Reader response: Singapore’s relations with the US and China

Jason Lim responds to Tim Huxley’s post on Singapore–US relations:

The relationship between China, the United States and Singapore is a complex one. Singapore has always seen itself as an ally of the United States since the days of the Cold War. In the 1960s and 1970s, with Singapore combating what it saw as the twin evils of communism and Chinese chauvinism, China was regarded as a major proponent for the destabilising of non-communist Asian regimes. Even after China launched its ‘reform and opening up’ policy in 1982, the official policy in Singapore has been to monitor the progress of Chinese economic reforms while maintaining a diplomatic distance from it. Passports issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs in Singapore list China as one of the countries the passport holder is not expected to visit unless permission has been given by the Singapore government.

Singapore still pursues a policy of ‘non-alignment’, with China replacing the position of the Soviet Union. Singapore recognises the economic and military value of having the United States as an ally but it does not place China in the same position. Singapore has taken a soft approach towards China, training its political leaders, provincial officials and civil servants in financial management and public administration. It is hoped that this approach will cement Sino-Singapore ties. Singapore has always maintained a position that it does not pursue any position that will be detrimental to the interests of Southeast Asia, chiefly its neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore established diplomatic ties with China only in 1991, after Indonesia and Malaysia had done so. The recent dispute in the South China Sea between China and some Southeast Asian nations (Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines and Vietnam) has revealed that Singapore’s position has not radically changed with the rise of China. Just last week, Emeritus Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong said, ‘Whether we like it or not, after the 45th AMM [ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2012], the South China Sea will remain a test case of ASEAN’s ability to forge consensus on difficult problems and act in the region’s broader interests’. China is seen to be a potential threat, even if the Singapore government does not explicitly say so.

Jason Lim is a lecturer in Asian history at the University of Wollongong.

Force expansion and warning time (part I)

The twin notions of force expansion and warning time have been integral to Australian defence planning since the 1970s. Yet over the years the focus on these issues has been neither strong nor consistent. Today, in the new age of Asia, we have to ask if these ideas are still relevant. In the first part of this post, I explore their conceptual foundations and history; in the second, I’ll draw some conclusions for defence policy, including ideas that the 2013 Defence White Paper could usefully pick up.

Time is often the neglected dimension of defence planning, yet its consideration is central to practical defence decision-making, including the allocation of resources. Two examples illustrate the principle. First, readiness and sustainability can be major consumers of resources, so not all elements of a defence force are kept at short notice for operations. There will usually be a spectrum of preparedness: counterterrorist forces able to move within hours at one end of the range, and reserve forces mostly able to move only after many months at the other. Second is the idea of reconstitution or mobilisation: when threats emerge, the defence force will be expanded and, conversely, when threats go away, as at the end of the World Wars and the Cold War, forces will be reduced. So time is an important parameter in a government’s approach to defence policy and risk management.

In Australia’s case, the end of the war in Vietnam called for fresh thinking about defence policy. The emerging ideas of the Defence of Australia filled some of this gap, but there was a need also for an analytical basis from which to argue for levels of defence funding—else the prospective budget cuts at a time of evident ‘low threat’ would have been harsh. This led the then deputy secretary, Gordon Blakers, to develop the concept of the core force and expansion base. In brief, a force-in-being would evolve which would both meet the demands of those lesser contingencies that might arise in the shorter term, and be the base from which expansion would occur in the event of major strategic deterioration. Intelligence would be critical in assessing warning time and ensuring that expansion would be timely. Read more

Australia in the Indo-Pacific century?

Defence Minister Stephen Smith used his ASPI speech on Wednesday night to make the definitive case for bringing the White Paper forward by a year. Close followers of the defence debate will be familiar with his strategic themes, but some interesting points emerged that hint at potentially sharp discussions around the Cabinet table. Most notable of these was Smith’s emphasis on the growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean region: ‘In this century, the Asia–Pacific and the Indian Ocean Rim, what some now refer to as the Indo-Pacific, will become the world’s strategic centre of gravity.’

Smith does not just mean India; he is talking about the factors which drive Chinese and US interest in the region, in Indonesia’s growing role above and beyond ASEAN and in the wider range of countries around the Indian Ocean that engage Australia’s strategic and commercial interests. Smith sees the US as an integral part of the Indo-Pacific and says that ‘substantially enhanced practical cooperation between Australia and the US is an essential part of Australia’s contribution to regional peace and security.’

Let’s be clear: if geographic terms have any meaning, this is not a vision of ‘Australia in the Asian Century’—the working title of Dr Ken Henry’s white paper. Stephen Smith is painting on a broader canvas, one which defines a wider set of Australian interests and which explicitly incorporates the United States. Australia will have two white papers, released perhaps some six or nine months apart. If these documents are truly to provide blue-prints for government decision-making, they should agree on how to think about the region and Australia’s place in it. Read more

To shun or to embrace? Australia–US relations and China’s rise (part II)

Minister Smith and General LiangIn my first post, I argued while there are very good historical reasons Australia should stay close to the United States, there are a number of factors for Defence White Paper writers to consider. Here, I’ll tease out those factors Australia should take into account in deciding whether to further embrace or to shun additional US overtures for security engagement in an attempt to placate a rising China.

Firstly, China has some valid strategic concerns. It has resource insecurity and needs to import masses of energy and raw materials to sustain its economy. It also needs to keep open its sea lines of communication. This makes it vulnerable to competing pressures—not unlike the way Japan was vulnerable to American embargoes in the early 1940s. It isn’t unreasonable that China would want to have a greater sense of security and a confidence that it wouldn’t be subject to blackmail on the open seas.

China also has some understandable historical grudges. In considering the Opium Wars of the 19th century, we look back in horror at what the West, particularly Britain, was prepared to do to China to get its economic way there. Then, in the first half of the 20th century, what Japan did to China was also horrific. As a result of these legitimate long-held-grievances we’re looking collectively to China to not take it out on us. The concern is that, in light of its memories and longer term view, China might not have the appetite for a polite and restrained accommodation with its neighbours as its power grows and its military capabilities are enhanced. Recent events at the ASEAN meetings in Cambodia and at sea (at the Senkaku Islands, Scarborough Shoals and Paracel Islands, as well as the incident involving the USNS Impeccable in 2009), coupled with China’s aggressive cyber posture, reinforce this concern. Read more

Thinking about defence and risk

Paul Monk initiated a valuable debate on these pages about the role of risk in defence planning. As it happens, I’ve been thinking along similar lines for sometime myself. So here’s my take on the role of risk in defence planning.

Just to be clear, I’m not talking about ‘risk management’ in the sense used in the 2009 White Paper. That was about hedging against changes in the strategic environment through the maintenance of a robust capability base coupled with regular reassessments. Sensible as that is, it’s at best a fragment of true risk-based approach to defence planning. My agenda is more ambitious; I contend that defence and strategic planning begins and ends with the management of strategic risk.

Let me begin by explaining what I mean by a strategic risk. I define a strategic risk to be an adverse event whose likelihood can be diminished by the possession of armed forces or consequences mitigated through the use of armed force. Other definitions of strategic risk are of course possible—there is at least one for each of the myriad ways in which the word strategic can be used—but this one suits my purposes. (As an aside, Hugh White’s carefully circumscribed definition of strategic interests bears close examination.) Read more

Grand Strategy? Influencing others…

This post is the second on demystifying grand strategy; it looks at how we can influence others. Grand strategy involves interacting with others in a way that will change them to our advantage. Grand strategy is not the ends sought—we decide that separately—nor is it the resources (the means) we use. Instead grand strategy is a mental roadmap we devise about how to use the people, money and materiel we have, we can build, we can hire or we can borrow to try to move others where we want them to go.

There are intrinsically three broad types of ways we can influence others as part of a grand strategy. Denial involves stopping others doing what they would like to do. Engagement involves helping others achieve what they—and ultimately we—want. Reform involves changing the social principles and rules that drive others’ actions. Each type has its own particular way to achieve an objective, but crucially different outcomes require using different grand strategies.

A denial grand strategy assumes that superior power determines outcomes; you can stop others achieving their objectives by being more powerful than them. Military and economic might is used in ways that deters or, if need be, physically stop others from engaging in undesirable behaviour. You become more powerful through building up your own military and economic power, forming alliances, or both. The problem with alliances though is that your allies may only be fair-weather friends seeking to maximise their benefits. Read more

ASPI recommends: The evolution of strategy

The Evolution of StrategyFor readers looking for a good one-volume text on strategy, I would recommend Beatrice Heuser’s work, The evolution of strategy: thinking war from antiquity to the present, published in 2010. Heuser, an academic at the University of Reading, offers an overview of strategy across the ages, interesting both for the sweep and scope of the subject matter and for the author’s elegant unpacking of an immensely complex topic. Readers will doubtless focus upon those chapters of greatest interest to themselves, and for me it’s her observations about the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic worlds that offer the greatest insights.

Her trenchant commentary upon strategy and war in general in the aftermath of World War II will give readers a lot of the broad framework they need to think about the contemporary strategic environment. For Heuser, warfare since 1945 has been characterised by what she calls ‘wars without victories and victories without peace’. With Afghanistan still stuttering to a fitful conclusion, it requires no great leap of imagination to believe that formulation might well continue to define the pattern of war in coming decades.

In an epilogue to the text, Heuser makes some astute observations about contemporary strategic thinking that will be of interest to Australian readers watching their government embark on yet another Defence White Paper. Writing with the British experience more in mind perhaps than the Australian one, Heuser notes: Read more

China’s military build-up: a cause for concern?

It’s not hard to find examples of concerns about China’s military build-up. But how much should we actually worry about it? In my view, not as much as many commentators assume. It’s true that, at home, the Communist Party and its apparatus continue to be in charge of this huge state and fiercely determined to nip any signs of organised dissent or opposition in the bud, if necessary by force. It is also the case that even if there were—unimaginably—some kind of breakdown in the Party and governmental apparatus, no-one has any idea of what might follow.

And yet the social volatilities unleashed by Mao half a century ago continue to bubble under the surface. Every day there are reportedly hundreds of protests or riots against thuggish local Party authorities, which are often put down by force. The Bo Xilai affair is only one example of uncertainty, disarray and fierce competition within the Chinese leadership in the run-up to this autumn’s changes at the very top of the CCP. Obviously the military cannot remain unaffected.

One reason for China to keep and expand large security and military forces is the misguided nationalist sense that China has for too long been put upon by greedy or careless foreign countries. It is time to assert China’s general power and prestige. (Television recently showed a clip of President Hu Jintao meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban-ki moon. President Hu stood still in the middle of the carpet in the centre of the room waiting for Ban-ki moon to sidle obsequiously up to him. Clearly neither man had forgotten the behaviour appropriate for a Korean tribute-bearer being received by the emperor.) Read more

To shun or to embrace? Australia–US relations and China’s rise (part I)

There’s a conundrum facing the writers of the Defence White Paper 2013. On one hand, Australia’s geography places it at the southern end of East Asia and its economy places it in a strong trading relationship with the North East Asian economies, particularly China. These factors have seen Australia become increasingly linked to the region. On the other hand, Australia’s cultural predisposition and security ties are Western orientated, particularly to the United States. The question to be asked, therefore, is: are Australia’s national interests best served by pressing into the United States or by pulling away to accommodate China’s rise? This two-part post seeks to address this question.

Australia has been living for almost seventy years under the Pax Americana—that is, the rules based order that the United States sponsored after World War II. The United States sponsored the IMF, World Bank, United Nations and a global order from which many have benefitted immensely.

There is also a strong predisposition in Australia towards the United States. The very idea of ‘America’ has always been attractive to many Australians ever since the Great White Fleet visited in 1907. The idea of a liberal, democratic, free-market and rules-based order is what the United States has seemed to epitomise. America is a remarkable country and it is one that is easy to criticise, and it is often in the breach of the rules that we consider its actions. Americans themselves are very critical of their failings and readily point them out to each other and to the world. But it is hard to imagine any country, with all its failings, having a more positive influence on world order than the United States. Read more

Singapore and the US: not quite allies

Singapore and the United States are linked not only by important economic relations, but also by a burgeoning defence relationship. Most recently in June 2012 the US announced that it would deploy as many as four littoral combat ships to the city-state from 2013, as part of the Pentagon’s much-publicised ‘rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’.

Their security links date back to the late 1960s, when Singapore actively supported Washington’s war effort in Vietnam. While this continuity, and the closeness and depth of their defence links today, might give the impression that Singapore is a US ally, the city-state’s government has nevertheless pointedly eschewed that status, preferring the strategic autonomy deriving from a less formal—if still intense—defence nexus. Nevertheless, the relationship could pose dilemmas for Singapore.

Singapore’s support for the US’ regional security role and military presence originated in the appreciation of Singapore’s elite, led by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam and Defence Minister Goh Keng Swee, that the interests of their small island state, sandwiched between much larger and potentially aggressive neighbours, as well as apparently endangered by communist North Vietnam and China, would be best served by preventing the regional dominance of any power. As Lee Kuan Yew said in 1966, it was vital for Singapore to have ‘overwhelming power on its side’. Singapore has built up its own armed forces primarily to prevent Indonesia and Malaysia from dominating its immediate locale; but at the grand regional level, Singapore’s small size and relatively limited diplomatic influence and military capacity have forced it to base its balance-of-power strategy on borrowing political and military strength from extra-regional powers, principally the US. Read more