable systems, initially to extend the capabilities of the Gripen. Then a new crewed fighter would arrive in service after 2040.

In August, Saab acquired Blue Bear, a small British company specialising in the control and coordination of drone swarms. In earlier briefings, Saab has discussed putting elements of the JAS 39E/F’s electronic warfare system in a decoy based on the British Spear 3 missile.

That’s to say, pieces are being put together.

Saab’s long leadership in mission computers and datalinks demands attention to what it’s doing now. The first military aircraft with a central mission computer based on integrated circuits? The AJ 37 Viggen, first flight 1967.

Four decades later, Saab said that what was then the future Gripen (now JAS 39E/F) would have a mission computer partitioned from flight-critical systems, to make upgrading software easier and faster. Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery: the architectures of the Northrop Grumman B-21 and the Rafale F4 followed Saab’s pattern.

History is in order when it comes to datalinks, too. The Swedish air force realised in the 1950s that Russian jammers about 400 kilometres from Sweden would make voice communications impossible. The J 35F Draken had a simple but robust ground-to-air datalink, and it was much more valuable if the bad guys did not know about it. Mentioning the datalink on the air was forbidden, and the datalink indicator in the cockpit was ingeniously disguised as a backup instrument. Even a friendly guest pilot would not know it was there.

The Viggen, replacing the Draken in 1979, had a four-ship link that was unrivaled until the F-22 entered service in 2005: it was far faster than NATO’s standard Link 16. Two JA 37s could use their radars in passive mode to perform a silent missile attack. The datalink made it possible to integrate the bearing and elevation from both aircraft in real time and generate a track precise enough for firing weapons.

The next-generation Gripen datalink added the ability to share fuel and weapons status and generate a common operational picture on the glass cockpit displays—20 years before a comparable capability arrived on the F-35.

Saab operations adviser Jussi Halmetoja brought the story up to date in a recent video.  ‘The big transitional change now, he said, is that ‘mission data is your greatest weapon—how you collect it, how you transform it, how you datalink it.’

Halmetoja describes the operation of a four-aircraft Gripen E/F formation: ‘Each aircraft has 40 different antennas, providing spherical passive detection, and every Gripen collects terabytes of data. You share the data at high rate across the four-ship to create situational awareness.’

Significantly, when you think of extending this philosophy to unmanned vehicles, the link-dependent functions are automated. The goal is a pilot who ‘trusts the system. Don’t go and do a lot of button-pressing’—for example, to control the radar of his or her own aircraft—‘because you can mess up the data fusion. The system monitors the track quality, and if it gets really bad it can use the active radar.’ But the algorithms driving the system will decide which aircraft’s radar to use in the group.

Halmetoja adds that ‘people raise their eyebrows when I say that every track is wrong, and every coordinate is wrong. It’s one of the greatest challenges.’ On the Gripen, to get the greatest possible fidelity, ‘we do the fusion at the lowest level, on the platform.’ (An earlier paper makes the point that this also reduces volume of traffic on the datalink.)

But there are still errors, says Halmetoja, ‘and to manage that you need networked smart weapons’ such as the MBDA Meteor ramjet-powered air-to-air missile. Those weapons need datalink support, but he adds that it does not have to come from the aircraft that fired the missile.

Saab produces the Gripen’s Arexis EW system, which uses the advanced technology of phased-array gallium-nitride antennas for precise tracking, jamming and deception. The company has long taken the view that electronic warfare and reduction of radar cross section are complementary, not alternatives, and that stealth is not a panacea.

Sweden has, for now, elected not to join either the British-Japanese-Italian Global Combat Aircraft Program or the parallel Franco-German-Spanish effort called FCAS. Says Nilsson: ‘The best solution for Sweden to create national ownership is that we do the same as with Gripen. That we have many partners, but that we decide on the design ourselves.’

Australia needs to manufacture change to ensure national security

After decades of gradual decline, Australia’s manufacturing capability is no longer mission-fit to meet national security needs. Any whole-of-nation effort to arrest this trend needs to start by making the industrial operating environment more conducive to manufacturing.

The sector needs both knowledge-based capital, for innovation, and financial capital. Given the scale of investment required, the government must cooperate with the private sector and incentivise the sector’s independent efforts.

A recent report I wrote for the United States Study Centre discusses how the Australian government can better engage with the manufacturing sector and align the private capital needed to finance its revival.

It first recommends commissioning an independent federal review with a focus on the manufacturing priorities of defence and national security initiatives. The report also recommends establishing an ‘Uplift Project Office’. Such an office, inside government, would coordinate engagement between departments and the investment community.

Successive Australian government strategic documents, including the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and 2024 National Defence Strategy, have underscored the national security importance of expanded advanced capabilities. Such capabilities include hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, autonomous systems, critical minerals extraction and processing, and related value-adding activities.

To establish a sustainable sovereign capability in these fields, or, at the very least, greater supply chain security, Australia needs to revive its domestic manufacturing base. This is a challenging prospect. Over the past two decades, when measured by exports by sector, Australian manufacturing has declined by more than 50 percent, while reliance on resource income has doubled. Manufacturing now accounts for just over 5 percent of Australia’s economic output.

The proposed manufacturing review would map the Australian stakeholder landscape and inform a whole-of-government approach to engaging the private sector to arrest the decline of Australian manufacturing. Among its priorities would be preparing the manufacturing sector to sustain any new investments.

Successful conduct and implementation of such a review would depend on effective communication between government and industry. This is where the proposed Uplift Project Office would add value.

The government would benefit from greater emphasis on private sector engagement to mobilise capital for national security objectives. The proposed office would ensure that engagement extends beyond prime manufacturers and major superannuation funds to include small and medium enterprises and dual-use start-ups, which often drive progress in advanced capability areas.

The office should also coordinate separate efforts such as AUKUS and the National Reconstruction Fund Corporation (NRFC).

The proposed office should work with the investment industry and manufacturing sector to co-develop a standard investment proposal process and identify contracting mechanisms for government projects to upskill responsible agencies in their ability to engage with sources of private capital. Collaborative and consultative engagement would optimise decision-making by better equipping officials to work with investors and industry.

The office should sit under the defence minister to ensure that national security priorities are embedded in its bottom-up activities and are aligned with top-down efforts under the 2024 Integrated Investment Program and NRFC. Ideally, the office would also be guided by an advisory council of stakeholders from Australia’s AUKUS partners to maximise its effect on Australia’s defence innovation priorities.

The office should also support the private sector in investing across different portfolios. It should work with existing government-adjacent investment vehicles, such as the Future Fund investment process and assist in developing plans to mitigate talent pipeline and skilled workforce challenges.

As the geopolitical landscape continues to shift, Australia must be able to self-sustain and contribute advanced capabilities. Industrial capability is a precondition of this. The government, together with industry partners, needs to back domestic innovators and create the conditions for participation in the development, production and global economic success of indigenous capabilities.

The revival of Australian manufacturing is a long-term project that the federal government needs to embed into its policy and practices for the betterment of Australia’s national security. The federal government needs to fine tune engagement with the private sector to ensure that necessary stakeholders can act in a concerted and coordinated manner.

Reaction isn’t enough. Australia should aim at preventing cybercrime

Australia’s cyber capabilities have evolved rapidly, but they are still largely reactive, not preventative. Rather than responding to cyber incidents, Australian law enforcement agencies should focus on dismantling underlying criminal networks.

On 11 December, Europol announced the takedown of 27 distributed platforms that offered denial of service (DDoS) for hire and the arrest of multiple administrators. Such a criminal operation allows individuals or groups to rent DDoS attack capabilities, which enable users to overwhelm targeted websites, networks or online services with excessive traffic, often without needing technical expertise.

The takedown was a result of Operation PowerOFF, a coordinated and ongoing global effort targeting the cybercrime black market. While the operation has demonstrated the evolving sophistication of international law enforcement operations in tackling cyber threats, it has also exposed persistent gaps in Australia’s cyber enforcement and resilience. To stay ahead of the next wave of cyber threats, Australia must adopt a more preventative approach combining enforcement with deterrence, international cooperation, and education.

Operation PowerOFF represents a shift in global cybercrime enforcement, moving beyond traditional reactive measures toward targeted disruption of cybercriminal infrastructure. Unlike previous efforts, the operation not only dismantled illicit services; it also aimed to discourage future offenders, deploying Google and YouTube ad campaigns to deter potential cybercriminals searching for DDoS-for-hire tools. This layered strategy—seizing platforms, prosecuting offenders and disrupting recruitment pipelines—serves as a best-practice blueprint for Australia’s approach to cybercrime.

The lesson from Operation PowerOFF is clear: Australia must shift its cyber strategy from defence to disruption, ensuring that cybercriminals cannot operate with impunity.

One of the most effective elements of Operation PowerOFF is its focus on dismantling the infrastructure of cybercrime, rather than just arresting individuals. By taking down major DDoS-for-hire services and identifying more than 300 customers, Europol and its partners effectively collapsed an entire segment of the cybercrime market.

This strategy is particularly relevant for Australia. Cybercriminal operations frequently exploit weak legal frameworks and enforcement gaps in the Indo-Pacific region. Many DDoS-for-hire services, ransomware networks and illicit marketplaces are hosted in jurisdictions with limited enforcement capacity, allowing criminals to operate across borders with little fear of prosecution.

Australia must expand its collaboration with Southeast Asian law enforcement agencies on cybercrime, ensuring that cybercriminal havens are actively targeted rather than passively monitored. Without regional cooperation, Australia risks becoming an isolated target rather than a leader in cybercrime enforcement.

Beyond enforcement, Australia must integrate preventative strategies into its cybercrime response. The low barriers to entry for cybercrime mean that many offenders—particularly young Australians—are lured in through gaming communities, hacking forums and social media.

Targeted digital deterrence, including algorithm-driven advertising campaigns, could disrupt this pipeline, steering potential offenders toward legal cybersecurity careers instead of cybercrime. An education-first approach combined with stronger penalties for repeat offenders, will help prevent low-level offenders from escalating into hardened cybercriminals, while helping to ensure that those cybercriminals face consequences.

Australia’s cybercrime laws must also evolve to address the entire cybercriminal supply chain, not just the most visible offenders. Operation PowerOFF showed that cybercrime is not just about the hackers who launch attacks, but also the administrators, facilitators, and financial backers who enable them.

Australian law enforcement should target financial transactions supporting cybercrime, using crypto-tracing and forensic financial analysis to dismantle cybercriminal funding networks. Harsher penalties for those who fund or facilitate DDoS-for-hire services could create a more hostile legal environment for cybercriminal enterprises, ensuring that they cannot simply relocate to more permissive jurisdictions. At the same time, youth diversion programs should be expanded, offering first-time cyber offenders rehabilitation options rather than immediate prosecution, preventing them from becoming repeat offenders.

Operation PowerOFF’s success is a win for international cybercrime enforcement, demonstrating that proactive, intelligence-driven disruption can dismantle even the most entrenched criminal networks.

But it is also a warning: without continuous vigilance, cybercriminals will regroup, rebrand, and relaunch. Australia must act now to strengthen its cyber enforcement, combining international cooperation, legal reform and preventative education to ensure that cybercriminals see Australia as a hostile environment for their activities, not a soft target.

Societal resilience is the best answer to Chinese warships

The Australian government has prioritised enhancing Australia’s national resilience for many years now, whether against natural disasters, economic coercion or hostile armed forces. However, the public and media response to the presence of Chinese naval vessels in the Tasman Sea over the past two weeks suggests that more work must be done to strengthen the resilience of Australian society.

Political leaders and senior officials have repeatedly stressed that ‘Australia faces the most complex and challenging strategic environment since the Second World War’, but recent commentary suggests that Australia as a society isn’t yet mentally adjusted to such circumstances.

While the public should be aware of China’s military signalling, and attempts to antagonise or even intimidate, we shouldn’t overreact.

Yes, these activities are unexpected. Yes, certain elements have been conducted unsafely and unprofessionally, notably the live fire drills which were carried out with extremely short notice and disrupted nearby civilian air traffic. Nevertheless, such activities are legal, relatively commonplace and likely to occur more frequently as China develops a more capable, expeditionary navy.

Taking the bait and choosing to be provoked only serves to justify Beijing’s common overreactions when non-Chinese ships operate legally in waters close to China.

Moreover, if Australian society—or, specifically, the voting public—regards activities such as sailing Chinese ships in our exclusive economic zone to be a threat, then the scope of government reaction is restricted: ministers may be under pressure to be more strident than they should be and react in ways that are not conducive to our long-term interests.

None of this excuses China’s blatantly aggressive acts, for example repeated hostile aircraft interceptions, endangering Australian aircraft and crews by releasing chaff or flares in front of them or using sonar against Navy divers. These are, and should be, condemned.

Denying China the headlines and propaganda victory it craves would clearly show how extreme Chinese measures have been.

Drawing on the Cold War experience, NATO naval vessels routinely shadowed Soviet warships in the North Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian Oceans to monitor their behaviour and obtain intelligence. Similarly, we should expect Chinese intelligence-gathering vessels to lurk nearby large-scale training exercises such as Talisman Sabre, as they did in 2023.

In today’s context of widespread strategic competition, we should expect these kinds of activities to be just as commonplace and therefore try to inform and educate the public accordingly.

The threat posed by China is not going away. Nor are its naval and coast guard vessels, whose numbers are rapidly rising, and its global ambitions are growing.

While the political drama that these events may provide is undoubtedly tempting in the lead-up to the federal election due by May (a coincidence, or an attempt to sow discord?) it is shortsighted to seek partisan advantage from a scenario that will be repeated frequently for maybe decades to come. That merely encourages similar behaviour from the other side of politics when governments change.

The priority should instead be on building a more resilient society that is better equipped to respond to complex—and confronting—situations. Part of that is ensuring our society is better informed and less susceptible to propaganda, misinformation and disinformation, none of which is served by overreacting to routine, if unprofessional, naval activities.

Beyond rhetoric, an important dimension of building resilience is ensuring that the Australian Defence Force is suitably equipped to respond to such scenarios. It would give the public confidence that their armed forces are capable of monitoring and responding as required.

As other contributors have noted, the Australian navy’s capability shortfall must be addressed. China has proven adept at using maritime means to intimidate, destabilise and coerce its neighbours in Southeast Asia. We must be mindful, and prepared, in case these techniques are applied in our immediate region.

Should China establish a base nearby or pursue more regular deployments to Australia and the Pacific, ADF resources would rapidly become strained if the level of response expected to every Chinese navy transit matched the tone set by the current reporting.

Resilient societies and polities are those that know when to respond forcefully, and when to keep their powder dry. For the sake of navigating the long-term challenge of a regional environment defined by strategic competition, Australia needs to learn and apply this lesson quickly.

Chinese navy transit: opinions in The Strategist

Views in The Strategist on the recent Chinese warship deployment near Australia range from ‘get used to it’, to a warning against overreaction and a welcoming of the resulting debate over defence. Here are introductions and links to the articles:

China will continue to conduct unsafe military manoeuvres and we can expect to see more advanced warships in our region, writes Joe Keary.

While the frequency and duration of deployments have been limited by a lack of support ships and overseas support bases, Chinese military developments show its goal of a navy capable of projecting power into our region and beyond.

As China’s navy improves its logistics and defensive capabilities, a lack of overseas bases will only slow, not stop, China’s ambition to project naval forces into global environs (including Australia’s) more often and for longer durations.

China’s demonstration of its advanced naval capabilities highlights Australia’s shortcomings, writes Jennifer Parker.

While China’s fleet has grown in number and capability, Australia’s fleet has aged and shrunk. This leaves Australia unprepared to protect its maritime security interests.

China’s naval demonstration on Australia’s east coast should serve a reminder of our vulnerability, and a warning that addressing this vulnerability requires Australia to truly recognise its place as a maritime power.

The deployment to nearby international waters raises the question of what Australia could do if China sortied into its waters, writes Ian Langford.

In the short-term, it should step up equipping the Australian Army for maritime defence.

Despite the fleet of ships remaining in international waters and the comments from many that this activity raises no concerns for our future defence capability plans, it nonetheless does reflect on our current military capacity and highlights the urgent need for ongoing improvements in force projection, sea control and, where necessary, maritime strike.

An Australian overreaction to China’s deployment jeopardises our own necessary activities in the South China Sea and North-East Asia, writes Jennifer Parker in another article.

Australia’s best response would be to expand our own maritime capabilities to effectively exercise our own rights and protect our interests.

The freedom of the seas is fundamental to our security as a maritime trading nation. Claims that China’s warships shouldn’t be operating in our exclusive economic zone or conducting live-fire exercises on the high seas undermines this principle, giving China a propaganda win to challenge our necessary deployments to North-East Asia and the South China Sea—routes that carry two-thirds of our maritime trade.

But the Chinese navy’s activation of political debate over defence policy is welcome, writes Euan Graham.

Noting legal reciprocity of freedom of navigation, countries have a duty to act professionally. The lack of advance warning and the flotilla’s transit were a message to which the Australian government should respond.

…ordinary Australians are quite entitled to read hostility in China’s intentions. The flotilla was not invited here, and China didn’t notify us it was coming. Carrying out live fire exercises in the Tasman Sea with little or no notice, as the flotilla did on 21 February, wasn’t just unprofessional; it sent an unmistakably coercive signal to Australia and New Zealand.

China has long used naval transits to send a message, but the pace has increased in recent years, writes Joe Keary.

They are known to monitor exercises, float around defence facilities and appear around election time. The expansion of activities reflects China’s ambition to grow the strength and capability of its navy and to project power into our region.

Together, these deployments paint a picture of a country that is undertaking sweeping efforts to transform its navy into a formidable blue water force, capable of regularly projecting hard and soft power to our region.

China’s navy sends a steady drumbeat of ships around Australia

China’s deployment of a potent surface action group around Australia over the past two weeks is unprecedented but not unique. Over the past few years, China’s navy has deployed a range of vessels in Australia’s vicinity, including state-of-the-art warships, replenishment ships, intelligence-gathering ships, survey ships, satellite support ships and hospital ships.

Together, these deployments paint a picture of a country that is undertaking sweeping efforts to transform its navy into a formidable blue water force, capable of regularly projecting hard and soft power to our region.

China’s navy, now the largest in the world by number of vessels, has a vast range of ships that can undertake a broad scope of tasks and we have seen nearly all varieties of ship in our region in the past five years.

In October, China put on a show of force in the South Pacific by sending two warships to Port Vila in Vanuatu. One was a Type 055 cruiser, marking the first known deployment of this advanced warship class to the South Pacific. The deployment was intended to send a clear signal of China’s ability to project power beyond its traditional areas of influence.

Unlike the current action group circumnavigating Australia, Chinese warships are not typically accompanied by replenishment ships (the exception being a 2019 deployment that appeared in Sydney Harbour after conducting operations in the Gulf of Aden). The addition of replenishment ships to Chinese action groups enables greater force projection into the Pacific.

Chinese Type 815 intelligence ships are regular visitors to our region. Since 2017, China has been sending at least one such ship to Australia’s north to electronically eavesdrop on our biennial Talisman Sabre military exercise with the United States and other partners.  At the most recent Senate estimates hearing, Chief of Defence Force Admiral David Johnston noted that an intelligence ship had travelled as far as Sydney after the 2023 Talisman Sabre exercise.

China is also developing a habit of sending naval ships to our region during election periods. While many commentators have understood the significance of the timing of the current deployment around Australia, it has yet to be noted that China’s navy was also present in the weeks before the 2022 federal election. In May that year, China sent an intelligence ship to Australia’s north-west, including near the Harold E Holt Communication Station, a sensitive defence facility near Exmouth, Western Australia. At the time, that was already significant. Now China has upped the ante in 2025.

China’s navy sends a range of vessels to the Pacific for port calls and good-will visits. Last year China sent an air-defence destroyer to Tonga, joining 11 other navies in celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Tonga Royal Navy. We now see regular Chinese navy visits to the Pacific, especially to the Pacific island countries that have militaries: Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga.

China also pursues soft power in the Pacific through the deployment of the Peace Ark. The Peace Ark is one of two hospital ships that China’s navy uses to provide health services as part its soft-power diplomacy in the region. In 2023, the Peace Ark paid friendly visits to Kiribati, Tonga, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and East Timor. It stayed for around a week in each port, offering free medical services to local populations.

China’s navy also has a range of ships that are used for tracking satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles—large ships with impressive arrays of dishes and scanners. Tracking ships of the Yuan Wang class regularly operate in the southern Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean west of Australia. Since China lacks ground stations elsewhere, these ships give it the ability to track launches and satellites that are not over its territory. (China operated a ground station in Kiribati for six years, but it closed in 2003.)

Finally, China has developed the world’s largest fleet of civilian research vessels. While many undertake missions for peaceful purposes, they also provide China’s military with important data about the world’s oceans. The Hidden Reach project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies does an amazing job of tracking these vessels and their ties to China’s military.

We are seeing more of these vessels in our vicinity, including off the north-west shelf of Australia. In early 2020, officials tracked the movements of a Chinese research vessel as it conducted deepwater surveys near Christmas Island. A Defence official said the ship was mapping waters used by Australian submarines to get to the South China Sea. It also spent much time in waters not far from the Harold E Holt Communication Station.

Like the current deployment, China’s naval activities in our region are consistent with international law. Operating a range of ships is also not unique to China. Most large countries, such as the US, Russia and France, maintain a variety of warships, space support vessels and research vessels that support military activities. However, the increasing number and variety of ships in our region sends a strong signal of China’s ability and intent to project hard and soft power.

This is our new reality. Monitoring and managing China’s growing naval presence in our region will place increasing strain on our military for years to come.

Australia’s defences must be ready in two years. Here’s what to do

Beijing deployed a naval task group to the waters around Australia for three related reasons. First, to demonstrate the reach and potency of Chinese sea power and to put Australia on notice that it is vulnerable to the application of that power. Second, to test our political and military responses. Third, to rehearse for wartime operations against Australia.

Regarding the last, the deployment was most likely a rehearsal run for the conduct of a seaborne missile strike on Australia, with China testing how it might most effectively launch missile strikes on Australian military facilities and critical national infrastructure.

The task group was led by a powerful cruiser that was equipped with 112 missile cells from which long-range land attack cruise missiles could be launched at targets across Australia.

In wartime, such an operation would be conducted by an even larger and better protected surface action task group, most probably consisting of the same type of cruiser, one or two escorting destroyers, one or two submarines and a replenishment tanker. The mission of the task group would be to fight through any opposing, mainly Australian, forces to get into optimal firing positions in the waters around Australia.

China would assume that in any plausible scenario where it might need to launch such an attack against Australia—as part of a broader US-China war—scarce US naval and air units almost certainly would be heavily engaged elsewhere in the broader Indo-Pacific region and therefore its attacking force would be able to fight through light, mainly Australian, defending forces.

This is not to say that our treaty ally, the United States, would not willingly come to our aid in such a scenario. The reality, however, is that in any such war the US would have very little spare capacity to do so.

It is not that we would be abandoned. Rather, the defence of Australia would be prioritised by the US according to the imperatives of the broader fight and we would be expected to do more for ourselves.

China also most likely would undertake air-launched long-range missile strikes against Australia. These would involve long-range missiles being launched by H-6 bombers, which most likely would fire them from the north of Indonesia, beyond the perceived range of Australia’s air defences. Submarines also probably would be sent to attack shipping around Australia, mine our ports and sea lanes and destroy undersea cables.

China’s relatively small number of aircraft carriers means it is unlikely that Australia would be subjected to carrier-borne air raids, but the possibility should not be discounted, especially as the Chinese aircraft carrier fleet grows in strength.

We should not delude ourselves that the deployment was a benign exercise, conducted ‘lawfully’ in international waters—with the underlying imputation being that is simply what great powers do.

Regrettably, this was the theme of the Australian government’s initial response, which could not have been better scripted in Beijing itself.

The deployment was a rehearsal and, at the same time, a menacing attempt at strategic intimidation, designed to increase anxiety in the Australian population about China’s growing military power and fuel domestic doubts about the wisdom of potentially risking conflict with China—for instance, over Taiwan.

This day of reckoning was long coming. Once China decided in the early 2000s to develop a blue-water navy, it was always going to focus some of its attention on our sea-air approaches and our nearby waters. This is because Beijing understands that, as a matter of geostrategic logic, Australia’s size and geographical location would be a valuable wartime asset for the US.

Neutralising that advantage is a key consideration for People’s Liberation Army war planners.

The PLA could not afford to yield to the US uncontested access to such a significant and secure bastion and staging area, where US forces could be concentrated in protected locations out of the reach of most of China’s conventional arsenal and from where devastating US strikes could be mounted on Chinese forces and bases in the littoral areas of East Asia, the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

While it has not taken a definitive decision to go to war, China has moved into a rehearsal phase for such a conflict. It is determined to give itself the option of fighting and winning a war against the US and its allies. It therefore has to test all of its operational plans, including the neutralisation of Australia’s wartime utility.

We are not special in this regard. China is rehearsing its war plans across the entire Pacific—including in relation to establishing sea control in the littoral rim of East Asia, from Japan to Indonesia, denying US sea and air access to that littoral rim, holding at risk US carrier strike groups and bases, such as Guam, and striking at more distant US staging areas, such as Alaska, Hawaii and Australia.

PLA war planning calculations have nothing to do with the tone or the content of the bilateral Australia-China relationship. They are a function of the hard-headed judgments that PLA war planners need to make. We could have a perfectly ‘stabilised’ relationship, with copious quantities of Australian wine and lobster flowing into Chinese ports, and still be on the PLA’s strike list.

Unfortunately, our response to the deployment was shaped principally by those whose focus is obsessively fixed on the state of the bilateral relationship rather than by those who are paid to think and advise in geostrategic terms.

We should expect more such demonstrations of power projection by China, using not only surface vessels but also submarines, carrier strike groups and H-6 bombers. Such power projection is commonplace around the rimlands and littoral regions of Eurasia, where Chinese, Russian and, increasingly, combined Chinese-Russian operations are mounted frequently against the US (including around Alaska and off Hawaii), Canada, Britain, Japan, Taiwan, The Philippines and others. We have much to learn from these allies and partners in terms of how they deal with such frequent and persistent Chinese and Russian visitors.

Until now Australia has been located safely away from this contact zone of Eurasia, with only Imperial Germany before WWI and Imperial Japan in the early years of the Pacific war of 1941-45 darkening our frontiers.

Today we are no longer protected by distance. Thankfully, there is a ready-made solution to this geostrategic problem. Ever since Kim Beazley commissioned Paul Dibb in February 1985 to conduct a review of Australia’s defence capabilities, the cardinal importance of defending Australia’s sea-air approaches has been at the core of defence planning, even if the requisite capabilities and level of funding required to carry out the resultant military strategy have never fully materialised.

For 40 years, Australian defence planning has been founded on the idea of defending our area of direct military interest, which extends well beyond the continent and the immediate waters around Australia. This means seeking to deny to an adversary the ability to successfully move into and through the sea-air approaches to Australia.

It also means achieving and maintaining sea control in key areas in the waters around Australia. Our strategy is to turn the vast archipelagic arc that extends from the waters to the west of Sumatra to those around Fiji into a great strategic barrier through which any adversary would have to move to attack Australia.

Once this geostrategic logic is understood, much else falls into place—for instance, why it is that Australia could not allow itself to be outflanked to the northeast by the establishment of Chinese bases in the South Pacific, which would represent a catastrophic penetration of the barrier.

In the same way that US president John Kennedy could not tolerate Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, we could not tolerate Chinese missile units or bombers having access to bases in the South Pacific.

The geography of this barrier is such that the sea-air approaches to Australia naturally funnel ships and submarines into a small number of chokepoints. When exploited well, chokepoints favour the defender. They create killing zones where attacking forces can be destroyed before they can do harm.

Australian defence planning also has to contemplate more distant operations, forward of the barrier, including in the South China Sea and in the southern portions of the Central Pacific (for instance, in the Guam-Bismarck Sea corridor) to attrite advancing adversary forces even before they reach the chokepoints.

While we have the strategy, which was given its clearest expression in the 1987 and 2009 defence white papers and has been honed across 40 years since Dibb’s landmark report, we do not have the full suite of capabilities or the mindset to execute the strategy in the face of the gathering storm.

We need to be ready by early 2027—which appears to be the earliest time that China will be ready to launch a military operation against Taiwan, which in turn may trigger a wider war.

Of course, assumptions about whether and when China would do such a thing need to be kept under constant review. In strategy, everything is contingent and nothing is inevitable. If it is to come, war will break out whether we are ready or not. Having missed our chance more than 15 years ago to properly start to prepare—when dark prophesies of a possible war first emerged—we now have to do what we can in the time we have. We should urgently do the following things, which are over and above what has been decided by successive Australian governments, most recently in response to the 2023 Defence Strategic Review.

1. Enhance surveillance

First, we must enhance the continuous wide-area surveillance of our area of direct military interest. We must be able to pinpoint the precise locations and track the movement of Chinese (and Russian) ships, submarines and aircraft of interest as far from Australia as possible. This will require the more intensive use and meshing together of the sensor feeds from national intelligence systems, space-based sensors, the Jindalee radar network, P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft, MQ-4C Triton surveillance drones, E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft, undersea sensors and other assets.
A fused situational picture of key Chinese and Russian movements in our area of direct military interest should be developed and shared in real time with US Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii in exchange for its fused picture of the same. This will require more resources to support 24/7 operations in the Australian Defence Force and the relevant intelligence agencies. Wide-area surveillance of our area of direct military interest cannot be a business-hours activity.

2. Lift operational readiness

Second, we must enhance ADF operational readiness, which means having more forces standing ready to undertake quick alert missions, such as air interceptions and maritime surveillance flights.

This will cost money and drain crews as they will fatigue more rapidly when kept at higher states of readiness. More assertive rules of engagement should be authorised by the defence minister to allow for the close shadowing of Chinese and Russian units in our area of direct military interest. This would be done in a safe and professional manner, as it is being done nearly every other day by our allies and partners who are being probed regularly at sea and in the air.

The ADF’s Joint Operations Command should be reconfigured along the lines of the original vision of defence force chief General John Baker, who in 1996 established the Australian Theatre Command, or COMAUST. Baker’s logic was that the ADF should be postured, and commanded, principally to conduct operations in Australia’s area of direct military interest. While operations farther afield would be undertaken from time to time, they should not be the main focus of the ADF. After 9/11, the ADF adopted a globalist orientation. Mastery of the area of direct military interest started to fall away.

It is time for the ADF to focus zealously once again on the defence of Australia’s area of direct military interest, and our national military command arrangements and systems should reflect this.

3. Acquire longer-range anti-surface warfare capabilities

Third, we must urgently acquire longer-range anti-surface warfare capabilities. A radical suggestion would be to acquire rapidly six to 10 B-1B Lancer bombers from the US Air Force’s inventory. B-1Bs have been configured in recent years for anti-ship strike missions. Each is now able to carry 36 Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (24 internally in bomb bays and 12 externally), which is a fearsome anti-surface capability. While the RAAF already is acquiring the LRASM weapon for use by its F/A-18F Super Hornets, having a platform in the order of battle with the range and payload capacity of the B-1B Lancer would severely impair PLA options for mounting surface action missions against Australia.

4. Acquire longer-range air superiority capability

Fourth, we must urgently acquire a longer-range air superiority capability to deal with the threat of stand-off attacks by PLA Air Force H-6 bombers operating north of Indonesia. Again, a radical suggestion would be to acquire rapidly the air-to-air version of the SM-6 missile to equip the RAAF’s F/A-18F Super Hornet fighters. Facing such fighters, especially if they were operating forward of the barrier, would make PLA planners think twice about mounting long-range bomber missions against Australia.

5. Remediate naval warfare capability

Fifth, we urgently need to remediate our naval warfare capability, to ensure that our battle fleet of six Collins-class submarines and 10 major surface combatants (the Hobart and Anzac classes) are fully crewed and ready for action.

This will require crewing, training, inventory and maintenance issues to be addressed. The RAN’s replenishment tankers need to be fixed and returned to the fleet as soon as possible. Across time, the RAN battle fleet will need to grow in size, given the rapid growth in the PLA Navy’s battle fleet.

Ideally, we should be aiming across the longer term for a battle fleet of 12 submarines, 20 major surface combatants and 20 smaller offshore combatants, the last of which could be used as missile corvettes and naval mine warfare vessels. To further enhance the RAN’s battle fleet, our large landing helicopter dock vessels should be re-purposed as sea control carriers, with embarked anti-submarine and airborne early warning helicopters and long-range naval drones.

6. Ensure RAAF is battle ready

Sixth, we need to ensure that the RAAF is battle ready, with its squadrons fully crewed and its air bases well protected and fully functional. It is relatively easier to expand an air force, as compared with a navy, given the vagaries of naval shipbuilding. The RAAF is therefore the better bet in terms of a rapid expansion that could be achieved soonest.

More F-35 Lightning II fighters should be acquired, along with the B-1B Lancers mentioned already. The latter could serve as an interim bomber, pending reconsideration of the acquisition of the B-21 Raider strategic bomber. Crewing ratios should be increased quickly, such that the RAAF has more crews than aircraft, which could then be flown more intensively. The extraordinarily rapid expansion of the RAAF’s aircrew training pipeline in World War II should be its guiding vision.

7. Push forward army’s maritime capability

Seventh, the army should continue to develop its increasingly impressive maritime warfare capabilities and readiness. Consideration should be given to the rapid acquisition of the ground-based Typhon missile system, which would give the army a long-range anti-ship and land strike capability. As we barricade the sea-air approaches to Australia, we will have to be vigilant in relation to stealthy commando raids and sabotage operations. The army will need to be postured to deal with such attacks.

8. Address capability gaps

Eighth, we need to remediate a number of other capability gaps where we have no or virtually no capability. Of particular concern is integrated air and missile defence. We will need to acquire some combination of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Patriot interceptors on land and SM-3 interceptors at sea. Naval mine warfare capability also needs to be addressed.

There are likely to be other gaps that would impair our ability to execute the strategy. Given the urgency of the situation, rapidly acquired interim solutions will have to suffice to fill many of these gaps. Such interim solutions can be refined and built on. That is the lesson of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

9. Negotiate PNG alliance

Ninth, a military alliance should be negotiated with Papua New Guinea to provide for the establishment of ADF bases in locations such as Manus, Rabaul and Lae to support the conduct of maritime surveillance, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and air superiority missions. For instance, a forward-deployed composite RAAF wing, consisting of F-35A Lightning fighters, B-1B Lancers armed with LRASM, F/A-18F Super Hornets armed with SM-6 missiles, and P-8 Poseidon maritime aircraft could operate from the Bismarck to the Celebes seas and beyond with the aim of denying access into our northern sea-air approaches. A similar alliance should be negotiated with The Philippines. This would extend our coverage north of the barrier into the South China Sea.

We need to better appreciate the significance of PNG and the Philippines as Pacific watchtowers of the sea-air approaches to Australia. Our Indian Ocean territories are our western watchtowers.

10. Develop a war book

Tenth, we should urgently reinstate the practice of developing a war book that would deal with civil defence, national cyber defence, the protection of critical infrastructure and the general protection, and sustainment of the population during times of war.

 

While the likelihood of war in the foreseeable future is low, perhaps 10 to 20 per cent, it is enough to warrant action. This will cost money and divert resources from more agreeable activities. That is the nature of war, which drains societies even when it does not occur. Against this must be weighed the costs of being unprepared.

While this worsening strategic environment is very confronting, there is an even darker scenario. Imagine if we had to face a coercive, belligerent, and unchecked China on our own. That would require a very different military strategy and a significantly larger ADF.

That is a grim story for another day—and one that may require us to pursue our own Manhattan Project. In that world, we would look fondly on this relatively benign age.

Trump’s speech to Congress: America First in trade and alliances

In what might have been the longest presidential address to Congress in American history—an hour and forty minutes without intermission—President Donald Trump delivered a performance on Tuesday night that was simultaneously grandiose, confrontational, optimistic and revealing of the direction in which he intended to take his administration and his country.

It also received high marks from nearly seven in 10 Americans who watched it.

For Australian observers, the annual address, as expected at such spectacles, offered few specifics but did provide insights into how the United States’ role in the world is evolving. It’s a transformation with implications for the Indo-Pacific and allies’ strategic calculations.

Electoral politics is theatrical by nature, but Trump has elevated the art well beyond the standards of the campaign season and his first term in office. His address to Congress displayed all the elements of classic political theatre: the heroes (Trump himself, and the various ‘everyday Americans’ whose stories he highlighted), the villains (the Democratic opposition, sitting glumly throughout), and the dramatic narrative arc of national redemption

‘America is back,’ Trump declared in the opening moments, setting the tone for what would be a celebration of his administration’s accomplishments and a vision of US restoration.

The president’s embrace of tariffs signals a fundamental shift in American economic policy that will reverberate throughout global supply chains.

‘On April 2nd reciprocal tariffs kick in,’ Trump announced, explaining his philosophy: ‘whatever they tariff us, other countries, we will tariff them.’ This principle of reciprocity was framed not as protectionism but as fairness. ‘We will take in trillions and trillions of dollars and create jobs like we have never seen before,’ he added.

Trump’s economic vision represents a rejection of the post-Cold War neoliberal consensus that has dominated Western economic thinking. In its place stands a muscular economic nationalism that prioritises American manufacturing, energy production and job creation above abstract principles of free trade. Australia, with its robust trade relationships with both the US and China, will need to navigate carefully across this evolving landscape.

The president’s emphasis on US energy dominance further underscores this nationalist approach. By declaring a ‘national energy emergency’ and authorising expanded fossil fuel production as part of an all-energy policy, Trump is signaling a reversal of policies that is sure to rile many Americans and Australians.

Perhaps most consequential for Australia’s strategic position was Trump’s articulation of his foreign policy vision, which represents a break from both Republican neocons and Democratic liberal interventionism.

His approach blends two different veins of American foreign policy thinking identified by Walter Russell Mead. The president taps Hamiltonian elements, such as economic strength as power, national security linked to economic strength, and alliances between government and business. He talks about making the world safe for American business.

Trump also exhibits a Jacksonian streak—sceptical of foreign entanglements, preferring a restrained military but willing to exercise overwhelming force when US interests are directly threatened, and insisting on putting America—and rank-and-file Americans—first.

On Ukraine, Trump revealed he had received a letter from President Zelenskyy stating that ‘Ukraine is ready to come to the negotiating table as soon as possible to bring lasting peace closer.’ This announcement, coupled with Trump’s assertion that he had also had ‘serious discussion with Russia,’ simply repeated his determination to end the conflict rapidly.

‘It’s time to stop this madness,’ Trump declared. ‘It’s time to halt the killing. It’s time to end this senseless war.’ For Australia, which has supported Ukraine diplomatically and materially, this pivot represents a challenge. Canberra can get on the peace train now or decline to align with its chief security provider with the hopes that Trump won’t see Australia as an obstacle to ending the fighting and that prolonging the war may, perhaps, result in some future better outcome for Kiev.

Similarly, Trump’s approach to the Middle East suggests a willingness to allow Israel greater freedom of action while the US simultaneously works to end the conflict in Gaza. ‘Iran, of course, is at the nexus of Middle Eastern tensions,’ Trump said, suggesting a harder line against Tehran than his predecessor’s administration.

The president’s announcements regarding the Panama Canal (‘We are taking it back’) and Greenland (‘We need Greenland for national security’) are classic Trumpian figurative language but also reveal his policy of hemispheric prioritisation.

Perhaps most striking was the evidence of how Trump has transformed the Republican Party. His speech revealed a party no longer defined by free-market orthodoxy, limited government and interventionist foreign policy but instead by economic nationalism, cultural conservatism and a focus on working-class interests. Trump concluded his speech thus: ‘Every single day we will stand up and we will fight, fight, fight for the country our citizens believe in and for the country our people deserve.’

‘The Republican Party is now the party of peace,’ Trump declared, cementing his break with Republican primacists—those who are committed to US global dominance. His criticism of endless wars, coupled with his emphasis on border security and economic protectionism, represents realignment of American politics with Pacific implications. The US, after all, is a Pacific power and, among many things, a Pacific island state.

Trump’s address is just another signal of shifts that Australians have seen coming. First, his emphasis on America First economic policies suggests potential trade tensions, even with allies. Australia’s export economy may suffer from reciprocal tariffs and Trump’s focus on American manufacturing.

Second, Trump’s scepticism of legacy alliances and international institutions—whose value and utility he measures against contemporary US interests—may create uncertainty in the regional security architecture that Australia has relied on. While Trump did not specifically or directly address the Indo-Pacific or China in this speech, his America First theme should remind Australia to demonstrate its value to the alliance more explicitly.

Finally, Trump’s populist realignment of US politics mirrors a broader shift in Western democracies that may yet influence Australian politics. The success of his economic- nationalist and cultural messaging offers a template for Australian politicians.

Australians, watching this political theatre from afar, would do well to remember that this is also reality. Structural demands for change in the global order will remain on stage long after the applause for Trump fades.

A loss in Europe is a loss in the Indo-Pacific

The United States shocked the world last week with President Donald Trump’s very public rift with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. This was followed by a US pause on military aid and some intelligence sharing with Ukraine, all intended to push Ukraine to agree to a ceasefire on terms favourable to Russia. But Russia’s interests are also China’s. A bad peace in Europe may mean more bad behaviour in the Indo-Pacific.

Trump campaigned for the presidency in part on a commitment to end Russia’s war on Ukraine, without regard for who is the aggressor and who is the victim. He seems to want a legacy as the president who ended wars, contrasting with his predecessors, both Republican and Democrat. The overall direction of US foreign policy is now being shaped to fit within these constraints.

This has empowered voices within the Republican Party who see China, not Russia, as the pacing threat of our time. Key figures in the administration, such as nominee for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, have for several years pushed the idea that to meet the threat posed by China, the US must direct resources away from Europe and the Middle East and towards the Indo-Pacific. That position has been widely, though not universally, adopted within the Republican Party.

There is certainly bipartisan agreement in the US that East Asia is now the key theatre for US grand strategy, and that China’s global ambitions and growing military prowess pose a pacing threat to the US and its democratic allies and partners.

In his Senate confirmation hearing this week, Colby said the US must focus on ‘denying China regional hegemony’ and that it ‘would be a disaster for American interests’ if Taiwan were to fall to China. But US aid to Ukraine and Israel has delayed arms shipments to Taiwan, and Colby has said the US simply doesn’t have the capacity to support conflicts in three regions. By his logic, and perhaps now that of the White House, the US must remove its support for Ukraine so it can concentrate its resources against China and in support of Taiwan.

But the reality is that the European and Indo-Pacific fronts are intricately linked as long as Russia and China support each other and their interests are aligned. Countering one adversary will require addressing the influence of the other.

The two countries declared a no-limits partnership just days before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed that partnership last month on the three-year anniversary of the war. The partnership has been material and substantial: China has provided assistance to Russia’s war machine, geospatial intelligence for its military, markets for its natural resources and sanctioned companies, and backing at the United Nations.

Russia, meanwhile, is strengthening military cooperation with China, including in the Indo-Pacific. In 2024, the US intercepted Chinese and Russian bombers flying for the first time together near Alaska, and Russia joined China in military exercises in the Sea of Japan.

Both countries echo each other’s propaganda, and their massive media and covert disinformation apparatuses amplify each other’s messaging.

Why would China dedicate its resources and risk its reputation in Europe to support Russia in Ukraine if leaders in Beijing did not believe that a Russian win in Ukraine was vital to Chinese interests? Indeed, a Russian victory would be an immense victory for China as well. It would shatter the image of a strong and unified west, show NATO to be a paper tiger and sow doubt throughout the world about the value of US security guarantees. These are all goals that Beijing has pursued for decades, and that are key to the revisionist world order Beijing hopes to craft.

A Russian win in Ukraine, moreover, would create a clear precedent for one of Xi’s most important goals—taking Taiwan. That’s why the Taiwanese government, which has more to lose than anyone else in the Indo-Pacific region, has for three years loudly cheered US support for Ukraine. If Colby’s argument were correct—that is, if US military support for Ukraine ran counter to Taiwan’s interests—Taiwan would now be rejoicing. Instead, Taipei is filled with trepidation.

If the war in Ukraine ends on terms favourable to Russia, both China and Russia will be free to concentrate more of their joint efforts in the Indo-Pacific. Instead of a cautious China and a distracted Russia in the eastern theatre, the US will have to deal with an emboldened China and a vindicated Russia—even as US allies and partners in the region view the US with newfound skepticism. If the US at some point calls on Europe for assistance in East Asia, few would expect them to heed that call.

International Women’s Day 2025: progress and possibilities

International Women’s Day (IWD) serves as both a celebration of progress and a reminder of the ongoing challenges women face worldwide. Across national security, diplomacy, human rights and digital spaces, women continue to break barriers. Yet, systemic hurdles persist. From ensuring meaningful representation in leadership roles to addressing targeted threats against women in politics and online spaces, the fight for gender equality is far from over. In this piece, ASPI staff examine the role of women, their impact and the importance of intersectionality in shaping inclusive policies and practices. This work is a part of sustained action to ensure gender equality remains a cornerstone of a secure, just and prosperous world.

 

Women in national security—Raelene Lockhorst, deputy director of National Security Programs

Women are force multipliers in Australia’s national security, serving across the Australian Defence Force, Australian Federal Police, Australian Border Force, and Australian Public Service.

In the ADF, women excel in operational and technical domains and enhance capability and adaptability by leading combat missions, directing intelligence efforts and pioneering defence technologies. In the police and border forces, they strategically counter transnational crime and secure borders, disrupting threats and protecting our national interests. Within the public service, women shape strategic policy to reinforce our national security architecture.

As global challenges such as geopolitical tensions and emerging threats intensify, women in national security remain indispensable. Women often bring heightened emotional intelligence and resilience, forged through navigating systemic barriers, which enhances team cohesion and long-term planning. Their ability to ‘expand the strategic toolkit’ makes national security more robust through inclusion, not sameness.

On IWD 2025, we celebrate their leadership and achievements, their progress paving the way for a more secure, progressive future, reinforcing that inclusivity is a cornerstone of national strength.

 

Women in international security—Raji Pillai Rajagopalan, resident senior fellow

This IWD takes place in a world defined by tension and deepening conflicts. This will no doubt affect women too; in fact, we know that conflicts negatively affect women’s rights and well-being. Across conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, Congo and elsewhere, women are the most affected, with sexual violence being the singular marker in all such conflicts. Moreover, as great power conflict intensifies, human rights in general and women rights in particular may take secondary place or worse to what are seen as other, ‘more important’ priorities.

But this IWD is also an opportunity to celebrate progress. There are now more women than ever before working on security issues. Young women are much more open to pursuing a career in this field as policymakers, administrators, scholars, journalists and other professionals. We have raised awareness of gender issues, including adequate representation at all levels. It is heartening to see more young women willing to enter areas of hard security and bring their unique perspectives. The numbers look more promising today than they were three decades ago when I entered the security field, but they are not reflected adequately in leadership, managerial and mentorship roles. While we celebrate wins, breaking gender barriers remains a work in progress.

 

Mainstreaming intersectionality—Afeeya Akhand, researcher

This year’s IWD theme is ‘For ALL women and rights: Rights. Equality and Empowerment’. The word ‘all’ has been deliberately capitalised by the United Nations, highlighting the importance of not treated women as a homogenous whole.  When putting together panels, events and media coverage about IWD, we need an intersectional lens to reflect the diversity of experiences and traits of all women, including with respect to differences in race, religion, age, sexual orientation and more.

An intersectional lens of IWD celebrations in Australia is particularly important as it helps represent our cultural, linguistic and racial diversity. We are one the most multicultural countries in the world, being home to the world’s oldest continuous culture and non-Indigenous Australians identifying with more than 300 different ancestries. However, as highlighted in a 2024 survey of 1017 Australians who identify as women or non-binary (womxn), CALD and immigrant womxn reported growing exclusion from IWD celebrations. Asked whether they felt meaningfully represented in IWD events, media and professional panels, these two groups reported, respectively, an 11 and 7 percent decline in representation compared to the 2023 survey.

We all have a role to play in elevating and supporting women, especially women from traditionally marginalised backgrounds. IWD is about elevating equality and human rights, so we must continue to translate diversity into reality.

 

Women and online safety—Fitriani, senior analyst

Women’s online safety is a serious issue as digital threats disproportionately target women, restricting their public participation. A 2021 UNESCO report found that 73 percent of women journalists have faced online violence, while a 2020 Economist Intelligence Unit study revealed that 85 percent of women globally have experienced or witnessed online harassment. The rise of AI-driven technology has worsened this issue, with cases of non-consensual deepfake pornography increasing by around 500 percent between 2019 and 2023.

Women in politics are especially vulnerable. According to a 2022 Centre for International Governance Innovation study, 50 percent of female politicians in Southeast Asia and 90 percent in India, Nepal, and Pakistan faced abuse, including online. The impact is severe: 76 percent of women change how they engage on social media due to online abuse, and 32 percent stop posting on certain issues.

Despite these alarming trends, as of 2023 only 22 countries had legal protections against online gender-based violence. Governments, tech companies and civil society must take urgent action, including stronger regulations, better platform accountability and digital literacy programs. Platforms must improve content moderation and privacy tools, while law enforcement must hold perpetrators accountable. This IWD we strive for the creation of safe and inclusive digital space for all so everyone can positively benefit from it.

 

Reproductive rights in the United States—Bethany Allen, head of China Investigations and Analysis

Women’s reproductive healthcare is facing systematic challenges in the US. After Roe v. Wade was overturned in 2022, 19 US states have banned or placed tight restrictions on abortions, in some cases with severe legal penalties for hospitals and doctors found in violation of the law. In states with total abortion bans and only vague carve-outs for the woman’s life and health, media outlets have documented the deaths of several pregnant women after hospitals feared acting too soon to mitigate life-threatening medical emergencies such as sepsis would expose them to legal liability. In these states, obstetricians are packing up and moving to states without abortion restrictions, exacerbating the healthcare deserts for American women in small towns and rural areas. In states with total abortion bans there are also cases of women who have experienced miscarriages facing scrutiny to ensure their miscarriage wasn’t an induced abortion.

These challenges are only set to deepen over the next four years as anti-abortion extremists within the Republican Party are empowered to implement their agenda. Items on this agenda include: revoking FDA approval for medical abortion pills (currently used in around two thirds of abortions in the US), which would make it unavailable nationally; making it a crime to put medical abortion pills in the mail; passing laws that criminalise assisting women crossing state lines for abortion care; and requiring providers to report abortion data to the federal government, creating an abortion surveillance state. A lawmaker in one state has even proposed legislation that would create a registry of pregnant women who are ‘at risk’ of getting an abortion.

 

Foreign aid for women’s and LGBTQI+ rights—Daria Impiombato, analyst

The US turn on women and LGBTQI+ rights is also seen in the freeze of USAID, which before the pause accounted for 40 percent of global aid. Reproductive health programs overseas that have been saving lives for decades are now halted. While in 2022 the US was the second largest government funder of LGBTQI+ aid projects, after the Netherlands, its support has ground to a halt under the Trump administration.

Organisations dealing with women and LGBTQI+ issues are particularly vulnerable: often their local governments are the biggest perpetrators of the abuses against them and in many cases, being queer or having an abortion is considered illegal, so there is simply nobody else to turn to.

While some have suggested that China may step in and expand its influence through more aid programs, the country’s approach to women’s and LGBTQI+ rights is problematic. From the legacy of the One Child Policy, which caused innumerable forced sterilisations and killings of newborn girls, to the recent turn towards a pro-natalist approach to tackle a demographic timebomb, women in China are still considered as instruments of the state. Meanwhile, LGBTQI+ people are increasingly harassed, and more and more LGBTQI+ rights organisations have been forced to shut down, with people’s accounts censored or banned online.

With the two world’s superpowers hugely regressing on these issues, the picture is bleak. It is now more important than ever for middle powers such as Australia, where women and LGBTQI+ people enjoy far greater rights, to step up targeted foreign aid.

 

Practical barriers to female participation—Elizabeth Lawler, subeditor

Women often fight an uphill battle to exist in male-dominated fields. But the battle rarely ends when we enter those spaces. Instead, women face practical disadvantages, often having to make do with equipment and facilities that are designed for men.

We see this in the armed forces. Uniforms and armour present challenges for women that they do not present for most men. Uniforms are often ill-fitting, with limited smaller sizing options available. The same is true for armour, which is rarely designed to accommodate women’s bodies. These issues affect performance and present unacceptable safety concerns. On top of that, female uniforms often cost more than their male equivalents.

While change is a long-term process, it is important to celebrate progress. According to a UN report on women in defence, data collected from 52 countries showed that a majority had begun to adapt military uniforms and facilities to accommodate women. The Australian army has been working with industry partners to develop female-specific body armour. In 2022, the US military announced its first military-issue bra.

Women can’t safely participate in areas that are designed for a world without them. All fields, particularly those that are historically male-dominated, must strive for equity.